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ABSTRACT. 
Despite extensive w r i t i n g on S o c i a l Democracy i n B r i t a i n , 
l a r g e l y i n the form of h i s t o r i e s o f the Labour Party and 
ma r x i s t s t a t e theory, few s t u d i e s have undertaken, i n depth, 
an e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s of a p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d o f s o c i a l democracy 
as government, and even fewer u s i n g the e x t e n s i v e documentation 
a v a i l a b l e i n the Public A r c h i v e s . 
Theories of the r o l e o f the s t a t e and those t h a t manage 
i t are o f t e n based on a b s t r a c t , e s s e n t i a l l y d e d u c t i v e reasoning 
and o v e r - i n f l u e n c e d by a h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e t o t h e i r o b j e c t o f 
a n a l y s i s . Such approaches have r e s u l t e d i n a n e g l e c t of the 
scope f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y behaviour i n the management of the 
c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e by reducing i t t o t h a t r e q u i r e d f o r system 
maintenance. 
The aim of t h i s t h e s i s has been t o examine the nature 
of any such revealed d i s c r e t i o n by opening up and ' d i s s e c t i n g ' 
the black box of policymaking through a d e t a i l e d examination 
of a government programme considered v i t a l t o the c o n t i n u i n g 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l i t i c i a n s and the labour movement. 
An a l y s i s was made of attempts t o i n s u l a t e and p r o t e c t the 
programme from f o r c e s and i n t e r e s t s t h a t could be expected, on 
a p u r e l y d e d u c t i v e reading, t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h i t s success. 
C r u c i a l i n t h i s respect was the way i n which p o l i c i e s or 
programmes were r e l a t e d i n an environment, o f t e n conceived as 
one where im p e r a t i v e s * stemming from the c o n s t r a i n t s of the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l market, reduce or remove the degree of 
d i s c r e t i o n and compel adjustment i n domestic p o l i c y . The 
c l o s i n g chapters o u t l i n e d the key f e a t u r e s o f the d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
behaviour apprehended i n the study- Much o f the c o n j u n c t u r a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f s o c i a l democratic management was seen t o l i e i n 
a s e r i e s o f ' p o l i c y spaces' achieved through a mix of admin-
i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l and n e g o t i a t i o n . Some of the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
and r e s u l t i n g costs of such a s t r a t e g y were a l s o revealed: 
the s h o r t term h o r i z o n i n investment p l a n n i n g , known 
e u p h e m i s t i c a l l y at the time as 'make do and mend", l e a d i n g to 
a n e g l e c t o f long run and p r o g r e s s i v e accumulation. 
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CHAPTER I . 
The Framework f o r A n a l y s i s 
IiNTRODUCTION 
This research i s devoted to an i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the planning 
and e x e c u t i o n o f B r i t i s h post war s o c i a l and economic recon-
s t r u c t i o n , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e t o the h o u s e b u i l d i n g 
programme up to 1949. I t c o n c e n t r a t e s on c e n t r a l government's 
a l l o c a t i o n and c o n t r o l o f resources i n a p e r i o d when equipped with 
a set o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e powers, and an economic theory i n h e r i t e d 
from and t e s t e d i n the war and r e t a i n e d f o r the peace. As a 
f o r m a t i v e p a r t o f i t s h i s t o r y , t h i s post war experience w i l l 
c o n t r i b u t e towards an understanding o f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
f e a t u r e s o f s o c i a l democratic management. While being aware that 
t h i s p e r i o d possesses unique f e a t u r e s absent or present i n lesser 
degrees the f u r t h e r one moves from the 1940's, i t i s judged by 
the w r i t e r t h a t , c o n c entrated i n these years i s a s u f f i c i e n t 
aggregation o f d i f f e r e n t problems auid p o l i c y making responses 
to enable an e v a l u a t i o n o f the n a t u r e o f t h a t management. 
The focus on housing r e s u l t s from the apparent d u a l i t y i n 
s o c i a l democratic p r a c t i c e where a l l e g i a n c e t o c o n s t i t u e n c y 
r e s u l t s i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s o c i a l programmes ( t h e micro 
l e v e l ) , w h i l e a t the same time a t t e m p t i n g to i n f l u e n c e the 
t o t a l i t y o f r e l a t i o n s known as the economy ( t h e m a c r o l e v e l ) . 
Housebuilding i s judged to be e s p e c i a l l y r e v e a l i n g i n s o f a r as i t 
i l l u s t r a t e s the c o n f l i c t r e s u l t i n g from i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s between 
the two s e c t o r s o f p o l i c y making and thus p r o v i d e s s i g n i f i c a n t 
m a t e r i a l f o r an a n a l y s i s o f the a l l o c a t i v e q u e s t i o n s t h a t con-
s t i t u t e major problems f o r s o c i a l democracy. 
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SECTION I:BRITISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY;THE EXISTING ANALYSIS 
Much o f the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on B r i t i s h sociaLL democracy 
cen t r e s on Party and f a c t i o n and lacks d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f what 
i s done w i t h government o f f i c e . A l a r g e p a r t o f i t has under-
taken the d i s c o v e r y o f basic antecedents. There are s t u d i e s 
which have looked a t the i n t e g r a t i o n o f Labour i n t o an alr e a d y 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d Party system. The development begins w i t h a 
s o c i a l movement aind ends w i t h a s t r u c t u r e d o r g a n i z a t i o n 
e x h i b i t i n g s p e c i f i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problems o f i n t e r n a l govern-
ment which d e r i v e from the uneasy r e l a t i o n s between i t s bureau-
cracy and support base. These r e l a t i o n s are r e g u l a r l y r e s o l v e d 
i n the e l e c t o r a l process where a premium i s p u t on co-operation.^ 
Antecedents o f another k i n d are s t u d i e d by those c o n c e n t r a t i n g 
on the i d e o l o g i c a l ingredients o f the P a r t y . Some w r i t e r s have 
p o i n t e d to the i n t e l l e c t u a l p o v e r t y o f the B r i t i s h Labour 
t r a d i t i o n : i t s e m p i r i c a l and a n t i - t h e o r e t i c a l p o s t u r e . Such a 
poverty has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r s o c i a l democratic p r a c t i c e i n 
government as i t encourages le a d e r s i n the s p i r i t o f p r a c t i c a l 
compromise w i t h the i n t e r e s t s o f c a p i t a l i s m as opposed to a 
determined p u r s u i t o f s o c i a l i s t g o a l s . T h i s type o f a n a l y s i s 
i s complicated by f a c t o r s such as the e x i s t e n c e o f many more 
areas o f s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n which have f a l l e n out o f c a p i t a l i s t 
market c o n t r o l . i n Britain^compared to p a r t s o f the c o n t i n e n t 
1. P e l l i n g , H., A Short H i s t o r y o f the Labour P a r t y . (London, 
MacMillan, 1972). 
MacKehzie, R.T., B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s (London, Heinemann 
1963). 
Mimkin, L., The Labour Party Conference,Revised e d i t i o n 
(Manchester U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980). 
2. S a v i l l e , J., * The Ideology o f Labourism' i n R. Beuewick, R.N. 
Berki and B. Parekh ( e d s . ) , Knowledge and B e l i e f i n P o l i t i c s , 
(London, A l l e n and Unwin, 1973), pp.213-226. 
Nairn, T., 'The Nature o f the Labour Party* i n P. Anderson 
(ed.) Towards Soci a l i s m , (London, Fontana 1965) pp.159-220-
where s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s were more t h e o r e t i c a l l y s e l f conscious, 
and l e s s s u b j e c t to i d e o l o g i c a l hegemony. This ' p r a c t i c a l ' policy 
outcome cannot however be worked i n t o any n o t i o n o f 'degrees' 
of s o c i a l i s m since s o c i a l i s m i s seen as a t o t a l l y new set o f 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n r a t h e r than a q u e s t i o n o f 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . ^ L i t t l e account i s taken o f how f a r changes i n 
the l a t t e r can a f f e c t the balance o f power between classes i n 
p r o d u c t i o n since changes i n d i s t r i b u t i o n by piecemeal reforms 
are compatible w i t h the c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f c a p i t a l i s t 
r e l a t i o n s . These c o n t e n t i o n s l e a d t o the c o n c l u s i o n i n o t h e r 
w r i t e r s t h a t s o c i a l democracy achieves the i d e o l o g i c a l c o n t a i n -
ment of s o c i a l i s m . ^ The l i m i t e d immediate demands of the 
p r o l e t a r i a t are s u c c e s s f u l l y s a t i s f i e d through a s e t of m a t e r i a l 
concessions, but the success i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the s t a b i l i t y o f 
the c a p i t a l i s t mode of p r o d u c t i o n . This l i n e o f argument 
then extends t h ^ mechainism o f ' s o c i a l c o n t r o l ' from i d e o l o g i c a l 
hegemony to i n t e g r a t i o n through i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n and p o l i c y 
o u t p u t . The forms o f i n t e r v e n t i o n - n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , admin-
i n s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l , and p o l i c i e s of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n become p a r t 
o f the ' a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s m ' . " ^ 'Reproduction' o f 
c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s i s seemingly guaranteed by the t r a n s f o r m -
a t i v e c a p a c i t y o f the d e c i s i o n making apparatus. Much o f 
t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f s o c i a l democracy as a form o f s o c i a l 
c o n t r o l proceeds by way o f a s e r i e s o f a s s e r t i o n s , based on 
1. Anderson, P., 'Problems o f a S o c i a l i s t S t r a t e g y ' IN P. 
Anderson and R. Blackburn ( e d s . ) . Towards S o c i a l i s m , (London, 
Fontana 1966), pp. 221-90. 
2. f o r i n s t a n c e , Therborn, G. What the R u l i n g Class does when 
i t Rules. (London, NLB 1978), pp. 209-218. 
3. i b i d . , p.217. 




broad h i s t o r i c a l sweeps and cross n a t i o n a l comparisons. The 
major c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s o c i a l democratic p o l i t i c s , i s p o s i t i v e 
sum as f a r as the c a p i t a l i s t process o f expanded accumulation 
i s concerned, assumes what needs t o be demonstrated."^ 
Other w r i t e r s take a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n l a y i n g 
s t r e s s on the e x t e n t to which the p r a c t i c e o f s o c i a l democracy 
r e s u l t s i n a succession o f d e f e a t s even f o r the immediate 
a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s o f the w o r king c l a s s . Rather than c o n t a i n -
n t o r s o c i a l c o n t r o l the p r a c t i c e r e s u l t s i n a s e r i e s o f con-
f r o n t a t i o n s between Party and c l a s s t o the p o i n t where a con-
t i n u i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two i s t h r e a t e n e d and new forms 
o f s o c i a l i s t p o l i t i c s become p o s s i b l e as i l l u s i o n s are repeatedly 
s h a t t e r e d . The i l l u s i o n o f s o c i a l democracy l i e s i n the 
r h e t o r i c o f i t s l e a d e r s h i p c o n s t a n t l y emphasising the p e a c e f u l , 
parliamentary, c l a s s l e s s road to s o c i a l i s m ^ b u t the recent r e c o r d 
demonstrates t h a t even the modest aims and o b j e c t i v e s o f the 
manifesto have been b l u n t e d and the i n t e r e s t s o f the working 
c l a s s s a c r i f i c e d . There are two major problems w i t h t h i s s o r t 
o f a n a l y s i s . F i r s t l y , the normative emphasis i n t h a t the 
behaviour o f s o c i a l democracy i n government i s examined w i t h 
reference to i t s d e v i a t i o n from a concept of what i t should be. 
A s u c c e s s f u l and genuine s o c i a l i s m l i e s through the p u r s u i t o f 
a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r a t e g y which i s the d e n i a l o f s o c i a l democracy. 
Since the l a t t e r r e l i e s on a p a r l i a m e n t a r y o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l road 
o f reform w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g system and r e a l s o c i a l i s m i s a 
1. Therborn, What the R u l i n g Class does. p.216. 
2. Coates, D., The Labour Party and the S t r u g g l e f o r S o c i a l i s m . 
(Cambridge, U n i v e r s i t y Press 1975). 
11 
d e n i a l o f the e x i s t i n g system^the necessary outcome o f s o c i a l 
democratic p r a c t i c e i s bound to be a c o n s t a n t b e t r a y a l o f i t s 
c o n s t i t u e n c y . Having taken t h i s p o s i t i o n we cannot then r e a l l y 
blame these writers f o r not examining i n d e t a i l p e r i o d s which appear 
to suggest some gain f o r t h e c l a s s since such p e r i o d s o f s o c i a l 
reform are not r e l e v a n t to the q u e s t i o n o f an a l t e r a t i o n i n the 
balance o f power between c l a s s e s . ^ I n any case, c o n s t r a i n t s 
of working w i t h i n the system overwhelmingly b i a s the p r a c t i c e 
2 
towards a c a p i t a l i s t d i r e c t i o n . The main c r i t i c i s m o f such 
e m p i r i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n s as t h e r e are i n such accounts o f b i a s 
i s t h e i r s e l e c t i v e and o f t e n s u r f a c e t r e a t m e n t o f c r i t i c a l 
c r i s i s p o i n t s i n these e a r l i e r periods."^ 
The second major problem i n the a n a l y s i s i s an under-
e s t i m a t i o n o f the e l e c t o r a l , r e f o r m i s t t r a d i t i o n i n the working 
c l a s s i t s e l f I n a s far as t h i s has consequences i n terms o f 
prediction i t i s assumed t h a t d i s i l l u s i o n w i l l spread i n a l e f t -
4 
ward d i r e c t i o n r a t h e r than new forms o f s o c i a l democratic appeaU 
A n a l y s i s o f working c l a s s p e r c e p t i o n s and the n a t u r e o f t h e i r 
e x p e c t a t i o n s cannot be shrugged o f f as a f a l s e s t a r t being 
e s s e n t i a l l y the f a u l t o f l e a d e r s who have caused them.^ N e i t h e r 
caji these e x p e c t a t i o n s be assumed on scant evidence t o be 
1. Coates, The Labour Party pp.46-7. 
^* i b i c i . pp.65-69. 
3. i b i d , p.69. To a c e r t a i n e x t e n t Coates has remedied t h i s , 
Coates, D. , Labour i n power? A Study o f the Labour Government 
1974-9. (London, Longmans 1980), f o r a l a t t e r p e r i o d but the 
account does not draw on c l a s s i f i e d Cabinet o r departmental 
source m a t e r i a l . I n a d d i t i o n , as we. w i l l argue below, i t i s 
the e a r l y p e r i o d which i s c r u c i a l f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
4. Coates, The Labour P a r t y , pp.236-7. 
5* i b i d . , pp. v i i - v i i i . 
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c o n s i s t e n t , given d i f f e r e n t l e a d e r s h i p behaviour, w i t h a 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r a t e g y . ^ 
A n a l y s i s o f e x p e c t a t i o n s , i t w i l l be seen i n chapter 2, 
i s an i m p o r t a n t i n g r e d i e n t i n the a n a l y s i s o f the d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
behaviour o f s o c i a l deraocracy| n o t o n l y because i t i n d i c a t e s the 
e x t e n t o f demands, but because i t i l l u s t r a t e s how f a r the 
demands themselves are c o n t i n u a l l y focussed on e s t a b l i s h e d 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and leaders,even when t r u s t i s low. The s e l f -
a c t i v i t y o f the c l a s s i t s e l f ^ i n terras o f an independent exercise 
of power^is p r e f e r r e d l e s s than the very veiled . t h r e a t s i n order 
to get l e a d e r s t o a c t . Whatever v a r i a t i o n s e x i s t i n the degree 
of t r u s t the very p r i o r e x i s t e n c e o f such a l e g i t i m a c y f o r 
Parliamentary p o l i t i c s i s the o n l y reason t h a t l e a d e r s can have 
the c a p a c i t y t o act and be l i s t e n e d t o and perhaps 'betray* i n 
the f i r s t p l a c e . Such a l e a d e r s h i p f e t i s h may be the r e s u l t 
o f ideology^ as the previous t h e o r i s t s maintciined^and although that 
i s ajiother matter o u t s i d e t h i s r e s e a r c h , i t cannot be assumed--
not to e x i s t o r to be weakening i n l i n e w i t h the weakening o f 
recent s o c i a l democratic governments. I t can be argued t h a t 
p a r t o f the t r u s t y and t h e r e f o r e the success o f s t r a t e g i e s to 
get the movement to accept m a r g i n a l changes i n d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
or even a postponement o f them^derives e i t h e r from the populism 
Z 
o f the language, or as.we m a i n t a i n from some f o r m a t i v e experience 
i n the s o c i a l i z a t i o n o f rank and f i l e . This may take the form 
o f a p o l i t i c a l memory passed on from each g e n e r a t i o n , t h a t , 
1, Coates, The Labour Party, p . i x . 
2. G y f o r d , . J . and Haseler, S. S o c i a l Democracy: bevnnd 
Revisionism (Fabian Research Series 292 March 1971). 
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success having been achieved i n the p a s t , i t can, a f t e r another 
e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y , be y e t seized again. The f a i l u r e o f t h i s or 
t h a t attempt may not d e s t r o y the f a i t h t h a t i t i s worth t r y i n g 
r a t h e r than j e t t i s o n i n g the past f o r aji u n c e r t c i i n f u t u r e w i t h 
u n t r i e d methods and groupings. The c o n t i n u a l r e f e r e n c e back t o 
1945 by B r i t i s h s o c i a l democracy as some k i n d o f 'golden age' 
r e q u i r e s a separate i n v e s t i g a t i o n , h o t l e a s t on t h a t aspect o f 
p r a c t i c e which f i g u r e d h i g h on working c l a s s expectations^ y e t 
when compared to h e a l t h and income maintenance r e f o r m i s 
considered t o ;have been a r e l a t i v e f a i l u r e , i . e . Housing.''" I f 
the 'golden age' i s not a myth the process by which i t was gained 
should be f u l l y examined f o r what i t r e v e a l s about s t r a t e g y , 
p r a c t i c e and perhaps the appeal o f t h i s form, o f p o l i t i c s . A 
study o f process may a l s o r e v e a l the e x t e n t t o which any seem-
i n g l y g r a t u i t o u s s o c i a l reforms i n d i s t r i b u t i o n a l t e r e d what 
appears to have been l e f t s t a b l e : namely, the balance o f power 
between c a p i t a l aind labour i n the dynamic whole which i s the mode 
of p r o d u c t i o n . 
A l l o f the v a r i o u s e x i s t i n g approaches t o B r i t i s h s o c i a l 
democracy c l a s s i f y i t as a species o f l a b o u r movement. A l l the 
c r i t i c a l arguments however, c u l m i n a t e i n a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t ^ w h a t -
ever i t s apparent antecedents and consequences f o r the working 
c l a s s ^ i t a c t s as a form o f l e g i t i m a t i o n f o r bourgeois r u l e . What 
then o f bourgeois p a r t i e s t h a t share s i m i l a r p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s 
and ideology as t h a t o f labour s o c i a l democracy? . In. B r i t a i n such 
1. McKay, D. and Cox, A. The P o l i t i c s o f Urban Change. (London, 
Cropm Helm 1979) pp.116-122. 
14 
a tendency i s n o t i c e a b l e i n the s o - c a l l e d pragmatic or 'one 
n a t i o n ' branch o f conservatisn. For our p e r i o d t h i s f a c t i o n was 
dominant i n the Tory P a r t y . T h e i r s h a r e i n o f f i c e and b a s i c 
p o l i c y assumptions with the Labour P a r t y i n the c r u c i a l piaJining 
p e r i o d of the C o a l i t i o n government means that, f o r purposes of 
a n a l y s i n g p r a c t i c e , we widen s o c i a l democracy to i n c l u d e a l l 
those who subscribed to the. i d e a of what became known l a t e r as 
the 'post war s e t t l e m e n t ' . The l o s s i n p r e c i s i o n by a b s t r a c t i n g 
the phenomenon of s o c i a l democracy from the h i s t o r y of the 
labour movement and s o c i a l i s t g o a l s , t o g e t h e r w i t h the perhaps 
a r t i f i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between s o c i a l democracy a s P a r t y and 
sociaJL democracy as government, i s compensated f o r , i f , as a 
r e s u l t , we can c o n c e n t r a t e on the c h a r a c t e r o f i t s p r a c t i c e ; 
the d i s c r e t i o n , the t echniques, the c o n s t r a i n t s and the con-
sequences t h a t flow from 'middle way' management of the c a p i t a l i s t 
economy. T h i s f o c u s has not been as w e l l developed as one would 
have expected. The one major work along t h e s e l i n e s , concen-
t r a t e d on the pre-war period^ contending t h a t the 1929-31 l a b o u r 
government l a c k e d the w i l l i n g n e s s to develop d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
t echniques and f e l l w i t h v a r i o u s degrees of f a t a l i s m i n t o an 
acceptance of p r e v a i l i n g c o n s t r a i n t s . " ^ P o s t 1943 s o c i a l demo-
c r a c y appeared a n x i o u s to remove c o n s t r a i n t s . T h i s t h e s i s w i l l 
look a t the e x t e n t and c h a r a c t e r of t h a t management. Ho p e f u l l y 
i t w i l l c o n t r i b u t e not to the e v e r burdgeoning m a t e r i a l on what 
s o c i a l democracy i s not, but to a much firmer e m p i r i c a l l y based 
a n a l y s i s of what i t has done and where i t s appeal l i e s . 
1. S k i d e l s k y , R., P o l i t i c i a n s and the Slump:The Labour 
Government 1929-31. (London, MacMillan 1967 ) . 
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SECTION I I : THE FORM OF AiNALYSIS. 
Those works w r i t t e n on s o c i a l democracy which have seen 
t h e i r r e s e a r c h task as one of t e s t i n g f o r s o c i a l i s m have o f t e n 
proceeded by way of a commentary around a c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y 
d r i v e n n a r r a t i v e . T h i s has meant t h a t major conj-unctures r e c e i v e 
p a r t i a l treatment i n o rder to f a c i l i t a t e a broad sweep of 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n . ^ The o t h e r major thre a d of study i s t h a t which 
hopes to t e l l us something about s o c i a l democracy through a 
study of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p o l i t i c i a n s . Again these a r e e s s e n t i a l l y 
n a r r a t i v e or c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y based and i n c l u d e as p a r t of the 
' l i f e h i s t o r y * of the i n d i v i d u a l h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government^ 
u s u a l l y i n order to i l l u s t r a t e impact or l a c k of i t on c r u c i a l 
e v e n t s . These events a r e only r e c o n s t r u c t e d to the e x t e n t t h a t 
the p a r t i c i p a n t s or ' a c t o r s ' and t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s can be 
r e v e a l e d , o f t e n a p o l o g e t i c a l l y ; i t not being the s u b j e c t ' s f a u l t 
i f s tage events o u t s i d e h i s v i s i o n or immediate f i e l d of c o n t r o l 
2 
s e t c o n s t r a i n t s on a c t i o n . Often the c o n s t r a i n t s a r e conceptual-
i z e d i n terms of opposing v a l u e s and c o n f l i c t s w i t h o t h e r 
p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s . While we r e c o g n i z e the importance of such 
i n t e r p e r s o n a l e f f e c t s we have taken the approach t h a t f o c u s e s on 
a t o t a l government b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h i s can r e v e a l the e x t e n t of 
c o l l e c t i v e as opposed to i n d i v i d u a l d i s c r e t i o n and c a l c u l a t i o n . 
The t h e s i s takes the form of a c a s e study and f o r t h a t 
reason appears s u b j e c t to the same methodological problems t h a t 
1. see f o r example, M i l i b a n d , R#, P a r l i a m e n t a r y S o c i a l i s m (second 
e d i t . London, M e r l i n P r e s s 1973), a l s o P r i t t D.N., The Labour 
Government 1945-51. (London, Lawrence and W i s h a r t 1960). 
Howell, D. , B r i t i s h S o c i a l Democracy. (London,, Croo.n Helm 1976) 
and E a t w e l l , R. The 1945-51 Labour Governments. (London, 
B a t s f o r d Academic 1979). 
2. see f o r example, Donoughue, B. and Jones, G.W. Herbert 
Morrison: . P o r t r a i t of a P o l i t i c i a n . (London, Weidenfeld and 
N i c o l s o n 1973), a l s o , Marquand, D., Ramsay McDonald, (London, 
Jonathan Cape 1977). 
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a t t a c h to any casework, e s p e c i a l l y the problem o f how f a r 
p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s a r e unique e v e n t s which cannot be used f o r 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e theory. While t h i s i s of major 
concern to p o s i t i v i s t s anxious to t r e a t t h e i r o b j e c t of a n a l y s i s 
i n a form i n which i t can c o n t r i b u t e to s t a t e m e n t s about pattern 
and law l i k e r e g u l a r i t i e s t a more modest c l a i m f o r the c a s e 
study method i s that i t can c o n t r i b u t e to a b e g i n n i n g i n con-
c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s . I t s h e u r i s t i c m e r i t l i e s i n i t s a b i l i t y to 
advance p r o p o s i t i o n s based on r e a l e v ents which may then be used 
to c o n t r i b u t e to middle range t h e o r i z i n g . ^ At most cases may be 
a b l e to undermine or f a l s i f y e x i s t i n g hypotheses but by them-
s e l v e s they prove nothing. D e s p i t e t h i s ^ i t i s hoped t h i s study 
may be of some importance i n i n c r e a s i n g the c o m p l e x i t y i n 
e x p l a n a t i o n of the phenomenum known as B r i t i s h s o c i a l democracy, 
not l e a s t because the c a s e p o s s e s s e s many ' d e v i a n t ' q u a l i t i e s 
which q u a l i f y i t f o r a p o s i t i o n as a s p e c i e s of the genus or 
even perhaps the o r i g i n . . While the d e v i a n t c a s e study may 
suggest a more f o r m a l i z e d t e s t ^ t h i s study i s one of a 
' c o n f i g u r a t i v e i d e o g r a p h i c ' type r a t h e r than a ' d i s c i p l i n e d 
conf i g u f a t i v e study'"^. I n t e r p r e t i v e , r a t h e r than r u l e o r 
p a t t e r n seeking, such s t u d i e s o f d e v i a n t c a s e s a r e not n e c e s -
s a r i l y the p r e s e r v e of those u s i n g l o g i c a l - d e d u c t i v e methods 
1. H a l l , P., e t a l . ( e d s . ) . Change, Choice and C o n f l i c t i n 
S o c i a l P o l i c y . (London, Heineraann 1975). 
2. Sjoberg, G., and Nett, R. A Methodology f o r S o c i a l Research 
(New York, Harper and Row, 1968). pp.259-60. 
3. These terms can be found i n E c k s t e i n , H.,'Case Study and 
Theory i n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e ' i n F, G r e e n s t e i n and N. Polsby, 
( e d s . ) The Handbook of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , Vol.7. ( S t r a t e g i e s 
of E n q u i r y ) ( R e a d i n g Mass. Addison Wesley 1975) pp.96-9. 
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but a l s o of those t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f p a r t s 
to whole.^ T h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean l a c k o f method-
o l o g i c a l r i g o u r , A p a r t i c u l a r need has been to a d e q u a t e l y s i t u a t e 
the s o c i a l programme. One problem concerns 
the need to a v o i d a b s t r a c t i n g out from the t o t a l i t y i n o r d e r to 
c o n c e n t r a t e on the development one i s i n t e r e s t e d i n . There i s 
a need to r e l a t e i t to c o n c u r r e n t , o v e r l a p p i n g , and competing 
events, p l a c i n g the boundaries wide enough to p r e s e n t over-
s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . ^ The boundary problem i n s t u d i e s u s i n g systems 
a n a l y s i s i s acute i n so f a r as 'outcomes' a r e s e p a r a t e d out and 
seen as s i d e e f f e c t s (such as s t a r v a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from w a r ) . 
The a n a l y s i s t must look f o r goal r e l a t e d 'outputs' which can be 
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d to the i n t e n t i o n of programmers."^ Yet we 
m a i n t a i n such unintended e f f e c t s a r e c r u c i a l i n s t u d i e s e s t a b -
l i s h i n g p o l i c y interdependence, e s p e c i a l l y where such e f f e c t s 
a r e l a t e r r e c o g n i s e d as p a r t o f the problem, or to use t h e i r 
vocabulary, c o n s t i t u t e 'feed-back'. Such widening of boundaries 
can however l e a d to the o p p o s i t e danger: the d i s s i p a t i o n of 
e f f o r t over too wide an a r e a . T h i s can be avoided, as t h i s 
study hopes to do, by c o n f i n i n g the p e r i o d of a n a l y s i s , i . e . 
r e s t r i c t i n g the number of y e a r s covered. The next s e c t i o n i s 
devoted to showing the e x t e n t and importance of the i n g r e d i e n t s 
t h a t make up the c a s e study. 
1. S j o b e r g asid Nett. Methodology f o r S o c i a l Research, p. 263. 
2. H a l l e t a l . , Change, Choic e and C o n f l i c t i n S o c i a l P o l i c y , p.17. 
3. Smith, B., Policymaking i n B r i t i s h Government - An A n a l y s i s 
o f Power and R a t i o n a l i t y . (London, Martin Robertson, 1976). 
p.13. 
4. D i e s i n g , P., P a t t e r n s of D i s c o v e r y i n the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s . 
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972) p.277. 
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SECTION I I I : THE INGREDIENTS OF THE STUDY 
At the micro l e v e l the r e s e a r c h c o n c e n t r a t e d on a 
p a r t i c u l a r ; a s o c i a l programme, i t s o r i g i n , development and f a t e . 
P a r t l y because many of the e x p l a n a t i o n s were thought to d e r i v e 
from d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o u t s i d e the immediate f i e l d , and a l s o p a r t l y 
because the immediate f i e l d i t s e l f , we s u s p e c t , may have been 
s t r u c t u r e d by the n a t u r e of the management of s o c i a l programmes, 
we have opened up a macro l e v e l : the t o t a l i t y of events known 
as r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Thus i t i s hoped we can show the n a t u r e of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a s p e c i a l k i n d of s o c i a l p o l i c y and a 
c a p i t a l i s t economy as managed by s o c i a l d e m o cratic government, 
i l l u s t r a t i n g the more generaJ. problem of p u r s u i n g government 
programmes i n response to the p r e s s u r e s of a c o n s t i t u e n c y anxious 
f o r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y i n i t s w i d e s t s e n s e and an economic strategy, 
some of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of which i n v o l v e i n s e c u r i t y . By 
f o c u s s i n g on r e b u i l d i n g we do j u s t i c e to one of the key a s p e c t s 
of s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e n v i s a g e d f o r the p e r i o d . Reconstruction 
cannot be reduced to r e c o n v e r s i o n , i . e . the r e s t o r a t i o n o f 
B r i t i s h c a p i t a l i s m on a p r o f i t a b l e trend of accumulation, p a r t l y 
because t h i s u n d e r e s t i m a t e s the s p e c i f i c i t y o f the o b j e c t s of 
the whole, but a l s o because i t presumes what needs to be 
demonstrated. Our task i s r a t h e r to t r a c e the b a l a n c e between 
s o c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and s i n c e the f o c u s i s on 
r e b u i l d i n g , to account f o r i t s p l a c i n g i n the whole, i . e . from 
i t s ambitious s t a r t to i t s e v e n t u a l s t a b i l i s a t i o n . We do not 
t h e r e f o r e s t a r t from an assumed ' r o l e ' f o r the S t a t e , but seek 
to understand the n a t u r e of the p o l i t i c a l - b u r e a u c r a t i c manage-
ment i n the c r u c i a l post-war s t a t e of s o c i a l democracy. We break 
19 
up 'the s t a t e ' i n t o i t s f i e l d , i n t o d i f f e r e n t s i t e s , i n o r d e r 
to t r a c e the i n t e r a c t i o n between p o l i c i e s : the mix and any 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between government programmes. By l o o k i n g a t 
p o l i c y combination through time we a r e i n a p o s i t i o n to t r a c e 
the dynamic p r o c e s s which change o r m a i n t a i n p r i o r i t i e s . I f 
there a r e any d e f i n i t i o n s by p a r t i c i p a n t s o r commentators on 
what o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y should be» we s h o u l d t e s t whether i n 
f a c t such d e c l a r a t i o n s a r e r e a l i s e d by an e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
of how f a r d i s p l a c e m e n t s are e f f e c t e d on programmes by r e p r e s e n t -
a t i v e s or spokesmen of the s t r u c t u r e as a whole (be they 
o f f i c i a l p l a n n e r s or a d v i s o r y e c o n o m i s t s ) . The o c c u r r e n c e of 
c r i s i s appears to be the time i n which such d e f i n i t i o n s a r e r i f e , 
and w i l l be c e n t r a l to t h i s t h e s i s to undertake an examination 
of such p o i n t s of d e c i s i o n . 
The c h o i c e of b u i l d i n g and i n p a r t i c u l a r housing as the 
c e n t r a l s o c i a l problem programme f o r t h i s t h e s i s i s also,: i n 
p a r t , governed by the way i n which p o l i t i c i a j i s saw i t as a t e s t 
c a s e f o r the s u c c e s s of the second post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
However, u n l i k e i n c r e a s e d w e l f a r e b e n e f i t s or the c r e a t i o n of 
the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h s e r v i c e f i n a n c e d e s s e n t i a l l y from the current 
revenue, the c a p i t a l spending housing programme i n v o l v e d what 
Of f e has c a l l e d the ' p r o ductive a c t i v i t i e s of the S t a t e ' , where 
a p o l i c y has to be produced by m a n i p u l a t i n g a number of v a r i a b l e s 
i n the o u t s i d e environment which, a r e not immediately a v a i l a b l e 
i n the s t a t e apparatus i t s e l f as w i t h tax revenue, s t a f f , and 
l e g a l power* The p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s o f the modern c a p i t a l i s t 
s t a t e , i n so f a r as they i n v o l v e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of p h y s i c a l investment and l a b o u r power, i n v o l v e a broader scope 
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of r e s o u r c e t h a t cannot be s t a n d a r d i s e d , r o u t i n i s e d or c h a j i n e l -
l e d through a r i g i d h i e r a r c h y of b u r e a u c r a c y . Such r e s o u r c e s 
have to be produced o u t s i d e of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . ^ T h i s i s 
e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n housing where the product i s assembled from 
a number of sourceSf and where the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e s e c t o r s 
i n t e r s e c t , both i n the p r o v i s i o n o f the commodity i t s e l f and 
a l s o i n the supply of m a t e r i a l s and money c a p i t a l . The same 
c a p i t a l r e s o u r c e s can be used f o r non-housing purposes. Where 
the S t a t e takes pre-emptive measures to skew r e s o u r c e s i n 
d i r e c t i o n s t h a t , i n a p u r e l y c o m p e t i t i v e market, they would not 
othe r w i s e take, then the p o s s i b i l i t y i s s e t up t h a t the p u b l i c 
and p r i v a t e s e c t o r s w i l l be s t a b i l i s e d a t some l e v e l which w i l l 
l e a d one s e c t o r to a share o f r e s o u r c e s g r e a t e r than the o t h e r . 
For d i s t r i b u t i o n of s h a r e s to be accepted w ithout c o n f l i c t they 
must be seen as l e g i t i m a t e , aj^d the c r e a t i o n of such l e g i t i m a c y 
i s as much a task of s t a t e management as i s the d e c i s i o n o f 
i n i t i a l a a i o c a t i o n i t s e l f . 
Conventional p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e , i n so f a r as i t d e a l s w i t h 
fXJlicy making, c o n c e n t r a t e s e s s e n t i a l l y on the mechanism or 
technology of d e c i s i o n making and implementation. P o l i c y 
making i s viewed from the p o i n t o f view of the a c t o r who can 
e x e r c i s e c h o i c e . Of cou r s e t h e r e a r e c o n s t r a i n t s on c h o i c e such 
as the degree of valu e d i s s e n s u s , i n f o r m a t i o n , and b u r e a u c r a t i c 
behaviour. N e v e r t h e l e s s ( t o whatever degree) t h e s e a r e con-
s t r a i n t s on what would be the f r e e f l o w o f p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n 
1. Offe, C., * The Theory of the C a p i t a l i s t S t a t e and the problem 
of p o l i c y formation' IN L.N. L i n b e r g , R. A l f o r d e t a l . , ( e d s . ) 
S t r e s s and C o n t r a d i c t i o n i n Modern C a p i t a l i s m ( L e x i n g t o n 
Mass. D.C. Heath & Co. 1975), pp.125-144. 
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and thus b u r e a u c r a t i c i n e r t i a and o t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s can be 
reduced by a g g r e s s i v e c l e a r t h i n k i n g and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
techniques.^ 
The i d e a t h a t t h e r e a r e s t r u c t u r a l l y determined c o n s t r a i n t s , 
governed by the nature o f p r o d u c t i o n : t h a t t h e r e are c o n t r a -
d i c t i o n s produced by fundamental i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s i n p o l i c i e s 
when t h e i r e f f e c t s combine, i s something t h a t i s very r a r e l y 
s t u d i e d by those c o n c e n t r a t i n g on micro l e v e l d e c i s i o n s such as 
the s i t i n g of a t h i r d London a i r p o r t , b u i l d i n g an underground 
r a i l w a y here or there, or the reform of s o c i a l work.^ Only by 
s t a r t i n g t h i s r e s e a r c h w i t h the presumption of s t r u c t u r a l l y 
determined c o n s t r a i n t i»e. government i n a c a p i t a l i s t economy 
r e - e n t e r i n g a c o m p e t i t i v e world market, w i t h X r e s o u r c e s a t i t s 
d i s p o s a l , and X programmes to implement, can we c o r r e c t l y 
e v a l u a t e ajid understand the degree of p o l i t i c a l d i s c r e t i o n and 
e v a l u a t e the s t r e n g t h , and indeed the n o v e l t y , o f any c h o i c e s 
taken i n economic p o l i c y . 
T h i s t h e s i s l o o k s mainly a t the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p r i o r i t i e s 
w i t h i n the p o l i c y mix. D e v i c e s o r mechanisms to e n f o r c e and 
safeguard them a r e c r u c i a l to the p e r i o d under i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
s i n c e they a r e r e l a t e d to the n o t i o n of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y , and the 
need to p r o t e c t and i n s u l a t e s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n from v e s t e d 
i n t e r e s t s and market f o r c e s . P a r t of t h i s i n s u l a t i o n i s thought 
to be secured by p l a n n i n g and c o - o r d i n a t i o n . The development of 
house b u i l d i n g was seen as p a r t of the wider n a t i o n a l b u i l d i n g 
1. f o r d i f f e r e n t models of d e c i s i o n making and s u g g e s t i o n s f o r 
improving c h o i c e and r a t i o n a l i t y see Dror, Y., P o l icymaking 
Re-examined ( S c r a n t o n . Penn. Chandler, 1968). 
2, These a r e some d e c i s i o n s and 'outputs' s t u d i e d by c o n v e n t i o n a l 
' p o l i c y a n a l y s i s ' s c h o o l s . For a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d example 
concerning the underground l i n k to Heathrow a i r p o r t , see 
Smith, Policymaking i n B r i t i s h Government pp.152-9. 
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programme, and t h a t was p a r t of the i n v e s t m e n t programme, a 
p a r t of which was shared w i t h a l l o c a t i o n s to p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y . 
C a p i t a l i s t investment i t s e l f f i g u r e d as p a r t of the l a r g e r 
whole: t h a t being the n a t i o n a l economy wherein i t shared 
r e s o u r c e s w i t h consumption and e x p o r t s . The whole t h e r e f o r e i s 
an i n t e g r a t e d s t r u c t u r e , where one can t r a c e v a r i o u s w e i g h t i n g s 
given to each programme a c c o r d i n g to the n a t u r e o f the p r i o r i t y . 
C o - o r d i n a t i o n i s however dynamic, being r e l a t e d to adjustment, 
i n the sense t h a t ' c o r r e c t i o n s ' i n the b a l a n c e between^and 
t h e r e f o r e the weighting of programmes^become advocated as a 
r e s u l t of the i m p e r f e c t i n s u l a t i o n of the i n t e r n a l from the 
e x t e r n a l economy, once the c a s h f r e e m e n t a l i t y of the war 
economy has ceased. The e x t e r n a l economy s e t s up s t r u c t u r a l l y 
determined c o n s t r a i n t s which l e a d to the apparent n e c e s s i t y f o r 
adjustment. That n e c e s s i t y i s t r a n s m i t t e d through r e s i d e n t 
economists, who, r e p r e s e n t to the s t a t e the o b j e c t i v e needs 
and the i n d u s t r i a l i m p e r a t i v e s which must be handled i f the 
s t a t e i s to m a i n t a i n the accumulation p r o c e s s of c a p i t a l , and 
s u r v i v e i n a c o m p e t i t i v e environment. An economic and i n d u s t r i a l 
l o g i c seems to i n d i c a t e the need f o r the g r e a t e r s u p e r v i s i o n of 
s o c i a l programmes, moni t o r i n g and s t a b i l i s a t i o n . The measures 
may a l s o i n v o l v e the requirement to t r a n s f e r r e s o u r c e s between 
programmes on a s c a l e which t h r e a t e n s e x i s t i n g p r i o r i t i e s . 
Were such measures, deemed n e c e s s a r y by some» g e n e r a l i s e d 
as the dominant economic l o g i c of p o l i t i c i a n s ? To what e x t e n t 
d i d p o l i t i c i a n s embrace Keynesian arguments as a way of 
m a i n t a i n i n g p r i o r i t i e s ajid a v o i d i n g h a r s h a l t e r n a t i v e s ? To what 
ex t e n t d i d s o c i a l democratic government f i n d i t s c h o i c e widened 
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or r e s t r i c t e d by the use and na t u r e of d i s c r i m i n a t o r y and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s ? How f a r was the adjustment and 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n managed i n fav o u r o f c a p i t a l ? U l t i m a t e l y we a r e 
t r y i n g to gauge the degree o f p o l i t i c a l d i s c r e t i o n open to s o c i a l 
democracy and the natu r e of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n i n a f o r m a t i v e period 
when the u t i l i s a t i o n of s t a t e c o n t r o l was^ f o r peacetime^ a t i t s 
maximum. I n the next s e c t i o n we examine key background f e a t u r e s 
of the p e r i o d under study. 
SECTION IV;THE NATURE OF THE PERIOD UNDER INVESTIGATION. 
One o f the foremost l a b o u r t h e o r i s t s a t t h i s time has 
w r i t t e n t h a t one of the key a s p e c t s of B r i t i s h s o c i a l i s m c o n s i s t s 
i n the use of the s t a t e f o r s o c i a l ends by r e d i s t r i b u t i n g 
r e s o u r c e s and wealth through m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n the market 
mechanism.^ Cole d i d not imagine t h a t t h i s would be a c o n f l i c t 
f r e e p r o c e s s . On the c o n t r a r y , the F a b i a n s t r a i n i n the Labour 
p a r t y has always b e l i e v e d i n the n e c e s s i t y f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
c o n t r o l s over p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t to s u p e r v i s e and r e g u l a t e but, 
l i k e the r e s t of the par t y , they shared c e r t a i n assumptions 
about r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g w i t h i n which t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would 
take p l a c e . The o r i g i n s of p o l i c y would d e r i v e from needs as 
r e v e a l e d by surveys and the advocacy o f e x p e r t s i n each 
p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d , i n c l u d i n g economic p o l i c y . T r a n s f o r m a t i o n , -
the means to e f f e c t ends, would be determined by the weight of 
votes and the r e s u l t i n g p a r l i a m e n t a r y m a j o r i t y . That p o s s e s s i o n 
would enable changes, d r a f t e d by e x p e r t s and c i v i l s e r v a n t s , to 
1. Cole, G.D.H., B u i l d i n g and P l a n n i n g . (London, C a s s e l l and Co. 1943). p.73. 
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be e f f e c t e d through the C a b i n e t , backed up by a framework of 
supplementary p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s , u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e to 
i t . I t would be t h e i r t a s k to ' c a r r y out the d e t a i l e d and 
h i g h l y t e c h n i c a l work of s u r v e y i n g the needs of economic r e -
o r g a n i s a t i o n . ' Some s o r t of g e n e r a l economic p l a n would r e s u l t , 
the primary purpose of which was to ensure the c o m p a t i b i l i t y of 
v a r i o u s g o a l s and d e v i s e p r i o r i t i e s 
to s e t t l e i n the l i g h t a proper survey of the 
a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s and of the e x i s t i n g u s e s , 
what can be done and what cannot be done and 
among t h i n g s t h a t can be done what needs d o i n g 
most.2 
L a s t l y , u n d e r l y i n g t h i s , was the assumption t h a t the ' n a t i o n ' 
would c o n t i n u e to be the c h i e f f o c u s of p o l i c y ; the problem of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l market f o r c e s being r e g u l a t e d by t h e i r e q u i v a l e n t 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e form - p r o t e c t i o n i s t t r a d e . 
Compared w i t h 1919-21 the n o v e l t y of the second r e c o n -
s t r u c t i o n was the way i n which c a p i t a l i s t s , workers and t h e i r 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s had accepted many of the b u r e a u c r a t i c p r a c t i c e s 
of the war economy i n o r d e r to arrange and implement the t r a n s -
i t i o n to peace i n a ' r a t i o n a l ' and planned way. The p a r a l l e l 
apparatus, whose jo b i t was to r e g u l a t e , a l l o c a t e , and manage 
over the v a r i o u s s e c t o r s , would be r e t a i n e d f o r the peace i n 
o r d e r to remove the anarchy from r e c o n s t r u c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of the p e r i o d a f t e r the f i r s t world war-
Fundamental f e a t u r e s of the B r i t i s h war economy were the 
suspension of the o p e r a t i o n of the c o m p e t i t i v e p r o c e s s of 
1. Cole, G.D.H., Plan f o r Democratic B r i t a i n . (London, Odams 
P r e s s 1939). p.33. 
2. i b i d . 
3. i b i d . p.217. 
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accumulation, and a r e - o r d e r i n g of the r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e 
and c a p i t a l r e s u l t i n g from c o n t r o l s which i n t e r v e n e d i n the 
production as w e l l a s d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i s r e s u l t e d i n a d e v i a n t 
form of c a p i t a l i s m . Although s u r p l u s and p r o f i t was s t i l l 
e x t r a c t e d p r i v a t e l y by owners,^ r e s t r i c t i o n s were p l a c e d on 
u t i l i s a t i o n . The very e x i s t e n c e of c a p i t a l i s t s and t h e i r 
' r i g h t s ' were c o n d i t i o n e d by t h e i r a c c e p t a n c e o f a r o l e as 
agents of the s t a t e . T h e i r s u c c e s s was guaranteed, not by t h e i r 
c o m p e t i t i v e e f f i c i e n c y , c o s t s having been t e s t e d i n the market, 
and with expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n governed by movements i n the 
r a t e o f p r o f i t but because of the use v a l u e of t h e i r output f o r 
2 
purposes of war. The s t a t e was the main p u r c h a s e r of 
commodities i n markets extended o r c r e a t e d , t h a t o t h e r w i s e 
could not e x i s t on such a s c a l e . P r i c e s and c o s t s became 
accounting d e v i c e s as money f l o w s and v a l u e s become s u b o r d i n a t e 
to p h y s i c a l p l a n n i n g f o r u s e . I n s h o r t , c h o i c e s i n the s t r u c t u r e 
of p r o d u c t i o n were not d e c i d e d by the market and movements i n 
the r a t e o f p r o f i t , but by b u r e a u c r a c y . With r e g a r d to 
r e l a t i o n s o f production, w h i l s t the war economy d i d not a l t e r 
the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of labour to c a p i t a l i n the l a b o u r p r o c e s s , 
a l t e r a t i o n s were made i n the terms o f exchange through s t a t e 
sponsored changes i n hours, maLximura/minimum wage r a t e s , 
r e g u l a t i o n of employment c o n d i t i o n s ajid moves to d i r e c t l a b o u r . 
1. But not i n c a s e s where the government b u i l t and owned the f a c t o r i e s . 
2. Open tender c o n t r a c t i n g was r e p l a c e d by f i x e d p r i c e 
c o n t r a c t s and c o s t p l u s arrangements. 
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I t t h e r e f o r e cannot be mai n t a i n e d th a t war c a p i t a l i s m r e q u i r e s 
only marginal a l t e r a t i o n s i n the theory of the c a p i t a l i s t 
s t a t e . ^ The s t a t e does not j u s t m a i n t a i n the common e x i s t e n c e 
of f r a c t i o n s o f c a p i t a l a c c o r d i n g to r e l a t i o n s o f domination 
e s t a b l i s h e d by the accumulation p r o c e s s . I t a c t i v e l y d i s -
c r i m i n a t e s a g a i n s t s e c t o r s a c c o r d i n g to the n o n - c a p i t a l i s t 
c r i t e r i o n o f ' p r i o r i t y ' . I n B r i t a i n , o u t l e t s f o r c a p i t a l were 
s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d , and a c c e s s to the money c a p i t a l market was 
c u r t a i l e d through the C a p i t a l I s s u e s Committee. Firms were not 
allowed to b u i l d without a l i c e n c e or i n s t a l new machinery. 
Some had to have l i c e n c e s to manufacture, w h i l e o t h e r s had the 
q u a n t i t y of t h e i r output c u r t a i l e d . I n t e r s e c t o r a l t r a n s f e r s of 
c a p i t a l were e f f e c t i v e l y b a r r e d by s e v e r e r e s t r i c t i o n s over the 
en t r y i n and out of i n d u s t r i e s , c hecks being kept by r e g i s t e r s 
to ensure new entrants were e l i m i n a t e d and ' e s t a b l i s h e d f i r m s ' 
p r o t e c t e d . Some c a p i t a l i s t s , e s p e c i a l l y those i n consumer 
production, were not allowed to keep t h e i r l a b o u r f o r c e s or 
r e c r u i t more, and had to c o n f i n e t h e i r a c t i v i t y to u t i l i t y ranges 
with the supply of raw m a t e r i a l s c u t . Import l i c e n c i n g was 
intr o d u c e d i n or d e r to conserve f o r e i g n exchange. The r e s u l t 
of a l l t h i s was t h a t c h o i c e s between t a n k s and motor c a r s , 
uniforms and d r e s s e s , houses or m u n i t i o n s f a c t o r i e s , were 
decided by b u r e a u c r a t i c a l l o c a t i o n . 
The p a r t i c u l a r form t h a t b u r e a u c r a t i c c o - o r d i n a t i o n took 
f o r the war economy was a l s o determined by the primary aim of 
1. as i n Po u l a n t z a s , N. P o l i t i c a l Power and S o c i a l C l a s s e s 
(London, New L e f t B o o k s 1973). p.294. *" 
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s e c u r i n g the t r a n s f e r o f the maximum volume of r e s o u r c e s to war 
production. To have allowed the p r i c e mechanism to o p e r a t e 
would have r e q u i r e d the government to b i d up wages and c o s t s i n 
the war s e c t o r . S i n c e t h a t would have meant huge p r o f i t s and a 
p o l i t i c a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of income ( a s was 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the ' b u s i n e s s as u s u a l ' phrase o f World War 
One,^ p r o f i t s would have had to be taxed a t such l e v e l s t h a t 
would have blunted the i n c e n t i v e to t r a n s f e r . Once the govern-
ment had decided to i n t e r v e n e and skew the s t r u c t u r e of 
production, u n d e r w r i t i n g i t by f i x e d p r i c e c o n t a c t s , i t had to 
ensure t h a t the s u p p l i e s of i n p u t s , - m a t e r i a l s and components, 
s p e c i f i e d i n the c o n t r a c t , were a l s o forthcoming i n the r i g h t 
q u a l i t i e s and the r i g h t p r i c e , a c c o r d i n g to d e l i v e r y d a t e s 
phased i n l i n e w ith the demands of the s e r v i c e c h i e f s . By t h i s 
means the net of i n t e r v e n t i o n spread. The p r i n c i p a l means of 
a l l o c a t i n g r e s o u r c e s became the manpower and m a t e r i a l budgets, 
which, matched the working p o p u l a t i o n / c a p a c i t y w i t h the number 
of w o r k e r s / i n p u t s r e q u i r e d by each i n d u s t r y . The m a t e r i a l 
budget was s e p a r a t e because a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of m a t e r i a l s came 
from abroad and t h e r e f o r e d i d not make a c a l l on any proposed 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of s o c i a l l a b o u r . Each supply department was l e f t 
to plan f o r expansion i n the l i g h t o f r e q u i r e m e n t s put to i t by 
the a p p r o p r i a t e s e r v i c e c h i e f s . No c e n t r a l power f o r co-
o r d i n a t i o n r e c o n c i l e d at one and the same time the p l a n s of a l l 
the departments i n r e l a t i o n to a l l the f a c t o r s which a f f e c t e d 
1. Marwick, A., The Deluge : B r i t i s h S o c i e t y and the F i r s t World 
War. (London, MacMillan 1965). pp.39-44, 123-4. 
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them. C o - o r d i n a t i o n was a f f e c t e d through the c o n t r a c t s them-
s e l v e s . ^ I f the Manpower Committee reduced the tank programme 
i n order to expand a i r c r a f t f a c t o r y b u i l d i n g , t h i s would meaji 
a r e d u c t i o n i n the former's need f o r raw m a t e r i a l s , a f a c t 
which would be taken i n t o account by the Raw M a t e r i a l Committee 
i n the next review when a l l the Departments put i n t h e i r ' b i d s ' 
f o r the next q u a r t e r . These g e n e r a l committees c o u l d ensure 
t h a t new d i s t r i b u t i o n s and t r a n s f e r were e f f e c t i v e , by v i r t u e 
of the f a c t t h a t c o n t r a c t s would be reduced i n one a r e a and 
expanded i n another, and t h a t r e s o u r c e s would not seep out i n t o 
a l t e r n a t i v e s i n the non-government s e c t o r because these had 
been c u t o f f by the v a r i o u s mechanisms d e s c r i b e d above. The 
f a c t t h a t the government po s s e s s e d the r e s e r v e power to d i r e c t 
labour was a f a c i l i t y of the l a s t r e s o r t . I t was because most 
l a r g e f i r m s worked f o r the government and not f o r p r i v a t e 
account, as i n peace, t h a t t h i s c o u l d be s o . ^ 
S i n c e the t r a n s f e r of r e s o u r c e s to the war s e c t o r would 
reduce the supply of consumer goods, demand had to be r e s t r a i n e d 
to stop f u l l employment ( e x c e s s demand) from l e a d i n g to an 
i n f l a t i o n a r y push on p r i c e s , w i t h the r i c h e s t g e t t i n g the l i o n ' s 
s hare. DemaJid r e s t r i c t i o n was c o n c e i v e d i n terms of ' f a i r 
s h a r e s ' , so t h a t although the working c l a s s was p e n a l i z e d by 
i n c r e a s e d purchase tax and post war c r e d i t s , t h e r e was a l s o the 
E x c e s s P r o f i t s duty, a tax on d i v i d e n d s , r a t i o n i n g and p r i c e 
1. See Devons, E. 'Economic P l a n n i n g i n War and Peace', The 
Manchester School of Economics and S o c i a l S t u d i e s , Vol.XVI, 
No.l. (January 1948), pp.1-29. 
2. See Devons, E., 'The P r o g r e s s of Reconversion', The 
Manchester School of Economic and S o c i a l S t u d i e s , Vol.XV, 
No.l. (January 1947) pp.1-25. 
29 
c o n t r o l . S i n c e food and raw m a t e r i a l s were bulk purchased, 
e i t h e r a t home or abroad by s t a t e monopoly a t h i g h s c a r c i t y 
p r i c e s , and as they were to be s o l d to consumers by the 
d i s t r i b u t o r s a t l e s s , food s u b s i d i e s became a widespread 
p r a c t i c e . For manufactured goods the f i n a l p r i c e had to be 
agreed by a committee a t the Board of Trade. The c o n t r o l p r i c e 
had, however, to be high enough to a l l o w the h i g h c o s t and 
perhaps i n e f f i c i e n t producer to s u r v i v e ; h i s output being 
s o c i a l l y n e c e s s a r y to s e c u r e supply. But again, i f the r e t a d l 
p r i c e was to be l e s s , s u b s i d i e s were e s s e n t i a l . 
There are two fundamental d i f f e r e n c e s between the p e r i o d 
of war economy and the p e r i o d of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . F i r s t l y , a 
l a r g e p a r t of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r no l o n g e r works as 'agent' to 
government by c o n t r a c t . N e i t h e r does the government consume 
t h r e e - f i f t h s of the n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n , ^ I t t h e r e f o r e cannot 
be c o n t r o l l e d i n the same ways. Secondly, i f the 'economic' 
i n war economy m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f o n ly i n the problem of shortages, 
b o t t l e n e c k s , p r i o r i t i e s , e t c , w i t h q u e s t i o n s of v a l u e and c o s t 
r e l e g a t e d to s u b s i d i a r y r o l e , t h i s i s o n l y because the govern-
ment has e f f e c t i v e l y mortgaged the f u t u r e ^ i n s t e a d of paying f o r 
imports of food and raw m a t e r i a l s by meajis of e x p o r t s and f o r 
p u b l i c expenditure by means of e x t e n t i o n s i n t a x a t i o n . F o r c e d 
s a v i n g , however, l i k e the Post War C r e d i t s , had to be paad back 
and War Loans c a r r i e d i n t e r e s t ) over i s s u e s o f a f l o a t i n g debt. 
1. Chapter 2 of the t h e s i s w i l l d e a l w i t h the e x p e c t a t i o n s of 
the labour movement i n war economy. For a p r e l i m i n a r y over-
view see C a l d e r , A., The People's War: B r i t a i n 1939-45. 
(London, Jonathan Cape, 1969). 
2. Dow, J.C.R,, The Mcuiaqement of the B r i t i s h Economy 1945-60. 
(Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1970), p.7. 
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i n the form of t r e a s u r y b i l l s ^ w o u l d c a r r y i n f l a t i o n a r y dangers 
beyond a c e r t a i n p o i n t . Other promises to pay, n e g o t i a t e d 
e x t e r n a l l y , took the form of s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s by which com-
modi t i e s were purchased from the dominions and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s 
without an immediate e q u i v a l e n t being given i n exchange but 
through a paper t i t l e to a c l a i m on f u t u r e p r o d u c t i o n . Another 
type of mortgaging the f u t u r e i n v o l v e d a l l o w i n g the c a p i t a l 
equipment of the country i n a number of s e c t o r s to run down 
making i t work longer hours and s e l l i n g o v e r s e a s a s s e t s . Above 
a l l the attempt a t s e l f s u f f i c i e n c y f o r a c o u n t r y dependejit on 
imports was only p o s s i b l e because of the monumental d e l i v e r y o f 
f r e e g i f t s (Lend L e a s e ) , which o b v i a t e d the need f o r export and 
enabled p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y to s h i f t to m u n i t i o n s . However, 
the n e g o t i a t i o n of t h i s a l s o i n v o l v e d f u t u r e commitments. 
A r t i c l e 7 of the Mutual Aid T r e a t y saw B r i t a i n a g r e e i n g to 
pursue n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t and t h e r e f o r e n o n - p r o t e c t i o n i s t t r a d e 
and exchange p o l i c i e s come the peace. These fundamental d i f -
f e r e n c e s c o n d i t i o n e d the f u t u r e environment f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
and y e t they r e c e i v e d l i t t l e or no r e c o g n i t i o n i n p a r t y pro-
nouncements. What was emphasised was the r a t i o n a l i t y of war 
c o n t r o l , which would be r e t a i n e d and adapted to smooth the 
t r a n s i t i o n to peace and a c h i e v e c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e s . These 
o b j e c t i v e s i n v o l v e d a l a r g e s c a l e b u i l d i n g programme and a 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of labour and c a p i t a l to p r o j e c t s and a c t i v i t i e s 
deemed by government to be ' e s s e n t i a l ' . The very i d e a of s t a t e 
determined n e c e s s i t y i n p r o d u c t i o n was an echo o f the war economy 
as was the view t h a t p r o f i t a l one should be r e j e c t e d as the s o l e 
determinant of whether a p a r t i c u l a r p i e c e o f i n v e s t m e n t should 
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or should not be undertaken. The r e t e n t i o n of much of the war 
economy was deemed v i t a l to the s u c c e s s of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n : 
r a p i d d e c o n t r o l being the cause o f f a i l u r e a f t e r 1918. The 
1945 Labour manifesto was q u i t e c l e a r on t h i s , Labour would 
undertake a planned r e c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h such programmes as 
housing provided without r e g a r d to ' s e c t i o n a l i n v e s t e d 
i n t e r e s t s ' ^ : the e x p e r i e n c e of 1918 was i n s t a n c e d . The 
r e t e n t i o n of c o n t r o l s would mean an ordered r e t u r n to peace 
t h a t would prevent economic ' b l i z z a r d s and f o r c e s ' . P l a n n i n g 
would 'win the peace f o r the people'. I t would ensure t h a t 
' f i r s t t h i n g s would come f i r s t ( i n c l u d i n g houses f o r the p e o p l e / 
P r i v a t e i n d u s t r y would s e r v e the n a t i o n , and p l a n n i n g would 
ensure a balance between the g o a l s o f s o c i a l and p r o d u c t i v e 
recons true t i o n but: 
The housing programme would be one o f the 
g r e a t e s t ajid one of the e a r l i e s t t e s t s of a 
government's r e a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n to put the 
Nation f i r s t . Labour's pledge i s f i r m and 
d i r e c t - i t w i l l proceed w i t h a housing 
programme with the maximum p r a c t i c a l speed 
u n t i l every f a m i l y i n the i s l a n d has a good 
s t a n d a r d of accommodation.^ 
As one e n t h u s i a s t has summed up the f e e l i n g , the 1945 e l e c t i o n 
was an i n d i c a t i o n of a 
1. L e t us f a c e the F u t u r e ' (1945) IN C r a i g , F.W.S., (ed.) 
B r i t i s h G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n M a n i f e s t o s 1918-66. ( C h i c h e s t e r 
P o l i t i c a l Reference P u b l i c a t i o n s 1970). p.98. 
2. i b i d . ^ 
^* i b i d * p.102. 
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sober judgement on how the N a t i o n a l energy 
d i s p l a y e d i n war c o u l d be turned to the work 
of peace; the very d i s c i p l i n e of war c o u l d be 
used to b u t t r e s s the n e c e s s a r y p l a n n i n g f o r 
the f u t u r e . ^ 
While many i n the Party, l i k e Foot, saw t h i s as the embryo of 
s o c i a l i s m , the whole d i r e c t i o n of the mamifesto e x h i b i t s the 
p r a c t i c a l h e a r t of B r i t i s h S o c i a l Democracy: s t a t e power was 
going to be used to ensure p r o v i s i o n of expanded s e r v i c e s f o r 
the community and i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r the working c l a s s . While 
there was much emphasis i n the m a n i f e s t o on f u l l employment, 
h e a l t h and w e l f a r e reforms, i t was the Housing programme t h a t 
was to be the t e s t of the new government's management of Recon-
s t r u c t i o n and to provide a comparison w i t h the p e r i o d a f t e r the 
F i r s t World War. 
SECTION V:THE PLAN OF THE THESIS. 
The t h e s i s begins w i t h a more extended treatment of the 
p l a n s made f o r peace. An a n a l y s i s of the c l i m a t e of working 
c l a s s e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y i n t h e i r w i d e s t sense 
and the government's f o s t e r i n g of reform s e n t i m e n t s a r e aJ.1 
p l a c e d i n the context of wartime m o b i l i z a t i o n and the b a r g a i n i n g 
Foot, M., Aneurin Bevan;a biooraphy Vol.2. 1945-60. (London, 
Davis-Poynter 1973). To the b e s t of my knowledge, a p a r t from 
Foot's biography of Bevan above, which mentions the need f o r 
more r e s e a r c h , t h e r e a r e o n l y two o t h e r works t h a t d e a l 
e x t e n s i v e l y with the Housing and b u i l d i n g programmes i n t h i s 
p e r i o d , both w r i t t e n from p u b l i s h e d s o u r c e s . The f i r s t 
c o n c e n t r a t e s l a r g e l y on the f i n a n c i a l c o s t of h o u s e b u i l d i n g , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y m a t e r i a l s , see Sabatino, R.A., Housing i n G r e a t 
B r i t a i n 1945-9. ( D a l l a s Southern Methodist U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 
1956) w h i l e the second l o o k s a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of b u i l d i n g 
c o n t r o l s , r a t h e r narrowly as a t e c h n i c a l e x e r c i s e . see 
Rosenberg, N., Economic P l a n n i n g i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y 1945-9 ( P h i l a d e l p h i a U n i v e r s i t y of P e n n s y l v a n i a 
P r e s s 1961). Sketchy treatments a r e a v a i l a b l e i n any g e n e r a l 
h i s t o r y t e x t of the p e r i o d , f o r i n s t a n c e . P i n t o - D u s c h i n s k y , 
M., 'Bread and C i r c u s e s ' IN V. Bogdanor and R. S k i d e l s k y 
( e d s . ) , The Ace of A f f l u e n c e 1951-64, (London, Macmilian 1970) 
pp.53-63. 
33 
of the labour movement, i n c r e a s e d , as i t was, i n a f u l l y 
employed war economy. A r e s u l t i n g c o n f i g u r a t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t i c 
power ajid p r i o r i t y c o n t r o l over a re-emerging c a p i t a l i s t 
economy i s l i n k e d with these developments. Chapter 3 c o n t i n u e s 
t h i s theme by l o o k i n g a t the formation of the housing programme 
and t a r g e t . T h i s i s a c e n t r a l , c r u c i a l and t h e r e f o r e lengthy 
c h a p t e r f o r a number of r e a s o n s . F i r s t l y , i t e s t a b l i s h e s the 
reasons f o r the government's u n d e r t a k i n g commitments i n the 
housing f i e l d . T h i s was i n p a r t due to the undersupply caused 
by bomb d e s t r u c t i o n : a problem compounded by r e t u r n i n g s o l d i e r s 
and t h e i r p o t e n t i a l f a m i l y s i z e come the peace. The former's 
absence was e q u i v a l e n t to a temporary em i g r a t i o n abroad and made 
worse by the wartime bein on h o u s e b u i l d i n g . These f a c t s were 
r e v e a l e d i n departmental s u r v e y s but the c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n s a r e 
why and a t what st a g e d i d t h a t p h y s i c a l need become p o l i t i c a l l y 
potent and why were promises made to improve on i n t e r - war 
standards of housing? Chapter 3 also goes cn to i l l u s t r a t e i n some 
d e t a i l the d e t e r m i n a t i o n and shape of the b u i l d i n g programme 
both by the c o a l i t i o n and the subsequent Labour Government* The 
d e t a i l i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r to show the c o n t e n t s of the 'black 
box'. The production of p o l i c y i n t h i s a r e a was a c o m p l i c a t e d 
assembly product, the d e t a i l s o f which can only be r e v e a l e d by 
m a g n i f i c a t i o n . Success was judged to be dependent on the 
d e v i s i n g of measures to i n s u l a t e the programme from p o t e n t i a l 
c h a l l e n g e . T h i s i n s u l a t i o n was l i n k e d w i t h the e x c l u s i o n or 
'management' of i n t e r e s t s . How f a r r e s o u r c e s c o u l d be p r o t e c t e d 
f o r use i n p u b l i c housing was dependent on a system of l i c e n c e d 
demand being i n s t i t u t e d which covered c a l l s on l a b o u r m a t e r i a l s 
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and the supply of money c a p i t a l . While much of t h i s c h a p t e r 
suggests i m p e r f e c t c o n t r o l to the e x t e n t t h a t c o s t s of b u i l d i n g 
would s t i l l r i s e , the terms of subs i d y arranged w i t h the 
Treasury were s u f f i c i e n t l y l i b e r a l to p r e v e n t the premature 
c l o s i n g of the programme when such f a u l t s appeared. The success 
of the housing programme would a l s o depend on how f a r the 
government c o u l d i n s u l a t e the programme, not o n l y from i n t e r n a l 
market f o r c e s and i n t e r e s t s but from r i v a l c l a i m s on what 
should be done d u r i n g the ' t r a n s i t i o n ' p e r i o d and l a t e r from 
those s e e k i n g adjustment of c o n t r o l s and programmed assumptions. 
Chapter 4 l o o k s a t the way apparent e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t s were 
b u i l t i n t o r e c o n s t r u c t i o n as a r e s u l t of n e g o t i a t i o n s c e n t e r i n g 
on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and exchange problem. Chapter 5 
looks a t the economic machinery and assumptions governing the 
o v e r a l l a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s and the n a t u r e o f the b a l a n c e s 
chosen between consumption, inves t m e n t atnd the r e v i v a l of t r a d e . 
Chapters 6 and 7 undertake an a n a l y s i s of c r i s i s p o i n t s 
i n such management cind the way they were handled hoping thereby 
to throw l i g h t ^ through a f u r t h e r m a g n i f i c a t i o n o f detad.!^ on the 
q u a l i t i e s of ' f i n e tuning', the e x t e n t to which p r i o r i t i e s were 
a d j u s t e d and the r e j e c t e d a l t e r n a t i v e s . Chapter 8 develops 
some of the c o s t s and consequences of the/ chosen s t r a t e g y i n 
r e l a t i o n to post-war investment and the c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r 
draws together the key a s p e c t s of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e x p e r i e n c e and 
r e l a t e s them to the broader problem of the scope of d i s c r e t i o n 
a v a i l a b l e i n the management of the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e by s o c i a l 
democracy. 
CHAPTER I I 
The Acceptance of S o c i a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of t h i s c h a p t e r i s to e x p l a i n the adoption by 
government of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p l a n s . I t w i l l be shown t h a t such 
p l a j i n i n g cam b e s t be understood i n the c o n t e x t o f the perceptions 
held of the f u t u r e both by p l a n n e r s and those being planned f o r . 
Working c l a s s e x p e c t a t i o n s of peacetime government p o l i c y , 
shaped through p a s t e x p e r i e n c e s aJid r e v e a l e d i n o p i n i o n r e s e a r c h , 
provided government w i t h a map of p u b l i c o p i n i o n which,given i t s 
nature,they f e l t unable to i g n o r e . I t was f e l t t h a t t h e r e could 
be no b a s i s f o r appeals to n a t i o n a l u n i t y , both i n the c o n t e x t 
of the war o r f o r the r e t u r n to peace, u n l e s s p r e v i o u s T r e a s u r y 
r e l u c t a n c e to commit r e s o u r c e s above what was c o m p a t i b l e w i t h 
l i k e l y t r e nds i n p r o d u c t i v i t y , low t a x a t i o n and a r e t i r i n g debt, 
w^as r e p l a c e d by extended aoid e x p e n s i v e c o l l e c t i v e p r o v i s i o n f o r 
those who were r e q u i r e d s t r u c t u r a l l y to s e r v i c e the economy as 
labour power. 
SECTION I ; THE PRESSURE FOR CHANGE. 
Commentators on t h i s p e r i o d have operated w i t h the concept 
of a 'post war s e t t l e m e n t ' or ' s o c i a l c o n t r a c t ' by which working 
c l a s s c o - o p e r a t i o n i n the war e f f o r t was exchanged f o r e n l a r g e d 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the government machine and i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o 
s o c i a l policy.''' The Labour P a r t y j o i n e d C h u r c h i l l and the 
C o n s e r v a t i v e s i n a C o a l i t i o n and unions were given more 
Beer, S»$ Modern B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s (London, Faber and Faber, 
1965), pp.212-16. see a l s o F e l l i n g , H., H i s t o r y of Trade 
U n i o n i s m. (London, MacMillan 1963) C h . l l . P a r t of the o r i g i n 
of the Beveridge Report l i e s i n the February 1941 TUC depu-
t a t i o n to the M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h demanding improvements i n 
s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , see Marwick A., 'The Labour P a r t y and the 
Welfare S t a t e i n B r i t a i n ' . American H i s t o r i c a l Review, No.73, 
(1957) pp.380-403, esp. p.397, and Addison, P., The Road to 
1 9 4 5 ; B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s and the Second World War, (London, 
Jonathan Cape 1975), pp.168-9. 
representation in the C i v i l S e r v i c e machinery of c o n s u l t a t i o n 
and v a r i o u s committees f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h i s p o s i t i o n was 
achieved because unions had become key ' i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s * f o r 
the implementation of a war economy."^ I n war l a b o u r as the key 
r e s o u r c e becomes s c a r c e r a t h e r than abundant, and i n a d d i t i o n 
i s r e q u i r e d to be s o c i a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d i n p r o p o r t i o n s f i x e d by 
munitions and o t h e r r equirements. Such r e s o u r c e dependency 
a l t e r s the b a r g a i n i n g power of labour i n the s t a t e and 
f a c i l i t a t e s i t s a b i l i t y to e x t r a c t c o n c e s s i o n s on working con-
d i t i o n s and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y d u r i n g the war and promises about 
2 
l i f e come the peace. T h i s n o t i o n t h a t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n was 
produced by a n e g o t i a t e d exchange appears born o u t by the 
r h e t o r i c o f the a c t o r s themselves. The n o t i o n of a 'people's 
peace', as the q u i d pro quo f o r c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n the war e f f o r t , 
can be found as f a r back as the 1940 Labour P a r t y c o n f e r e n c e ^ 
D i s c u s s i o n around of the N a t i o n a l E x e c u t i v e Committee document 
'Home P o l i c y ' , t a l k e d of s a c r i f i c e s being r e p a i d i n economic 
s e c u r i t y and a good st a n d a r d of l i v i n g by the use of the organ-
i z a t i o n of war f o r the s o c i a l p l a n n i n g of peace, and b u i l d i n g a 
'iNew B r i t a i n ' . C o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s who had begun to c h a r a c t e r -
i z e the s t r u g g l e as an i m p e r i a l i s t war were t o l d by Morrison 
When we have pl a y e d our p a r t f u l l y we s h a l l 
have won i n t h i s country a g r e a t e r r e s p e c t than 
we have today aind a g r e a t e r power gr^p o v e r the 
c a p i t a l i s t system on the home f r o n t . 
1. Beer, Modern B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s , p.215. 
2. f o r a modern t h e o r e t i c a l treatment of 'exchange power' and 
the r e s o u r c e s a s s o c i a t e d with i t , see Hamilton, M-, 'An 
A n a l y s i s and Typology of S o c i a l Power', PART I I Philosophy 
of S o c i a l S c i e n c e 7, (1977), pp.51-65. 
3. LPCR, 1940, p.133. 
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On a t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l the i s o l a t i o n of t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y war 
o r g a n i z a t i o n and the r e q u i r e d degree of p u b l i c support and 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war as important c a s u a l f a c t o r s i n the growth 
of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n and s o c i a l p o l i c y , have been a m b i t i o u s l y 
s t a t e d by A n d r e s k i . ^ I n r e t u r n f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n and support 
s o c i a l p r i v i l e g e s and.income l e v e l l i n g take p l a c e . T h i s , 
however, w i l l only follow, a c c o r d i n g to A n d r e s k i , i f the population 
mass i n v o l v e d i n the war r e a c h e s a c e r t a i n c r i t i c a l l e v e l * " ^ 
T h i s ' M i l i t a r y P a r t i c i p a t i o n R a t i o ' i s determined by the o b j e c t -
i v e t e c h n i c a l requirements o f war such a s the n e c e s s a r y c o s t 
and e x t e n t of weaponry and an accompanying l e v e l of s o c i a l 
4 
m o b i l i z a t i o n . T h i s h y p o t h e s i s was a p p l i e d and found wanting 
f o r the p e r i o d of the f i r s t world wair by P h i l i p Abrams. He 
c r i t i c i z e s the vagueness o f the concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n without 
a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of i t s n a t u r e and t h e r e f o r e the s o c i a l g a i n t h a t 
i t may b r i n g , ^ P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war i s i n no sense a 
v a l u a b l e i n d i c a t o r of r e a l a c c e s s to the d e c i s i o n making l e v e l s 
a t which s o c i a l p o l i c y i s made. The l a b o u r movement, although 
h e a v i l y i n v o l v e d i n the f i r s t world war, d i d not gain o r 
7 
s e r i o u s l y seek a c c e s s u n t i l a f t e r 1939. A n d r e s k i caJinot- e^qslain 
why,when the second world war was drawing to a c l o s e , s o c i a l 
commitments showed not only a q u a n t a t i v e but a qualitative i n c r e a s e . 
Our own f i n d i n g s suggest the need to r e c o g n i z e government p e r -
1. And r e s k i , S., M i l i t a r y Orqamization and S o c i e t y . (Second e d i t . 
London, Routledge and Kegan Pau l 1968). 
2. i b i d . , p.29. 
3. i b i d . , p . 3 3 . 
4. i b i d . 
5. Abramst P., 'The F a i l u r e o f S o c i a l Reform:1918-20». 
P a s t and Pr e s e n t 24 ( A p r i l 1963), pp.43-64. 6. i b i d . , p.59 
7. i b i d . , p.61 
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c a p t i o n of p o s s i b l e s o c i a l c o n f l i c t t h a t would a r i s e i n peace-
time i f nothing was done i n terms of s o c i a l and economic con-
c e s s i o n . The attempt to n e u t r a l i z e s o c i a l f o r c e s by c a t e r i n g 
to p e r c e i v e d e x p e c t a t i o n s was developed f i r s t l y , w i t h r e f e r e n c e 
to the b i t t e r phase of c l a s s s t r u g g l e between 1918 and 1920 and 
secondly, w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y i n mind t h a t p o l i t i c a l support 
might i n c r e a s e f o r those appearing to t h r e a t e n normal p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and c u l t u r e . 
Both Calder"^ and Addison^ have noted, i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
works, C h u r c h i l l ' s e a r l y d e s i r e to postpone c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n u n t i l a f t e r the war, by r e f u s i n g to c o n s i d e r 
s p e c i f i c war aims on the grounds of p o s s i b l e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h 
m i l i t a r y o b j e c t i v e s and the l a t e r concern t h a t the f u t u r e , and 
p o s s i b l y t i g h t , post war economy should not be mortgaged."^ T h i s , 
however, became i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to s u s t a i n when the 
i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s of the government r e v e a l e d o p i n i o n , common 
to troops and c i v i l i a n workers, t h a t t h i s p r o s p e c t was c o n s i d e r -
ably unpopular. The M i n i s t r y of Information summing up a whole spate 
1. C a l d e r , A., The People's War; B r i t a i n 1939-45. ("London, 
Jonathan Cape 1969), p.98. 
2. Addison, P., The Road to 1945, p.126. 
3. i b i d . , pp.220-1. 
4- Weekly 'Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Reports' were produced f o r the 
government by the M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n . P a r a l l e l w i t h 
Mass Observation, s u b j e c t s of 'concern' were not i n c l u d e d 
u n l e s s a percentage of the t o p i c s had been r a i s e d i n a l l 
r e g i o n s . Checks were made to see i f they were constamt over 
time. Regional I n f o r m a t i o n O f f i c e r s ( R . I . O . s ) would nominate 
s e c r e t l i s t e n e r s such as p u b l i c a n s , who were v a l u a b l e by 
being i n c o n t a c t w i t h a wide number of people. The r e g i o n a l 
o f f i c e r s would compile a r e p o r t aind the r e p o r t s from a l l 
r e g i o n s would be c o l l a t e d i n London where the common elements 
were drawn out, supplemented by m a t e r i a l gathered from p o s t a l 
c e n s o r s h i p and a f i n a l weekly r e p o r t s e n t to the M i n i s t e r . 
For more i n f o r m a t i o n see Cab. 66/31 C a b i n e t Paper WP(42)548 
25th November 1942 'Assessment o f P u b l i c F e e l i n g a t Home' 
25th November 1942. Memo by M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n . 
A w e l l r e s e a r c h e d but r a t h e r narrowly f o c u s s e d study of the 
M i n i s t r y of Inf o r m a t i o n p u b l i s h e d a f t e r t h i s c h a p t e r was 
d r a f t e d u t i l i z e s the same documentation that the author of t h i s 
t h e s i s gleaned from the f i l e s and a p p l i e d h e r e . See McLaine, I . , 
M i n i s t r y of Morale;Home F r o n t Morale and the M i n i s t r y of 
Inf o r m a t i o n i n World War I I . (London, A l l e n & Unwin 1976)Ch.6. 
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of early P o s t a l C e n s o r s h i p and Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Reports, noted t h a t 
there was a c o n t r a d i c t o r y f e e l i n g amongst the p u b l i c t h a t w h i l e 
t h i n g s would probably 'never be the same agad-n' many f e a r e d t h a t 
the post war s i t u a t i o n 'may be as bad as the l a s t one'. 'There 
i s a d e c l i n i n g b e l i e f i n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , p a r t y programmes and 
even P a r l i a m e n t i t s e l f . People were demanding f u l l employment, 
p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t u n f a i r d i s m i s s a l , o l d age p e n s i o n s , i . e . 
' o c c u p a t i o n a l and economic s e c u r i t y ' , a ' l e v e l l i n g up o f income 
w i t h a h i g h e r minima and a lower maxima' and 'an equa l chance 
f o r a l l c h i l d r e n ' • Such o p i n i o n s 
seem to be f a i r l y widespread amongst the more 
r e f l e c t i v e members of a l l c l a s s e s throughout 
the country, not l e a s t members o f the armed 
s e r v i c e s ajid sometimes they a r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
am a d m i r a t i o n f o r R u s s i a . 
The o f f i c i a l s were wo r r i e d t h a t the government, j u d g i n g by 
the Paymaster-General's r e c e n t speech were not going f a r enough. 
Good i n t e n t i o n s should be supplemented by p l a n n i n g and p r o g r e s s 
r e p o r t s . ^ The unemployment i s s u e f i g u r e d a g a i n and aga i n i n 
r e p o r t s not only with those who had memories o f the 1930's but 
a l s o with younger men.^ The argument, which had been s t r e s s e d 
by C h u r c h i l l i n Cabinet"^ and which had been r e f l e c t e d i n p u b l i c 
statements t h a t we must c o n c e n t r a t e on winning the war was not 
a p p r e c i a t e d . The u n p o p u l a r i t y of. a goal ess war was b e l i e v e d 
to be a f f e c t i n g the war e f f o r t i n terms of morale^ and t h e r e f o r e 
of o u t p u t ^ i n the munitions f a c t o r i e s where apathy and in d i f f e r e n c e 
1. INFl/864. Post War Aims and R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P r o b l ems, October 
1941-3. Notes f o r M i n i s t e r of In f o r m a t i o n , 2 1 s t A p r i l 1942. 
2. INF 1/292. Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Weekly Reports, 26th February 1942 and 24th November 1941. 
3. Cab 66/33. Ca b i n e t Paper WP(43)18, i 2 t h January 1943. Promises 
about Post War C o n d i t i o n s . Note by Prime M i n i s t e r . 
4. INF 1/292. Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Weekly Report. 24th November 1941. 
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were commonplace.^ I n a d d i t i o n ^ a n d more i m p o r t a n t l y f o r the 
future, the absence of government response was seen as s t i m u l a t i n g 
i d e a s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s o u t s i d e the acc e p t e d framework. 
Cyni c i s m towards e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c i a n s r e g a r d i n g i n t e n t i o n s on 
the implementation of the popular Beveridge Report on s o c i a l 
i n s u r a n c e was e v i d e n t ; people remembered what had happened to 
the 'land f i t f o r heroes l a s t time'. T h i s c y n i c i s m was mixed 
with anger, 'Things would be u n p l e a s a n t and th e r e would be h e l l 
to pay'"^. Some f e e l i n g f o r what the M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n 
c a l l e d 'Home grown s o c i a l i s m ' was a l s o p r e v a l e n t . While some 
of t h i s was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the Communist and Common- Wealth 
P a r t i e s : the l a t t e r having some impact a t b y - e l e c t i o n s , 
i t does not owe a l l e g i a n c e to any p a r t i c u l a r 
p a r t y but e x p r e s s e s a resentment of the system 
which has given so much power to so few people'* 
I n the E a s t e r n Region t h e r e was a " d e s i r e among the working 
c l a s s e s f o r some s o r t o f post war new ord e r , aimed a t r e d u c i n g 
the g u l f between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' There are 
r e f e r e n c e s to the need of ' s o c i a l i s m i n i t s p u r e s t form i n t h i s 
country a f t e r the war* and 'to t h i s end they mean to make t h e i r 
v o i c e s heard when the op p o r t u n i t y p r e s e n t s i t s e l f ' . ^ While some 
of t h i s s o c i a l i s t ' f e e l i n g ' can be seen as a s p i n o f f from the 
p o p u l a r i t y of S t a l i n , the R u s s i a n war e f f o r t and t h a t , however 
c r u d e l y c o n c e i v e d , t h e i r ' s was a 'People's Government' which d i d 
1. INF 1/292. Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Weekly Report. 16th March 1942, 
see a l s o INF 1/284, Report on Home Morale No.51, 'Complacency 
i n the F a c t o r i e s ' , 24th September 1943. 
2. INF 1/292. Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Weekly Report. 8 t h December 1942. 
3. INF 1/292. Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Weekly Report. 1 s t December 1942. 
4. INF 1/292. Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Weekly Report. 18th February 1942. (RIO M i d l a n d s ) . 
5. i b i d , see a l s o INFl/282. Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Weekly Report. 28th October 1943. 
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not o f f e r a r e t u r n to economic and s o c i a l i n s e c u r i t y a f t e r the 
war^ i t was a l s o p e r c e i v e d as the r e s u l t of war economy i t s e l f . 
While C h u r c h i l l wanted to c o n s i d e r 
what a c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d to c o u n t e r the tendency 
of the p r e s e n t p u b l i c to f o r g e t the dangers o f 
communism i n t h e i r enthusiasm o v e r the r e s i s t a n c e 
of R u s s i a . 2 
The M i n i s t r i e s o f f i c i a l s noted how f a r the management o f the 
home f r o n t had engendered the s o c i a l i s m . T h e i r e x p r e s s i o n t h a t 
i t was 'home grown' was p a r t i c u l a r l y apt given t h e i r a n a l y s i s 
The R u s s i a n s a r e o p e r a t i n g a g a i n s t the Germans 
beyond e x p e c t a t i o n , so t h a t we cannot c a l l 
communism i n i t s e l f i n e f f i c i e n t . The c o n t r o l by 
the government i n t h i s country of i n d u s t r y , the 
l e v i e s made on e a r n i n g s and upon c a p i t a l a r e a l l 
i n t e g r a l p a r t s of B o l s h e v i k theory ajid the com-
b i n a t i o n of these f a c t o r s i s bound to educate the 
p u b l i c i n t o assuming t h a t communism i s e i t h e r a 
re a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to the pre-war system o f 
democratic theory o r i s a l o g i c a l sequence to the 
wartime system of c o n t r o l . ^ 
There were l i m i t s to combatting t h i s sentiment by 'majiaging' the 
Communist P a r t y ' s second f r o n t campaign as t h e r e were o t h e r 
reasons why such 'home grown s o c i a l i s m ' should a r i s e aind t h i s 
was i d e n t i f i e d e n d l e s s l y by the M i n i s t r y as a ' d i s l i k e o f v e s t e d 
i n t e r e s t s ' , the p o l i c y o f ' f a i r s h a r e s ' , the f e a r o f a po s t war 
slump and the apparent l a c k of s o c i a l reform. There was a need 
To c o n v i n c e a s u s p i c i o u s and h i g h l y s c e p t i a l 
p u b l i c o p i n i o n t h a t the government was i n 
e a r n e s t and t h a t i n s p i t e o f the blainket t h a t 
had been put on d i s c u s s i o n s o f the s u b j e c t , a 
g r e a t d e a l had i n f a c t been done and was being 
done .... the b e l i e f t h a t nothing was being done 
was l i k e l y to have dangerous consequences.^ 
1. f o r t h i s p o p u l a r i t y see I N F l / 2 9 2 . Home I n t e l l i g e n c e V^^eekly 
Reports, l i t h June 1942, 20th May 1942, 11th February 1942, 
11th March 1942. 
2. Addison, The Road to 1945, p.135. 
3. i b i d . 
4. I N F l / 6 8 3 . Post War Re c o n s t r u c t i o n - . M i n i s t r y P l a n n i n g and P o l i c y 
1942-4. Minutes of meeting between r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 
M i n i s t r y o f I n f o r m a t i o n and the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n S e c r e t a r i a t 
15th J u l y 1943. 
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Nothing i n the r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t the ' s o c i a l i s m ' spoken 
of by o f f i c i a l s was s y s t e m a t i z e d and a r t i c u l a t e d but r a t h e r 
a vague h o s t i l i t y to u n b r i d l e d c a p i t a l i s m w i t h o u t s o c i a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The growing demand f o r gua r a n t e e s t h a t cap-
i t a l i s m be ' c o n t r o l l e d ' , t h a t people ought 'to be t o l d what 
they are f i g h t i n g f o r ' and th a t ' p r i v i l e g e ' s h o u l d not l o s e 
them the next peace was something ' t h a t can be heard wherever 
working men gather together'."^ T h i s overwhelming demand f o r 
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y i n i t s w i d e s t sense, c o m p r i s i n g f u l l employment, 
p r i c e c o n t r o l ' f a i r s h a r e s ' and improved housing, and w e l f a r e 
a s s i s t a n c e , was a l l the more potent f o r i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g 
during wartime, on the home f r o n t and i n the f o r c e s , and was 
r e i n f o r c e d by the i n c r e a s e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of o r g a n i s e d labour 
a t the c e n t r e . F u l l employment had swept away one mode of 
i n d u s t r i a l d i s c i p l i n e , and although t h e r e was agreement to 
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n and a ban on o f f i c i a l s t r i k e s , t h e r e was 
no f r e e z e on wages.^ While d i r e c t i o n of lab o u r had been used^ 
i n d u s t r i e s a p p l y i n g f o r s c h e d u l i n g under the ' E s s e n t i a l work 
Order' were o b l i g e d by Labour M i n i s t e r Bevin to r e c o g n i z e and 
i n s t i t u t e j o i n t n e g o t i a t i n g machinery on r a t e s o f pay and 
improved working c o n d i t i o n s : shop stewards g a i n i n g i n c r e a s e d 
r e c o g n i t i o n i n l i n e w i t h t h i s development. 
1. INFl/679. M i n i s t e r s Memorandum on propaganda 1942. Southern 
Region to Headquarters. 28th A p r i l 1942. 
2. f o r the p a t e r n a l i s m i n v o l v e d i n armed f o r c e s l i f e , see 
Thornton, A.P., The Habit of A u t h o r i t y : P a t e r n a l i s m i n 
B r i t i s h H i s t o r y . (London, George A l l e n and Unwin 1966), 
pp.358-9. 
3. Cal d e r , A-, The People's War: p.115. 
see a l s o B u r r i d g e , T.D., B r i t i s h Labour and H i t l e r ' s War, (London, Duetsh, 1976). 
4. C a l d e r , The People's War, pp.235-8. 
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E x t e n s i v e r e n t c o n t r o l , r a t i o n i n g and food s u b s i d i e s were a l s o 
i n t r o d u c e d with an eye to the r e a c t i o n o f l a b o u r and the exper-
i e n c e of the i n d u s t r i a l u n r e s t of 1916-1917 which had been caused 
by r i s i n g r e n t s , i n f l a t i o n , r i s i n g food p r i c e s and ' p r o f i t e e r i n g ' 
At the c e n t r e t r i p a i r t i t e bodies grew up w i t h roughly equal 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r c a p i t a l and labour, such as the N a t i o n a l J o i n t 
Advisory Committee (1939) f o r manpower d i s t r i b u t i o n problems 
under the M i n i s t r y of Labour, and the N a t i o n a l Production 
Advisory C o u n c i l on I n d u s t r y i n 1941.^ Each government d e p a r t -
ment c o v e r i n g an i n d u s t r y s e t up s i m i l a r ' C o n s u l t a t i v e C o u n c i l s ' . 
A R e c o n s t r u c t i o n J o i n t A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l c o m p r i s i n g r e p r e s e n t -
a t i v e s o f the F . B . I , and the T.U.C. was s e t up i n December, 1942? 
With t h i s network of c o r p o r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n so w i d e l y s p r e a d 
the government was c o n t i n u a l l y reminded of the c l a i m s of l a b o u r . 
While employers and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s were not shy i n u s i n g such 
machinery to back up t h e i r own c l a i m s they, too, would argue f o r 
labour. Some weaker s e c t i o n s of i n d u s t r y , such as the c o t t o n 
manufacturers, opposed the expense o f s o c i a l reform as a t a x on 
e n t e r p r i s e , but o t h e r s such as I . C . I , were more s y m p a t h e t i c . ^ 
Sam C o u r t a u l d thought u n l e s s men i n p o s s e s s i o n a r e prepared to 
adapt themselves and compromise t h e r e was no a l t e r n a t i v e to a 
complete s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n . ^ 
A t t l e e ' s e a r l y c o m plaint t h a t we were i n danger of f i g h t i n g 
a n e g a t i v e ' c o n s e r v a t i v e war'^ was e v i d e n c e d i n June 1942 when 
1. Marwick, A., B r i t a i n i n a Century of T o t a l War. (London, Bodley Head 1968). 
2. Cab 117/203. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l Papers. 
3. Addison, The Road to 1945, pp.214-15. 
4. C a l d e r , The People's War, p.294. 
5. Addison, The Road to 1943, p.121. 
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a l e t t e r addressed to the Prime M i n i s t e r was r e c e i v e d from one 
of the l a r g e s t c e n t r e s o f c o n c e n t r a t e d munition workers, the 
Woolwich Arsenal Shop Stewards Committee.^ I f apathy and low 
output were to be removed workers must have a s s u r a n c e s t h a t the 
war was t h e i r concern - memories of the f a l s e promises o f 1918 
and the d e p r e s s i o n were ' a l l too poignant'. 'The one d e s i r e o f 
the working man i s f o r s e c u r i t y . * What would winning the war 
mean i n terms of the f u t u r e ? The whole o b j e c t o f government 
p o l i c y i n the post war p e r i o d should be 'economic s e c u r i t y f o r 
the working p o p u l a t i o n * . The c i v i l s e r v a n t s who a p p r a i s e d the 
l e t t e r thought t h a t , d e s p i t e i t s 'communist i n s p i r a t i o n ' , i t 
was g e n e r a l l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the f e e l i n g s of workers and 
suggested t h e r e was need f o r a s s u r a n c e s on many o f the p o i n t s 
r a i s e d . The e a r l y and r a t h e r vague aim of the i n i t i a l Committee 
on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n problems o f 
p e r p e t u a t i o n of the N a t i o n a l U n i t y a c h i e v e d 
i n war through a s o c i a l and economic s t r u c t u r e 
designed to s e c u r e e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y and 
s e r v i c e among a l l c l a s s e s of the co u n t r y ^ 
was l a t e r backed by the warning t h a t any promises should not be 
' f a l s e promises' which would r a i s e hopes ajid provoke b i t t e r d i s -
a l l u s i o n m e n t i f they c o u l d not be c a r r i e d out."^ The r e s u l t 
p r e d i c t e d was one of s o c i a l u n r e s t . 
I f we don't do t h e s e t h i n g s we a r e committing 
o u r s e l v e s to c l a s s w a r f a r e f o r a long time to 
come and we a r e committing our p o l i c y f o r the 
f u t u r e i n t o the hands of those who w i l l not be ^ 
f i t t e d to e x e r c i s e a sound and ba l a n c e d judgement. 
1. Cab 117/201. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n S e c r e t a r i a t . ( R o y a l Ordinance 
F a c t o r i e s ) l e t t e r from Woolwich A r s e n a l Shop Stewards 
Committee, June 1942. 
2. Cab 87/1. Committee on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Problems, 24th February 1941, Terms of Reference. 
3. H.C. Deb, Vol.385, C o l . l 0 7 5 . December 1 s t 1942. Debate on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
4. H.C. Deb, Vol.389, Vol.62-3. May 4th 1943. Debate on Housing. 
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On 6th March, 1943* the Lord P r e s i d e n t t John Anderson wrote to 
Brendan Bracken, the M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n t h a t Home F r o n t 
M i n i s t e r s had been w o r r i e d about 
The e x t e n t to which i n matt e r s o f Post War 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n the f i e l d of p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n 
has been l e f t open to e x t r e m i s t s 
these 'seem to be c a t c h i n g the p u b l i c i m a g i n a t i o n * and i t was 
high time t h a t the balance should be . r e d d r e s s e d 
by g a i n i n g of f a r more moderate and r e a l i s t i c 
views 
M i n i s t e r s should speak more on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . ^ 
That such a r e a l i s a t i o n had reached C h u r c h i l l was evidenced 
by the f a c t t h a t he took time o f f on the 2 1 s t March, 1943, to 
make a long r a d i o speech, which, although q u a l i f i e d by q u e s t i o n s 
of c o s t and warnings of 'easy promises', o u t l i n e d a four y e a r 
plan i n f i v e o r s i x broad p r a c t i c a l a r e a s which i n c l u d e d 
r e b u i l d i n g towns and improved housing, a. N a t i o n a l Health S e r v i c e 
compulsory i n s u r a n c e from c r a d l e to the grave, and f u l l employ-
2 
ment. The government had r e c e i v e d g r e a t i n t e r e s t i n i t s 
e a r l i e r move to i n v e s t i g a t e housing s t a n d a r d s , design,and equip-
ment.- The Dudley Committee, s e t up 20th A p r i l 1942, had been 
extended to take i n s m a l l women's c o n s u l t a t i v e groups, who had 
c o n t a c t s w i t h women's o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n working c l a s s a r e a s . 
The use of q u e s t i o n n a i r e s and re s p o n s e s to press a r t i c l e s . 
!• INFl/864. Post War Aims and R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Problems. Note: 
John Anderson to Brendan " Bracken, March 1943. 
2, C a l d e r , The People's War, p.534. 
3. Women's Housing Advisory Committee nominated by v a r i o u s 
women's o r g a n i s a t i o n s up and down the country, ( f o r i n s t a n c e 
South Wales mining a r e a s ) . HLG 37/62 Design and D w e l l i n g s 
Committee e s p e c i a l l y Note 30th A p r i l , 1943. 
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showed a widespread d e s i r e f o r the guarantee of t h r e e bedroomst 
g r e a t e r s e l f c o n t a i n e d f a c i l i t i e s , cupboards, b u i l t i n ward-
robes, hot water h e a t e r s , k i t c h e n , e l e c t r i c power p o i n t s and 
laundry f a c i l i t i e s , two w.c.*s, ( t o a v o i d bathroom/w.c• 
combination), i n c r e a s e d l i v i n g space, and two rooms on the 
ground f l o o r , (one f o r meals and one f o r f a m i l y a c t i v i t i e s ) . 
The o v e r a l l s i z e of the houses should t h e r e f o r e i n c r e a s e as 
necessary."^ Mass o b s e r v a t i o n had found s i m i l a r f e e l i n g 
2 
independently through i n t e r v i e w i n g . Asked by S i r Seymour 
W i l l i a m s , one of the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 
whether c o s t s should be c o n s i d e r e d , one of the women's o f f i c i a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , a Fulham housewife and J u s t i c e of the Peace 
who had l i v e d i n a slum,^ spoke f o r many when she r e p l i e d *we 
have never c o n s i d e r e d the expense of the war so why should we 
be p a r t i c u l a r about housing*. The f i n a l Dudley Report 
s t r e s s e d t h a t the 
e x p e r i e n c e gained by the v a s t numbers of 
women now i n i n d u s t r y and s e r v i c e s w i l l 
i n f l u e n c e t h e i r a t t i t u d e to housing: f o r 
wartime f a c t o r i e s and h o s t e l s o f t e n p r o v i d e 
high standards of s e r v i c e s and equipment, 
which w i l l make such women i n t o l e r a n t of 
i n f e r i o r c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e i r own house. ^ 
Throughout 1943 and 1944, the M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n had been 
g a t h e r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from up amd down the country that post 
war housing, along w i t h employment, was becoming the 
number one i s s u e i n the p u b l i c mind w i t h the e x i s t e n c e of 
1. HLG 37/63, Design of D w e l l i n g s Committee. 
2. INFl/284, Reports on Home Morale S p e c i a l Report No. 39, 11th 
March 1943. ' P u b l i c f e e l i n g about Housing', Note submitted 
by Mass O b s e r v a t i o n . 
3. D a i l y Telegraph, 2 1 s t A p r i l , 1942, ( q u o t i n g a Mrs. Maggie 
D o l l a r ) . 
4. HLG 37/64, Design of D w e l l i n g s Committee verbatum comments June 1944. 
5. Design of D w e l l i n g s , Report of the Sub-committee of the 
C e n t r a l Housing Ad v i s o r y Committee of the M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h 
( H.M.S.O. 1944), p.6. 
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'apprehension and s c e p t i c i s m about government i n t e n t i o n s * . 
'Unrest i s expected i f r e t u r n i n g servicemen f i n d no houses a v a i l -
able* People i t seemed wanted permanent t r a d i t i o n a l houses and 
de p r e c i a t e d the i d e a of temporary housing.^ E a r l i e r p r e s s s t a t e -
ments t h a t the R u s s i a n s had began house b u i l d i n g had been w i d e l y 
2 
noted. Opinion p o l l s i n 1945 e l e c t i o n r e v e a l e d t h a t housing 
was s t i l l the s t r o n g e s t i s s u e of concern.*^ The M i n i s t r y o f 
Health had r e c e i v e d i n December 1943, a d e p u t a t i o n of r e p r e s e n t -
a t i v e s from the L.C.C., the A s s o c i a t i o n o f M u n i c i p a l Corpor-
a t i o n s , and bodies r e p r e s e n t i n g urban and r u r a l d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l s 
r e p o r t i n g an ' i n s i s t e n t demand f o r houses without any power to 
4 
meet i t . ' The M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n noted t h a t the s i t u -
a t i o n i n London was p a r t i c u l a r l y a c u t e and p r e d i c t e d t h a t the 
temper of the people would not be improved ajid an ugly s i t u a t i o n 
would a r i s e . 'Mass d e p u t a t i o n s c o u l d be expected'. The V bombs 
had made t h i s s i t u a t i o n worse 
of a l l the problems f a c i n g us on the home 
f r o n t , housing i s the most urgent and one of 
the most important from the px^int of view of 
f u t u r e s t a b i l i t y and p u b l i c contentment.^ 
T h i s view was backed up when he r e c e i v e d a d e p u t a t i o n from the 
London Labour P a r t y and Trades C o u n c i l u r g i n g a c o n t r o l l e d 
programme.^ C h a r l e s Key, an E a s t End M.P. t a l k e d i n P a r l i a m e n t 
1. INFl/291, Reports on Home Morale. Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Weekly 
Report, 30th November 1944 ajid 7 t h December 1944. 
2. INFl/282, Home I n t e l l i g e n c e Weekly Report, 14th October 1943. 
3. McCallum, R.B. and Readman, A., The B r i t i s h G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n 
of 1945, (London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1947), p.237. 
4. HLG 101/252, Housing F i n a n c e * ( C o s t s , Rents and S u b s i d i e s ) , 
1942-6, Reports of d e p u t a t i o n . 
5. Cab 124/469, M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n - S e c r e t a r i a t f i l e s , 
5th September 1944, Memo on Housing by M i n i s t e r o f 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
6. Cab 124/469, M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n - S e c r e t a r i a t f i l e s , 
Note to M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , 5th September, 1944. 
49 
of 
s e e i n g volcanoes of s o c i a l d i s c o n t e n t ... 
no l o c a l a u t h o r i t y would be a b l e to s i t on 
t h a t problem and keep i t s people q u i e t . ^ 
That t h i s was not i d l e s p e c u l a t i o n was m a n i f e s t e d i n the housing 
m i l i t a n c y and d i r e c t a c t i o n t h a t o c c u r r e d throughout 1945 
and i n t o 1946. V i g i l a n t e groups o r g a j i i s e d s q u a t t e r s of homeless 
f a m i l i e s and ex-servicemen, f i r s t , t a k i n g over empty m i l i t a r y 
b u i l d i n g s and then empty p r i v a t e f l a t s i n B r i g h t o n and o t h e r 
major c i t i e s . The most notable being the communist l e d 'Sunday 
Squat* i n Kensington, C h e l s e a and S t . Johns Wood. The r e s u l t of 
t h i s was a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the r e t a i n e d wartime r e q u i s i t i o n i n g 
powers a v a i l a b l e to l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , wj.lth. the t h r e a t o f 
f u r t h e r d i r e c t a c t i o n compelling the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s to use 
these powers. At the h e i g h t of the movement 45,000 people were 
s q u a t t i n g i n v a r i o u s forms or o t h e r . ^ 
S i n c e the housing programme was formed be f o r e the outbreak 
of t h i s m i l i t a n c y , we cannot i n t e r p r e t government p o l i c y i n t h i s 
or over the whole f i e l d of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n as b e i n g the r e s u l t of 
' c l a s s s t r u g g l e ' . From the evidence, however, on the r e l a t i o n -
s h i p between s o c i a l dematnds, government p e r c e p t i o n of them and 
p u b l i c p e r c e p t i o n of government.it seems t h a t the s t a t e , 
p o s s e s s i n g a system of o p i n i o n i n t e l l i g e n c e , d e c i d e d to a n t i -
c i p a t e , and thereby h o p e f u l l y f r u s t r a t e , m i l i t c L n c y from a c l a s s 
whose key p o s i t i o n i n the economy enabled i t to d i s r u p t and de-
s t a b i l i z e . T h i s s t r a t e g y was p o s s i b l e because the r e v e a l e d 
1. H.C. Deb, Vol.409, C o l . I l l , 22nd March 1945, Debate on Housing. 
2. For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s on the 1945/6 s q u a t t i n g movement, see 
B a i l e y , R. , The S q u a t t e r s , (Harmonsworth. Penguin 1975). 
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n e g a t i v e and vague a n t i - c a p i t a l i s m had not developed i n t o a 
p o s i t i v e d e s i r e f o r the replacement o f e x i s t i n g power s t r u c t u r e s , 
e i t h e r a t the p o i n t of production, or a t the l e v e l of the s t a g e . 
The a n t i - c a p i t a l i s m was judged to be manageable^by the d e c l a r a t i o n 
and c o n s t r u c t i o n of p o l i c y programmes^because d i s c o n t e n t centred 
on the market e f f e c t s and i n s e c u r i t y engendered by peacetime 
c a p i t a l i s m , r a t h e r than the g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n of ownership and 
c o n t r o l i n p r oduction i t s e l f . What seemed to u n i f y the demands 
i n t o a manageable whole was the apparent d e s i r e f o r the con-
t i n u a t i o n of many of the s o c i a l f e a t u r e s of the war economy 
i n t o peace. What seems to have made p o l i t i c i a n s anxious to 
respond was the f e a r t h a t the s m a l l growth i n support f o r 'home 
grown s o c i a l i s m ' would i n c r e a s e i f t h e r e was d e c o n t r o l on p r i c e s , 
an absence of s o c i a l reform and unemployment. These were the 
e x p e r i e n c e s of the p e r i o d a f t e r the F i r s t World War: people i t 
seemed would not t o l e r a t e r e p e t i t i o n . The second i n c e n t i v e to 
respond was the l i n k between peace p l a n s and morale i n the 
conduct of the war i t s e l f . While we have found i t i m p o s s i b l e 
to c o n s t r u c t any measures which would adequately l i n k the 
p u b l i c a t i o n of p o l i c y documents w i t h improved output f i g u r e s i n 
munitions f a c t o r i e s or enthusiasm f o r b a t t l e on the f r o n t , 
p o l i t i c i a n s b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e was a r e l a t i o n s h i p was r e f l e c t e d 
i n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of war aims propaganda. The l e c t u r e s given 
by and the d i s p u t e s surrounding the Army Bureau o f C u r r e n t 
A f f a i r s , (A.B.C.A.) and the very e x i s t e n c e of such u n o f f i c i a l 
bodies of p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n l i k e the ' C a i r o Parliament' i n the 
B r i t i s h Army i n d i c a t e d a widespread i n t e r e s t i n r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s ques-
tions that c i v i l i a n p l a n n e r s c o u l d not ignore, d e s p i t e t h e i r d i s t a s t e 
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f o r t h i s type of a c t i v i t y . " ^ The l a s t f a c t o r m o t i v a t i n g 
p o l i t i c i a n s was t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s stood some 
chaince of s u c c e s s i n the aims of s t a v i n g o f f d i s c o n t e n t . While 
not a r t i c u l a t e d a t any le n g t h , the o f t mentioned d e s i r e to 
c a t e r f o r the 'moderate', ' s e n s i b l e ' m a j o r i t y r e v e a l s a b a s i c 
t r u s t i n the r e f o r m i s t c h a r a c t e r o f the B r i t i s h working c l a s s , 
which, had been handsomely demonstrated i n the e x t e n t o f 
r e g u l a t i o n and c o n t r o l i n the labour market d u r i n g the war. 
These were of c o u r s e a few e x c e p t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t ought 
to be mentioned v i z . the u n o f f i c i a l d i s p u t e s i n 1943 amd 1944 
tha t broke the n o - s t r i k e agreement. D e s p i t e t h e s e no s i g r d f i c a n t 
movement developed among workers t h a t i n d i c a t e d any p>ositive 
d e s i r e f o r the k i n d of s o c i a l i s m t h a t r e q u i r e d s e l f - a c t i v i t y 
and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n by the workers themselves. While t h i s 
appears to have been the c a s e d u r i n g the F i r s t World War, the 
i s s u e s t h a t l e d to support f o r shop stewards both then and i n 
the Second World War were i s s u e s about wages ajid the i n f r i n g e -
ment of t r a d i t i o n a l t r a d e s union r i g h t s . D e s p i t e being l e d by 
avowed M a r x i s t s i n the former p e r i o d , and i n the famous 1944 
c o a l aJ^d s h i p b u i l d i n g s t r i k e s by supposed T r o t s k y i t e s , such 
g r i e v a n c e s d i d not wi d e l y m o b i l i z e the c l a s s but were s p a t i a l l y 
c o n c e n t r a t e d on c e r t a i n renowned militant enclaves and in the 
l a t t e r p e r i o d were s p o r a d i c and s h o r t l i v e d . T h e government's 
1. Addison, The Road to 1945, pp.217-9. For the ' C a i r o ' P a r l i a -
ment, see H a r r i n g t o n , W., and Young, P.» The B r i t i s h 
R e v o l u t i o n , (London, Davis Poynter 1978), pp.116-17. 
2. Marwick, A., The Deluge; B r i t i s h S o c i e t y and the F i r s t World 
War, (London, McMillan 1965), pp.72-3. 
3. Wigham, E., S t r i k e s and the Goverament 1893-1974, (London, 
McMillan 1976), Ch.6, esp. pp.92-3. 
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o p i n i o n r e s e a r c h , i n d i c a t e d the scope f o r the management of 
d i s c o n t e n t : an apparent d i s t r u s t of p o l i t i c i a n s , y e t a w i l l i n g -
ness to renew t r u s t given some c o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e of p l a n s and 
a c t i o n being taken i n the s h o r t term. Promises would not be 
enough given the memories of such broken pledges a f t e r 1918: 
such memories, the o p i n i o n r e s e a r c h r e v e a l e d , were a l l too 
p>oign£Lnt. Any attempt which i n 1918 had been s u c c e s s f u l of 
running a p a t r i o t i c e l e c t i o n to confirm the e x i s t i n g l e a d e r s h i p 
was b e l i e v e d i n a p p r o p r i a t e , even by C h u r c h i l l who was persuaded 
to run a g a i n s t a background of s o c i a l p o l i c y . The key d i f f e r e n c e 
between 1918 and 1943 was the e x t e n t to which c o n c r e t e p l a n s and 
assumptions about R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and i t s f i n a n c e were made, and 
i n many c a s e s p a r t i a l l y implemented, d u r i n g the war,. 
Thus ther e appears to be some j u s t i f i c a t i o n in t a l k i n g of 
the working c l a s s as a s o c i a l f o r c e i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
p o l i c y . The f a c t t h a t changes and new programmes were made wi t h 
r e f e r e n c e to what people 'wanted*, 'would s t a n d ' o r had come to 
'expect', and t h a t such s e n t i m e n t s were b e l i e v e d to be ..commonly 
h e l d as a c l a s s of f e e l i n g i s e v idence of the government's 
i m p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n of the p o t e n t i a l power of workers and 
s o l d i e r s without i t s e x p l i c i t e x e r c i z e by the c l a s s i t s e l f . T h i s 
power i s not of a type t h a t r e q u i r e s an e m p i r i c a l mani-r. . ' * 
f e s t a t i o h so that we have a equation of reform produced by 
the intended e f f e c t s of m i l i t a n c y . Such a c l a s s i c a l s t i m u l u s -
response view of the o r i g i n s of s o c i a l p o l i c y has been s u b j e c t 
to c r i t i c a l a p p r a i s a l , even i n a r e a s where i t appears most n e a t l y 
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a p p l i e d - f o r i n s t a n c e , the e a r l y r e n t c o n t r o l and housing 
l e g i s l a t i o n . ^ I n so f a r as i n t e r p e r s o n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n S o f power 
can be v a l i d l y u t i l i z e d here, an i n s t a n c e o f power o f t e n 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d as ' r e a c t i o n a l power' seems a p p r o p r i a t e . Thus 
power a c c r u e s to A over-B. when-it i s a f u n c t i o n of B's b e l i e f s about 
A's r e a c t i o n s . ^ S i n c e t h e s e b e l i e f s concern e f f e c t s t h a t a r e 
always p r o s p e c t i v e t h e r e a r e a number o f problems about a t t r i -
buting i m p l i c i t as opposed to m a n i f e s t i n f l u e n c e , not l e a s t the 
f a c t t h a t B may be u t t e r l y mistaken about A's r e s o u r c e s , h i s 
w i l l i n g n e s s to use them, h i s p r e f e r e n c e s and perhaps even h i s 
e x i s t e n c e . Whether such workers and s o l d i e r s were prepared i n 
the 1940's to back up t h e i r demands by a c t u a l m i l i t a n c y , i n the 
absence of government response, i s not something t h a t can be 
demonstrated c o n c l u s i v e l y one way or another. The r e a l p o i n t i s 
th a t the government b e l i e v e d they would and, s i n c e they a c t e d 
on t h a t b a s i s , we c a l l the phenomenum o f working c l a s s power 
r e a l s i n c e i t had the consequences of r e a l i t y . T h i s should not 
however be exaggerated. We cannot deduce from t h i s a n y t h i n g 
other than a c o n t i n u a t i o n i n the b a s i c a l l y r e f o r m i s t n a t u r e of 
those c l a s s demands. The f a c t t h a t such s o c i a l f o r c e s a t the 
time found e l e c t o r a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y r a t h e r than v i o l e n t rank 
and f i l e e x p r e s s i o n r e i n f o r c e s the c o n t e n t i o n made i n c h a p t e r 1 
that the working c l a s s s t i l l looked to the c e n t r e f o r p a t e r n a l -
1. Dickens, P., ' S o c i a l Change, Housing and the S t a t e - Some 
Aspects o f c l a s s f r a g m e n t a t i o n and i n c o r p o r a t i o n 1915-46 
IN M. Harloe (ed.) Papers p r e s e n t e d a t the Conference on 
urban change and c o n f l i c t . U n i v e r s i t y of York 1977, (London 
C e n t r e f o r Environmental S t u d i e s 1978), pp.336-396. 
2. de Crespigny, A., 'Power and i t s Forms' P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s f Vol.16, No.2, 1966, pp.192-205. 
3. Dahl, R., Modern P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , (New York P r e n t i c e H a l l , second e d i t . 1970), pp.30-1. 
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i s t i c l e a d e r s h i p demanding changes i n p o l i c y r a t h e r than 
a l t e r a t i o n s i n the shape and d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n s t i t u t i o n a l power. 
Even those 'home grown' s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s were committed to 
working through e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s and much of t h e i r p o t e n t i a l 
support may have been exaggerated by s o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c o p i n i o n 
anxious to c o n v i n c e those not concerned w i t h the home f r o n t . 
S o c i a l i s m i n the middle 40's was r a r e l y d e f i n e d c o n c r e t e l y . For 
many i n the Labour P a r t y i t seemed to be synonyjnous with a con-
t i n u a t i o n of war c o n t r o l s and a maintenance of the environment 
of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y i n i t s w i d e s t sense. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
e s t i m a t e whether such demands f o r improved housing, h e a l t h and 
f u l l employment were p e r c e i v e d by the working c l a s s as 
n e c e s s i t a t i n g r a d i c a l changes i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e 
and economy merely because they were c l o t h e d i n the r h e t o r i c of 
a n t i - c a p i t a l i s m and ' s o c i a l i s m ' . C e r t a i n l y i t seemed the p u b l i c 
was under no i l l u s i o n t h a t a d i f f e r e n t peacetime economic p o l i c y 
was r e q u i r e d but the b a s i c c o n t o u r s of the new r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between s t a t e and economy t h a t would make i t p o s s i b l e was 
b e l i e v e d a l r e a d y to be i n p l a c e w i t h the k i n d of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
c a p a c i t y and f i n a n c i a l f a c i l i t y e x i s t i n g a t the time, w i t h 
marginal a l t e r a t i o n s and e x t e n s i o n s as r e q u i r e d by the c o n d i t i o n s 
of peace. T h i s was the view of the t r a d e union leadership-^ and 
2 
of the Labour P a r t y . But t h e s e o r g a j i i z a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p s took 
1. T.U.C. I n t e r i m Report on Post War R e c o n s t r u c t i o n (1944) quoted 
p.127 H a r r i n g t o n and Young, The B r i t i s h Re\zblution. 
2. Labour Party, 'Let us Face the F u t u r e ' (1945) i n C r a i g , 
F.W.S. (ed.) B r i t i s h G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n M a n i f e s t o s , 1918-1966 
( C h i c h e s t e r P o l i t i c a l Reference P u b l i c a t i o n s 1970), p.98. 
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t h i s view from the movement as a whole- There i s no e v i d e n c e 
t h a t these bodies spent any time m a n i p u l a t i n g and shaping the 
views of t h e i r members to get them to abandon some more ambitious 
p r e f e r e n c e . The e x t e n t of the movements a t t r a c t i o n f o r i t s 
t r a d i t i o n a l v e h i c l e can be gauged i n the s c a l e o f e l e c t o r a l 
support f o r a Party which had i n the 20's and 30's, r e p e a t e d l y 
demonstrated i t s i n a b i l i t y to impiKne-nt the o b j e c t i v e s of i t s 
manifesto. The chosen c o u r s e i n 1945 was c l e a r f o r a l l those 
who c o u l d read and l i s t e n . I t was the v o i c e of those whose 
e x p e r i e n c e i n war had taught them the t e c h n i q u e s o f a r e g u l a t e d 
aind c o n t r o l l e d c a p i t a l i s m , and the v i r t u e s o f p l a n n i n g . P r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e would s u r v i v e so long as i t s e r v e d the people's 
peace a s i t had the people's war and not the v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s 
of a few. The Housing programme would be the ' r e a l t e s t o f the 
government's r e a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n to put the n a t i o n f i r s t ' . 
SECTION I I : DECISIONS ON CHANGE 
Many of the commitments on r e c o n s t r u c t i o n were made, however, 
long before the e l e c t i o n . The Beveridge r e p o r t p u b l i s h e d i n 1942 
became a symbol f o r the advocates and opponents o f change. The 
C a b i n e t had agreed to p u b l i s h i t but to postpxDne commitment 
u n t i l f u l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n had been given by the new R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
P r i o r i t i e s Committee. I n t h i s , the T r e a s u r y view was' s t a t e d 
s t r o n g l y . Extended s o c i a l s e r v i c e s of t h i s type i n v o l v e d a l a r ge 
1. 'Labour P a r t y 'Let us Face the F u t u r e ' (1945) IN C r a i g , F.W.S 
(ed.) B r i t i s h G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n ManifesJ:os , .p..l02. : 
2. Cab 65/28 C a b i n e t Meeting WM(42')159, 26th November,-• 1942. 
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and c o n t i n u i n g commitment which would be an e x t r a burden on 
i n d u s t r y when c o n s i d e r e d alpngsidis l a r g e peacetime defence c o s t s , 
the need to r e s t o r e t r a d e and e x p o r t s and the a l r e a d y high l e v e l 
of t a x a t i o n . The plan should t h e r e f o r e be d e f e r r e d u n t i l a f t e r 
I . ' 1 the war when we would have a b e t t e r a p p r e c i a t i o n o f our p o s x t i o n . 
The C a b i n e t agreed. While i t might be n e c e s s a r y to acc e p t the 
p r i n c i p l e of f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e s , a comprehensive N a t i o n a l H e a l t h 
S e r v i c e and f u l l employment, no f i r m commitments c o u l d be made. 
As f o r employment p o l i c y i t should be p o i n t e d out t h e r e was no 
2 
f i n a l s o l u t i o n . These views were to be put to P a r l i a m e n t . 
Spurred on by the T.U.C, a determined r e v o l t of n i n e t y - s e v e n 
labour back-benchers l e d the Labour P a r t y m i n i s t e r s i n the 
C o a l i t i o n topush f u r t h e r on t h i s and o t h e r R e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s s u e s ? 
I n June they put forward a j o i n t submission on the 'need f o r 
4 
d e c i s i o n s ' . They argued t h a t to w a i t u n t i l the end of the war 
would mean th a t f i n a n c e f o r the post war b u i l d i n g programme 
would be h e l d up. Could not p r o v i s i o n a l e s t i m a t e s o f the 
N a t i o n a l Income be made b e f o r e then? C h u r c h i l l was a b l e to 
postpone f u l l d i s c u s s i o n u n t i l October when the C a b i n e t went 
i n t o s p e c i a l s e c r e t s e s s i o n to d i s c u s s the i s s u e . ^ His main 
argument was t h a t no c o a l i t i o n government should b i n d i t s 
1. Cab 87/3 Committee on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Problems, January 11th 
1943, Memo by Tr e a s u r y , see a l s o Cab 87/12 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
P r i o r i t i e s Committee meeting 22nd January 1943. 
2. Cab 66/34 C a b i n e t meeting WM(43)28, 12th February 1943. 
3. H a r r i n g t o n and Young, The B r i t i s h R e v o l u t i o n , p.187. 
4. Cab 66/38 Cab i n e t Paper WP(43)255, 26th June 1943, 'Need f o r 
D e c i s i o n s ' J o i n t Memo by Mo r r i s s o n , Bevin and A t t l e e . 
5. Cab 65/36 Cabinet meeting WM(43)140, 14th October 1943, 
see a l s o c o n f i d e n t i a l annexe, Cab 65/40. 
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s u c c e s s o r and i n the absence o f f i r m promises by the labour 
l e a d e r s h i p to continue the c o a l i t i o n no commitments should be 
made. Bevin and Morrison were on d i f f i c u l t ground here. They 
wished to make no promise of co n t i n u e d c o a l i t i o n . I n s t e a d they 
argued t h a t there were many i s s u e s which r a i s e d no p a r t y con-
t r o v e r s y and the b u i l d i n g programme was one of t h e s e which 
would be h e l d up u n l e s s the f i n a n c i a l go-aheads were g i v e n . The 
Prime M i n i s t e r agreed to review the p o s i t i o n and f i v e days 
l a t e r produced a paper which s t a t e d t h a t p l a n s and d e c i s i o n s on 
food and employment should be taken 'whether or not they a r e 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l ' . Whatever government was e l e c t e d post war 
s o c i e t y would c o n s i s t o f a l a r g e amount of 'p r o g r e s s and reform' 
on which p r e l i m i n a r y l e g i s l a t i o n must be planned i n o r d e r to be 
ready.^ A ' t r a n s i t i o n ' p e r i o d of two y e a r s was o u t l i n e d i n 
which l o n g e r term problems i n c l u d i n g the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of 
i n d u s t r y would be h e l d over. The immediate d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
the t r a n s i t i o n would be food, employment, e x p o r t s and recon-
v e r s i o n of i n d u s t r y to peace. The i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t the b u i l d i n g 
programme and new housing would be one of the i t e m s on the long 
term l i s t drew c r i t i c i s m from o t h e r s in the C a b i n e t t h a t t h i s 
would l e a v e ex-servicemen and young married c o u p l e s without anything 
to look forward to i n the s h o r t term and i t was the sense o f the 
meeting t h a t these too should be i n c l u d e d among the schemes f o r 
which a c t i o n had to be reported and d e c i s i o n s of p r i n c i p l e taken i f 
1. Cab. 65/42 Cabinet Paper WP(43)467. 19th October 1943. 
'V\/ar T r a n s i t i o n and Peace'. Memo by the Prime M i n i s t e r 
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necessary.''' " ^ t some doubt remained about the d e c i s i o n s 
taken t h a t day and we s h a l l see i n the next c h a p t e r on the 
formation of the programme t h a t the i s s u e was f a r from s e t t l e d 
w i t h regard to the p r o v i s i o n of new housing. N e v e r t h e l e s s the 
vagueness of C h u r c h i l l ' s formula about s h o r t term and long term 
o b j e c t i v e s - i . e . t h a t ' i n the war we should p l a n f o r the t r a n s -
i t i o n and i n the t r a n s i t i o n we should plan f o r peace', meant 
t h a t i n e f f e c t , p l a n n i n g would begin i n the implementation of 
most of the s o c i a l measures ( i n c l u d i n g Beveridge and the housing 
programme) bef o r e the war ended, s i n c e the s h o r t t r a n s i t i o n 
s tage was the stage a t which many m i n i s t e r s agreed the p u b l i c 
would be most concerned w i t h e v i d e n c e of government i n t e n t i o n s . 
Once some s o r t o f green l i g h t had been given a t the October 
meeting, m i n i s t e r s and departments proceeded on the b a s i s of 
t h e i r autonomy and the p r e s s u r e s b e a r i n g i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
f i e l d s . The e x p e r i e n c e of 1918 was t h a t the s e p a r a t e M i n i s t r y 
of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n p l a n n i n g i t s own schemes auid o n l y u s i n g the 
Departments as t o o l s had broken down as the departments r e s e n t e d 
a p o l i c y being imposed on them. I n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of 1943, 
t h i s would have been the most r a t i o n a l px5licy i f C h u r c h i l l ' s 
o b j e c t i v e of keeping plsuis phased a c c o r d i n g to h i s scheme was 
to be a c h i e v e d . The s e r i o u s n e s s of t h i s i n t e n t i o n however must 
be q u e s t i o n e d i n view o f the f a c t t h a t h i s appointment of Lord 
Woolton as ' M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n * w i t h a s t a f f o f f i v e was 
no more than a f o r m a l i s a t i o n o f the p r e v i o u s p o s t s of ' r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t y f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' h e l d by the m i n i s t e r s w i t h o u t P o r t -
1. Cab 65/36 Cab i n e t meeting WM(43)144, 2 1 s t October 1943 
( C o n f i d e n t i a l Annexe). 
2. f o r a f u l l account, see Johnson, P.B., Land F i t f o r Heroes; 
The P l a n n i n g of B r i t i s h R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 1916-1919 ( U n i v e r s i t y 
of Chicago P r e s s 1969). 
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f o l i o . There was to be no c e n t r a l department of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
and even the aim of t h i s m i n i s t e r was to 'push s t r a g g l e r s ' atnd 
i n s p i r e departments r a t h e r than one of e x e r c i s i n g c a u t i o n . ^ The 
r e a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n f u n c t i o n was r e s e r v e d f o r the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
Committee on which Labour P a r t y m i n i s t e r s i n the c o a l i t i o n 
e x e r c i s e d equal i n f l u e n c e owing to t h e i r command of some of the 
key home f r o n t m i n i s t r i e s . _ Even i n m i n i s t r i e s they d i d not 
c o n t r o l , a c t i o n was pushed by d e c i s i o n s on m a j o r i t y vote i n the 
main committee. By the end o f 1944 White Papers on a N a t i o n a l 
H e a l t h S e r v i c e ; f u l l employment and S o c i a l S e r v i c e s (lairgely based on 
Beveridge) had been p u b l i s h e d and d r a f t implementing p r o p o s a l s 
were being prepared a t o f f i c i a l l e v e l . An E d u c a t i o n B i l l reached 
the s t a t u t e book and i n March 1945 the Housing p r o p o s a l s were 
ready. That C h u r c h i l l had made a long r e t r e a t on the q u e s t i o n 
of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n from the very f i r s t days of the 'War Aims' 
d i s c u s s i o n s i s not i n doubt. But t h i s o p p o s i t i o n cannot be 
l o c a t e d simply a t C h u r c h i l l ' s door. The Prime M i n i s t e r was 
backing and supporting the o p p o s i t i o n of one o f the p r i n c i p a l 
Departments of S t a t e , the T r e a s u r y . There was a d u a l i s m i n the 
p o l i c y o f the Prime Minister a t t h i s time. The s t a t e of the 
p u b l i c mood demanded r e a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n y e t the argument of 
c o s t seemed to q u a l i f y the response to i t . T h i s can be seen i n 
C h u r c h i l l ' s 1943 r a d i o speech, where, having mentioned a f o u r 
y e a r p l a n of r e a l p r a c t i c a l measures on the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , 
housing, education, h e a l t h and f u l l employment, he t r e a t e d the 
1. Cab 66/43 Cab i n e t Paper WP(43)538, 26th November 1943, 
M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Memo by Prime M i n i s t e r . 
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p u b l i c to a homily on 'housewives budgeting'. But w h i l e the 
T r e a s u r y ' s p o s i t i o n was s t r o n g h i s t o r i c a l l y , i t s power to 
i n f l u e n c e was l e s s owing to the de-emphasis i n th e war economy 
on f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t and the replacement o f a.concern w i t h 
money v a l u e s and flows w i t h p h y s i c a l units» such a s labour and 
sh i p p i n g space. Keynesian economics w i t h i n the T r e a s u r y meant 
t h a t the p u r e l y budgetary q u e s t i o n of burden and debt i n v o l v e d 
i n p u b l i c expenditure c o u l d always be argued from the a l t e r n a -
t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e of m a i n t a i n i n g e f f e c t i v e demand; the Beveridge 
p r o p o s a l s tendung to i n c r e a s e working c l a s s income^" and t h e r e f o r e 
the p r o p e n s i t y to consume and the b u i l d i n g programme by v i r t u e 
o f the m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t of s t a t e induced c a p i t a l investment. 
T h i s new Keynesian r a t i o n a l e , s t r e n g t h e n e d by i t s s u c c e s s e s i n 
2 
the macro-management of war f i n a n c e gained g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e 
over T r e a s u r y thinking*^^ and seemed to make the reformed c a p i t a l -
ism, t h a t everyone agreed was n e c e s s a r y , auid the i n t r i n s i c 
m e r i t s o f p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l reforms i n themselves, p o s s i b l e 
the c r i t i c a l f a c t o r was never the p o s s i b i l i t y of change but 
s o c i a l n e c e s s i t y . I n the middle of June, 1944, the T r e a s u r y made 
1. P o l l a r d , S., The Development of the B r i t i s h Economy 1914-67, 
(London, Edward Arnold Second E d i t i o n 1969) pp.322-30. 
2 . see S a y e r s , R.S., F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1939-45, H i s t o r y of the 
Second World War C i v i l S e r i e s t (London H.M.S.O. 1956). 
3 . T h i s should be q u a l i f i e d . The t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s i n the T r e a s u r y 
l e a d by S i r R i c h a r d Hopkins* i t s permanent head, fought a 
s t r o n g r e a r guard a c t i o n a g a i n s t Keynesiaui t h i n k i n g , as the 
d r a f t i n g of the f u l l employment p r o p o s a l s 1941-44, i n i t s 
v a r i o u s forms ( i n the many R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committees) r e v e a l . 
The f i n a l white paper i n 1944 Employment P o l i c y Cmnd. 6527, 
(London, H.M.S-O. May 1944), b e a r s the mark of compromise 
e s p e c i a l l y i n the s e c t i o n on d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . D e s p i t e t h i s ^ 
the change s i n c e the 1920's/30's was c o n s i d e r a b l e . Then the 
'Treasury View' was very s t r o n g l y entrenched, s e e S k i d e l s k y , 
R., P o l i t i c i a n s and the Slump ; the Labour Government 1929-31 
(London, McMillan 1967), esp. the Appendix,Treasury Memo 1931 
'S t a t e Borrowing'. 
Yet 
i t s 
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one of i t s l a s t d i t c h attempts to h a l t the momentum and to 
prevent the p u b l i c a t i o n of a s o c i a l i n s u r a n c e White Paper. I t 
complained of 'long t e r m ^ c o n t i n u i n g and expanding s c a l e o f 
commitments' which would l e a v e ' l i t t l e room f o r r e m i s s i o n of 
t a x a t i o n , paying o f f the n a t i o n a l debt and encouraging the 
r e v i v a l o f e n t e r p r i s e ' ; i t would e f f e c t i v e l y 'mortgage the 
f u t u r e ' . ^ Such arguments were banished by the C a b i n e t vote not 
to go a g a i n s t the trend by which i n d u s t r i a l e f f i c i e n c y was seen 
as much i n terms of p r o v i d i n g an 'element of s t a b i l i t y ' through 
contentment; The C h a n c e l l o r was t o l d t h a t t h e r e was 'considerable 
p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n the scheme p a r t i c u l a r l y among the f i g h t i n g 
f o r c e s ' . Delay would be m i s i n t e r p r e t e d . 
We have argued i n t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t p a r t i c u l a r p i e c e s of 
s o c i a l reform were o c c a s i o n e d as much by t h e i r g e n e r a l and 
common r e l a t i o n to the q u e s t i o n of s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y and p o l i t i c a l 
c o h esion as to t h e i r i n t r i n s i c m e r i t as d i s c r e t e p o l i c y reforms. 
S i n c e t h e i r f i n a n c i a l p x > s s i b i l i t y depended on the adoption o f a 
new economic p o l i c y which was a l s o , by v i r t u e o f i t s f u l l employ-
ment o b j e c t i v e s , i t s e l f i n t e nded to m a i n t a i n suppx^rt,*^ the whole 
f u t u r e o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n was i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d to the q u e s t i o n 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e and economy. 
In the c o n d i t i o n s of the immediate post war p e r i o d i t was 
p r e d i c t e d t h a t the l i k e l y economic s i t u a t i o n would be one of 
shorta g e s and i n f l a t i o n . I n such a s i t u a t i o n c l a i m s on r e s o u r c e s 
1. Cab 66/52 Cab i n e t Paper WP(44)353, 28th June 1944, Post War 
F i n a n c i a l Commitments memo by the C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer. 
2. Cab 65/43 C a b i n e t Meeting WM(44)87, 4 th J u l y 1944. 
3. One of the very f i r s t d r a f t s o f the e v e n t u a l White Paper on 
Employment P o l i c y on 8 t h J u l y , 1941, r e f e r r e d to the 
'prevention of s o c i a l i n s e c u r i t y and u n r e s t ' . Cab 117/23 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n O f f i c e C o u n c i l Papers. 
4. See S e c t i o n I I I . 
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wou. I d be s o r t e d out by the power of money, the r i c h h a v i ng the 
l a r g e s t say by v i r t u e o f t h e i r a b i l i t y i n such i n f l a t i o n to 
command the ' e f f e c t i v e demand'. The i n t e r v e n t i o n of the s t a t e 
would have to go t h a t one s t e p f u r t h e r i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , f o r 
the only way of e n f o r c i n g the s o c i a l p r i o r i t i e s and p o l i t i c a l 
i m p e r a t i v e s of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n was by the d e c i s i o n to r e t a i n 
s u b s t a n t i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s over the market. These 
c o n t r o l s had been used r e l a t i v e l y s u c c e s s f u l l y i n the war economy* 
t h e i r purpose now i n the minds of t h e i r s t r o n g e s t s u p p o r t e r s , i t 
seemed, would be to i n s u l a t e the n a t i o n from i n d i s c r i m i n a t e 
economic forces'^, to c r e a t e the s t a b i l i t y and s e c u r i t y through 
which s o c i a l reform would s u r v i v e and f o r p u b l i c contentment to 
be r e t a i n e d . The mechanism of "_. c o n t r o l would h e l p e f f e c t , 
l i k e i n the war, a weighted h i e r a r c h y of o b j e c t i v e s i n which 
' f i r s t t h i n g s s h a l l come f i r s t ' . 
SECTION I I I ; THE FRAMEWORK OF CONTROLS 
A number of s e p a r a t e but r e l a t e d i s s u e s surrounded the 
r e t e n t i o n of c o n t r o l s . F i r s t l y , as we s h a l l see i n c h a p t e r 3, 
t h e r e were d e v i c e s to d i r e c t r e s o u r c e s f o r p a r t i c u l a r programmes 
i n s u l a t i n g r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and c r e a t i n g a c l i m a t e o f extended 
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y . Secondly, t h e r e was the problem o f how to 
a c h i e v e f u l l employment without i n f l a t i o n . With the r e t u r n to 
peace both workers and c a p i t a l i s t s would t r y and spend the 
s a v i n g s they had been f o r c e d to hoard i n the war. A consumer and 
1. C o n t t o l s would c o n t r o l 'economic b l i z z a r d s and f o r c e s ' see 
Labour Manifesto 'Let us Face the F u t u r e ' IN C r a i g , ( e d . ) 
B r i t i s h General E l e c t i o n M a n i f e s t o s , p.98. 
2. i b i d . , p.101. 
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investment boom would develop a t the same time the s t a t e i t s e l f 
wished to command r e s o u r c e s . C o n t r o l s would ease the i n f l a t i o n -
a ry p r e s s u r e . L a s t l y i t was f e l t t h a t the c o n t r o l s c o u l d be 
u t i l i z e d i n t r a n s f e r s where p r i o r i t i e s and c o n s e q u e n t l y the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s needed to be changed between the major 
c l a i m a n t s o f consumption, inves t m e n t and e x p o r t s . 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n we w i l l expamd on the r a t i o n a l e f o r con-
tinu e d c o n t r o l s , the importance of the consensus t h a t surrounded 
t h a t r a t i o n a l e and some b u i l t i n l i m i t s to t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s . 
Bevin made ex t r a v a g a n t c l a i m s f o r what c o u l d be a c h i e v e d . 
I f we c o u l d keep the c o n t r o l s f o r f i v e y e a r s * we need not f e a r 
f o r the next one hundred y e a r s * . He s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e i r aim 
would be to prevent a s h o r t i n f l a t i o n a r y boom c r a s h i n g i n t o a 
slump. I f we allowed t h a t to o c c u r 'we should have l o s t the war'. 
The immediate problem a f t e r the war was l i k e l y to be i n f l a t i o n * 
A major p a r t of consumer p r o d u c t i o n had stopped d u r i n g the war. 
The r e s u l t was(encouraged by v o l u n t a r y methods and i n c r e a s e d 
i n d i r e c t and d i r e c t t a x a t i o n ) a high l e v e l of s a v i n g t h a t would 
want to be turned i n t o post war spending. B u s i n e s s e s had s i m i l a r 
accumulated funds a s a r e s u l t o f war damage compensation, e x c e s s 
p r o f i t s taoc repayments, ( 2 0 % on the 100% p r o f i t s d u t y ) , un-
d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s and accumulated d e p r e c i a t i o n a l l o w a n c e s . 
T h i r d l y , the government wanted to push aiiead w i t h i t s own 
extended expenditure, c u r r e n t and c a p i t a l , coming under the " 
head of s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . The i m p l i c a t i o n d r i v e n home aga i n 
and again i n committee was t h a t any sudden withdrawal of wartime 
c o n t r o l s would have meant a huge p u r c h a s i n g power and then a 
massive aggregate demand r e l a t i v e to the supply o f goods.^ The 
1. Cab 87/55 O f f i c i a l Committee on Post War I n t e r n a l Economic 
Problems, 26th May 1942. 'The Post War R e l a t i o n between 
p u r c h a s i n g power and consumer goods*. Memo by T r e a s u r y 
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r e s u l t i n g r i s i n g p r i c e l e v e l would h i t the n e c e s s a r y r e v i v a l of 
the export t r a d e , and, although r i s i n g p r i c e s would c a n c e l out 
the e x c e s s demand, i t would do so i n a way i n which s u p p l i e s 
would be skewed towards the r i c h . F i s c a l p o l i c y f o r the c l a w i n g 
back of p u r c h a s i n g power by i n d i r e c t and d i r e c t taixation would 
not work by i t s e l f and tax e s were a l r e a d y h i g h . The only o t h e r 
a l t e r n a t i v e was to use monetary p o l i c y : dear money and c u t s i n 
p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e and r a i s i n g o f i n t e r e s t r a t e s w i t h c u t s i n 
government debt. Yet such a d e f l a t i o n a r y move would go 
a g a i n s t the i m p l i e d s e t t l e m e n t w i t h the working c l a s s : f o r the 
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e e f f e c t s o f dear money would tend to c u t back on 
' p r i o r i t y * as w e l l as c a p i t a l . p r o j e c t s that-were not 
immediately p r o f i t a b l e , w h i l e c u t s i n c u r r e n t budgetary expend-
i t u r e would put a l l the w e l f a r e reforms promised i n jeopardy. I f 
d e f l a t i o n went so f a r as to cause s t a t i c o r f a l l i n g s e l l i n g 
p r i c e s t h e r e would be attempts to match t h i s by r e d u c i n g c o s t s 
i n c l u d i n g wages l e a d i n g to the s o r t of i n d u s t r i a l u n r e s t of the 
1920*s t h a t had ended i n the g e n e r a l s t r i k e . To the e x t e n t t h a t 
c o s t s c o u l d not be reduced unemployment would re-appear. 
Yet the government d i d have a c h o i c e a t the end of the war. 
There had been no d e c i s i o n , as i n 1918, to r e t u r n to the gold 
standard or a t a p a r i t y t h a t would make d e f l a t i o n v i t a l . So i t 
was e v e n t u a l l y decided t h a t d i r e c t c o n t r o l s c o u l d balcince 
aggregate demand with supply. R a t i o n i n g would p r e v e n t e x c e s s 
consumer expenditure and encourage s a v i n g to be ma i n t a i n e d . 
B u i l d i n g l i c e n c e s , l i m i t a t i o n of supply o r d e r s , s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n 
( u t i l i t y models) and m a t e r i a l l i c e n c e s would keep investment and 
production down to the c a p a c i t y expected to be a v a i l a b l e f o r 
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both c l a i m s of the s t a t e and p r i v a t e s e c t o r s on immediate post 
war r e s o u r c e s . L i c e n s i n g would be a mode of a l l o c a t i n g which 
would enable the p o l i t i c a l l y d e cided non-market c a t e g o r y of 
' p r i o r i t y ' to be imposed and ' e s s e n t i a l * p r o d u c t i o n to go ahead 
a t the expense of ' i n e s s e n t i a l * . A s i m i l a r mechanism c o u l d be 
a p p l i e d to imports, given the s h o r t a g e s of f o r e i g n exchange, 
and an import l i c e n c e would be needed be f o r e f o r e i g n exchange 
c o u l d be withdrawn. Labour c o u l d be a l l o c a t e d on the b a s i s of 
p r i o r i t y by some measure of l a b o u r regulation,"^ We s h a l l see, 
i n more d e t a i l , the c o n n e c t i o n between the need f o r c o n t r o l and 
the p r o v i s i o n of the n e c e s s a r y b a s i s f o r the government induced 
b u i l d i n g programme i n the next c h a p t e r . 
The consensus on c o n t r o l s emerged from d i s c u s s i o n of the 
p a s t as w e l l as the probable s t a t e of the f u t u r e . From the very 
beginning the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee took l e s s o n s from the 
e x p e r i e n c e of World War One, u t i l i z i n g the r e s e a r c h e r s a t 
N u f f i e l d C o l l e g e , Oxford, who were s u r v e y i n g the p a s t w i t h an 
2 
eye to the f u t u r e . One of the seminal memorandums the 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n machinery d i g e s t e d was Tawney's ' A b o l i t i o n of 
Economic C o n t r o l s ' which was l a t e r p u b l i s h e d i n a r t i c l e form.^ 
T h i s argued t h a t the government a f t e r the F i r s t World War had 
never judged the u t i l i t y of c o n t r o l s i n any o t h e r way than as 
1. The notion of ' e s s e n t i a l p r i o r i t i e s ' e n f o r c e d by l i c e n c e d 
a l l o c a t i o n and p r i c e c o n t r o l can be found i n 'Employment 
P o l i c y ' Cmnd. 6527, esp. para.18. 
2. See papers i n Cab 117/39 Committee on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
Problems. N u f f i e l d R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Survey. 
3. Tawney, R.H., 'The A b o l i t i o n of Economic C o n t r o l s 1918-21' 
Economic H i s t o r y Review, x i i i Nos. 1 & 2, pp.1-31. 
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measures evolved piecemeal f o r wartime problems amd as such they 
came under c h a l l e n g e from i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , who argued they were 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the r e v i v a l o f peacetime t r a d e and i n d u s t r y , 
and who were anxious to take advantage of the po s t war boom. 
The i n f l a t i o n and the boom e v e n t u a l l y broke i n 1920, but mean-
w h i l e the c o n t r o l s ( e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p a l l y as defence r e g u l a t i o n s ) 
had been allowed to l a p s e as t h e i r war time l i m i t s ran out. I t 
had not even been n e c e s s a r y to argue f o r t h e i r r e p e a l . The 
l e s s o n was c l e a r . I f t h e r e was a c l e a r r a t i o n a l e f o r c o n t r o l s / 
as Tawney agreed t h e r e was, then the government would have to 
take p o s i t i v e s t e p s to r e t a i n and ope r a t e them by c o n v e r t i n g 
them from defence r e g u l a t i o n s i n t o a new s t a t u t e . T h i s i s what 
the m i n i s t e r s who s a t on the i n d u s t r i a l sub-committee o f the 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee recommended on 18th September, 1944.^ 
To s e c u r e e x p o r t s and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s , s u c h as the 
housing programme, b u i l d i n g l i c e n c e s , c a p i t a l i s s u e s c o n t r o l , 
imports l i c e n s i n g amd modi f i e d labour d i r e c t i o n s were to be 
r e t a i n e d . The p r i o r i t i e s , were, f i r s t of a l l , the completion of 
the Japanese war; second e x p o r t s ; t h i r d l y 'the r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
of a decent s t a n d a r d of domestic comfort i n t h i s country and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r a r a p i d p r o g r e s s w i t h a government housing programme'; 
f o u r t h l y , the re-equipment of i n d u s t r y ; f i f t h l y , f a i r s h a r e s o f 
ne c e s s a r y consumer goods by r a t i o n i n g so long a s s h o r t a g e s e x i s t ; 
and l a s t l y , a v o i d i n g i n f l a t i o n by s t a b i l i s i n g p r i c e s and c o s t s . 
1. Cab 87/13 M i n i s t r y o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n (sub-committee on 
i n d u s t r i a l problems) Paper, I S t h September 1944. Economic 
C o n t r o l s i n the T r a n s i t i o n . 
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The committee agreed t h a t 'doing something f o r the working 
p o p u l a t i o n ' was a ' c o n d i t i o n precedent' f o r the e x p o r t t r a d e ^ 
and on 27th October, agreed t h a t r e s t o r i n g expK>rts should come 
second i n the d r a f t a f t e r 'improving s t a n d a r d s ' a t home i n 
2 
j u s t i f y i n g the c o n t r o l s ' . When i t was proposed to make t h i s 
3 
p u b l i c C h u r c h i l l urged caution a t a C a b i n e t meeting : any p u b l i c 
statement should be more vague and should c o n f i n e a f i r m commit-
ment a t the moment only to a p e r i o d between the d e f e a t of 
GermaJiy and the d e f e a t of Japan: the u l t i m a t e aim being to , . . 
r e l a x 'by o r g a n i z e d s t e p s ' once s h o r t a g e s were over. T h i s 
was l a r g e l y a r e a c t i o n . '. . to Labour P a r t y m i n i s t e r s , who had 
argued s t r o n g l y t h a t c o n t r o l s should be r e t a i n e d even a f t e r t h i s 
i n o r d e r to cope with ' s u r p l u s e s ' as w e l l as s h o r t a g e s - the 
i m p l i c a t i o n being t h a t they should be used to r e g u l a t e employ-
4 
ment and production i f t h e r e was o v e r - p r o d u c t i o n i n a slump. 
C h u r c h i l l ' s move however was never intended to f u r t h e r immediate 
d e c o n t r o l a s subsequent e v e n t s proved. I t was a l a s t minute 
h e s i t a n c y on what o f f i c i a l s and h i s m i n i s t e r i a l c o l l e a g u e s had 
taken t h r e e y e a r s to prepare without h i s a c t i v e involvement. I n 
A p r i l 1945, Herbert Morrison's d r a f t Supply and S e r v i c e s ( T r a n s -
i t i o n a l Powers) B i l l was agreed i n p r i n c i p l e by the C a b i n e t ^ and 
l e s s than a month l a t e r the Prime M i n i s t e r s a n c t i o n e d the 
1. Cab 87/14 M i n i s t r y o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n I n d u s t r i a l Sub-Committee 
meeting, 16th October 1944. 
2. Cab 87/14 M i n i s t r y o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n I n d u s t r i a l Sub-Committee 
meeting, 27th October 1944. 
3. Cab 65/44, C a b i n e t Meeting WM(44)145, 2nd November 1944. 
4. i b i d . 
5. Cab 65/50 Cabinet meeting W>1(45)52, 25th A p r i l , 1945. 
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r e t e n t i o n of a l l c o n t r o l s s p e c i f i e d f o r two y e a r s a f t e r the 
war w i t h power to extend them f o r each y e a r a f t e r t h a t i f 
Parl i a m e n t agreed.^ The B i l l was l o s t d u r i n g d i s s o l u t i o n but 
was r e s u r r e c t e d a f t e r the Labour Government took O f f i c e . The 
powers were amended to l a s t f o r a f i v e y e a r p e r i o d b e f o r e 
renewal was to be r e q u i r e d . ^ M i n i s t e r s agreed to i n c l u d e powers 
to make e n t i r e l y new r e g u l a t i o n s i f n e c e s s a r y . ^ Aneurin Bevan, 
the new M i n i s t e r of Health had agreed t h i s might be r e q u i r e d i n 
order to ensure b u i l d i n g l a b o u r was e f f e c t i v e l y c o n c e n t r a t e d on 
new permanent housing. The r e l a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y e x i s t i n g 
between the C o n s e r v a t i v e l e d c o a l i t i o n ajid the m a j o r i t y Labour 
government r e f l e c t e d the consensus t h a t e x i s t e d on the r a t i o n a l e 
t h a t l a y behind the r e t e n t i o n of c o n t r o l s . The d e - c o n t r o l 
r h e t o r i c of C o n s e r v a t i v e e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s ' \'\ 
should not be taken as e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t i o n . 
The consensus on c o n t r o l a l s o e x i s t e d i n p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y . 
The d i r e c t o r of the F e d e r a t i o n of B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s , S i r Guy 
Locock, wrote to Jowett, the M i n i s t e r r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n r e c o r d i n g a ' g e n e r a l a s s e n t ' among h i s members 
f o r 'the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of c o n t r o l f o r some time a f t e r the war'^ 
and the p r e s i d e n t , Lord Dudley Gordon, reminded the Annual 
General Meeting that c o n t r o l s w i l l a v o i d an i n f l a t i o n a r y 
scramble and boom t h a t would not l a s t l o ng.^ 
1. Cab 65/50. C a b i n e t meeting Wi^(45)58, 4th May 1945. 
2. Cab 128/1. Cabinet meeting CM(45)23, 16th May 1945. 
3. Cab 75/21 Home P o l i c y Committee Meeting, 22nd August 1945. 
4. Cab 128/1. C a b i n e t meeting CM(45)24, 20th August 1945. 
5. Cab 124/204. Report o f S t e e r i n g Committee on P o s t War 
Employment l e t t e r , 7 t h A p r i l 1943, Locock to J o w e t t . 
6. The Times, 15th A p r i l 1943. 
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I n a l e t t e r to Jowett he s a i d t h a t he had imp r e s s e d on 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s i n Manchester t h a t t h i s a t t i t u d e should not be 
'reversed* as soon as peace came."^ Apart from t h e i r changed 
p e r c e p t i o n of the m e r i t s of immediate d e - c o n t r o l : the f a c t 
t h a t i n f l a t i o n would meaji a r i s e i n c o s t s and a d e v a l u a t i o n of 
t h e i r accumulated c a p i t a l s a v i n g s , many i n d u s t r i a l i s t s had no 
reason to f e e l apprehensive t h a t the c o n t r o l s would be used to 
prevent them from e a r n i n g a r e t u r n on t h e i r employed c a p i t a l . 
Many of the war c o n t r o l s had worked through e x i s t i n g t r a d e 
a s s o c i a t i o n s who n e g o t i a t e d ' c o n t r o l l e d p r i c e s * h i g h enough to 
cover the c o s t of the average producer, (t h e average i n c l u d i n g 
the i n e f f i c i e n t i t h e i r output being n e c e s s a r y f o r reas o n s of 
s u p p l y ) . The d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a t e r i a l s had a l s o u t i l i s e d trade 
a s s o c i a t i o n s . Government departments d e s i g n a t e d a s * P r o d u c t i o n 
Departments' would a l s o 'sponsor' the i n d u s t r i e s they were 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o n t r o l l i n g . The C a b i n e t ' s M a t e r i a l s Committee 
would share out, a c c o r d i n g to broad s t r a t e g i c p r i o r i t i e s , the 
a v a i l a b l e m a t e r i a l s g i v i n g a quota to each s e c t o r o f i n d u s t r y 
v i a the department. The l a t t e r would then i s s u e l i c e n s e s up 
to t h e i r a l l o c a t i o n v i a t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s who would then d e a l 
them out to the i n d i v i d u a l f i r m s . The f a c t t h a t trade 
a s s o c i a t i o n s were i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f m a t e r i a l s 
complemented the p o l i c y o f r e v o k i n g the e x t e n s i v e use of Production 
C o n t r o l by which i n d u s t r i e s had s t a t u t o r y l i m i t a t i o n s p l a c e d on 
supply and manufacture. Those c o n t r o l s would o n l y be kept f o r 
1. Cab 124/204, Report of S t e e r i n g Committee on P o s t war 
Employment l e t t e r , 5th May 1943, Gordon to Jo w e t t . 
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s e c t o r s f o r c e d i n t o u t i l i t y ranges where the raw m a t e r i a l s were 
i n s h o r t supply^ such as the f u r n i t u r e t r a d e . 
With regard to the q u e s t i o n o f lab o u r c o n t r o l , o p p o s i t i o n 
was expected from the Trade Unions. Government p o l i c y , w i t h the 
b e n e f i t of the a d v i s e of Bevin, had a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t e x c l u s i v e 
labour d i r e c t i o n , with f i n e s and p r o s e c u t i o n s , extended i n t o the 
peacetime^would not be a c c e p t a b l e . More fundamentally however, 
the q u e s t i o n could not be c o n s i d e r e d o u t s i d e o f chosen assump-
t i o n s about the type of economic system t h a t was to p r e v a i l . 
The o f f i c i a l s working as a backup to the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee 
were i n l i t t l e doubt. 
I f c o m p e t i t i v e p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y i s to be 
r e s t o r e d as the p r e v a i l i n g economic system 
a f t e r the war, i t i s h a r d l y c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t 
t h e r e should remain any s u b s t a n t i a l degree o f 
c o n t r o l over labour s i n c e i t i s i n h e r e n t i n 
any c o m p e t i t i v e system t h a t employers should 
be f r e e to engage and d i s m i s s t h e i r s t a f f a t 
t h e i r own d i s c r e t i o n . ^ 
T h i s would gain added f o r c e when many more employers e n t e r e d 
the market f o r labour come the peace w i t h the c e s s a t i o n of 
production and supply c o n t r o l . 
The government's e v e n t u a l s t r a t e g y i n t h i s f i e l d i n v o l v e d 
r e l i a n c e on the C o n t r o l of Engagement Order by which employeees 
cou l d only be engaged v i a a lab o u r exchange and not by open 
adv e r t i s e m e n t . The Labour Exchange would then o f f e r ' p r i o r i t y ' j o b s 
f i r s t . The problem here was t h a t the p r i o r i t y s e c t o r s : c o a l mining, 
t e x t i l e s , b u i l d i n g and b u i l d i n g materiaUs were d i r t y , unpopular 
1. Cab 87/55. O f f i c i a l Committee on Post War I n t e r n a l Economic 
Problems. 10th February 1942. Note on the F u t u r e o f Labour 
C o n t r o l s by M i n i s t r y of Labour and N a t i o n a l S e r v i c e . 
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j o b s , and, w i t h d i r e c t i o n l a r g e l y a b o l i s h e d , the b e s t means to 
ensure men went to these i n d u s t r i e s was i f they had nowhere 
e l s e to go. The problem was t h a t i n an environment of f u l l 
employment the engagement o r d e r would only d e a l w i t h those who 
pres e n t e d themselves f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n a t the exchange. I t cou l d 
not a f f e c t t r a n s f e r s by compulsory s h i f t s of men amd women 
al r e a d y employed. Attempts to l i m i t p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y ' s i n t a k e 
of labour through production c o n t r o l s ( L i c e n c e s to manufacture 
and l i m i t a t i o n s on supply) would be bound to c r e a t e the g e n e r a l 
unemployment th a t the government was t r y i n g to a v o i d as munitions 
demand d e c l i n e d . 
The Labour Cabinet i n h e r i t e d the C o a l i t i o n ' s p l a n s f o r the 
r e l a x a t i o n of major d i r e c t i v e l a b o u r c o n t r o l s and reviewed the 
p o s i t i o n . M i n i s t e r s were d i v i d e d on the question."^ Morrison, 
Bevin and I s a a c s , the M i n i s t e r o f Labour, stood out f o r 
r e l a x a t i o n keeping only the Engagement Order. S h i n w e l l and 
Bevan wanted the . r e t e n t i o n of some r e s e r v e powers o f d i r e c t i o n 
f o r the whole of i n d u s t r y . E r n e s t Bevin, although F o r e i g n 
S e c r e t a r y , was s t i l l the e f f e c t i v e head of the T r a n s p o r t and 
General Workers Union and s t r e s s e d t h a t the government c o u l d not 
pla y the ' P a t r i o t i s m Card'. The p u b l i c had not been 'educated' 
to expect e x t e n s i v e d i r e c t i o n i n peace and i t would be unpopular 
2 
wi t h the unions. The Cab i n e t agreed t h a t the E s s e n t i a l Work 
Order (E.W.O.) by which workers c o u l d not l e a v e o r be sacked 
from i n d u s t r i e s without p e r m i s s i o n should be r e l a x e d . The m a j o r i t y 
n C a b i n e t was to make l a b o u r c o n t r o l e f f e c t i v e over a 
view 1 
^^^JH' Cabinet meeting. CM(45)4a, 1 s t November 1945. 
2. Cab 128/2. Ca b i n e t meeting. CM(45)54, 20th November 1945 
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l i m i t e d f i e l d o f e s s e n t i a l or 'designated' i n d u s t r i e s . The 
B u i l d i n g Programme would r e c e i v e top p r i o r i t y i n the r e t a i n e d 
Engagement Order. E.W.O.'s would apply only to c o a l mining, 
t e x t i l e s (and l a t e r permanent h o u s i n g ) . The use of compulsory 
powers ( f o r E»W,0. purposes) would be l i m i t e d to men under 
t h i r t y on the assumption t h a t i t was r i g h t to a p ply ' c o n s c r i p t i o n 
r i g h t a c r o s s the board here i f m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e was compulsory. 
Compulsion f o r the over t h i r t i e s was only to be used f o r the 
l i m i t e d purpose of r e d i s t r i b u t i n g w i t h i n one i n d u s t r y by r e q u i r -
i n g men a l r e a d y i n the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y to t r a n s f e r to 
permanent house b u i l d i n g work. Sevan and S h i n w e l l ' s p o i n t t h a t 
to apply compulsion i n only a few a r e a s would l e a v e o t h e r 
npopular p r i o r i t y i n d u s t r i e s l i k e b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s without 
p r o t e c t i o n was answered by the argument t h a t they c o u l d be made 
more ' a t t r a c t i v e ' by improved wages and c o n d i t i o n t Yet t h i s was 
dependent u l t i m a t e l y on a new d i f f e r e n t i a l wage p o l i c y on which 
there had been no r e a l d i s c u s s i o n and only a vague hope a t the 
p r e v i o u s meeting. 
Labour c o n t r o l s were t h e r e f o r e not c o n c e i v e d as a p l a n n i n g 
mechanism to e f f e c t an economy-wide d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a b o u r to 
f i t a s e t of d e f i n i t e i n p u t / o u t p u t programmes f o r each i n d u s t r y 
s i n c e the g r e a t bulk of i n d u s t r y was now going to work, not on 
government c o n t r a c t ^ b u t f o r p r i v a t e account, where the s c a l e 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n of output would be v a r i e d a c c o r d i n g to p r i v a t e 
d e c i s i o n . What the government aimed f o r was not t o s u p e r v i s e 
each s e c t o r a l l o c a t i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g i t s l a b o u r f o r c e but to 
u 
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p r o t e c t c e r t a i n s e c t o r s who were thought to be 'undermanned' 
i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , and as such they had to w a i t s l o w l y 
f o r s u r p l u s labour to a r r i v e from d e m o b i l i s a t i o n and then 
induce i t to those a r e a s . Compulsory powers were used l a r g e l y 
to m a i n t a i n labour i n the a r e a s i t i d e n t i f i e d as important and 
o c c a s i o n a l l y to r e d i s t r i b u t e w i t h i n i n d u s t r i e s but never to 
c o m p u l s o r i l y t r a n s f e r workers from e x i s t i n g j o b s d e s p i t e the 
view expressed by c i v i l s e r v a n t s t h a t t h i s was the only way 
to i n c r e a s e manpower i n the b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s industry."^ 
CONCLUSIONS 
C o n t r o l s , as we have seen i n t h i s s e c t i o n , were l a r g e l y 
evolved i n the war economy, c a r r i e d over i n t o the peace to 
ensure s t a b i l i t y i n the macro-economy, and the f u r t h e r a n c e of 
the government's s o c i a l o b j e c t i v e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r the govern-
ment b u i l d i n g programme. Y e t the requirement of an economy i n 
which the s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t was to be operated by p r i v a t e e n t e r -
p r i s e w i t h f r e e labour meant t h a t the c o n t r o l s would be l i m i t e d 
by the e x t e n t they c o u l d o p e r a t e w i t h the support of b u s i n e s s 
and l a b o u r . D i f f e r e n c e s between the p a r t i e s i n government 
c e n t e r e d l a r g e l y on the q u e s t i o n of how long they were to 
operate f o r . We s h a l l see i n the next c h a p t e r how both 
C o a l i t i o n and Labour accepted t h a t the most e x t e n s i v e c o n t r o l s 
would operate i n the f i e l d of b u i l d i n g and t h a t the r e a s o n s f o r 
t h i s were l a r g e l y to e f f e c t a p r i o r i t y f o r the Housing Programme, 
In t h i s f i e l d we s h a l l show t h a t w i t h i n the assumptions about 
1. Cab 129/4. Ca b i n e t Paper CP(45)260, 30th October 1945 
Appendix to Report of O f f i c i a l Committee on C o n t r o l s 
Memo by Lord P r e s i d e n t . 
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c o n t r o l t h e r e l a y a t e n s i o n between those who wanted the 
c o n t r o l s to m a i n t a i n and f u n c t i o n f o r f i x e d p r i o r i t i e s and 
those who argued t h a t a r a t i o n a l i n v e s t m e n t p o l i c y r e q u i r e d 
t h a t such d e v i c e s amd the assumptions behind them _ be used 
f l e x i b l y i n o r d e r to f u r t h e r o b j e c t i v e s which r e q u i r e d a 
change i n those p r i o r i t i e s . I n l a r g e measure the arguments 
which surrounded the f a t e o f the House B u i l d i n g Programme 
m o b i l i z e d and r e f l e c t e d the arguments about how f a r the s o c i a l 
p r i o r i t i e s of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n were to s u r v i v e . 
CHAPTER I I I . 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f 
P r i o r i t i e s - formation of the Housing Programme 
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INTRODUCTION 
Having l o c a t e d the importance of Housing i n the t h i n k i n g 
about R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h i s c h a p t e r d e t a i i l s the s p e c i f i c 
o r g a n i s a t i o n o f the house b u i l d i n g programme w i t h r e s p e c t to 
i t s e x t e n t and i t s c o s t . Both these f a c t o r s a r e e x t e n s i v e l y 
t r e a t e d i n order to show how; d e s p i t e i n i t i a l c r i t i c i s m , housing 
ac h i e v e d a p r i o r i t y which l e d to i t r e c e i v i n g a l a r g e s h a r e of 
r e s o u r c e s . T h i s c h a p t e r t h e r e f o r e d e a l s w i t h the i s s u e s 
surrounding e s t i m a t e s o f housing need, the p r i o r i t y a l l o c a t i o n 
of labour and m a t e r i a l s , the r o l e o f p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e and 
the subsidy n e g o t i a t i o n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v e d i n 
c o n s t r u c t i o n as a whole. We s h a l l show how the government 
evolved a d i s c r e t e and r e l a t i v e l y i n s u l a t e d b u i l d i n g programme 
which, i t was hoped, would av o i d the f a i l u r e s of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
c L f t e r 1918 and safegu a r d i t s e l f from c h a l l e n g e both from 
market f o r c e s and i n t e r e s t s i n housing and c o n s t r u c t i o n and 
from those, who l a t e r , would t r y to a l t e r the a l l o c a t i o n of 
r e s o u r c e s a t the expense o f housing. 
Once the s t a t e d e c i d e s to i n t e r v e n e i n a sphere o f output 
whose s c a l e and d i s t r i b u t i o n i s p r e v i o u s l y determined by 
market c r i t e r i a ^ p o l i t i c a l — b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n o v e r the 
q u e s t i o n of s o c i a l need and requirement r e p l a c e the p r i c e 
system as the a l l o c a t o r of r e s o u r c e s - The type and exten-t of 
need t h a t the l a t t e r system c o n s i d e r s i s t h a t o f money or 
e f f e c t i v e demand, by which pr o d u c t i o n i s on l y pursued a t a 
p r i c e high enough to cover c o s t and p r o f i t . T h i s l o g i c o f 
p r o d u c t i o n ^ r e f l e c t e d i n d i s t r i b u t i o n ^ m e a n s t h a t the h i g h e r an 
income the hi g h e r and more e x t e n s i v e the command of r e s o u r c e s . 
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I f the o u t e r boundaries or l i m i t s no l o n g e r r e s u l t from the 
o p e r a t i o n of market f o r c e s then i t f o l l o w s t h a t c o l l e c t i v e , o r 
s t a t e p r o v i s i o n ^ c a n c o n s i d e r i n c l u d i n g i n the c a l c u l a t i o n o f 
need elements t h a t would e i t h e r not be covered or would be 
reduced under market i n c e n t i v e s . The o b j e c t i v e s ^ o n c e programmed^ 
can then be backed by inducements, s a n c t i o n s or pov/ers d e r i v i n g 
from the s t a t e s monopoly of o r g a n i s e d and l e g i t i m a t e f o r c e . 
T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l d e s c r i b e how t h i s was o p e r a t i o n a l i s e d d u r i n g 
and a f t e r World War I I . 
The e x p e r i e n c e of housing p o l i c y i n the i n t e r - w a r p e r i o d 
was t h a t house b u i l d i n g , i f l e f t to p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e ^ w o u l d 
r e s u l t i n the e r e c t i o n of houses mainly f o r s a l e r a t h e r than 
l e t t i n g and mainly a t p r i c e s which those w i t h the g r e a t e s t need 
cou l d not a f f o r d . Working c l a s s housing, give n the wages 
Q f -th a . t . c l a s s , was not an a t t r a c t i v e prop>osition f o r the 
s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d e r as long as t h e r e was u n s a t i s f i e d demand 
from persons w i t h a g r e a t e r a b i l i t y to pay. During the i n t e r -
war p e r i o d the government had been prepared to i n d u c e the 
p r oduction of houses to l e t through i n t e r v e n t i o n and subsidies^. 
The d i f f e r e n c e between t h e s e i n i t i a t i v e s and the e x p e r i e n c e of 
the f o r t i e s l a y i n the e x t e n t , d u r a t i o n and c o n t r o l of the 
programme. Rather than s e l e c t i n g one f a c e t of the housing 
problem and c u t t i n g back on o t h e r s , l a r g e l y on grounds of c o s t , 
so t h a t generaJ. needs was f o l l o w e d by slum c l e a r a n c e and thence 
by an emphasis on overcrowding, the c o a l i t i o n government was 
prepared to c o n s i d e r i n c l u d i n g i n i t s programme a l l these 
a s p e c t s . For g e n e r a l needs, major demographic v a r i a b l e s were 
1. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the programmes of the 20's and 30's see 
Rowley, M., Housing and the S t a t e 1919*44.(London A l l e n & 
Unwin, 1945. ) 
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s t u d i e d such as the b i r t h r a t e ^ l i k e l y to i n c r e a s e with f u l l 
employment^ and the consequent r a t e i n the f o r m a t i o n of house-
holds. I n a d d i t i o n to the recouping o f l o s s e s o c c a s i o n e d by 
bomb damager d e s t r u c t i o n , a n d d e p r e c i a t i o n produced by the war-
time ban on b u i l d i n g , t h e r e were to be a l l o w a n c e s f o r o v e r -
crowding, slum c l e a r a n c e and subsequently the age of housing 
s t o c k , w i t h replacement a t a h i g h e r s t a n d a r d . The o t h e r 
i n n o v a t i o n l a y i n the c o n t r o l of p r o d u c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n by 
which p r i v a t e h o u s b u i l d i n g f o r s a l e was to be r e s t r i c t e d by 
l i c e n s e . Housebuilding f o r r e n t was to be p r o v i d e d e x c l u s i v e l y 
by L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s who i t was f e l t c o u l d s e l e c t tenants 
a c c o r d i n g to need. 
SECTION I ; ESTIMATES OF NEED AND THE FORMATION OF A TARGET 
Before the clamour of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n reached a peak i n 
1943 c i v i l s e r v a n t s a t the M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h had made some 
t e n t a t i v e and modest assumptions. They had been t h i n k i n g along 
the l i n e s o f an immediate post war programme of War Damage 
Repair, the r e b u i l d i n g of war d e s t r o y e d houses and some slum 
c l e a r a n c e . 
overcrowding co u l d be l e f t alone f o r the 
time being, as c o u l d improvement of s t a n d a r d s 
T h i s was d e s p i t e the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a l a r g e number of new 
homes would be needed to accommodate wartime m a r r i a g e s . S i r 
John Wrigley l a i d out the aim as the ' r e v i v a l of b u i l d i n g as 
a s e l f s u p p o r t i n g i n d u s t r y ' . L o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s c o u l d be 
c o n f i n e d to war damage r e p a i r and r e b u i l d i n g as t h i s would be 
l e s s open to o b j e c t i o n than b u i l d i n g by p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s on 
a wide s c a l e to meet g e n e r a l needs. They would t h e r e f o r e be 
c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h a t p a r t of housing important 'from a h e a l t h 
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p o i n t of view*. I f the problem of wartime m a r r i a g e s exceeding 
dwellings with the c e s s a t i o n of new b u i l d i n g e x i s t e d t h i s c o u l d 
be looked a t a f t e r the war i n the l i g h t of the s t a t e of p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e . Only i f the p r i v a t e s e c t o r c o u l d not be r e l i e d on 
would a s h o r t programme of c o u n c i l b u i l d i n g f o r g e n e r a l needs 
be n e c e s s a r y , ^ The assumption w a s • t h a t i t c o u l d . The 
M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h ' s c o n s u l t a t i v e body The C e n t r a l Housing 
Advisory Committee .on which r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of L o c a l 
A u t h o r i t i e s , b u i l d e r s ^ a n d b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s s a t ^ had on 16th 
October 1942, s e t up a sub-committee to i n v e s t i g a t e what p a r t 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e might b e s t p l a y i n post war housing, the 
c o n d i t i o n s i n which i t might e f f e c t i v e l y o p e r a t e and the 
methods of f i n a n c e and o r g a n i s a t i o n r e q u i r e d . C h a i r e d by S i r 
F e l i x Pole, i t i n c l u d e d the same i n t e r e s t s as the main 
2 
committee. 
Meainwhile a sense of urgency was d e v e l o p i n g among some 
M i n i s t e r s of the C o a l i t i o n which c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the c a u t i o u s 
approach of the M i n i s t r y . The M i n i s t e r of Labour, E r n e s t Bevin, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , drawing on the l e s s o n s of the p r e v i o u s experience 
i n 1919-21, wanted the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y w e l l prepared and 
s u b j e c t to c l o s e s t a t e c o n t r o l over the volume of b u i l d i n g 
work. A l a r g e expansion i n the b u i l d i n g l a b o u r f o r c e was 
n e c e s s a r y , he argued, not only f o r n e c e s s a r y b u i l d i n g p r o j e c t s 
but i n order to m a i n t a i n f u l l employment. To o b t a i n the 
n e c e s s a r y workers t h e r e should be a guarantee of s e c u r i t y by 
f i x i n g the d u r a t i o n of the programme,the s c a l e o f which would 
1. HLG 101/316 Departmental Committee on Post War Housing, 
Undated Papers 1941. H. Symon and J . Vvrigley-
2. I n c l u d i n g S i r Harold Bellman of Abbey N a t i o n a l and David 
Smith of H a l i f a x B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s , see HLG 37/67 C.H.A.C. 
Sub Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e Housing minutes & papers. 
80 
be determined l a r g e l y by our housing requirements expanded as 
they were by an i n c r e a s e i n m a r r i a g e s * The demand f o r houses 
and improved standards was everywhere i n e v i d e n c e and i t was 
h i g h l y important f o r the morale of the troops 
and of the munition workers t h a t the government 
should demonstrate e a r l y t h a t i t i n t e n d s to 
meet the demands.^ 
A s i m i l a r arguement about morale had been advanced by the 
2 
M i n i s t e r of Health, E r n e s t Brown. The Committee on Recon-
s t r u c t i o n problems having r e c e i v e d these papers d e c i d e d to 
3 
push the i s s u e i n t e r n a l l y . As a r e s u l t the O f f i c i a l Committee on 
Postwar Economic Problems had,by the end o f September 1942, 
decided to ask a l l Departments about demands f o r b u i l d i n g . 
The M i n i s t r y of works had a l r e a d y a n t i c i p a t e d the need to 
expand the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y l a b o u r f o r c e f o r r e b u i l d i n g ahdwar 
damage.repair. In Augist. 194 1, i t commissioned the E d u c a t i o n 
Committee of the C e n t r a l C o u n c i l f o r Works and B u i l d i n g s to 
produce a repxsrt on postwar t r a i n i n g and e n t r y i n t o the 
i n d u s t r y . The members o f the C o u n c i l i n c l u d e d such prominent 
r a d i c a l s as G.D.H. Cole, B a r b a r a Wotton and S i r Edward Simon-
On 19th November, 1942, the C a b i n e t saw the f i r s t d r a f t of the 
scheme and asked Bevam to conclude an agreement w i t h the 
b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y . ^ The s p i r i t of the r e p o r t d e r i v e d from the 1. Cab 117/25 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n S e c r e t a r i a t Postwar B u i l d i n g and 
Housing Programmes. Proposal f o r N a t i o n a l H o u s e b u i l d i n g 
C o r p o r a t i o n . Note by the M i n i s t e r of Labour l a t e r summarized 
i n Cab 87/2 Committee on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Problems. 17th June 
1942. P r o p o s a l s f o r N a t i o n a l H o u s e b u i l d i n g Memo by M i n i s t e r 
of Labour. 
2. Cab 87/2 Committee on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Problems Paper. 17th 
June, 1942. Postwar Housing Memo by the M i n i s t e r of He a l t h . 
3. Cab 87/2 Committee on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Problems Meeting 25th June, 1942. 
4. Report o f the E d u c a t i o n Committee of the C e n t r a l C o u n c i l f o r 
Works and B u i l d i n g s on T r a i n i n g f o r the B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y " 
(London H.M.S.O. 1942). 
5. Cab 65/32 C a b i n e t Meeting WfM(42)155. November 19th 1942. 
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f i r s t postwar e x p e r i e n c e when no plains had been made f o r an 
i n c r e a s e d supply of l a b o u r . As t r a i n i n g took timet advance 
p r e p a r a t i o n was e s s e n t i a l . S i n c e the b u i l d i n g workers unions 
remembered the 1920 boom, the scramble f o r l a b o u r and m a t e r i a l ^ 
the high p r i c e s and the r e s u l t i n g c u t s which put 40% of the 
men on the dole, only a long term guaranteed prograunme c o u l d 
get the n e c e s s a r y c o - o p e r a t i o n . The r e p o r t s recommendations 
envisaged ' d i l u t i o n ' o r s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g schemes f o r a d u l t s 
and the r e l a x a t i o n of t r a d e union r u l e s ; t o a l l o w boys to 
complete t r a i n i n g i n a s h o r t e r p e r i o d than the normal union-
backed a p p r e n t i c e s h i p . C o l e argued, i n another p l a c e s t h a t 
i t was n e c e s s a r y to have 'a solemn d e c l a r a t i o n ' by a l l p a r t i e s 
o n the n e c e s s i t y to m a i n t a i n a twenty y e a r programme embodied 
i n l e g i s l a t i o n . ^ Such a 'solemn d e c l a r a t i o n ' was given by 
Bevi.n when he einnounced to both s i d e s of the i n d u s t r y he was 
p l a n n i n g f o r ' s e c u r i t y and c o n t i n u i t y f o r employers and 
o p e r a t i v e s ! a p o l i c y i n l i n e w i t h f u l l employment ajid aui 
economic system of ' f a i r r e t u r n s to employers w i t h s t a b i l i t y 
and good p r o s p e c t s f o r the workers'. The b u i l d i n g programme 
would not be looked a t i n terms of money but of the number of 
people who could be g i v e n employment. 'The humaji problem 
f i r s t ••. a c t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of m a t e r i a l s and f o r e i g n exchange 
second'. The departments would work on the p r i n c i p l e t h a t work 
could be found f o r 12 y e a r s . ^ The e x i s t e n c e of such a l a b o u r 
i n t e n s i v e programme would, through the m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t , 
m a i n t a i n demand i n the economy as a whole and would t h e r e f o r e 
1. Cole, G.D.H., B u i l d i n g and P l a n n i n g . (London, C a s s e l l & Co. 1945). p.163. 
2. IvORKS 45/63. A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l on B u i l d i n g and C i v i l E n g i n e e r -
i n g I n d u s t r i e s meeting. 1 s t Maxch, 1943. 
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c o n t r i b u t e to f u l l employment g e n e r a l l y . These secondary 
e f f e c t s were a l s o advocated a t the 1943 C o nference of the Town 
and Country Planning A s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Joan Robinson p u t t i n g 
a c r o s s the p o i n t t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f narrow money c o s t 
should not d e t e r R e c o n s t r u c t i o n p l a n n e r s . ^ That however, was 
p r e c i s e l y the i s s u e t h a t came b e f o r e the C a b i n e t as i t pondered 
whether to accept the recommended t a r g e t of 1,400,000 men i n 
the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y by t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r the war to be 
maintained f o r twenty y e a r s on programmes o f c o n s t r u c t i o n work. 
Even a t the end of the p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e h o u s e b u i l d i n g boom 
of the t h i r t i e s and the d r i v e to re-armament i n 1938 the 
i n d u s t r y was only 1,050,000 s t r o n g . Y e t BevxJi demanded a 
qu i c k d e c i s i o n i n order to get e a r l y union c o - o p e r a t i o n f o r 
2 
d i l u t i o n and t r a i n i n g . Meanwhile the T r e a s u r y made a b i d to 
stop the momentum, c l a i m i n g as i t s a u t h o r i t y a r e p o r t by the 
Economic Problems Committee on which such r e s p e c t e d economists 
as Lord Robbins s a t . T h i s committee had come to the 
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t no guarantee of employment sh o u l d be g i v e n i n 
c a s e a r i s e i n b u i l d i n g c o s t s i n c r e a s e d the f i n a j i c i a l 
l i a b i l i t i e s of the programme^ and i t was f i n a n c e to which the 
f i n a l r e p o r t drew a t t e n t i o n to. A b u i l d i n g programme 
employing 1,400,000 would r e q u i r e a c c o r d i n g to t h i s e s t i m a t e 
an annual capitaJ. e x p e n d i t u r e of £600 m. and a l a r g e new 
1. Tyerman, D., (ed.) Ways and Means of R e b u i l d i n g . Report 
of the London Conference of the Town and Country P l a j i n i n g 
A s s o c i a t i o n 1943. (London, Town and Country P l a n n i n g 
A s s o c i a t i o n 1944). pp.9-26. 
2. Cab 71/11 Lord P r e s i d e n t s Committee meeting. 18th January 
1943, d i s c u s s i n g the proposed White Paper on T r a i n i n g f o r 
the B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y . 
3. Cab 87/55 O f f i c i a l Committee on Postwar I n t e r n a l Economic 
Problems meeting 27th November 1942. 
4. Cab 87/57 O f f i c i a l Committee on Postwar I n t e r n a l Economic 
Problems. January 14th 1943. Report on the Economic back-
ground of the Postwar B u i l d i n g and C o n s t r u c t i o n Programme. 
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housing programme would talce £315 m. ( a t 1939 p r i c e s p l u s a 
35% i n f l a t i o n a l l o w i i n c e ) . Accumulation or s a v i n g s of £700 m. 
to £800 m. would not be a b l e to support t h i s t o g e t h e r w i t h 
other foi-ms of investment such as new c a p i t a l f o r s h i p b u i l d i n g , 
r a i l w a y s , roads, new p l a n t and equipment to cure any 
o b s o i e s e n c e i n B r i t i s h m anufacturing i n d u s t r y , t o g e t h e r w i t h 
investment f o r c o l o n i a l development and p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s such 
as gas and e l e c t r i c i t y . To spend more i n the N a t i o n a l income 
than s a v i n g s provided would l e a d to i n f l a t i o n , and an i n v e s t -
ment programme of the s i z e e n v i s a g e d c o u l d not be c a r r i e d out 
without d e p r i v i n g other i n d u s t r i e s of t h e i r c a p i t a l and 
c o m p e l l i n g labour which might be employed i n i n d u s t r y , to 
t r a n s f e r to building."^ Robbins wrote to Lord Norman Brook, 
the head of the C i v i l S e r v i c e t h a t a l a r g e r i s s u e was i n v o l v e d . 
I doubt very much the wisdom of amy p r o p o s a l 
which appears to g i v e s p e c i a l g u a r a n t e e s of 
s e c u r i t y and continuous employment to p a r t i c u l a r 
i n d u s t r i a l groups. They c o n s t i t u t e a c l a i m to an 
economic p o s i t i o n which, i n y e a r s to come, i t 
may not be prudent to p r o v i d e - a p o s i t i o n o f 
p r i v i l e d g e which o t h e r i n d u s t r i a l groups w i l l 
envy, and w i l l no doubt i n due c o u r s e demand*^ 
The T r e a s u r y had a l r e a d y won a c o n c e s s i o n i n the s e t t i n g up of 
the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P r i o r i t i e s Committee, a body whose duty i t 
was to c o s t the v a r i o u s c l a i m s on the N a t i o n a l Income. At the 
f i r s t meeting on f i n a n c i a l a s p e c t s of the Beveridge plain they 
had a l r e a d y sought to r e i n t r o d u c e p a r t of the o l d T r e a s u r y 
argument, of the t w e n t i e s aind t h i r t i e s about the s c a l e o f 
expenditure, c u r r e n t and c a p i t a l , which would be revenue 
1. Cab 87/57 Report on Economic background of Postwar 
B u i l d i n g ... l o c . c i t . 
2. Cab 123/123 D i s c u s s i o n s on Postwar B u i l d i n g Programme 
1943-5 Robbins to Norman Brook 28th January 1943. 
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producing, u l t i m a t e l y r e d u c i n g c h a r g e s to the exchequer, and 
t h a t p a r t which would be a burden. The most the T r e a s u r y 
c o u l d a c h i e v e on s o c i a l s e r v i c e s however, was to g e t the 
government to delay a f i n a l commitment.^ On the b u i l d i n g 
programme however, i t was not so s u c c e s s f u l . The C h a n c e l l o r 
repeated the arguments of the O f f i c i a l Committee's r e p o r t 
but given the support ranged a g a i n s t him by E r n e s t Bevxn and 
Lord P o r t a l ( t h e M i n i s t e r of Works) b a c k t r a c k e d amd advocated 
only t h a t t h e r e should be no commitment on a f i x e d a l l o c a t i o n 
of l a b o u r to b u i l d i n g ; they should merely agree to a 
' s u b s t a n t i a l amount of b u i l d i n g ' . Bevi.n and P o r t a l however, 
p r e s s e d t h e i r case, even a f t e r the M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h had 
agreed t h a t so long as housing was g i v e n p r i o r i t y he had no 
o b j e c t i o n to a s m a l l e r t o t a l b u i l d i n g l a b o u r f o r c e . A com-
promise was reached where i t was agreed to p u b l i s h a f i x e d 
t a r g e t o f men, but 1,250,000 r a t h e r than 1,400,000, to be 
reached t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r the war, but to be m a i n t a i n e d f o r 
3 
twelve and not twenty y e a r s . The C a b i n e t met and agreed to 
4 
p u b l i s h a White Paper. The White Paper would i n c l u d e t h a t 
f i g u r e , aiming 'to m a i n t a i n s t a b i l i t y i n the i n d u s t r y f o r the 
p e r i o d of the programme' w i t h a system of c o n t r o l and 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of b u i l d i n g companies r e q u i r i n g them a l l to 
observe the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of employment agreed i n the 
war i n c l u d i n g the guaratnteed week. I t would o u t l i n e an a d u l t 
1. Cab 87/12 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P r i o r i t i e s Committee meeting 22nd January 1943. 
2. Cab 87/12 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P r i o r i t i e s Committee meeting 
28th January 1943. 
3. Cab 65/33. C a b i n e t meeting WM(43)34 February 23rd 1943 
4. T r a i n i n g f o r the B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y . Cmnd 6248. (London, 
H.M.S.O. February 1943). 
85 
trad-ning and youth a p p r e n t i c e s h i p scheme and the b u i l d i n g of 
t r a i n i n g c e n t r e s , a l l of which the government was to pay f o r . 
I t was hoped t h a t these methods would p r o v i d e an e x t r a 200,000 
men f o r the i n d u s t r y , together w i t h normal and s p e c i a l r e l e a s e s 
from the f o r c e s aind t r a n s f e r from war i n d u s t r i e s . With t h i s 
c r u c i a l commitment to b u i l d i n g , the government began the 
p r o c e s s of h i v i n g o f f a b u i l d i n g p l a n i n t o a d i s c r e t e a r e a 
r e l a t i v e l y i n s u l a t e d from the q u a r t e r l y a l l o c a t i o n s of the 
Manpower Committee. The q u e s t i o n of a l l o c a t i o n s w i t h i n 
b u i l d i n g however, remained to be d e c i d e d . 
I n December, 1943, and March, 1944, the government were 
making statements about t h e i r e s t i m a t e s of housing need and 
a t e n t a t i v e programme of p r o v i s i o n f o r i t . At t h i s s t a g e , 
E r n e s t Brown the H ealth M i n i s t e r , was e n v i s a g i n g 3 to 4 
m i l l i o n houses i n ten to twelve y e a r s of which 1^ to 2h 
m i l l i o n would be to r e p l a c e slums or those d e f i c i e n t i n modern 
a m e n i t i e s and 1^ m i l l i o n to provide separate houses for each family 
and to e l i m i n a t e overcrowding. He o u t l i n e d the p o s i t i o n o f 
300,000 f a m i l i e s l i v i n g i n sluns v/hich had i t not been_.for the war 
would have been condemned J The government's t a r g e t roughly 
1. H.C. Deb Vol.395. Col 391-2 1 December 1943. O r a l Answer. 
H.C. Deb Vol.398 Col 269-278 15th March 1943.Oral Answer. 
For an independent e s t i m a t e see Richardson, H.W. and Aldcrofl^ 
D., B u i l d i n g i n the B r i t i s h Economy between the Wars (London 
A l l e n & Unwin 1968). They w r i t e t h a t w i t h the backlog from 
the t h i r t i e s slum campaign i t s ungenerous s u b s i d y r e l a t e d to 
the number of persons rehoused r a t h e r than o f houses b u i l t , 
t h e r e were s t i l l over 260,000 u n f i t houses i n the U.K. a t 
the end of the war ( s e e t a b l e 21 p.181). The overcrowding 
su b s i d y t h a t f o l l o w e d (which a g a i n was ungenerous - persons 
being allowed to s l e e p i n l i v i n g rooms aind not be c l a s s i f i e d 
as overcrowded p.186) . made l i t t l e impact. I n a d d i t i o n 
to a l l t h i s there was a housing shortage of 800,000 i n 1939 
( p . 1 9 6 ) . I f one i n c l u d e s war m a r r i a g e s , war d e s t r u c t i o n and 
the f a c t t h a t the s h o r t a g e s were h e a v i l y c o n c e n t r a t e d i n 
the b i g c i t i e s ^ t h e e x t e n t of need was even g r e a t e r . 
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matched the Labour P a r t y ' s demand f o r f o u r m i l l i o n over t e n 
y e a r s ^ and a c c o r d i n g to the government was based on the need 
to r e p l a c e slums, and overcrowding, house those p e r s o n s married 
s i n c e the war, meet bomb d e s t r u c t i o n , house those on the 
w a i t i n g l i s t s i n c e 1938 and meet the p r o s p e c t i v e demand d u r i n g 
the next ten y e a r s a r i s i n g from p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e s and 
needed improvements i n s t a n d a r d s . ^ The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
3 
P r i o r i t i e s Committee's r e p o r t on housing i n May was p e s s i m i s t i c 
r e g a r d i n g the achievement of such t a r g e t s a f t e r the war. F i r s t 
of a l l i t went back to the T r e a s u r y i n s p i r e d r e p o r t which i t 
appended, warning t h a t the r a t e o f p r o g r e s s would depend on 
the e x t e n t we were prepared to use accumulated s a v i n g s extracted 
e i t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y o r f o r c i b l y by t a x a t i o n to f i n a n c e the 
programme. Secondly^ given the m a s s i v e a r r e a r s o f maintenance 
and r e p a i r work t h a t would be demanded i n housing, the expected 
output of new houses per annum c o u l d o n l y be 50,O00 g i v e n i t s 
share of b u i l d i n g labour (and t h i s f i g u r e i n c l u d e d S c o t l a n d ) . 
The M i n i s t r y of Health was s t i l l pursuing a c a u t i o u s p o l i c y 
e n v i s a g i n g l i t t l e new house b u i l d i n g because of h i g h b u i l d i n g 
c o s t s and r e n t c o n t r o l . U n l e s s p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e c o u l d be 
tempted i n t o a c t i o n , v i a such s u g g e s t i o n s as b u i l d i n g s o c i e t y 
l e n d i n g on houses b u i l t to l e t , the gap would have to be f i l l e d 
by some l o c a l a u t h o r i t y b u i l d i n g f o r g e n e r a l needs i n the 
1. Housing and P l a n n i n g a f t e r the War. (London, Labour P a r t y 1943). o p . c i t . 
2. H.C. Deb. Vol.395. C o l s 391-2. 1 s t December 1943, O r a l Answer. 
3. Cab 87/3 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Problems Committee Paper May 25th 
1943. Post War Hoising P o l i c y , memo by the M i n i s t e r of 
H e a l t h . 
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i n t e r i m . But f o r the l o n g e r term, which, i t seemed, a c c o r d i n g 
to Brown's statement i n March, was to commence a f t e r a t r a n s -
i t i o n p e r i o d of one y e a r , p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e would p r o v i d e f o r 
e v e r y t h i n g except slum c l e a r a n c e now r e s e r v e d by t r a d i t i o n f o r 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . While the m i n i s t r y r e c o g n i s e d the importajice 
of c o n t r o l l i n g e x c e s s demand i n b u i l d i n g and was w i l l i n g to 
c o n s i d e r the l i c e n c i n g of b u i l d i n g work and c o n t r o l of the 
a l l o c a t i o n of m a t e r i a l s i n s h o r t supply, the r e was no a t t e n t i o n 
to the types and o r i g i n of work t h a t would be r e g u l a t e d , hence 
the generous allowaince f o r labour to be employed on r e p a i r and 
maintenance even a f t e r war damage was c l e a r e d up. With r e g a r d 
to c o s t , p r i c e s c o u l d b e s t be kept low by e v e n t u a l r e - e n t r y of 
c o s t - c o m p e t i t i v e p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , a i d e d through the de-
c o n t r o l of r e n t s and a moderate wages p o l i c y by b u i l d i n g 
workers^which^would o t h e r w i s e l e a d to the ' suspension' o f 
h o u s e b u i l d i n g . T h i s t h r e a t of the q u e s t i o n of c o s t echoed the 
events of 1920's. 
When i n May Lord P o r t a l , the M i n i s t e r of Works produced a 
t e n t a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n of b u i l d i n g l a b o u r i t became c l e a r t h a t 
h i s m i n i s t r y was t h i n k i n g i n much more expansive terms. An 
immediate h o u s e b u i l d i n g programme of 200,000 houses over two 
y e a r s i n s t e a d o f the H e a l t h M i n i s t r y ' s 50,000 i n a y e a r . T h i s 
was the 'maximum number to s a t i s f y p u b l i c pressure'."^ He 
t h e r e f o r e asked t h a t the government c o n s i d e r the e x t e n t to 
which i t would be n e c e s s a r y to c o n t r o l demand i n the i n d u s t r y 
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by l i c e n s i n g of p r i v a t e work. The Lord P r e s i d e n t of the 
C o u n c i l , who ac t e d as c o - o r d i n a t o r o f home p o l i c y r e c e i v e d 
s t r o n g a d v i c e from h i s r e s i d e n t economist (D.N. C h e s t e r ) not 
to mount a b i g housing d r i v e j u s t a f t e r the war. P r i o r i t y 
d e c i s i o n s were clouded by the p o l i t i c a l judgements of 'two 
vigorous M i n i s t r i e s ' , a r e f e r e n c e to B e v i n ^ t h e M i n i s t e r of 
Labour amd P o r t a l , M i n i s t e r of Works. There was no f e a r o f 
unemployment given the s t a t e of po s t war aggregate demand and 
t h e r e f o r e we should t r y and spread our b u i l d i n g over a long 
p e r i o d . Labour c o u l d not be found f o r 200,000 houses u n l e s s 
there was the s t r i c t e s t c o n t r o l on o t h e r b u i l d i n g work. He 
advocated the government 'abandon i t s optimism ajid communicate 
the pessimism to the public'"^. But t h i s was j u s t what the 
government was not keen to do. I t p r e f e r r e d i n s t e a d to g i v e 
a p r i o r i t y to housing. When the R e c o n s t n a c t i o n P r i o r i t i e s 
Committee met on the 30th J u l y , 1943, i t had a r e v i s e d copy 
of the memo by the M i n i s t e r s of Works and Labour before i t , 
s t a t i n g the l i k e l y c a p a c i t y o f the i n d u s t r y ^ w i t h the l i k e l y 
2 3 demands on i t . I n September t h i s was c o n s i d e r e d i n depth . 
Of the amount a v a i l a b l e f o r new c o n s t r u c t i o n the share f o r 
new housing c o u l d be i n c r e a s e d to c a t e r f o r two hundred 
thousand houses i n two y e a r s by c u t s i n o t h e r new b u i l d i n g ' 
i n c l u d i n g new f a c t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . Maintenance and r e p a i r 
could a l s o be reduced by l i c e n c i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s on a l l but 
the s m a l l e s t j o b s so t h a t wages and p r i c e s would not r i s e 
1. Cab 123/123 l o c . c i t . 28th J u l y 1943. Note by D.N.Chester. 
Chester, l i k e Robbins and others^was r e s i d e n t economist 
i n the Economic S e c t i o n of the C a b i n e t O f f i c e . 
2. Cab 87/12 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P r i o r i t i e s Committee meeting 
30th J u l y 1943. 
3. Cab 87/12 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P r i o r i t i e s Committee meeting 
20th September 1943. 
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a t t r a c t i n g labour away from permanent house b u i l d i n g . The 
p u l l of demaind would be d u l l e d i n o-rder- to s a t i s f y - s o c i a l need. 
The M i n i s t e r of Health pointed to the a c u t e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f 
those r e - u n i t e d f a m i l i e s w i t h no houses of t h e i r own, or homes 
they had s u r r e n d e r e d on e n t r y i n t o the s e r v i c e s , being f o r c e d 
now to 'double up'. T h i s need c o u l d only be s a t i s f i e d by a 
major house b u i l d i n g programme. 
People w i l l expect to see a s u b s t a j i t i a l number 
of new houses being b u i l t d u r i n g the f i r s t y e a r 
a f t e r the war. I t would not be r i g h t to make the 
i n i t i a t i o n o f a new b u i l d i n g programme dependent 
on the p r i o r s a t i s f a c t i o n o f the demaind f o r 
maintenance work or the making good of war damage. 
We should prepare now^. Dal ton, the P r e s i d e n t o f the Board of 
Trade however, was anxious t h a t the ' i n d u s t r i a l c a s e ' should 
not go by d e f a u l t . The government should a l s o r e a l i s e the 
need f o r the r e b u i l d i n g of bombed f a c t o r i e s t the c o n v e r s i o n 
of wartime f a c t o r i e s to peacetime work and new f a c t o r y b u i l d i n g , 
a l l o f which was no l e s s u r g e n t than the b u i l d i n g of new 
houses. The meeting agreed a t the L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s s u g g e s t i o n 
that there was a need f o r a system of b u i l d i n g c o n t r o l and 
p r i o r i t y and decided to s e t up a sub-committee on the c o n t r o l 
2 
of post war b u i l d i n g . E x a c t l y what the o r d e r of p r i o r i t i e s 
was to look l i k e was s t i l l open to d i s p u t e and i n December the 
M i n i s t e r o f H e a l t h made a f u r t h e r b i d f o r a t t e n t i o n . Both he 
emd h i s o f f i c i a l s were now s t r e s s i n g the need f o r immediate 
l a r g e s c a l e h o u s e b u i l d i n g a f t e r the war 
1. Cab 87/13 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P r i o r i t i e s Committee Paper. 
13th September. Post War B u i l d i n g Programme Memo by 
the M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h ( d i s c u s s e d a t meeting above. 
2. Cab 87/12 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P r i o r i t i e s Meeting 20th September 1943. 
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To g i v e the p u b l i c some c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t 
we are b o l d l y t a c k l i n g t h i s p r e s s i n g problem.^ 
P a r t of the long terra programme f o r housing s h o u l d now be 
brought forward and d e a l t w i t h by l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . Although 
t h e i r r o l e as slum c l e a r e r s was to be postponed f o r the time 
being, the long term aim was always to r e t u r n g e n e r a l needs 
housing to p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e when the h i g h c o s t o f b u i l d i n g 
was reduced. The c a t e g o r i e s to be c a t e r e d f o r i n new con-
s t r u c t i o n were not only those made homeless through war 
d e s t r u c t i o n , those m a r r i e d and those who had g i v e n up a house 
because of war s e r v i c e but a l s o 'those who had never had a 
2 
home of t h e i r own' . The r a t i o n a l e f o r the immediate programme 
was now 'to provide houses f o r those who simp l y cannot get 
s e p a r a t e houses of t h e i r own' not because they were very poor 
and below the ' g e n e r a l economic l e v e l o f the working c l a s s ' 
but because o f the 'maladjustment of supply and demand'."^ The 
s t a t e would thus i n t e r v e n e not only to p r o v i d e a ' f a i l s a f e ' 
p r o v i s i o n f o r those too poor to p u l l i n the market but a l s o f o r 
those who would not w a i t f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n o f normal market 
f o r c e s . The reason f o r t h i s change i n the M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h ' s 
view seemed to be r e l a t e d to the need to c a t e r to e x p e c t a t i o n : 
to the f a i t h of the people i n the p o s t war set t l e m e n t ^ s o m e t h i n g 
we drew a t t e n t i o n to i n Chapter 2. 
1. cab 124/446 O f f i c e of M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n - Housing 
2. ijL^^^""" ^ ^ " i ^ ^ ^ ^ R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
3. i b i d . 
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The f e e l i n g s ajid needs of those who have no 
s e p a r a t e home of t h e i r own who a r e mainly ex-
servicemen and d e m o b i l i s e d war vorkers r e t u r n i n g 
to t h e i r own d i s t r i c t s , w i l l be so s t r o n g t h a t 
i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t whatever the programme o f 
temporary c o n s t r u c t i o n may be, a s u b s t a n t i a l 
number of new permanent houses should be under 
c o n s t r u c t i o n i n the e a r l y days a f t e r the end 
of the war with Germany. I t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t 
they should be w i d e l y s p r e a d as p o s s i b l e both 
because the need i s widely spread and i n o r d e r 
t h a t they may be seen to be going up a l l o v e r 
the country. The s i g h t of houses under 
c o n s t r u c t i o n w i l l do a l o t to encourage those 
i n need to be p a t i e n t . 1 
A programme of 100,000 houses i n the f i r s t y e a r f o l l o w e d by 
200,000 i n the second y e a r would be a p p r o p r i a t e . Exchequer 
s u b s i d i e s should be promised to l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s f o r g e n e r a l 
needs b u i l d i n g (and not j u s t f o r removing slums and o v e r -
crowding) and backdated to encourage s t a r t s b e f o r e the 
2 
l e g i s l a t i o n was passed. So when the f i r s t meeting of the 
new sub-committee on b u i l d i n g met, i t was agreed to prepare 
a r e p o r t a d v o c a t i n g the r e d u c t i o n of the wartime f i g u r e of 
£100 under which l i c e n c e s f o r maintenance and r e p a i r were not 
needed, which would h e l p ensure t h a t a l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n of 
the labour f o r c e a v a i l a b l e should be a l l o c a t e d to housing.^ 
The f i n a l r e p o r t was ready on 9th March, 1944, and p o i n t e d out 
that, whereas before the war r e p a i r and maintenance had had 
only about one t h i r d o f the b u i l d i n g l a b o u r f o r c e - t h e demand 
fo r a r r e a r s of meiintenance and r e p a i r - of f a c t o r i e s and o f f i c e s , 
as w e l l as houses ajid war damage r e p a i r , t h a t would f a l l on the 
market a f t e r the war was l i k e l y to absorb two- t h i r d s i f not 
1. Cab 124/446 O f f i c e o f M i n i s t r y of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n - Housing 
1 s t December 1943. D r a f t Note by M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
2. i b i d . 
3. Cab 87/11 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee - Sub-Committee on the 
C o n t r o l of Post War B u i l d i n g . Meeting 15th December 1943. 
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the whole of a l l b u i l d i n g l a b o u r . The r e d u c t i o n o f the l i c e n c e 
f e e expenditure to only £10 might h e l p to reduce i t or keep 
i t a t two t h i r d s , ^ but the one t h i r d l e f t f o r new c o n s t r u c t i o n 
would have to be d i v i d e d amongst new f a c t o r i e s , o f f i c e s and 
shops, h o s p i t a l s , s c h o o l s and government b u i l d i n g s as w e l l as 
new housing. Even i f new housing got two t h i r d s o f the remaining 
one t h i r d , i t would s t i l l be i n s u f f i c i e n t g i v e n the f a c t t h a t 
no houses had been b u i l t i n the war w h i l e some f a c t o r i e s had 
2 
been. The r e p o r t however, s t u c k to two t h i r d s o f the new 
b u i l d i n g and argued t h a t the housing programme c o u l d proceed 
on the assumption t h a t , a p a r t from the new l i c e n c i n g l i m i t , 
the share of labour devoted to maintenance and r e p a i r c o u l d be 
drawn o f f by the c o n t i n u e d use of m o d i f i e d l a b o u r c o n t r o l s , by 
which employees c o u l d only be c o n t r a c t e d through l a b o u r 
exchanges, and where they would be o f f e r e d p r i o r i t y j o b s f i r s t , 
of which housing would top the l i s t . ^ I n a s u b m i s s i o n to the 
C a b i n e t the M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n advocated t h a t to 
a c h i e v e a t a r g e t of 300,000 b u i l t or b u i l d i n g i n 2 y e a r s , i t 
1. £10,because a l i c e n c i n g l i m i t of £5 would be u n a c c e p t a b l e to 
the p u b l i c and u n e n f o r c e a b l e as i t would apply to the very 
s m a l l j o b s i m p o s s i b l e to s u p e r v i s e ^ see Cab 87/11 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Sub-Committee on c o n t r o l of P o s t 
War B u i l d i n g meeting 18th February, 1944. 
2. Cab 87/11 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Sub-Committee on the 
C o n t r o l of Post War B u i l d i n g . 11th January 1944. Note by 
S i r John Wrigley ( M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h ) . 
3. Cab 87/11 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Sub-Committee on the 
C o n t r o l of Post War B u i l d i n g . 9 t h March 1944. Report of 
the Sub-Committee (Chairman S i r P e r c i v a l Robinson). The 
Report a l s o advocated c o n t r o l s on c o s t s v i a r e g u l a t i o n i n 
the p r i c e of b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s . 
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would be n e c e s s a r y to r e s t o r e the g e n e r a l needs s u b s i d y , 
i n t r o d u c e compulsory purchase of land a t 1939 p r i c e s and s t a r t 
p r e p a r i n g s i t e s now.^ 
At t h i s p o i n t the Prime M i n i s t e r , C h u r c h i l l , i n t e r v e n e d . 
While ag r e e i n g t h a t permanent housing had a p l a c e and e a r l y 
l e g i s l a t i o n on a subsidy should be acceptedf more emphasis 
should be p l a c e d on r e s t o r i n g war damaged houses and e s t a b l i s h -
i n g f o r young married c o u p l e s 'a l a r g e programme i n emergency 
housing* w i t h s t a n d a r d i s e d f u r n i t u r e and f i t t i n g s . So when 
on the 8th March and l a t e r on the 15th March, 1944, the M i n i s t e r 
of Health went ahead and announced the two y e a r programme of 
300,000 houses^ the v a s t bulk of which were to be b u i l t by 
IOCCLI a u t h o r i t i e s through the r e s t o r a t i o n of the g e n e r a l needs 
3 
subsidy, i t was f o l l o w e d by a speech on the r a d i o by C h u r c h i l l 
on 26th March, 1944, announcing i n a d d i t i o n a t a r g e t of 500,000 
s t e e l p r e f a b s to be t r e a t e d as a ' m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n ' w i t h 
4 
f a c t o r i e s assigned m a t e r i a l s and s i t e s a l l o c a t e d ' . He 
remarked that t h i s would be ' s u p e r i o r ' to the i n t e r w a r house, 
w i t h gas and f r i d g e f i t t i n g s and would be mass produced so 
t h a t t h e r e would be no heavy c h a r g e s f o r r e n t . P r i o r i t y would 
be given to s o l d i e r s and young m a r r i e d c o u p l e s s i n c e t h e r e would 
only be two bedrooms. I n C h u r c h i l l ' s mind t h i s was to be top priority, 
the second ' a t t a c k ' being on war damage r e p a i r . The i m p l i c a t i o n 
1. Cab 66/46. C a b i n e t Paper WP (44)10, 15th February, 1944. 
Housing i n the T r a n s i t i o n a l P e r i o d , 15th February, 1944. 
. Memo by the M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n * 
2. Cab 65/41 Cabinet meeting WM(44)25, 24th February, 1944. 
3. H.C. Deb. Vol. 396, C o l . 2057, 8th March, 1944. Debate on Post War Housing P o l i c y . 
H,C. Deb, V o l . 398, C o l . 278, 15th March, 1944. Debate on Housing. 
4. C a l d e r , A-, 'The People's War' B r i t a i n 1939-45. (London, Jonathan Cape, 1965), p. 535. 
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was t h a t permainent t r a d i t i o n a l housing would be a poor t h i r d . 
The r a t i o n a l e behind t h i s move was t h a t p r e f a b s would save on 
s i t e l a b o u r , f a c i l i t a t e s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n aund t h e r e f o r e a l l o w 
f o r a s o l u t i o n to the housing problem without the c o s t of the 
permanent programme. The M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h opposed C h u r c h i l l ' s 
move and i n t e r p r e t e d i t as an a t t a c k on the permanent programme 
The C e n t r a l Housing A d v i s o r y Committee r e p o r t e d t h a t p r e -
f a b r i c a t e d housing lowered s t a n d a r d s (room s i z e s were s m a l l e r ) , 
took up s i t e s on which permanent housing c o u l d go ahead, and 
competed f o r b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s s l o w i n g down permanent con-
s t r u c t i o n . Despite the s a v i n g of on s i t e l a b o u r , i t would teep 
too many l a b o u r e r s i n the b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s i n d u s t r i e s and i n 
f a c t o r i e s f a s h i o n i n g c a r c a s e s , a t the expense of the b u i l d i n g 
i n d u s t r y . They pointed out t h a t although the c a p i t a l o u t l a y 
was l e s s than a permanent house i t s reduced l i f e would mean 
higher loan charges on what were l i k e l y to degenerate.-into 
slums. They had no o b j e c t i o n to a s m a l l programme to s u p p l e -
ment permanent h o u s e b u i l d i n g but not of a s i z e t h a t would 
j e o p a r d i s e s u c c e s s i n the l a t t e r . ^ I t soon became apparent 
however, t h a t the temporary programme would be r u l e d out on 
oth e r grounds p r i n c i p a l l y the f a c t t h a t the c a p i t a l c o s t 
e s t i m a t e s r o s e u n t i l t h e r e was very l i t t l e s a v i n g . I n A p r i l / 
May 1944, Lord P o r t a l p r e d i c t e d a p r i c e of £550 each. By 
e a r l y 1945 they were e s t i m a t i n g £900 - £1,000 eac h . ^ As the 
1. H.L.G. 37/66. C.H.A.C. Sub-Committee f o r Temporary and 
Permanent C o n s t r u c t i o n I n t e r i m Report undated 1943-4. 
2. The reason f o r the i n c r e a s e d c o s t was t h a t the o r i g i n a l 
e s t i m a t e had made no al l o w a n c e f o r m a n u f a c t u r e r s p r o f i t , 
t r a n s p o r t c o s t s o r the chamging p r i c e of manufactured 
f i t t i n g s . See Cab 87/37 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee:Sub-
committee on Housing Paper. 8 t h September 1944. I n c r e a s e d 
C o s t of Temporary Housing. Memo by the M i n i s t e r of Works. 
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p r i c e rose>. • the t a r g e t was reduced so t h a t by the end o f 
November 1944, the t a l k was o f 200,000 - 250,000 'emergency' 
houses of s t e e l or aluminium. These would contadn s t a n d a r d -
i s e d f i t m e n t s a l l purchased by the Exchequert e r e c t e d a t their 
expense on l o c a l a u t h o r i t y s i t e s under t h e i r l e t t i n g and 
management."^ I t appeared t h a t ^ owing to the c r i t i c a l need f o r 
munitions i n 1945^ the manufacturing c a p a c i t y would not be 
a v a i l a b l e and the t a r g e t was reduced. IVhile i m p o r t s from the 
U.S.A. and Sweden were c o n s i d e r e d , t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e was 
r e j e c t e d as both were hard c u r r e n c y a r e a s and the government 
n e e d e d . a l l the f o r e i g n exchange i t c o u l d get f o r food and raw 
m a t e r i a l s . I t was the C o a l i t i o n , however, and not the Labour 
government which decided to de-emphasise what Bevan c a l l e d 
• r a b b i t hutches'. As the M i n i s t e r o f Works p o i n t e d out 
The o p i n i o n of P a r l i a m e n t , p r e s s and p u b l i c i s 
unanimous on t h i s p o i n t the r e p a i r o f houses 
and the p r o v i s i o n of temporary bungalows a r e 
regarded as p a l l i a t i v e s i n our immediate 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , not a s a l t e r n a t i v e s to the b u i l d i n g 
of new houses.3 
On the 22nd January, 1945, the C o a l i t i o n d e c i d e d to downgrade 
4 
the programme i n favour o f permanent c o n s t r u c t i o n so t h a t by 
the March 1945,^ i t had been d e c i d e d to f i r m l y a l l o c a t e only 
145,000 - 150,000. 
1. HousinqiThe Temporary Programme. Cmnd 6686. (London, H.M.S.O. 1945). 
2. Foot, M.> Aneurin Bevan;a biography Vol.2. 1945-60. 
(London, Davis-Poynter 1973).p.81. 
3. Cab 87/37. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee:Sub-Committee on 
Housing Paper 24th November 1944. Temporary Housing 
Memo by the M i n i s t r y o f Works. 
4. Cab 87/36. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Comraittee:Sub-Committee on 
Housing meeting 22nd January, 1943. 
5. Housing* Cmnd.6609. (London, H.M.S.O. March 1945). 
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I n r e t r o s p e c t , one can see t h a t the p r e f a b was not r e a l l y 
a way out f o r the government* I f i t o b v i a t e d the need to expand 
o n - s i t e b u i l d i n g labour i t i n c r e a s e d the s t a t e use of p l a n t 
and manufacturing c a p a c i t y and the use of i n p u t m a t e r i a l s , 
e s p e c i a l l y s t e e l , a t a time when as much as p o s s i b l e was needed 
i n p r i v a t e manufacturing, e s p e c i a l l y f o r exp o r t . Any l a r g e 
s c a l e and novel use of p r e f a b r i c a t i o n f o r permanent housing 
would have been a bold move i n the y e a r s before i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
b u i l d i n g had r e a d l y s t a r t e d . Although government was w i l l i n g 
to make paper p r o j e c t i o n s about the p o s s i b i l i t y " ^ , the prospect 
was not only am economic gamble but r a i s e d too many r i s k s 
i n v o l v i n g as i t d i d a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t of unemployment f o r 
b u i l d i n g workers who had j u s t promised to expand t h e i r numbers 
by a l l o w i n g d i l u t i o n . A c c o r d i n g - t o the government, t h e r e was, 
i n a d d i t i o n , s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n from the t r a d i t i o n a l b u i l d i n g 
compajiies who f e a r e d i t would r u i n them and g i v e t h e i r t r a d e 
to f a c t o r y m a j i u f a c t u r e r s . ^ 
The i d e a o f C h u r c h i l l ' s to c o n c e n t r a t e on war damage 
r e p a i r was a l s o dropped and the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee 
agreed war damage rep^Lir should not go so f a r a s to make 
i m p o s s i b l e the completion of the permanent programme of new 
houses by a r e d u c t i o n i n i t s l a b o u r f o r c e . P r i o r i t y f o r 
permanent housing would be gi v e n i n the p r o d u c t i o n and d i s -
t r i b u t i o n of m a t e r i a l s by the Board o f Trade and the M i n i s t r y 
1. Cab 87/36. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee:Sub-Committee on 
Housing meeting 7th June 1945. 
2. Cab 87/36. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee:Sub-Committee on 
Housing meeting 13th March 1945. Acco r d i n g to Foot, 
( Sevan p . 8 l ) t h e r e was a s m a l l experiment i n p r e f a b r i c a t e d 
permanent housing;some 10,000 of the permanent houses 
e v e n t u a l l y b u i l t being of t h i s type. 
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of Supply."^ 
The f i n a l outcome of a l l t h i s was the C o a l i t i o n ' s White 
Paper p u b l i s h e d i n March 1945. As we s h a l l see t h i s was sub-
s t a n t i a l l y adopted by the incoming Labour Government. I t 
est i m a t e d t h a t out o f the 12^ m i l l i o n houses o f 1939, 3 - 4 
m i l l i o n had been damaged i n the war and th e r e were a r r e a r s of 
r e p a i r on the r e s t . There were 210,000 d e s t r o y e d , 250,000 
u n i n h a b i t a b l e . To c a t c h up on d e s t r u c t i o n and to pro v i d e f o r 
the s h o r t term e x c e s s of f a m i l i e s o v e r houses c a u s e d by the 
c e s s a t i o n o f wartime b u i l d i n g and the r i s e i n m a r r i a g e s , the 
government c a l c u l a t e d , we would need 750,000 d w e l l i n g s before 
the end of 1948.^ I f one added an al l o w a n c e f o r the r a p i d 
completion of the pre-war slum c l e a r a n c e and overcrowding 
programmes, the need was f o r 1,250,000 i n the s h o r t term. The 
long term o b j e c t i v e of 3 - 4 m i l l i o n i n t o twelve y e a r s was to 
ac h i e v e the p r o g r e s s i v e improvement i n stand a r d s , but the 
f i r s t concern was to get as many d w e l l i n g s i n t o u s e as p o s s i b l e 
whether i n e x i s t i n g b u i l d i n g s u n f i t f o r h a b i t a t i o n but made 
good, or by new ones- I n view of the l i m i t s on l a b o u r resources 
the two year programme of 300,000 houses would be phased so as 
to complete 220,000 with 80,000 under c o n s t r u c t i o n and n e a r i n g 
completion. The government would a s s u r e a good supply of 
m a t e r i a l s and components and p r o v i d e a s u b s i d y . L o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s would make p l a n s and s e l e c t s i t e s . To ensure 
1. Cab 87/6 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee meeting 8th September 1944 
2. Housing Cmnd. 6609. l o c . c i t . 
3. i b i d p a r a 4. 
4. Of those 300,000 S c o t l a n d would get 50,000 see H C DPH 
v o l . 409 C o l . 1094. 22nd March 1945. D;bate on H o u ; i n g r 
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r e a s o n a b l e p r i c e s there would be no r a p i d d e c o n t r o l as had 
happened i n 1919 over m a t e r i a l s and fitments.. . . Work done 
on p r i v a t e account would be s u b j e c t to l i c e n c e i f i t was over 
£10 i n e x p e n d i t u r e - a r e g u l a t i o n t h a t was to apply from May 
1945."^ One can of c o u r s e c r i t i c i s e the t a r g e t from the p o i n t 
of view of b eing i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r e v i o u s e s t i m a t e s of need 
but the C o a l i t i o n b e l i e v e d t h a t was the maximum t h a t c o u l d be 
a chieved so soon a f t e r the war, even w i t h housing a c h i e v i n g 
2 
the ' h i g h e s t c i v i l i a n p r i o r i t y ' . As we saw i n c h a p t e r 2, the 
e x p l i c i t aim of the government was to a v o i d any promises i t 
could not c a r r y out. When the Labour government came to power 
the b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of the C o a l i t i o n ' s plan remained u n a l t e r e d 
although i t was to r e c e i v e more emphasis w i t h housing f o r s a l e 
being i i m i t e d ^ ^ and Employment Exchanges i n s t r u c t e d to g i v e 
4 
new housing the number one p r i o r i t y on a l l Labour a v a i l a b l e . 
Bevaji e x p l a i n e d t h a t the C o a l i t i o n t a r g e t of 750,000 to g i v e 
a s e p a r a t e home f o r each f a m i l y , to make up a r r e a r s and to 
r e p l a c e d e s t r u c t i o n and another. 500,000 to complete pre-war 
slum c l e a r a n c e and overcrowding programmes would remain^ as 
would the immediate two y e a r programme of 300,000. I n a d d i t i o n 
he proposed to take powers to f a c i l i t a t e c o n v e r s i o n and 
adaption of l a r g e r houses i n t o f l a t s . New l o c a l a u t h o r i t y 
b u i l d i n g f o r r e n t was however to have f i r s t p r i o r i t y on labour, 
1. See M i n i s t e r s speech H.C. Deb. V o l . 409. 22nd March 1945. 
2. According to the M i n i s t e r of Works (H.C. Deb. V o l . 409. 
C o l . 1261. 23rd March 1945) t h e r e would be a minimum of 
145,000 temporary p r e f a b s r i s i n g to a maximum of 200,000. 
He t h e r e f o r e f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n t a l k i n g of a 2 y e a r 
programme of 400,000 houses. 
3. Cab 124/450 Lord P r e s i d e n t s O f f i c e : Post War Housing. 
Meeting of M i n i s t e r s . 8 t h August 1945. 
4. Cab 87/36 Housing Committee meeting 17th August 1945. 
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m a t e r i a l s and components. There was no p r o s p e c t o f being a b l e 
to s e t a hi g h e r t a r g e t than the C o a l i t i o n ' s and even t h a t was 
s u b j e c t to r e s e r v a t i o n depending on the supply of m a t e r i a l s 
and l a b o u r . ^ As Foot e x p l a i n s , Sevan's dilemma was t h a t i f he 
f i x e d a t a r g e t too high and f a i l e d to r e a c h i t the p u b l i c would 
take i t badly, but i f he f i x e d i t too low he would r i s k the 
whole programme. Bevan decided no o f f i c i a l t a r g e t should be 
pub l i s h e d although he would work p r i v a t e l y to the C o a l i t i o n ' s 
f i g u r e . ^ T h i s move r e c e i v e d s t r o n g support from Lord Addison: 
who argued from the ' l i g h t of h i s e x p e r i e n c e ' t h a t i t would be 
a huge t a s k to get enough la b o u r on to the b u i l d i n g s i t e s or 
to keep a c o n t r o l on buildxng c o s t s . Bevan d i d however improve 
on the C o a l i t i o n s r a t h e r c a u t i o u s a t t i t u d e to the Dudley 
standards i n f o r m i n g l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s by c i r c u l a r on 13th 
November t h a t they should p l a n f o r l a r g e r housest (900-950 sq. 
f e e t ) , i n s t e a d of the 800-900 range. T h i s would make i t 
p o s s i b l e to have a second W.C. on the ground f l o o r l e v e l and 
guarantee t h r e e o r more bedrooms.^ 
The housing programme began i n e a r n e s t i n the middle of 
1945. U n l i k e the s i t u a t i o n i n 1918 - advance p r e p a r a t i o n s had 
been made to ensure a s t a r t as soon as the war ended, ( a l t h o u g h 
1. _Cab 129/3 C a b i n e t Paper CP(45)208 6th October.1945. 
Housing Memo by the M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h d i s c u s s e d Cab. 
128/1 C a b i n e t meeting CM(45)41 15th October 1945. 
2. Foot, Bevan. p.82. 
3. Cab 129/4 C a b i n e t Paper CP(45)274 5th November 1945. 
P r o g r e s s Report on Housing Memo by the M i n i s t e r o f H e a l t h . 
4. Cab 128/2 C a b i n e t Meeting CM(45)54. 20th November 1945. 
Lord Addison had been M i n i s t e r o f H e a l t h r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
the f i r s t Post War Housing d r i v e 1918-21. Having j o i n e d 
the Labour P a r t y he had been appointed by Atclee to the 
post of S e c r e t a r y f o r Dominion A f f a i r s . 
5. Cab 129/5. C a b i n e t Paper CP(45)330. 6th December 1945. 
P r o g r e s s Report on Housing. Memo by the M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h . 
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t h i s time t h e r e were problems w i t h the c o n t i n u i n g c o n f l i c t 
with Japan - t h a t went on u n t i l A u g u s t ) . On 3rd August, 1944, 
a Housing Act was passed extending the pre-war slum c l e a r a n c e 
s u b s i d i e s o f 1938 to the p r o v i s i o n of g e n e r a l needs houses by 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . ^ The g e n e r a l o p i n i o n was t h a t the s u b s i d y 
f i g u r e s would be i n c r e a s e d a f t e r the war and backdated t o cover 
houses s t a r t e d now under t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n . I n 1943 a l l l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s who d i d not a l r e a d y own enough l a n d f o r a b u i l d i n g 
programme were asked to earmark the n e c e s s a r y l a n d and were 
t o l d they might proceed w i t h i t s a c q u i s i t i o n . E a r l y i n 1944, 
they were asked to s t a r t the p r e p a r a t i o n of s i t e s . I n A p r i l 
1945 C o u n c i l s were informed t h a t the ban of t h e i r b u i l d i n g 
anything i n wartime would be r e l a x e d , by June tend e r s were 
being approved.^ 
SECTION I I . THE DEBATE ON BUILDING PRIORITIES 
The p r e c e d i n g must not be i n t e r p r e t e d as though the 
formation of the programme never came under c h a l l e n g e . We have 
a l r e a d y noted the T r e a s u r y ' s warning on ac c u m u l a t i o n . The 
governments commitment to pursue a housing d r i v e i n a s i t u a t i o n 
i n which t h e r e would no longer be any i d l e r e s o u r c e s i n the 
country and where the quantity o f men and m a t e r i a l s that c o u l d 
be a l l o c a t e d f o r i t depended on i t r e c e i v i n g a we i g h t i n g that 
seemed to p l a c e i t above a l l the o t h e r t a s k s o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
came i n from some p o i n t e d c r i t i c i s m d u r i n g the p l a n n i n g s t a g e . 
The debate on p r i o r i t i e s c e n t r e d around the recommendation 
1. The H o u s i n g ( F i n a n c i a l P r o v i s i o n s ) Act, 1944. 7 and 8 
Geo. 6. Ch.33. ( 3 r d August 1944), i n The P u b l i c G e n e r a l 
A c t s of 1944 (London, H.M.S.O. 194 5 ) . 
2. Kohan, CM., Works and B u i l d i n g s . H i s t o r y of the Second 
World War C i v i l S e r i e s (London, H.M.S.O. 1952 p.431). 
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t h a t two t h i r d s of a l l new b u i l d i n g r e s o u r c e s should be 
a l l o c a t e d f o r new houses. The Board of Trade was d i s t u r b e d 
t h a t the Robinson Report^on the c o n t r o l of p o s t war b u i l d i n g ^ 
had made no f i r m a l l o c a t i o n f o r f a c t o r y b u i l d i n g and was ' d a i l y 
r e c e i v i n g e n q u i r i e s from m a n u f a c t u r e r s . ^ The governments 
r e s i d e n t economists added t h e i r weight. Robbins wrote: 
T h i s degree of p r e - o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the housing 
programme w i l l i n t e r f e r e w i t h the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
of our export i n d u s t r i e s which should have p r i o r i t y 
even over housing. At a p i n c h we can put up f o r a 
y e a r or two, w i t h the exiguous d w e l l i n g space which 
we now p o s s e s s but i f l e n d l e a s e s u p p l i e s f a l l o f f 
and we have not v a s t l y expanded our e x p o r t s we may 
not have the w h e r e w i t h a l l even to f i l l our stomach's 
or c l o t h e our backs ... I am g e n u i n e l y alarmed to 
observe an e v o l u t i o n of thought a t a very h i g h l e v e l 
which i s r a p i d l y b r i n g i n g i t about t h a t e x p o r t s w i l l 
f i g u r e as the C i n d e r e l l a . 2 
On the m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l . Lord C h e r w e l l Paymaster-General 
and C h u r c h i l l ' s p r i v a t e a d v i s o r ( p r e v i o u s l y known as P r o f e s s o r 
Lindemannj^attacked tJ^e assumption b u i l t i n t o the Robinson 
Report t h a t the b u i l d i n g programme should be planned f o r a 
3 
p e r i o d up to 10 y e a r s * These p o i n t s were made more s t r o n g l y 
by the S e c r e t a r y of the Department f o r O v e r s e a s Trade, H a r c o u r t 
Johnstone. He a t t a c k e d the i d e a of s o l v i n g unemployment by 
• t e a r i n g down houses' and i n c r e a s i n g the r a t e of replacement 
1. Cab 124/77 O f f i c e of M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n : B u i l d i n g 
P r i o r i t i e s . 7th September 1944. L e t t e r from the Board of 
Trade summarizing telephone d i s c u s s i o n s on 18th August 
and 7th September, 1944 between Board of Trade and M i n i s t r y 
of Works o f f i c i a l s . 
2. Cab 124/585 O f f i c e of M i n i s t e r of Reconstruction:Comraents 
on Sub-Committee on C o n t r o l of P o s t war B u i l d i n g 3 1 s t 
March 1944. L i o n e l Robbins to Norman Brook and J.P. Maud. 
3. Cab 87/8 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Paper. 2nd June 1944. 
The Long Term b u i l d i n g Programme. Memo by the Paymaster-
General . 
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when e x i s t i n g houses c o u l d be l i v e d i n l o n g e r . Such b u i l d i n g 
constituted ' u s e l e s s work'. I n s t e a d r e s o u r c e s were needed f o r 
the export trade and f o r our r o l e as ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l policemen'. 
We were a l r e a d y p l a n n i n g heavy e x p e n d i t u r e on s o c i a l s e r v i c e s 
to r e l i e v e want and must beware the burden t h a t a l l t h i s would 
p l a c e on the middle c l a s s e s . " ^ Hugh Dal ton. C o a l i t i o n Trade 
2 
M i n i s t e r , a t t a c k e d the one t h i r d a l l o c a t i o n to 'other b u i l d i n g ' . 
I t was too s m a l l , i t would have to c o v e r the b u i l d i n g of new 
f a c t o r i e s as w e l l a s warehouses, o f f i c e s and shops; s c h o o l s 
and h o s p i t a l s . Between a l l of these axi a l l o c a t i o n would be 
needed. ' I n many c a s e s ' s a i d Dal ton, 
i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g , f o r example^the r e b u i l d i n g 
of bombed f a c t o r i e s , t h e c o n v e r s i o n o f f a c t o r i e s 
to peacetime purposes, aind the e r e c t i o n o f new 
ones w i l l be no l e s s urgent than the b u i l d i n g of 
new houses.3 
He a l s o d i s a g r e e d t h a t l i c e n c e s should have to be granted f o r 
e s s e n t i a l r e p a i r s i n the i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d , a p r o v i s i o n t h a t 
would a f f e c t the speed o f peacetime a d a p t i o n . These c r i t i c i s m s 
of Dalton, c e n t r e d , as they were on the problems o f simple 
r e c o n v e r s i o n , h a r d l y touched on the more extended requirements 
f o r expansion, m o d e r n i s a t i o n and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e d f o r 
i n c r e a s e s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y . Robinson's a l l o c a t i o n to new housing 
of two t h i r d s of la b o u r f o r new b u i l d i n g was made worse by the 
f a c t t h a t labour f o r new temporary houses would come out o f the 
othe r t h i r d o f new b u i l d i n g labour a l l o c a t e d f o r f a c t o r i e s , r e -
1. Cab 87/8 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Paper. 23rd June 1944. 
The Long Term b u i l d i n g Programme. Memo by the S e c r e t a r y f o r 
Overseas Trade. 
2. Cab 87/8 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Paper. i 5 t h A p r i l 1944. 
Report of the Sub-Committee on C o n t r o l of Post war b u i l d i n g . 
Memo by the P r e s i d e n t of the Board o f Trade. 
3. i b i d . 
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equipment and o t h e r purposes. S i r John Wrigley o f the Ministry 
of H e alth had been given a promise t h a t the temporary prograume 
would not be undertaken a t the expense of permanent housing."^ 
I t must be s t r e s s e d t h a t these c r i t i c i s m s would have added 
f o r c e when one r e a l i s e d t h a t 6 6% of the i n d u s t r y ' s r e s o u r c e s 
were a l r e a d y hived o f f f o r war damage, maintenance and r e p a i r s 
much of which would again a c c r u e to the Housing p r i o r i t y . The 
f u l l d i s t r i b u t i o n can be shown t h e r e f o r e as f o l l o w s : -
FIGURE 1 : D i s t r i b u t i o n of the B u i l d i n g Labour f o r c e . 
r* 
TOTAL BUILDING LABOUR FORCE 
2 7 ^ 
to War Damage R e p a i r s and 
o r d i n a r y maintenance and 
repau.r (Housing p r i o r i t y 
but i n c l u d i n g f a c t o r y r e p a i r s ) 





Other new b u i l d i n g 
f a c t o r i e s , s c h o o l s , 
h o s p i t a l s , temp-
o r a r y housing e t c . 
We must a l s o be aware of the f a c t , which, was not i t seems 
p r o p e r l y a p p r e c i a t e d ^ e v e n by these c r i t i c s ^ a t the time, t h a t 
1. Cab 124/585. O f f i c e of M i n i s t e r o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
A. -Johnson to S i r John Wrigley. 13th A p r i l 1944. 
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as war damage r e p a i r receded"^ aind r e s o u r c e s were g r a d u a l l y 
r e l e a s e d so t h a t a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of the t o t a l labour f o r c e 
went on new b u i l d i n g , the a p p l i c a t i o n of the t w o - t h i r d s housing 
p r i o r i t y would l e a v e the r e l a t i v e p r i o r i t i e s unchanged even 
though more work i n a b s o l u t e terms c o u l d be done i n each 
c a t e g o r y . N e v e r t h e l e s s the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee accepted 
the Robinson Report, recommended t h a t a more d e t a i l e d scheme 
f o r the c o n t r o l of b u i l d i n g b e worked out and i n v i t e d 
Departments to submit t h e i r non-housing r e q u i r e m e n t s . When 
these a r r i v e d the l a r g e s t s i n g l e demand came, as expected, from 
the Board of Trade f o r Labour and ex p e n d i t u r e on f a c t o r i e s and 
workshops and f o r much more than the allowance i n the Robinson 
Report. The e s t i m a t e d demands and a t e n t a t i v e d e t a i l e d 
a l l o c a t i o n f o r y e a r I was ready by January 1945.^ The t o t a l 
b u i l d i n g l a b o u r f o r c e was expected to r i s e s l i g h t l y more than 
p r e d i c t e d from 337,000 - 800,000 i n y e a r I e q u i v a l e n t to 
535,000 men throughout the y e a r and d i s t r i b u t e d i n accordance 
w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s of the Robinson Report. The f o l l o w i n g 
t a b l e a b s t r a c t e d from the s t a t i s t i c s i n the paper i l l u s t r a t e s 
the n a t u r e of the a l l o c a t i o n . 
1. S u b s t a n t i a l war damage r e p a i r to houses had taken p l a c e under 
the C o a l i t i o n . The London R e p a i r s E x e c u t i v e under the auspjices 
of a War Damage Commission, working through l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
s t a r t e d p r i n c i p a l l y i n London and the South E a s t ('bomb a l l e y ) 
i n the summer of 1944. '^he government s e t a p r e l i m i n a r y 
t a r g e t of r e p a i r s to 719,000 houses i n September 1944 and 
ach i e v e d i t i n March 1945. see Bowen, I.,'The C o n t r o l of 
B u i l d i n g * i n D.N.Chester (ed.) L e s s o n s o f the B r i t i s h War 
Economy. (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1951).pp.139-40. 
2. Cab 87/5 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee meeting. 20th A p r i l 1944. 
3. Cab 87/10. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Paper 16th January 1945. 
Requirements and P r i o r i t i e s f o r P o s t war b u i l d i n g o t h e r than 
housing. J o i n t memo by the M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and 
the M i n i s t e r of Works. 
105 
Table 1. 
A v a i l a b l e b u i l d i n g l a b o u r f o r c e : olanned ^1-[ r^n^ri r.r^ of work. Year I . • b u i l d i n g 
New 
B u i l d i n g 




War Damage Rep a i r 182,000 34% 
Maintenance and Repa i r 145,000 27% 
61% New Housing 127,000 
« 
24% 
15% New b u i l d i n g sponsored 
by the Board o f Trade 31,175 6% 
24% Other New b u i l d i n g 49,825 9% 
LOO% 535,000 100% 
New housing was given j u s t a l i t t l e s h o r t o f t w o - t h i r d s new 
b u i l d i n g . The memo noted t h a t the labo u r l i k e l y t o be a v a i l a b l e 
f o r new c o n s t r u c t i o n o t h e r than housing would be no more than 
50% o f the requirements put forward by the P r o d u c t i o n Depart-
ments. Although the Board o f Trade was a l l o c a t e d 70% o f i t s 
demand ( w i t h 31,175 men) b e t t e r than t h a t of the Departments 
c o n s i d e r e d as a whole, s e v e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ought to be noted. 
These f i g u r e s were paper p r e d i c t i o n s based on e s t i m a t e s by 
c i v i l s e r v a n t s a t the Board of. Trade o f the l i k e l y demand from 
p r i v a t e c a p i t a l . They would have to assume t h a t they had 
c o r r e c t l y s m t i c i p a t e d the post war i n t e n t i o n s of i n v e s t o r s . I t 
l e f t out of account what the v a r i o u s s e c t o r s may ha.ve needed 
on an o b j e c t i v e standard, s e t perhaps by e c o n o m i s t s , f o r a degree 
of modernization. I n a d d i t i o n the e s t i m a t e s were based on 
l i k e l y a p p l i c a t i o n f o r l i c e n c e s and t h e r e f o r e d i d not r e f l e c t 
what might have been the demand from p r i v a t e c a p i t a l had th e r e 
been no s t a t e v e t t i n g and c o n t r o l o f the p r o c e s s o f investment. 
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Consequently the t a b l e r e v e a l s a s h a r e f o r trade and i n d u s t r y 
which was very low c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t i t was a time of r e c o n -
s t r u c t i o n . We cannot assume t h a t the Board of Trade would 
get the bulk of approved r e p a i r and maintenance work s i n c e i t 
was r e c o g n i s e d t h a t much of t h i s was l i k e l y to be engaged on 
housing where the g r e a t e s t accumulated need of r e p a i r was 
e v i d e n t . L i c e n c i n g A u t h o r i t i e s would be hard p r e s s e d to j u s t i f y 
g r a n t i n g p r i o r i t y f a v o u r s to c a p i t a l i s t s whose f a c t o r i e s and 
p l a n t was i n t a c t and i n working o r d e r but who wanted to improve 
or extend t h e i r c a p a c i t y . 
The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee went ahead and approved the 
t e n t a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n f o r the f i r s t p o st war y e a r ^ a g r e e i n g t h a t 
i t should be adopted as a g e n e r a l guide to the M i n i s t e r of 
Works i n making more d e t a i l e d p l a n s f o r the p e r i o d . Although 
the e x a c t f i g u r e s p r e d i c t e d above would e v e n t u a l l y be m o d i f i e d 
a c c o r d i n g to the number of entramts to the b u i l d i n g t r a d e the 
g e n e r a l p r o p o r t i o n s were to be m a i n t a i n e d . When Labour took 
o f f i c e , these p r i n c i p l e s c o n t i n u e d . I n a d d i t i o n to the two-
t h i r d s new housing r u l e f o r new c o n s t r u c t i o n , the new govern-
ment made i t q u i t e p l a i n t h a t i t saw the t w o - t h i r d s r u l e a l s o 
a p p l y i n g to the whole b u i l d i n g l a b o u r f o r c e as w e l l , so t h a t 
a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n of o r d i n a r y maintenace, r e p a i r and 
adaption work would f a l l to the Housing S e c t o r . Any new 
b u i l d i n g workers r e c r u i t e d to the i n d u s t r y would always be 
1. Cab 87/10 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Meeting 29th January 
1945. 
2. Cab 87/37 Housing Committee Papers. 19th August 1945 
Programme f o r Housing Memo by the M i n i s t e r of Works. 
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d i s t r i b u t e d so as to l e a v e the l a r g e share f o r housing 
u n d i s t u r b e d . ^ 
SECTION I I I ; T H E ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
W r i t i n g on wartime b u i l d i n g c o n t r o l s and a l l o c a t i o n s one 
commentator has w r i t t e n t h a t 
a t no time, nor i n any country, had t h e r e been 
a precedent f o r a planned c o n t r o l of the 
o p e r a t i o n s of the whole of the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y 
or f o r the c e n t r a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n of some t h i r t y 
f i v e d i f f e r e n t government programmes.^ 
The l i c e n c i n g c o n t r o l s t h a t were e v o l v e d were c o n s i d e r e d to be 
a s u b s t a n t i a l improvement -on the l a s t war R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
e x p e r i e n c e . The concept ' i n e s s e n t i a l ' ( i n the ' N a t i o n a l 
I n t e r e s t ' ) was a p p l i e d to b u i l d i n g of o f f i c e s , r e s t a u r a n t s 
and p l a c e s of e n tertainment and l u x u r y housing on which i n 
1919-20 b u i l d i n g labour had been d i v e r t e d through the p u l l 
of money demand. To prevent peacetime pent-up demand being 
r e l e a s e d on s c a r c e p r o d u c t i o n c a p a c i t y l e a d i n g to a r i s e i n 
p r i c e s , and to ensure t h a t t h e r e was no c o m p e t i t i o n f o r labour 
and r e s o u r c e s between p u b l i c a l l y induced and p r i v a t e work, i t 
was d e c i d e d to c o n t r o l demand a t s o u r c e . To f a c i l i t a t e l a n d 
use p l a n n i n g and development^the Committee on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
problems very e a r l y on wanted the government to a c c e p t t h a t 
defence R e g u l a t i o n 56A should be kept to 'prevent work 
p r e j u d i c i a l to r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' . ^ T h i s r e g u l a t i o n prevented 
1. Out of a p r e d i c t e d working l a b o u r f o r c e of 970,000 f o r 
June 1947, 582,000 would be working on housing (300,000 
on permanent new h o u s e b u i l d i n g ) , see Housing Programme f o r 
1947 Cmnd. 7021. (London, H.M.S.O. January 1947. p.4. 
2. Kohan, Works and B u i l d i n g s , p.413. 
3. Cab 87/1 Committee on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Problems, 28th May 
1941. Statement to be made on U t t w a t t Report and r e l a t e d 
matters* Attached to meeting. 
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b u i l d i n g o p e r a t i o n s from going ahead without a s t a t e approved 
l i c e n c e i f they were l i k e l y to exceed a c e r t a i n maximum c o s t 
i n a y e a r . The government d e c i d e d t h a t the f i g u r e should be 
reduced from the f i g u r e of £100 which had h e l d f o r most of the 
war, to £10 from August, 1945, the r a t i o n a l e h a v i n g broadened, 
meanwhile from l a n d use p l a n n i n g to the management of 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n generadly. To supplement t h i s c o n t r o l o f 
demand some c o n t r o l of supply was needed over l a b o u r and 
m a t e r i a l s i n o rder to f u l f i l government i n t e n t i o n s . The war-
time manpower budget whereby a d e f i n i t e amount of l a b o u r was 
apportioned or a l l o t t e d was based (each q u a r t e r ) on the t o t a l 
of the a v a i l a b l e workers i n the i n d u s t r y worked out by the 
M i n i s t e r of Labour from f i g u r e s which b u i l d i n g f i r m s were 
o b l i g e d to send i n i f they were to be ' r e g i s t e r e d ' as e n t i t l e d 
to o p e r a t e . The t o t a l f i g u r e was then d i s t r i b u t e d among 
Departments i n a way t h a t would f u l f i l s t r a t e g i c p r i o r i t i e s . 
The t o t a l of a l l departmental programmes would then e q u a l the 
t o t a l c a p a c i t y . Each department would then know what s h a r e of 
b u i l d i n g c a p a c i t y i t c o u l d use f o r the q u a r t e r l y p e r i o d . T h i s 
was i t s c e i l i n g . The C o n s e r v a t i v e ' c a r e t a k e r ' C o a l i t i o n 
decided to operate peacetime b u i l d i n g by a very s i m i l a r method? 
I t was p o i n t e d out t h a t w h i l e l i c e n s i n g c o u l d p r e v e n t work 
1. Cab 75/21 Home P o l i c y Committee meeting 8 t h May 1945, see 
a l s o Cab 87/36 Housing Committee meeting 22nd Jcinuary 1945. 
On March 20th, 1946, p e n a l t i e s were i n c r e a s e d f o r v i o l a t i o n s . 
L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l p r i v a t e b u i l d i n g 
p r o j e c t s needing a l i c e n c e between £10 and £100 and over 
t h a t ^ i f i t i n v o l v e d housing work. The M i n i s t r y of Works was 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l non-housing p r o j e c t s over £100. 
A u t h o r i z e d work, i . e . t h a t c a r r i e d on by o r f o r government 
departments^ was excluded from the requirement to be l i c e n c e d . 
2. Cab 184/630 O f f i c e of M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n - c l o s e r c o n t r o l of the b u i l d i n g programme. M i n i s t e r of Works a t a meeting 2 1 s t June, 1945. 
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being s t a r t e d i t c o u l d not c o n t r o l o r ensure t h a t men unable 
to work on an ' i n e s s e n t i a l ' p r o j e c t went to work on an approved 
one.^ T h e r e f o r e an e s s e n t i a l a d j u n c t of the manpower budget 
was some system of lab o u r c o n t r o l . The n a t i o n a l b u i l d i n g 
programme would then emerge from t h i s b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e s s . 
There would be a s y s t e m a t i c procedure f o r a l l o c a t i n g b u i l d i n g 
labour between d i f f e r e n t uses and a c o n t r o l d e v i c e f o r s e e i n g 
t h a t t h e s e a l l o c a t i o n s were f o l l o w e d . Each department had a 
b u i l d i n g programme o f some s o r t and each department as a 
•production' department was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r some s e c t o r of the 
economy. Some departments such as the M i n i s t r y o f Defence, 
Home O f f i c e and M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h had d i r e c t o r a u t h o r i s e d 
c o n t r o l of new work, i t being on government induced c o n t r a c t s . 
Some had on l y i n d i r e c t c o n t r o l by v i r t u e o f be i n g 'sponsors' 
f o r a p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y , e.g. the Board o f Trade whose work was 
th a t l i c e n s e d f o r p r i v a t e account. Y e t a l l o f them were r e q u i r e d 
to t o t a l up a labour claiim based on the a n t i c i p a t e d demands f o r 
b u i l d i n g work and p r e s e n t i t to the M i n i s t e r of Works. The 
D i r e c t o r o f Programmes aind C h i e f A l l o c a t i o n O f f i c e r of the 
M i n i s t r y o f Works was then, i n the l i g h t o f the p r i n c i p l e s o f 
n a t i o n a l p r i o r i t y s e t by government^to draw up a p r o v i s i o n a l 
a l l o c a t i o n . The department's o f f i c i a l s would then comment on 
t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n v i a an i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l Headquarters Buil d i n g 
Committee (H.Q.B.C.) ( s e t up August, 1946), whose j o b i t was to 
1. Cab 184/630 O f f i c e of M i n i s t e r o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n - c l o s e r 
c o n t r o l of the b u i l d i n g programme. M i n i s t e r o f Works a t a 
meeting 2 1 s t June 1945. 
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r e c o n c i l e c o n f l i c t . ^ S i n c e t h i s was based i n the M i n i s t r y o f 
Works and o t h e r Departments were not prepared to a c c e p t the 
a d j u d i c a t i o n of what was a f t e r a l l an ' i n t e r e s t e d ' department 
with i t s own b u i l d i n g programme and c l a i m on la b o u r , t h e r e was 
to be a Court of Appeal i n the Lor d P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee. 
T h i s was the i n n e r c a b i n e t o f c o - o r d i n a t i n g M i n i s t e r s f o r Home 
and Economic P o l i c y , whose j o b i t was to approve the f i n a l 
a l l o c a t i o n s h e e t . I t was u s u a l however f o r i t to merely r u t b e r 
stamp the t o t a l programme. From 1946, the H.Q.B.C. sent i t s 
proposed a l l o c a t i o n to the governments Economic D i r e c t o r a t e of 
C i v i l S e r v a n t s known as the ' S t e e r i n g Committee', (through i t s 
s p e c i a l panel the Investment Working P a r t y ) , f o r approval so 
that they c o u l d see i f • t h e r e was any c o n f l i c t w i t h the broader 
o b j e c t i v e s o f economic policy."^ 
Each Department's a l l o c a t i o n was g i v e n i n the form o f a 
labour c e i l i n g . A l l o c a t i o n by v a l u e o r money was seen to be 
unworkable and d i f f i c u l t to c o n t r o l month by month. S i n c e 
labour was the b a s i c commodity i n s h o r t supply under f u l l 
employment and s i n c e the war economy method of p l a n n i n g i n 
p h y s i c a l u n i t s (manpower, s h i p p i n g s p a c e ) had proved r e l a t i v e l y 
s u c c e s s f u l , t h e r e was every reason to keep a Manpower budget. 
1. Cab 71/22 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee Papers. 2nd October 
1945. P r o p o s a l s f o r C o n t r o l of the N a t i o n a l B u i l d i n g 
Programme Memo by M i n i s t e r of Works, see HLG 102/273 
H.Q.B.C. The B u i l d i n g and C i v i l E n g i n e e r i n g Programme esp 
Paper ECP 32. I t was a l s o the j o b of H.Q.B.C. to approve 
very l a r g e s i n g l e b u i l d i n g p r o j e c t s and s u p e r v i s e work on 
a r e g i o n a l b a s i s . 
2. Bowen, The C o n t r o l o f B u i l d i n g , p.127; see a l s o Kohan 
Works and B u i l d i n g s , p.91. 
3. Cab 132/4 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee Paper. 24th J u l y 1946. 
Co - o r d i n a t i o n of the b u i l d i n g and C i v i l E n g i n e e r i n g 
Programme Memo by the M i n i s t e r o f Works and the Lord 
P r e s i d e n t . For f u r t h e r d e t a i l on the Economic P l a n n i n g 
Machinery and a d i s c u s s i o n of the assumptions behind i t see 
Chapter 5. 
I l l 
without a completely d i r e c t i v e system of l a b o u r c o n t r o l , and 
with the automatic p r i o r i t y f o r housing, o t h e r forms of 
b u i l d i n g had to take t h e i r chance i n a s i t u a t i o n where t h e i r 
l i c e n c i n g or approval was not r e l a t e d to t h e i r l i k e l y p r o s p e c t 
of completion.^ Regional and Zone C o n f e r e n c e s of the p u b l i c 
b u i l d i n g sponsors i n a r e a s of l a b o u r s h o r t a g e were e v e n t u a l l y 
s e t up to d e v i s e s t a r t i n g d a t e s and r a t i o n l i c e n s i n g a p p r o v a l s 
w i t h the aim of a s s i s t i n g work on permanent housing. What 
labour c o n t r o l s as they were, f u n c t i o n e d l e s s as a l l o c a t i n g 
than as p r i o r i t y d e v i c e s . The ^ n t r o l of Engagement Order, f o r 
instsLnce, d i d not d i r e c t l a b o u r to s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t s but 
merely s p e c i f i e d t h a t unemployed l a b o u r should o n l y be r e -
employed v i a a l a b o u r exchange and t h e r e be o f f e r e d p r i o r i t y 
jobs o f which Housing was h i g h e s t . D i r e c t i o n was a p p l i e d ( t o 
men up to the age of 30) only as a l a s t r e s o r t i f the worker 
r e f u s e d a l l t h r e e o f f e r s of p r i o r i t y work. I f a department 
exceeded i t s paper c e i l i n g the o n l y s o l u t i o n was to have, i t s 
p r i o r i t y reduced by the counter c l e r k s . There was no f a c i l i t y 
to withdraw l a b o u r a l r e a d y employed, exce p t to t r a n s f e r men 
a l r e a d y i n the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y to new housing work. T h i s 
d i d not work i n r e v e r s e or to o u t s i d e the i n d u s t r y . T h i s ban 
on withdrawals was a c r i t i c a l p r o h i b i t i o n given t h a t f a c t t h a t 
t h e r e c o u l d be l i t t l e t r a n s f e r by the Engagement Order owing 
to f u l l employment.^ The wartime system of manp>ower budgeting 
had succeeded p r e c i s e l y because i t was based on an a r r a y of 
1. For a wider d i s c u s s i o n of l a b o u r c o n t r o l s , see Chapter 2. 
2. Cab 132/2 Lord P r e s i d e n t s Committee Paper, 3 r d February, 
1946. A p p l i c a t i o n of the E s s e n t i a l Work Order to permanent 
Housing. Memo by M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h . 
3. The use of d i r e c t i o n s was governed by C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n 
Cab 128/2 C a b i n e t meeting CM(45)58. 15th October 1945. 
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labour c o n t r o l s ^ i n c l u d i n g the power to r e g u l a t e r e c r u i t m e n t 
and d i s m i s s a l , wage maximums, and a system of company c o n t r o l 
t h a t grouped s m a l l e r c o n t r a c t o r s i n t o l a r g e r u n i t s and stopped 
new f i r m s being s e t up which would l e n d to d i s s i p a t e l a b o u r 
over a mass of s m a l l e r i n e s s e n t i a l j o b s . ^ But i n January, 
1946, the ban of new e n t r a n t s had been removed.^ The impos-
s i b i l i t y o f being a b l e to c o n t r o l a l a r g e mass of s m a l l j o b s 
done on p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y behind c l o s e d doors, below the £10 
r e g u l a t o r (which was not the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of any 'production 
department'), and which used b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s , i s seen by 
one author, as a c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n o v e r - b u r d e n i n g the b u i l d i n g 
i n d u s t r y , slowing up the i n d u s t r y c o m p l e t i o n r a t e of a l l 
b u i l d i n g i n c l u d i n g housing and i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the government 
3 
should have slowed down on the programmes i t c o n t r o l l e d . The 
f a c t t h a t i t pushed ahead w i t h housing a t t h i s time was a 
p l a j i n i n g f a i l u r e . T h i s f c i i l u r e of 'management' however l e a v e s 
u n e x p l a i n e d the p o l i t i c s behind the need f o r the housing drive» 
where, as we have noted, the l o g i c was f o r the working c l a s s 
to see as many houses going up as p o s s i b l e a l l o v e r the country, 
even i f the completion r a t e was thereby slowed down. The 
M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h had long p o s s e s s e d the means by which i t 
could r a t i o n new a p p r o v a l s and a s s i g n a quota of h o u s e b u i l d i n g 
to each l o c a l a u t h o r i t y , a u t h o r i s i n g each to go to tender i n 
1. Kohan, Works and B u i l d i n g s , p.143. 
2. B u i l d i n g ;Report of the Working P a r t y of the M i n i s t r y of 
Works. (Lonaon, H.M.S.O. January, 1950J. p.23. 
3. T h i s i m p o s s i b i l i t y i s l i n k e d to the i n a b i l i t y of 
o f f i c i a l d o m to invade the p r i v a c y of homes to check 
on expenditure, see Rosenberg, N., Economic P l a n n i n g 
i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y ( P h i l a d e l p h i a , 
U n i v e r s i t y of P e n n s y l v a n i a P r e s s 1961)p.26. 
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o r d e r l y s t a g e s to a s s u r e an even flow of demands f o r l a b o u r 
and m a t e r i a l s . ^ But i t begatn i t s prograuimef and c o n t i n u e d i n 
1946, to approve as masiy t e n d e r s as p o s s i b l e i n o r d e r , as 
2 
Bevan s t r e s s e d , to get schemes s t a r t e d a l l over the c o u n t r y . 
O c c a s i o n a l l y i t would turn the taps down, as i n the * F i n i s h the 
Houses Campaign* of October, 1946^^but not to any e x t e n t . So 
the number of s t a r t s c o n t i n u e d to r i s e . I n January, 1947, the 
government decided to t r y to complete 240,000 permanent houses 
i n one y e a r . While r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t t h i s would be dependent 
on whether f u e l and power s u p p l i e s would be s u f f i c i e n t to 
s u s t a i n output i n the b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s i n d u s t r i e s and whether 
s u p p l i e s of imported timber were forthcoming both of which were 
d o u b t f u l , i t decided to approve another 3O,00O s t a r t s . When 
the w i n t e r f u e l c r i s i s m a t e r i a l i s e d i t was found t h a t the 
t a r g e t e d r a t e of completion c o u l d not be a c h i e v e d . ^ Quoting 
the monthly d i g e s t o f s t a t i s t i c s , Rosenburg d i s c o v e r s t h a t the 
C o a l i t i o n s immediate programme of 220,000 b u i l t and 80,000 
b u i l d i n g by June, 1947, was nowhere near f r u i t i o n and i n s t e a d 
t h e r e were only 110,000 completed and 242,000 under 
c o n s t r u c t i o n . ^ He c o n c l u d e s t h a t the p o l i c y o f pushing ahead 
w i t h housing was c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e . The e x c e s s demand 
r e l a t i v e to b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l supply meant t h a t a l a b o u r and 
m a t e r i a l s were spread over too many s i t e s . ^ Unable to i n c r e a s e 
1. Prem 4 93/4 Machinery f o r the C o - o r d i n a t i o n and C o n t r o l of 
B u i l d i n g . 18th October 1944. Notes by B r i d g e s and John 
Peak., see a l s o Housing Programme f o r 1947. Cmnd.7021 
l o c . c i t . p a r a I B . 
2. Cab 134/320 Housing Committee meeting 11th December 1945. 
3. Cab 134/320 Housing Committee. Memos on the s u b j e c t i n 1946. 
4. Cab 134/320 Housing Committee meeting 13th January 1947. 
5. Rosenburg. Economic P l a n n i n g i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y pp.68-9. 
6. i l D i d p.85 note 26. 
7. i b i d p.45 
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supply i n the s h o r t run and u n w i l l i n g to reduce demand, * the 
housing programme was pushed forward without r e g a r d to the 
a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s ' . ^ T h i s i s h a r d l y an ast o u n d i n g deduction 
and c e r t a i n l y not a n a l y s i s . I t was a common c o m p l a i n t a t 
the time and could h a r d l y have been u n n o t i c e d by the govern-
2 
ment. A more important r e s u l t of t h i s d r i v e was t h a t Bevan 
had now guaranteed t h a t the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y programme would, 
e v e n t u a l l y , c o n s i s t of more than the minimum f i g u r e of 
300,000. As long as he coul d n e g o t i a t e a s u b s i d y t h a t would 
cover houses completed beyond the f i n a l date of June 1947: a 
l i m i t which the C o a l i t i o n had been assuming as the T r e a s u r y ' s 
l a s t word, then the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y programme c o u l d r o l l on 
beyond an immediate 2 y e a r p e r i o d . 
SECTION IV, DEPENDENCY AND COST; THE QUESTION OF MATERIALS AND WAGES. 
Both governments had r e a l i s e d t h a t the b i g g e s t supply 
problem a p a r t from t h a t of lab o u r would be how to ensure t h a t 
s u f f i c i e n t m a t e r i a l s were produced a t a r e a s o n a b l e p r i c e and 
t h a t t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n was r e g u l a t e d to ensure t h e housing 
programme ach i e v e d p r i o r i t y . I t was not t h a t n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
of the b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s i n d u s t r y was r u l e d out, i t was never 
c o n s i d e r e d by e i t h e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e s p i t e b eing a perennial 
demand of Labour P a r t y C o n f e r e n c e s . I t was c o n s i d e r e d t h a t 
to get the co - o p e r a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y , i t would be n e c e s s a r y 
to have 'voluntary s e l f r e s t r a i n t ' w i t h p u b l i c c o n t r o l being 
a l a s t r e s o r t . T h i s meant i n e f f e c t t h a t the government had 
1. Rosenburg Economic P l a n n i n g i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y p.50. 
2. The Times.18th November, 1946. 
115 
to a c c e p t a d i s t r i b u t i o n system and a p r i c i n g p o l i c y t h a t 
would a t t r a c t l e a s t r e s i s t a n c e from the i n d u s t r y e s p e c i a l l y 
when, because of shortages, t h e r e would be a s e l l e r s market 
which i n the s h o r t term would not change. We s h a l l show t h a t 
t h i s dependency made the ambition of a low c o s t h ousing 
programme more d i f f i c u l t to a c h i e v e . I n S e c t i o n V we s h a l l 
show th a t t h i s c o s t r e s u l t e d i n a f u r t h e r l e v e l o f i n t e r v e n t i o n ^ 
i n the realm of f i n a n c e ^ w h i c h was e a s i e r to e f f e c t i n i t i a l l y 
because of the l a r g e degree of consensus on c o n t r o l which had 
emerged i n t h i s f i e l d d u r i n g the war. 
The problem of g u a r a n t e e i n g a s u f f i c i e n t supply of 
m a t e r i a l s f o r the housing programme had however to be f a c e d . 
I n the long term the problem was one of i n c r e a s i n g output, 
where, f o r instaince, b r i c k p r o d u c t i o n was o n e - s i x t h of pre-war 
c a p a c i t y i n June, 1945.^ There were s i m i l a r problems f o r cement, 
t i l e s , e t c . Brickworks needed to be r e s t o r e d and re-opened 
a f t e r the war and the l a b o u r supply i n a l l the i n d u s t r i e s 
needed to be augmented by the a c c e l e r a t e d r e l e a s e of key men 
from the armed s e r v i c e s and munitions i n d u s t r i e s ^ , and by 
g i v i n g o f f e r s of j o b s i n thes e i n d u s t r i e s p r i o r i t y a t the 
labour exchanges under the Engagement Order. Bevin, now 
Foreign S e c r e t a r y , but s t i l l t a k i n g an i n t e r e s t i n g e t t i n g 
labour f o r housing, commented 
1. tosenburg. Economic P l a n n i n g i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n a I n d u s t r y , pp.39-40. 
2. Cab 87/37 Housing Committee meeting. 18th J u l y 1945. 
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There would be i n c r e a s i n g l y f i e r c e c o m p e t i t i o n 
f o r the a v a i l a b l e manpower i n 1946 from p r i v a t e 
manufacturers whose f a c t o r i e s would be ready 
f o r p r o d u c t i o n and i t i s important t h a t s t e p s 
should be taJcen now to get workers i n t o f a c t o r i e s 
which a r e producing components f o r the housing 
programme.^ 
A l l these were measures which would take time to a c h i e v e t h e i r 
e f f e c t . Suggestions t h a t men who used to work i n the 
i n d u s t r i e s should be r e c a l l e d and d i r e c t e d back to i t were 
r e j e c t e d by the M i n i s t e r of Labour on the grounds t h a t the 
oth e r employers would not c o - o p e r a t e i n a l o s s i n t h e i r labour 
f o r c e s l i k e they had du r i n g the war. The be s t way to proceed 
was to push f o r a hi g h e r r a t e of demobilisation and make the 
materials i n d u s t r y more a t t r a c t i v e by h i g h e r wages, even though 
these would tend to r a i s e p r i c e s and t h e r e f o r e the c o s t of 
housing. 
With regard to imported timber the p o s i t i o n was even more 
d i f f i c u l t . Our pr e v i o u s s u p p l i e r s i n E a s t e r n Europe and the 
B a l t i c were u n w i l l i n g to s h i p as much as they used to because 
of t h e i r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n needs. We had t h e r e f o r e to r e l y more 
3 
on s u p p l i e s from the U.S.A. and Canada. The government was 
of t e n o b l i g e d to c u t imports from thes e e x p e n s i v e d o l l a r 
c o u n t r i e s when s a v i n g s i n f o r e i g n exchange appeared n e c e s s a r y . 
The only o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e was Sweden.and^since they were a 
hard c u r r e n c y country^ Bevan suggested we exp o r t c o a l to them. 
1. HLG 102/35 B u i l d i n g Components; E x t r a c t from meeting of 
Manpower Committee. 24th October 1943. 
2. Cab 129/3 C a b i n e t Paper CP(45)225. 13th October 1945. 
Labour Shortages i n the B u i l d i n g M a t e r i a l s aoid Components 
I n d u s t r i e s . Memo by the M i n i s t e r o f H e a l t h . 
a l s o Cab 129/3 C a b i n e t Paper CP(45)230. 15th October 1945. 
D i t t o , a l s o Cab 134/320 Housing Committee meeting. 23rd/ 
January 1946. 
3. Housing i n B r i t a i n . C e n t r a l O f f i c e o f I n f o r m a t i o n . (London, 
H.M.S.O. 1950). pp.20-1. 
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T h i s would h e l p us pay and h e l p them not to burn wood f o r 
f u e l . ^ T h i s s u g g estion was never taken up owing to our own 
f u e l s h o r t a g e s . 
I n the s h o r t term t h e r e f o r e the problem was to d i s t r i b u t e 
the s u p p l i e s of m a t e r i a l s t h a t were a v a i l a b l e . With regard to 
timber, the government p o s s e s s e d an import monopoly through 
the Timber C o n t r o l . The M a t e r i a l s Committee ( t h a t a l l o c a t e d 
raw m a t e r i a l s ) used i t s powers so t h a t i n 1946 Housing got 45% 
of supply. For other m a t e r i a l s the government had agonised 
f o r a long time as to whether the s t a t e should buy i n bulk 
d i r e c t from the manufacturers c u t t i n g out the middle men and 
b u i l d i n g merchants, d i s t r i b u t i n g them through some c e n t r a l 
agency and e n s u r i n g a s t a n d a r d i s e d p r i c e f o r a l l l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s . The exchequer was not keen to f i n a n c e s t o c k i n 
ca s e the s t a t e was l e f t w i t h a l o s s consequent on h o l d i n g a 
mass o f m a t e r i a l s , i f the housing programme c e a s e d a b r u p t l y , 
as had happened i n 1920. B e s i d e s , the M i n i s t e r o f Works 
opposed any system which c u t out the b u i l d i n g merchants. He 
had been a d v i s e d by the b u i l d e r s t h a t the merchants were an 
i n t e g r a l and n e c e s s a r y p a r t of t h e i r arrangements f o r e f f i c i e n t 
h o u s e b u i l d i n g by p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e w ithout s u b s i d y . For the 
' t r a n s i t i o n ' , the o b j e c t i v e s of a p u b l i c programme would be 
s u f f i c i e n t l y achieved by the l i c e n c i n g system: m a t e r i a l s would 
flow to approved p r o j e c t s . " ^ Bulk p u r c h a s e was to.be used only 
1. Cab 129/11. C a b i n e t Paper CP(46)277. 17th J u l y 1946. 
Timber f o r Housing. Memo by the M i n i s t e r o f Works. 
2. Cab 129/14 C a b i n e t Paper CP(46)417. 8th November 1946. 
Timber f o r Housing Memo by the M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h . 
3. Cab 124/343. O f f i c e of the M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n : 
C e n t r a l Purchase and C o n t r o l of B u i l d i n g M a t e r i a l s . 
Statement of 24th October 1944 ajid o t h e r r e l a t e d papers. 
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as a l a s t r e s o r t to get p r o d u c t i o n going and then only i n 
c e r t a i n i n d u s t r i e s . I t would o n l y be u t i l i z e d on a major s c a l e 
f o r temporary p r e f a b s . Lord P o r t a l , the M i n i s t e r of Works, 
s t r e s s e d t h a t w h i l e i n the i n i t i a l s t a g e s most o f the house-
b u i l d i n g would be c a r r i e d out by p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s , i t was 
assumed t h a t p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e would a t a l a t e r s t a g e take 
over h o u s e b u i l d i n g , and any s p e c i a l arrangements made f o r the 
e a r l y p e r i o d should be so designed t h a t they would 'shade o f f * 
i n t o the system l i k e l y to be r e q u i r e d long term. 
The Labour government d i d not change t h i s p o l i c y . Verbally 
i t s t r e s s e d i t s r e s o l v e to use the r e s e r v e powers i f necessary. 
As i t turned out, i t o c c a s i o n a l l y b ulk purchased and used the 
s t a t e owned Royal Ordinamce F a c t o r i e s to produce some 
2 
m a t e r i a l s a s Sevan's p r o g r e s s r e p o r t s to the c a b i n e t r e v e a l , 
but g e n e r a l l y r e l i e d on a system of o r d e r s through the 
merchants and the t r a d i t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d m a n u f a c t u r e r s . 
What was c l e a r was t h a t the Labour Government had d e c i d e d not 
to mount the housing programme by i n v o l v i n g i t s e l f i n the 
b u i l d i n g w h o l e s a l e and r e t a i l i n g t r a d e as suggested by i t s 
t h e o r e t i c i a n s ' ^ and the perenaial demand of i t s s u p p o r t e r s f o r 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y was not even considered, 
I n s t e a d Labour opted f o r a f u l l e r r e f i n e m e n t of p r i o r i t y 
c o n t r o l . Each c o n t r a c t o r was given a c e r t i f i c a t e i n d i c a t i n g 
whether or not h i s requirement f o r m a t e r i a l s was p r i o r i t y A, 
1. Cab 87/36 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Sub-Committee on Housing 
meetings. 6 t h and 27th November 1944. The C a b i n e t agreed 
Cab 65/50 Cab i n e t meeting WM(45)59 23rd A p r i l 1945. 
2. Mainly those M a t e r i a l s which the M i n i s t r y o f Supply was 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r , see Cab 129/6 C a b i n e t Paper C P ( 4 6 ) 1 6 . 
17th February 1946. P r o g r e s s Report on Housing. 
3. see C o l e . B u i l d i n g and P l a n n i n g . 
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B,C e t c . The merchajits were supposed to g i v e p r e f e r e n c e i n 
accordamce w i t h the p r i o r i t y . Housing was to get automatic 
p r i o r i t y 'A*. The i d e a was t h a t the scheme ( i n t r o d u c e d i n A p r i l 
1946) would run p a r a l l e l cuid complement the p r i o r i t y f o r labour. 
The system was v o l u n t a r y and the r e c o g n i t i o n by m a n u f a c t u r e r s 
and merchants of the government's symbols f o r p r i o r i t y had i n 
September 1947 to be made compulsory with i t being a s t a t u t o r y 
o f f e n c e f o r merchants to d e l i v e r o r b u i l d e r s to r e c e i v e 
m a t e r i a l s without a u t h o r i s a t i o n , or i n e x c e s s of s t a t e d 
requirements: p e n a l t i e s being e x a c t e d f o r infringements."^ 
Both C o a l i t i o n and Labour Governments a c c e p t e d the need 
f o r the same form of p r i c e c o n t r o l based on v o l u n t a r y agreement. 
Where t h i s c o u l d not be o b t a i n e d p r i c e s would be f i x e d . I f an 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the c o s t s of f i r m s r e v e a l e d t h e i r p r i c e as 
too h i g h they would be r e v i s e d . Such was the o f f i c i a l l i n e on 
procedure- d e r i v e d a s i t w a s , from Defence r e g u l a t i o n s 
continued a f t e r the war. I t soon became apparent however, t h a t 
d e c i s i o n s taken i n t h i s f i e l d would not enable any s u b s t a n t i a l 
r e d u c t i o n i n the c o s t of b u i l d i n g by v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t 
most of the p r i c e s agreed were maiximum or c e i l i n g prices^, w i t h 
a l l o w a n c e s f o r an average r a t e o f p r o f i t o r r e t u r n on c a p i t a l 
e m p l o y e d ^ j u s t i f i e d as payment f o r r i s k . The f o rmula a l s o 
allowed f o r ' j u s t i f i e d ' c o s t s to be passed on i n h i g h e r p r i c e s ? 
S i n c e i t subsequently turned out t h a t most of th e s e c o s t s were 
o c c a s i o n e d by higher wages, a mandate was given f o r manufacturers 
1. f o r d e t a i l s see the s e v e r a l Papers i n HLG 102/103 P r i o r i t y 
D i s t r i b u t i o n of M a t e r i a l s . 
2. Cab 87/36 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee:Sub-Committee on Housing 
meetings. 22nd January amd 10th February 1945. 
Cab 87/37 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Sub-Committee on Housing Paper 
4th May 1945. Report of the O f f i c i a l Committee on Housing C o s t s . 
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to p r o t e c t p r o f i t s from the i n c r e a s e d s t r e n g t h of labo u r by 
charg i n g the consumer, i n t h i s c a s e , the s t a t e . ^ The i n d u s t r y , 
o r g a n i s e d through the N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l o f B u i l d i n g M a t e r i a l s 
Producers, got the government to a c c e p t t h a t any i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
of c o s t s would be done through the Trade A s s o c i a t i o n s , who, 
would then a d v i s e them o f ' R e p r e s e n t a t i v e P r o d u c e r s ' . The s t a t e 
should not go behind t h e i r backs to i n d i v i d u a l f i r m s . The 
government needed the output of a l l f i r m s and t h e r e f o r e i t had 
to agree to average p r i c e s high enough to keep h i g h c o s t 
o p e r a t o r s i n b u s i n e s s ^ e v e n i f t h i s meant e x c e s s p r o f i t s f o r the 
more e f f i c i e n t , a d e c i s i o n which i t admitted would c o n f i r m the 
pre s e n t s t r u c t u r e o f the i n d u s t r y . The i n d u s t r y had l o n g 
been known as e s s e n t i a l l y c a r t e l i s e d . During the l a s t p o s t war 
Re c o n s t r u c t i o n a Committee had noted 58% of b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s 
were s u b j e c t to t r u s t s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by r e s t r i c t i o n s o f output 
and p r i c e maintenance agreements w i t h the o b j e c t o f keeping 
p r i c e s high to customers.^ T h i s p r a c t i c e was confirmed and 
4 
agreed to by the b u i l d i n g merchants. 
I f , a s had been shown, the c o s t o f m a t e r i a l s took 60-70% 
of the p r i c e of housing^ what o t h e r s a v i n g s c o u l d be made by 
government on houses expected to c o s t 60% more than those of 
the pre-war p e r i o d ? The p r i c e of houses was expected to r i s e 
from a pre-war f i g u r e of £402 to £974. Roughly £200 o f the 
i n c r e a s e d c o s t was due to the i n c r e a s e i n s i z e and amenity a s 
^* The Times. 19th November 1946. 
2. Cab 132/4 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee Paper. 10th J u l y 1946. 
P r i c e C o n t r o l of B u i l d i n g M a t e r i a l s Memo by M i n i s t e r o f Works 
3. Report of the Committee on T r u s t s . Cmnd. 9236. (London, 
H.M.S.O. 1919) Appendix 'combinations i n b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s ' . 
4. Report of the Committee of Eng u i r y i n t o the D i s t r i b u t i o n of 
B u i l d i n g M a t e r i a l s and Components. M i n i s t r y of Works. 
(London, H.M.S.O.1948). 
fe^^ ^Z/^^?^9i^^9^^\ Committee on Housing C o s t s Paper. 3rd November 1944. A n a l y s i s o f C o s t s o f House C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
121 
l a i d down by the Dudley Report-^ Bevan made i t q u i t e c l e a r 
t h a t he would not seek f o r an ' i l l u s i o n a r y ' r e d u c t i o n of c o s t 
by c u t t i n g s t a n d a r d s . The 30% of the c o s t of a house t h a t 
d e r i v e d from wages cou l d not be a t t a c k e d f o r a number of 
r e a s o n s . F i r s t l y l abour, under f u l l employment^was a s c a r c e 
r e s o u r c e and t h e r e f o r e a c c r u e d i n f l u e n c e and b a r g a i n i n g power 
as r e f l e c t e d i n the guarantees s t r u c k w i t h the b u i l d i n g unions 
i n the 1943 T r a i n i n g White Paper.^ The Labour Government, f o r 
i t s p a r t , c o u l d not p i c k a f i g h t w i t h members of i t s own con-
s t i t u e n c y so soon a f t e r being e l e c t e d . With t h e s e o p t i o n s 
w r i t t e n o f f and w i t h the g r e a t e s t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the c a p i t a l 
c o s t of housing - the m a t e r i a l i n p u t s , s u b j e c t to the l o o s e s t 
form of c o n t r o l , the government was u n d e r t a k i n g a housing d r i v e 
with a high c o s t i n d u s t r y and a s k i n g the T r e a s u r y to f o o t the 
b i l l . I f housing was to be p r o t e c t e d from the k i n d of a t t a c k s 
t h a t l e d to the demise of the Addison programme i n 1920, some 
means had to be found to keep the c o s t a t l e a s t a s s t a b l e as 
p o s s i b l e w h i l e the houses were b e i n g b u i l t . The meajis chosen 
to do t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s another l e v e l of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n which 
a l s o f u n c t i o n e d , l i k e the labour and m a t e r i a l s p r i o r i t y , as an 
i n s u l a t o r f o r the Housing Programme. 
1. f o r these f i g u r e s , see Cab 87/37 Housing Committee Paper. 
12th November 1945. Housing C o s t s . Memo by the M i n i s t e r of 
Works. 
2. H.C.Deb. Vol.414. Col.1224. 17th October 1945. Debate on Housing. 
3. The government a l s o d e c i d e d t h a t a l l b u i l d e r s ^ a s a c o n d i t i o n 
of t h e i r r e g i s t r a t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r e n t r y i n t o 
government and l o c a l a u t h o r i t y work^had to agree to c o n t i n u e 
the wartime h o l i d a y s w i t h pay scheme, see B u i l d i n g Worker 
V o i . l . No.4 June 1947. For d e t a i l s o f the wage i n c r e a s e s 
s i n c e 1939, the guaranteed working week w i t h payments f o r 
'wet time' and s t a t u t o r y h o l i d a y s , see The B u i l d i n g Workers 
S t r u g g l e Amalgamated Union of B u i l d i n g Trade Workers 
Centenary Souvenir 1948. (both i n U n i v e r s i t y o f Sussex 
Reserve C o l l e c t i o n ) . 
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SECTION V;CHEAP MONEY AND THE SUBSIDY 
A w e l l known c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the Addison programme was 
th a t l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s had to pay high r a t e s of i n t e r e s t on 
t h e i r l o a n s r a i s e d f o r housing. With the e x c e p t i o n of s m a l l 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s w i t h very low r a t e a b l e v a l u e s who cou l d not 
get the money any o t h e r way, t h e r e was no p r o v i s i o n made f o r 
easy a c c e s s to funds from the exchequer. Most l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s had to compete w i t h a l l o t h e r borrowers, i n c l u d i n g 
i n d u s t r y and the s t a t e i t s e l f i n the open market a t a time of 
boom : a p r o c e s s which d e l a y e d t h e i r s t a r t i n g on housing 
schemes. The government d i d not a c c e p t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 
supply of housing f i n a n c e save by p r o v i s i o n of a subsidy. 
According to Austen Chamberlain the then C h a j i c e l l o r of the 
Exchequer, housing was not 
i n e s s e n c e n a t i o n a l but l o c a l and only a n a t i o n a l 
problem to the e x t e n t t h a t the problem a r i s e s i n 
each l o c a l a u t h o r i t y . ^ 
At t h i s time the government was engaged i n the attempt to 
reduce the money supply by mopping i t up through the s a l e o f 
long term Government S e c u r i t i e s and a b a l a n c i n g o f the budget. 
The problem was to fund the l a r g e s c a l e f l o a t i n g o r ^ o r t term 
debt ( T r e a s u r y B i l l s ) on which the f i r s t war had l a r g e l y been 
f i n a n c e d and which, because of t h e i r i n f l a t i o n a r y c r e d i t 
c r e a t i n g e f f e c t s , needed to be reduced. Reducing i n f l a t i o n 
was i m p e r a t i v e f o r the government t i e d as i t was to the commit-
ment to r e t u r n to the gold s t a n d a r d . With a l l wartime consumer 
1. T172/1177 C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer M i s c e l l a n e o u s Papers: 
1920 Deputalion from the Housing R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of L o c a l 
A u t h o r i t i e s . C h a n c e l l o r s speech 13th February 1920 re p o r t e d 
at meeting of the P a r l i a m e n t a r y Housing Group 3rd March 
1920. 
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p r i c e c o n t r o l s and r a t i o n i n g a b o l i s h e d ^ a n d w i t h the c a p i t a l 
market flooded by s h a r e i s s u e s of f i r m s a n x i o u s to r a i s e money 
f o r expansion^ t h e r e was no means of h o l d i n g demand i n check 
except by what Keynes l a t e r c h a r a c t e r i s e d a s 'a s w i f t and 
se v e r e dose of dear money'.^ The r e s u l t of a l l t h i s was an 
h i s t o r i c a l l y high average r a t e of i n t e r e s t of 6 ^ and c u t s i n 
p u b l i c expenditure# 
The banks would e n f o r c e these c r e d i t l i m i t s a s a means of 
r e s t o r i n g f o r the government a sound c u r r e n c y required--to-
r e t u r n to Gold. But the r e t u r n to Gold c o u l d not be 
se p a r a t e d from the i n t e r e s t of the c i t y i n a s t r o n g c u r r e n c y : 
i t going some way to m a i n t a i n or extend f o r e i g n d e p o s i t s . I n 
a d d i t i o n low i n t e r e s t r a t e s would s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i s a d v a n t a g e 
new i n v e s t o r s as a g a i n s t o l d i n v e s t o r s who had purchased when 
r a t e s were h i g h e r . The consequences b e l i e v e d to f l o w from 
'loose' money were u n a t t r a c t i v e to the c i t y as a whole and. .. 
anxious to p r o t e c t the v a l u e of t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t i n a debtor 
s t a t e ^ they demanded 3^  curb on any i n f l a t i o n a r y t e n d e n c i e s . 
The i d e n t i t y of i n t e r e s t between the c i t y and the Treasury 
based on the government's dependence on them f o r the imp l e -
mentation of r e s t r i c t i o n c r e a t e d a powerful o b s t a c l e to the 
advocates of s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and economic e x p a n s i o n ; 
The same p o s i t i o n d i d not apply a f t e r 1945. We have a l r e a d y 
drawn a t t e n t i o n to the reduced r o l e o f the T r e a s u r y i n the war 
economy, and the l e g i t i m a c y of p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l s over monetary: 
p o l i c y . I n a d d i t i o n both the C o a l i t i o n and'Labour governments had 
1. T172/1384 C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer. M i s c e l l a n e o u s Papers: 
Memoranda on Dear Money. Note by Keynes 7th Jaj^uary 1942. 
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no i n t e n t i o n of r e t u r n i n g to a gold s t a n d a r d which r e q u i r e d 
the k i n d of r e s t r i c t i o n s seen i n 1919. The px^sition of the 
C i t y of London as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l c e n t r e had been 
somewhat reduced along w i t h the e x t e r n a l p o s i t i o n o f B r i t i s h 
c a p i t a l and the c o n f i d e n t a s s e r t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t was missing, 
L a s t l y , l a r g e l y owing to the t e c h n i q u e s brought to the Treasury 
by Keynes the war had been f i n a n c e d by t a x a t i o n r a t h e r than 
expensive borrowing.^ What borrowing had taken p l a c e was done 
on much lower r a t e s of i n t e r e s t than i n the f i r s t world war. 
The banks i t seemed would s u f f e r very l i t t l e , i f a t a l l , from 
the c o n t i n u a t i o n of cheap money i n t o the peace} indeed, h i g h e r 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s would d e p r e c i a t e the v a l u e o f h o l d i n g s bought 
2 
when r a t e s were lower. 
As we saw i n c h a p t e r 2 the government had c o n s i d e r e d the 
q u e s t i o n of post war i n t e r n a l f i n a n c e and had de c i d e d t h a t 
c o n t r o l s over the economy should not be abandoned and a phase 
of ' t r a n s i t i o n ' and cheap money be i n s t i t u t e d to prevent a 
rep e a t of the i n f l a t i o n a r y boom/slump of 1919-20 t h a t had l e d 
to the demise of .'social r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . With p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l s 
i n o p e r a t i o n t h e r e was no reason to t u r n to monetary p o l i c y 
as a means of c o n t r o l l i n g demand and as Dalton l a t e r p o i n t e d 
out, t h e r e f o r e , no reason to p a n i c o v e r a l a r g e f l o a t i n g debt, 
s i n c e the p u r c h a s i n g power which i t would c r e a t e c o u l d not be 
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o e f f e c t i v e demand because the e x i s t e n c e o f p r i c e 
c o n t r o l ^ f i s c a l p o l i c y ajid r e s t r i c t i o n s on bank l e n d i n g . To 
1. see S a y e r s , R.S., F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1939-45. H i s t o r y of the 
Second World War C i v i l S e r i e s (London, H.M.S.O. 1956). 
2. The Economist. 7th Febru-ary 1942. 
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r e s t r i c t demand and co n g e s t i o n i n the c a p i t a l market the 
government decided to c o n t i n u e the wartime ban on i s s u i n g 
s h a r e s without T r e a s u r y permission.'^ T h i s was d e s p i t e 
c r i t i c i s m t h a t ^ t o g e t h e r w i t h the high l e v e l of t a x a t i o n , 
i n d u s t r y would be handicapped i f i t c o u l d not borrow f r e e l y 
on s h a r e s to expand.^ I t was a l s o d e c i d e d t h a t l o c a l a u t h -
o r i t i e s should get a l l t h e i r borrowed money f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
from a fund a t the exchequer and the l a t t e r would charge the 
same r a t e to them on which i t i t s e l f borrowed f o r the fund.^ 
S i n c e the government had ensured by these r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t 
the market was c l e a r , i d l e money c a p i t a l would v i r t u a l l y have 
nowhere to go except i n t o government s t o c k . The s t a t e c o u l d 
thus r a i s e money a t lower r a t e s of i n t e r e s t than would be the 
cas e without such i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the market. One o f the 
o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s c o n t r o l was to p r o t e c t and i n s u l a t e s o c i a l 
4 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . A l l t h i s was done w i t h the f a i l u r e s o f the 
pre v i o u s post war p e r i o d very much i n mind, xhe t h i n k i n g o f 
the Treasury was now the e x a c t r e v e r s e of the p o s i t i o n Austen 
1. Cab 87/56 Committee on Post War I n t e r n a l Economic Problems 
Paper. 17th November 1942. C a p i t a l I s s u e s C o n t r o l a f t e r the 
War. Note by the T r e a s u r y ; see a l s o Cab 87/13 Reconstruction 
P r i o r i t i e s Committee Paper. 19th A p r i l 1944 C a p i t a l I s s u e s 
C o n t r o l . Memo by the C h a n c e l l o r . The r e g u l a t i o n was 
e v e n t u a l l y i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the Borrowing ( C o n t r o l and 
Guarantees) Act, 1946, see Brady, R. C r i s i s i n B r i t a i n ; 
P l a n s and Achievements o f the Labour Government. (Cambridge 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1950). p.63. 
2. Cab 87/5 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee meeting 3 1 s t May 1944. 
3. Cab 87/56 Committee on Post War I n t e r n a l Economic Problems 
Paper. 17th November 1942. Borrowing by L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s 
A f t e r the War. Memo by the T r e a s u r y . The mechanism was t h a t 
the government i s s u e d l o c a l l o a n s s t o c k on the Stock 
Exchetnge, s o l d i t and thus s u p p l i e d the L o c a l Loan Fund. 
The P u b l i c Works Loans Board (P.W.L.B.)then i s s u e d l o a n s 
from the fund to the L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s on a p p l i c a t i o n . 
4. Employment P o l i c y . Cmnd. 6527. (London, H.M.S.O. May 1944). 
para. 1 6 ( d ) . 
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Chamberlain had maintained i n 1920. The T r e a s u r y noted t h a t i f 
L o c a l a u t h o r i t y e x p e n d i t u r e i s the r e s u l t o f 
n a t i o n a l requirementSf i t i s r i g h t t h a t the 
C e n t r a l Government should assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r p r o v i d i n g n e c e s s a r y c a p i t a l a t the l o w e s t 
p o s s i b l e r a t e s . 1 
While the Tr e a s u r y was keen to p o i n t out t h a t c e n t r a l i s e d 
borrowing co u l d only be t o l e r a t e d f o r the ' t r a n s i t i o n a i • phase^ 
there was a r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t a p r i n c i p l e had been conceded: 
the government was w i l l i n g to lend f o r c a p i t a l p r o j e c t s which 
were i n com p e t i t i o n w i t h or supplanted p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . 
With these d e c i s i o n s l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s were s a f e . I t was no 
longer n e c e s s a r y f o r them to queue i n the open market w i t h 
t h e i r stock i n s p e c t e d and t h e i r y i e l d r a t e s open to r e j e c t i o n . 
C e n t r a l government would l e n d them the money. R e j e c t i o n o f 
t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n would be a tantamount to a government 
r e j e c t i o n o f i t s own p o l i c y . L o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s would now 
b e n e f i t by the f a c t t h a t l o a n debt accumulated on new housing 
schemes would be lower thaji they c o u l d have expected on 
p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s was a c o n s i d e r a b l e inducement to 
b u i l d . 
The p o l i c y of cheap money d i d not stop however w i t h thes e 
c o n t r o l mechamisms. Hugh Dal ton, the new Labour C h a n c e l l o r 
1. Cab 87/56 Committee on Post War I n t e r n a l Economic Problems. 
Paper Borrowing by L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s a f t e r the War. l o c . c i t . 
These arrangements were l a t e r embodied i n the L o c a l 
A u t h o r i t i e s Loans Act, 1945. 8 and 9 Geo. 6, C h . l 8 , (28th 
March 1945) IN The P u b l i c G e n e r a l A c t s of 1945. (London, 
H.M.S.O. 1946), f o r i t s second r e a d i n g as a B i l l see 
H.C. Deb V o l . 407, C o l . 907-42, 24th January 1945 speech 
by C h a n c e l l o r . 
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with the support of Keynesi ^ d e c i d e d to t r y and g e t the long^ 
term r a t e down from j u s t over 3-^/8%, where i t was i n 1945, to 
2*5%.^ Short term r a t e s had a l r e a d y been reduced to I n 
October 1946 he c a l l e d i n the 3% l o c a l l o a n s s t o c k , p a i d o f f 
p a r t o f i t and i s s u e d a new 2^^o s t o c k i n exchange f o r the r e s t 
T h i s 'conversion* o p e r a t i o n by which e x i s t i n g l o a n s were 
n e g o t i a t e d a t lower r a t e s o f i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e d a c o m p l i c a t e d 
s t r a t e g y whose essence c o n s i s t e d of c o n d i t i o n i n g the market 
to a c cept t h a t lower r a t e of i n t e r e s t . T h i s was a c h i e v e d by 
u s i n g 'departmental' or s t a t e funds ( l i k e the money i n the 
Post O f f i c e Savings Bank) to support the market by buying the 
government's own s e c u r i t i e s , r e d u c i n g the supply o f long term 
stock, d r i v i n g up the p r i c e f o r and the demand from buyers 
e s p e c i a l l y banks, d r y i n g up means by which i n v e s t o r s c o u l d 
a n t i c i p a t e a f a l l i n r a t e s by buying e x i s t i n g high y i e l d i n g 
s t o c k and by f l o o d i n g the market w i t h f u r t h e r i s s u e s o f s h o r t 
term b i l l s , which, h e l d a s they were by banks a s c a s h a s s e t s , 
would c r e a t e c r e d i t , i n c r e a s e the money supply aoid r e d u c i n g 
l i q u i d i t y p r e f e r e n c e . By such means Dal ton b e l i e v e d he would 
'see the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s through'.^ Advice t h a t a drop i n 
r a t e s would h i t the I n s u r a n c e Companies was d i s c o u n t e d : the 
1. Dal ton, H., High Tid e and A f t e r : Memoirs 1945*60. (Uondon, 
M u l l e r 1962). p.124. See a l s o T160 Box 1408 F19187. 
A p p l i c a t i o n of Cheaper Money P o l i c y .Meeting of Dal ton, 
Keynes and Treasu r y O f f i c i a l s , S i r R i c h a r d Hopkins arnd S i r 
W i l f r e d Eady. 17th January 1946. 
2. I n 1945 L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s were borrowing from the P.W.L.B. 
at 3 l / 8 % see H.C. Deb, V o l . 414, C o l . 1224, 17th October 
1945. Debate on Housing. 
3. Dal ton, H. , High Tide and A f t e r , p. 165". 
4. T160, Box 1409, F19187 a p p l i c a t i o n o f the Cheaper Money P o l i c y . l o c . c i t . 
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c i t y would have to l e a r n to l i v e on 2 ^ . ^ T h i s p o l i c y would 
a l s o h e l p i n the government's aim to s h i f t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
income and Dal ton b e l i e v e d he was c a r r y i n g out the s p i r i t of 
Keynes dictum r e g a r d i n g the ' e u t h a n a s i a of the r e n t i e r ' . But 
there were l i m i t s to how f a r the c o s t of the housing programme 
co u l d be kept down by t h i s method and these l i m i t s were s e t by 
the s p e c u l a t o r s ! who, b e l i e v i n g t h a t the r a t e was as low as i t 
was l i k e l y to get and c o u l d only r i s e , d i d not want d e p r e c i a t e d 
s t o c k on t h e i r hands and engaged i n a bout of s e l l i n g a t the 
end of 1946, T h i s sentiment was f u r t h e r f e d i n Jamuary, 1947 
when the ajinual statements of the chairman of the b i g f i v e 
c l e a r i n g banks suggested t h a t cheap money c o u l d not be 
maintained**^ The very f a c t t h a t i n v e s t o r s l e f t o f f and s o l d , 
l e d to the r i s e t h a t they e x p e c t e d a s p r i c e s f e l l and the 
government had to g i v e new terms f o r t h e i r support: so by the 
end of 1947 the r a t e was back up a t 3%*'^ N e v e r t h e l e s s the 
i n i t i a l s u c c e s s of cheap money campaign was im p o r t a n t i n s o f a r 
as the most p r o g r e s s was made w i t h i t a t the time t h e - M i n i s t r y 
of Health was engaged i n a c r u c i a l n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h the 
T r e a s u r y and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s r e g a r d i n g how f a r the s t a t e was 
to s u b s i d i s e the high c o s t of b u i l d i n g c o u n c i l houses. 
The C o a l i t i o n had agreed t h a t the pre-war s u b s i d y f o r 
slum c l e a r a n c e should be a v a i l a b l e f o r g e n e r a l needs^although 
1. Dal ton. High Tide and A f t e r , pp.291-300, 
2. see I l e r s i c , A.R., Government F i n a n c e and F i s c a l P o l i c y 
i n Post War B r i t a i n . (London, S t a p l e s P r e s s 1955).p.220. 
3. Kennedy, CM. 'Monetary P o l i c y * i n Worswick, G.D.N., 
and Ady, P.M. The B r i t i s h Economy 1945-50. (Oxford, The 
Clarendon P r e s s 1952).p.201. 
4. The P.W.L.B. r a t e to l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s was i n c r e a s e d to 
3% i n January 1948, see Government and I n d u s t r y , (London, 
P.E. . 1952). p.191. 
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the e x a c t amounts were to be f i x e d when a b e t t e r e s t i m a t e of 
b u i l d i n g c o s t s c o u l d be made.''" The e x i s t i n g s u b s i d y of £5.50 
from the Exchequer aind £2.75 from the l o c a l r a t e s ( a r a t i o of 
2:1) on each house as a c o n t r i b u t i o n toward the annual i n t e r e s t 
loan charge on the c a p i t a l c o s t ( t h a t c o u l d not be met by r e n t ) 
spread over 40 y e a r s was to remain f o r the time being, and any 
2 
changes backdated to cover houses b u i l t i n the new programme. 
We have seen t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n r e s t o r i n g the g e n e r a l needs 
subsidy was passed i n August 1944-^ During the d r a f t i n g o f 
t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n however, the T r e a s u r y had opposed the un-
q u a l i f i e d r e - i n t r o d u c t i o n of a g e n e r a l needs s u b s i d y and had 
w r i t t e n i n t o the Act a requirement t h a t i t should only be 
o p e r a t i v e f o r 3 y e a r s ( u n t i l August 1947) and c o u l d be renewed 
only with t h e i r p e r m i s s i o n . The T r e a s u r y ' s arguments 
a r t i c u l a t e d by S i r Bernard G i l b e r t ^ a t supply s e c t i o n were two 
pronged- While s u b s i d i e s would i n c r e a s e the charge on the ta^ 
and r a t e p a y e r , t h e y would a l s o i n c r e a s e the gap between economi 
r e n t s i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r so t h a t p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e would 
n o t - r e s t a r t b u i l d i n g to l e t (which the T r e a s u r y assumed to be 
p o s s i b l e ) . That would be u n f o r t u n a t e because those having to 
be covered by s u b s i d y would extend^as would the * u n f o r t u n a t e 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t s of m u n i c i p a l l a n d l o r d i s m * . He 
1. H.C. Deb Vol.397.Col.2057. 8th March 1944. P o s t War Housing 
P o l i c y ; see a l s o Prem.4. 93/9 V a r i o u s - Housing. Lord 
Wootton to the Prime M i n i s t e r . 7 t h June 1945. 
2. Cab 87/7. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Paper 2 1 s t J a n u a r y 1944. 
Post War Housing Memo by the M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
The Author of t h i s t h e s i s has c o n v e r t e d i m p e r i a l to decimal 
coinage. 
3. Housing ( F i n a n c i a l P r o v i s i o n s A c t ) 1944 l o c . c i t . 
4. Cab 124/446 O f f i c e of M i n i s t e r of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n : Post war 




thought the q u e s t i o n of r e n t s should be the main t a l k i n g p o i n t 
both i n the Ca b i n e t and i n d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
when i t came to d e c i d i n g on arrangements to c o v e r the p o s t war 
c o s t of building.''" I s s u e s s u r r o u n d i n g the c a l c u l a t i o n o f 
subsidy were from the s t a r t i n t e n s e l y p o l i t i c a l . S i n c e the 
s i z e o f the houses was to i n c r e a s e from the slum c l e a r a n c e 
standard o f 760-800 square f e e t to the minimum advocated by 
the IXidley Report of 900 square f e e t ^ w i t h a f i f t y f o o t o u t -
b u i l d i n g , and a d d i t i o n a l a m e n i t i e s , and with b u i l d i n g c o s t s assumed 
to have i n c r e a s e d by 60%, the c o s t of the new house would be , 
n e a r l y double the pre war f i g u r e . ^ I f the g e n e r a l needs 
subsidy was to remain u n a l t e r e d a t the pre war 1939 slum 
c l e a r a n c e l e v e l on a new and i n c r e a s e d economic r e n t , the 
Tenants would have to pay w e l l over double the r e n t p r e v i o u s l y 
s e t of about 35p a week. The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee agreed 
to the then M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h ' s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s not be o b l i g e d to implement the i n c r e a s e d s i z e and 
amenity s t a n d a r d s to the f u l l e x t e n t . The s i z e was to be a 
maximum of 850 f e e t . The c a p i t a l c o s t of houses c o u l d then be 
reduced and i f the r e n t s o f o l d e r p r e war c o u n c i l houses were 
i n c r e a s e d to the same l e v e l as the new ones, a c o n d i t i o n 
i n s i s t e d on by the Chancellor,"^ the average r e n t f o r t e n a n t s 
could be kept a t 50p a week, a s m a l l e r i n c r e a s e but r e a s o n a b l e 
i n r e l a t i o n to the wage l e v e l . As t h i s would s t i l l l e a v e a 
1. T161 Box 1244S51518/02 S u b s i d i e s f o r P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e 
Housing i n t e r n a l l e t t e r . 15th A p r i l 1944. 
2. Cab 87/8 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Paper. 13th A p r i l 1944 
Housing, Standards and P l a n s . Memo by the M i n i s t r y o f 
He a l t h and Works. 
3. Cab 87/5 Meeting of the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee. June 
5th 1944. 
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d e f i c i t not covered by the o l d s u b s i d y ^ b o t h the exchequer and 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t y s u b s i d y on each house would have to r i s e by 
30% i f the r a t i o of c e n t r a l to l o c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s was to 
remain u n d i s t u r b e d a t 2:1.-'- The f i r s t s o l u t i o n , then, t o the 
problem o f the. high c o s t o f b u i l d i n g was a t the expense o f 
st a n d a r d s ^ t h e tenant l o s i n g by the a m e n i t i e s and the s i z e of 
h i s house being l e s s than he had been-.led to e x p e c t i n the war. 
The T r e a s u r y would meanwhile pay o n l y 30% more on each new 
c o u n c i l house than i t had on new slum replacement houses i n 
1938, a t a time when b u i l d i n g c o s t s were expected to have r i s e n 
60%. That t h i s was an u n s t a b l e s o l u t i o n would become c l e a r 
when Bevan i n s i s t e d on b u i l d i n g to b e t t e r s t a n d a r d s and the 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s p r e s s e d f o r a b i g g e r Exchequer s u b s i d y . The 
Tre a s u r y and the r e s i d e n t economists were however determined to 
f i g h t t h i s . The o p i n i o n of one r e s i d e n t economist a d v i s i n g 
the Lord P r e s i d e n t was t h a t i f i n t e r e s t r a t e s r o s e above 3,^/8%. 
(and he had no e x p e c t a t i o n they would f a l l owing to the need 
to fund the s h o r t term government debt) then the whole problem 
of housing f i n a n c e was a q u e s t i o n o f g e t t i n g t e n a n t s to pay 
even more r e n t than a l l o w e d f o r i n the p r e v i o u s c a l c u l a t i o n , 
i f the subs i d y was to remain a t a r e a s o n a b l e l e v e l . There was 
'a danger' t h a t the l e v e l of s u b s i d y would be determined by 
what people wanted to pay r a t h e r than what they c o u l d pay. 
A f t e r a l l ^ t h e i r a b i l i t y to pay much i n c r e a s e d r e n t s was 
evidenced by the f a c t t h a t they were spending more on d r i n k and 
tobacco. A 'proper' r e n t should be p a i d as'even now t e n a n t s on 
pre war e s t a t e s a r e g e t t i n g s u b s i d i e s when they c o u l d do w i t h -
1. Cab 87/5 Meeting of the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee, 17th A p r i l 1944. 
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» 1 out them. When Labour came to power Sxr Edward Hale a^d 
Bernard G i l b e r t o f the T r e a s u r y argued along s i m i l a r l i n e s . 
Rents should bear the brunt of the i n c r e a s e i n c o s t and the 
general needs subsidy be discontinued as the 1944 Act had i n d i c a t e d in 
October, 1947. I f the subsidy r a t i o of 2:1 was to be maintained^ 
and the r e s p e c t i v e i n c r e a s e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s kept a t what the 
p r e v i o u s C o a l i t i o n had o u t l i n e d f o r a house b u i l t to lower 
s t a n d a r d s ^ r e n t would have to go above 50p a week. ' I f the 
r a t i o were once i n c r e a s e d we would never get i t down a g a i n . ' ^ 
I t was no s o l u t i o n to suggest the annual burden be reduced by 
extending the p e r i o d of repayment from 40 to 60 y e a r s s i n c e 
that would mortgage the f u t u r e . M i n i s t e r s should c o n c e n t r a t e 
on the q u e s t i o n o f r e n t : t h i s was the fundamental i s s u e . ^ 
Bevan had met the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s on 11th September 1945 and 
they had argued f o r an a l t e r a t i o n of the r a t i o . I n October, 
Hale wrote to Bevan's Accountant, H. George: 
The r e n t put by your M i n i s t e r i s not enough 
and u n s a t i s f a c t o r y to be used i n n e g o t i a t i o n s 
w i t h the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
How c o u l d ,the s u p e r i o r Dudley type houses be s u b j e c t to the 
same r e n t of 50p as a temporary p r e f a b ? To put up the Exchequer 
c o n t r i b u t i o n would remove the management i n c e n t i v e of l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s to economise. To Hale the 2:1 r a t i o was s a c r o s a n c t , 
* I f we depart from t h i s where w i l l we be a b l e to s t o p ? ' 
1. Cab 117/125. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n S e c r e t a r i a t : P o s t War B u i l d i n g 
and Housing Programme:Proposal f o r a N a t i o n a l Housing 
C o r p o r a t i o n . D.N.Chester (Economic S e c t i o n C a b i n e t O f f i c e ) 
to A. Johnstone. 6th June 1945. 
2. T161 BOX1301S54574. Papers l e a d i n g to the Housing B i l l 1946. 
21 s t September 1945. Memo by S i r Edward Hale. 
3. HLG 101/252 Housing F i n a n c e ( C o s t s , Rents and S u b s i d i e s ) 
1942-5. 2nd October 1945. S i r Edward Hale to H. George
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I f there was d i f f i c u l t y i n g e t t i n g l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s to a c c e p t 
the i n c r e a s e d c o n t r i b u t i o n then r e n t i n c r e a s e was the answer. 
The T r e a s u r y d i d concede on the p o i n t r e g a r d i n g a 60 y e a r 
repayment p e r i o d thereby proposing a s m a l l e r r e n t i n c r e a s e f o r 
tenants than p r e v i o u s l y a t bOp.*^ But even t h i s was too much 
f o r Bevan and he wrote d i r e c t to the C h a n c e l l o r , Dal ton over 
the heads of the T r e a s u r y C i v i l s erveints, Hale and "Gi l b e r t . 
At a r e n t of 60p we should be a s k i n g f o r t r o u b l e , 
a r e n t of 50p was a l r e a d y 40% over the 35p now 
being p a i d (on e x i s t i n g c o u n c i l houses) ... C^^D 
although the i n c r e a s e i n the c o s t of houses i s 
a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r a b l y more than 40%, I suggest we ^ 
can not have regard to t h a t a s p e c t of the matter. 
Bevan f o l l o w e d t h i s up w i t h a p r i v a t e t a l k w i t h Dal ton which he 
l a t e r noted. Dal ton had conceded the overwhelming need to 
give housing p r i o r i t y and to g i v e i t a ' f l y i n g s t a r t ' amd not 
j e o p a r d i s e the* beginning of building. He would agree to 50p so long 
as Bevan would agree to re-open and r e v i e w the q u e s t i o n a f t e r 
two y e a r s . 
For the purposes of n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , 
the T r e a s u r y ' s second l i n e of defence was p r e s e n t e d to them by 
Bevan. T h i s i n v o l v e d keeping r e n t s a t 50p, i n c r e a s i n g the 
s u b s i d i e s from both the Exchequer and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n such 
a way t h a t the Exchequer paid p r o p o r t i o n a l l y more thus b r e a k i n g 
the 1938 r a t i o . But t h i s c o n c e s s i o n by the T r e a s u r y would only 
operate u n t i l A p r i l 1947. A f t e r then the Exchequer con-
t r i b u t i o n s and the r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s would come down as the 
1. HLG 101/252. Housing Fi n a n c e ( C o s t s , Rents and s u b s i d i e s ) 
2nd October 1945. S^ir Edward Hale-:to H. George. 
2. HLG 101/252 Housing Fi n a n c e ( C o s t s , Rents and s u b s i d i e s ) 
12th October 1945. Bevan to Dal ton. 
3. HLG 101/252 Housing Fi n a n c e ( C o s t s , Rents and s u b s i d i e s ) 
26th October 1945. Note by Bevan. 
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c o s t o f b u i l d i n g was reduced and the d e f i c i t c o n t r a c t e d so 
th a t by 1949 the 2:1 r a t i o would be r e s t o r e d . I f c o s t s d i d not 
f a l l as a n t i c i p a t e d i n the s c a l e , the d i f f e r e n c e should be met 
from r e n t s . The l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s a t the c o n f e r e n c e on 16th 
November, r e j e c t e d t h i s . Tender p r i c e s were a l r e a d y h i g h e r than 
the T r e a s u r y c a l c u l a t e d , the c o s t o f l a n d and b u i l d i n g workers 
wages meant b u i l d i n g c o s t s would i n c r e a s e r a t h e r than f a l l and 
th e r e f o r e the Exchequer c o n t r i b u t i o n should r i s e o r i f not a t 
l e a s t the r a t i o of c o n t r i b u t i o n s s h o u l d be 3:1. G i l b e r t a t 
the T r e a s u r y thought t h a t a way out was f o r Bevan to withdraw 
h i s r e c e n t c i r c u l a r to l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s o b l i g i n g them to b u i l d 
Dudley s i z e d houses."^ Bevan d i d not respond, i n s t e a d the two 
m i n i s t r i e s agreed t h a t t h e i r f i n a l o f f e r to the l o c a l a u t h o r -
i t i e s would be given as a 3:1 r a t i o which a n n u a l l y meant £16.50 
from the Exchequer and £5.50 from the r a t e s . T h i s would l a s t 
u n t i l J u l y 1947 w i t h a review i n October, 1946. The s l i d i n g 
s c a l e was dropped. The l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s s t i l l argued t h a t 
s u b s i d i e s should be hig h e r because the T r e a s u r y had under-
esti m a t e d p r e s e n t c o s t s and the l i k e l y d e f i c i t . But the l a t t e r s 
c o n c e s s i o n of a s p e c i a l h i g h e r s u b s i d y f o r a r e a s o f low r e n t 
c a p a c i t y or low r a t e a b l e v a l u e s , poorer a g r i c u l t u r a l a r e a s , and 
2 
houses b u i l t on expe n s i v e s i t e s seemed to win them around. 
The r e s u l t of a l l t h i s was t h a t Bevan had gained from the 
1. HLG 101/252 l o c . c i t . 13th December. Memo by G i l b e r t . 
2. HLG 101/216 Post War Housing S u b s i d i e s . 11th January, 1946, 
Conference between R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h 
and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . L e g i s l a t i o n was e v e n t u a l l y passed i n 
the Housing ( F i n a n c i a l and M i s c e l l a n e o u s P r o v i s i o n s Act 1946, 
9 and 10 Geo. 6. Ch.48. (18th A p r i l 1946) IN The P u b l i c 
General A c t s of 1946. (London, H.M.S.O. 1947). 
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T r e a s u r y not only a r i s e of 60% i n the s u b s i d y over the pre 
war f i g u r e but had made them pay p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y more towards 
the housing d e f i c i t than l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
The governments p o l i c y of cheap money was not e n t i r e l y 
s e p a r a t e from the matter of s u b s i d y . I t exerted a powerful 
'masking' i n f l u e n c e a t the c r u c i a l s t a g e when the s u b s i d y was 
up f o r review between October, 1946 and January 1947 s i n c e t h i s 
was a l s o the st a g e a t which Dal ton had managed to reduce l o c a l 
l o a n s s t o c k to 2%%. While the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s could argue 
th a t the subs i d y r a t i o should not be a l t e r e d or the amount of 
subsidy reduced because of the s t i l l h igh and r i s i n g c o s t of 
b u i l d i n g , the T r e a s u r y c o u l d argue t h a t the f a l l i n i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s d i d not war r a n t a r i s e i n the s u b s i d y e i t h e r s i n c e the 
reduced annual loan charge would have a compensating e f f e c t . 
Both arguments c a n c e l l e d each o t h e r out so t h a t the r e s u l t was 
a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the subs i d y a t the e x i s t i n g r a t e f o r as long 
as the c r i s i s of b u i l d i n g c o s t s was to l a s t . The T r e a s u r y had 
maintained t h a t the r a t i o n a l e f o r i t s c r e e p i n g withdrawa'l would 
be a f a l l i n b u i l d i n g c o s t s . I f t h i s d i d not happen, i t c o u l d 
stand i t s ground on r e f u s i n g to i n c r e a s e the s u b s i d y but i t 
would f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to reduce i t o r the r a t i o w i t h o u t 
t h r e a t e n i n g the housing programme. The dependency of the 
housing programme on elements of c o s t t h a t were l o o s e l y con-
t r o l l e d as i n the c a s e o f m a t e r i a l s producers or t e m p o r a r i l y 
reduced i n the c a s e of the i n t e r e s t r a t e , ^the l i m i t s i n the 
l a t t e r c a s e being s e t by the s p e c u l a t o r s , ] made i t l i k e l y t h a t 
the t r e n d o f c o s t s would c o n t i n u e to move upwards. I n t h i s c a s e 
the T r e a s u r y would be f a c e d w i t h a f u r t h e r demsuid f o r i t s money 
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both i n terms of the amount i t would have to l o a n out on the 
t o t a l progranune - money i t would not get f u l l y p a i d back f o r 
over 60 y e a r s and the money i t would never see a g a i n i n the 
form of g i f t s on each house b u i l t . Such demands would e i t h e r 
have to be agreed to or Housing c u t a t a time when the p u b l i c 
has been given to expect a s u b s t a n t i a l a t t a c k on the problems 
o f need. I t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g thery g i v e n t h i s high c o s t 
environment,, t h a t the T r e a s u r y was unable to a c h i e v e i t s e a r l i e r 
ambition of r e d u c i n g s u b s i d i e s a f t e r 1947. I n s t e a d i t con-
firmed, and m a intained a c o s t l y programme t h a t would extend 
i n t o the f i f t i e s . ^ 
SECTION VI; THE PLACING OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE HOUSING 
I n a c h i e v i n g a p r i o r i t y f o r housing, the government 
e v e n t u a l l y came to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t s p e c u l a t i v e p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e housing would not be a b l e to p l a y a b i g p a r t i n the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of g e n e r a l needs i n the y e a r s immediately a f t e r 
the war. We s h a l l show i n t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t of a l l the a s p e c t s 
of the housing programme t h i s was the e a s i e s t to manage. 
Although the labour government d i f f e r e d on p r e c i s e d e t a i l w i t h 
the C o a l i t i o n , i t d i d not pursue a p o l i c y which c o m p l e t e l y 
excluded p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . Rather the p l a c i n g o f p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e f o l l o w e d l a r g e l y the p l a n n i n g t h a t the main body of 
p r i v a t e b u i l d e r s a c c e pted. They were s e r e n e i n the knowledge 
1. L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s were informed i n June 1947 t h a t the present 
r a t e of s u b s i d y would be extended to June 1948 when t h e r e 
would be another review ( s e e T161 Box 1301/S54574 Papers 
l e a d i n g up to the Housing B i l l 1 9 4 6). From 1947 to 1952 
b u i l d i n g c o s t s continued to r i s e and the i n t e r e s t r a t e reached 
4%%. The Tory Housing M i n i s t e r , McMillan, n e g o t i a t e d an 
i n c r e a s e i n the s u b s i d y i n 1952 to £27.70 from the Exchequer 
and £8.90 from the r a t e s . (The 3:1 r a t i o r e m a i n i n g ) , see 
MacMillan, H., T i d e s of Fortune 1945-55 Volume I I I Memoirs 
(London, MacMillan 1969) pp.369-460, see a l s o N e v i t t , A.A. 
Housino T a x a t i o n and S u b s i d i e s (London, Nelson 1966)p.l07. 
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t h a t they would be c o n t r a c t i n g f o r majiy l o c a l a u t h o r i t y 
tenders, and t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t would be guaranteed by a long 
term b u i l d i n g programme on which the e v e n t u a l r e - e n t r y of 
p r i v a t e housing f o r s a l e would p l a y a b i g p a r t . Of more concern 
to them was government r e c o g n i t i o n f o r a scheme t h a t would i n 
e f f e c t guarantee f u t u r e b u i l d i n g s o c i e t y mortgages and 
e n s u r i n g t h a t those e s t a t e s l e f t u n f i n i s h e d because of the war 
were f i n i s h e d and e i t h e r s o l d o f f to c o u n c i l s o r to p r i v a t e 
owners s p e c i f i e d under the s t a t e s l i c e n s i n g system. We therefore 
conclude t h a t the l i m i t s or e x t e n t of the p u b l i c housing pro-
gramme i n r e c o n s t r u c t i o n cannot be a s c r i b e d to "the p o l i t i c a l 
o p p o s i t i o n of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r i n - t h i s f i e l d . 
The b u i l d i n g s e c t o r a t t h i s time can be d i v i d e d by s i z e 
i n t o four main s e c t o r s each s e c t o r s p e c i a l i z i n g i n one major 
type of b u i l d i n g a c t i v i t y , although i n p r a c t i c e the c a t e g o r i e s 
of work overlapped. There were the l a r g e c o n t r a c t o r s , f i r m s 
such as Wimpeys, C o s t a i n s and L a i n g whose boundaries were 
r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l r a t h e r than l o c a l ^ a n d who b u i l t on l a r g e 
c o n t r a c t s f o r the government, such as h o s p i t a l s , developed 
commercial s i t e s and engaged i n l a r g e s c a l e p r i v a t e and p u b l i c 
housing schemes. Middle s i z e d b u i l d e r s , mainly c o n f i n e d to 
l o c a l i t i e s , were a b l e to c o n t r a c t f o r L o c a l A u t h o r i t y schemes 
and develop t h e i r own e s t a t e s i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of demand to 
t h e i r own d e s i g n s . S m a l l e r g e n e r a l purpose b u i l d e r s sub-
c o n t r a c t e d ' to o t h e r s on housing schemes and on t h e i r own 
s p e c i a l i s e d i n b u i l d i n g s m a l l e s t a t e s o f t e n of p r i v a t e l u x u r y 
housing. L a s t l y , t h e r e were the very s m a l l 'jobbing' b u i l d e r s 
who s p e c i a l i s e d i n maintenance and r e p a i r work."^ 
1. see Working P a r t y Report on B u i l d i n g , 1950, l o c . c i t . , p.36, 
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During the war the l a r g e r b u i l d e r s were s t r e n g t h e n e d 
c o n s i d e r a b l y both a t the economic asid p o l i t i c a l l e v e l . They 
r e c e i v e d a l a r g e p o r t i o n of war work d u r i n g re-armament and 
a f t e r , a t a time when the p r i v a t e h o u s e b u i l d i n g boom of the 
30's showed s i g n s of s l o w i n g down.^ T h i s p o s i t i o n meant they 
were r e g u l a r l y c o n s u l t e d over a wide range of i s s u e s : a 
development i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n the s t a t e a p p a r a t u s . A National 
C o n s u l t a t i v e C o u n c i l was fonned i n 1941 when the M i n i s t e r of 
Works looked f o r a body ' f u l l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the i n d u s t r y ' 
and t h i s was seen to be the N a t i o n a l F e d e r a t i o n o f B u i l d i n g 
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Trade Employers (N.F.B.T.E.). I t was i n t h i s s e c u r e e n v i r o n -
ment of s t a t e guaranteed c o n t a c t s t h a t the unions n e g o t i a t e d 
and got through j o i n t agreements w i t h the N.F.B.T.E. f o r 
improvements i n wages and c o n d i t i o n s such as the guaranteed 
week, h o l i d a y w i t h pay, and payments f o r 'wet time' t h a t were 
e f f e c t i v e l y to ensure a permanent high c o s t i n d u s t r y a f t e r the 
war. The government r e c o g n i s e d these agreements and made them 
uniform and compulsory f o r the whole i n d u s t r y : a s i t u a t i o n 
which was to c o n t i n u e a f t e r the war. No b u i l d e r c o u l d c o n t r a c t 
or be given a l i c e n c e u n l e s s r e g i s t e r e d and h o l d i n g a c e r t i f i c a t e 
i s s u e d by the M i n i s t e r of Works promising to impie.ment the new 
wages and terms of c o n d i t i o n s . There were p r o s e c u t i o n s i f 
b u i l d i n g took p l a c e without t h i s . ^ 
1. see evidence i n Works 26 on D i s t r i b u t i o n of War C o n t r a c t s . 
Wimpeys and L a i n g s seem to have had a good s h a r e . 
2. Works 45/25 C o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the B u i l d i n g and C i v i l 
E n g i n e e r i n g I n d u s t r i e s . The N a t i o n a l C o n s u l t a t i v e *-ouncil 
was known u n t i l February 1945 as the A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l on 
the B u i l d i n g and- C i v i l E n g i n e e r i n g I n d u s t r i e s . 
3. V\/orks 45/24 C o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h B u i l d i n g and C i v i l E n g i n e e r i n g 
I n d u s t r y . C i r c u l a r 22nd A p r i l 1946. Defence R e g u l a t i o n 56 AB 
a l s o i n HLG 102/103 N a t i o n a l B u i l d i n g Programme - L i c e n c i n g 
f o r Housing. 
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Most of the b i g b u i l d e r s favoured a l a r g e s t a t e induced, 
guaranteed and s u b s i d i s e d b u i l d i n g programme to s u s t a i n t h e i r 
l a r g e p r o f i t s and p r o v i d e an o u t l e t f o r t h e i r c a p i t a l i n the 
guaranteed market they had now got used to working, in,. They 
were t h e r e f o r e , most anxious t h a t the s t a t e s h o u l d not r e v e r t 
to the pre war system of i n t e r n a l f i n a n c i a l orthodoxy where 
money had c o n s t r a i n e d b u i l d i n g , ^hey favoured K e y n e s i a n p u b l i c 
works financing."^ With the p r o s p e c t of war work being c u t , a 
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l a r g e housing and b u i l d i n g programme would f i l l the gap- To 
f u r t h e r t h i s they supported the i d e a t h a t a l i m i t should be 
f i x e d on e xpenditure f o r maintenance and r e p a i r a f t e r the war 
on work t h a t would tend to go to the s m a l l e r f i r m s and even 
v o l u n t e e r e d to do the l i c e n c i n g themselves, examining the small 
b u i l d e r s accounts to ensure t h a t t h e i r p r o f i t s were r e a s o n a b l e ? 
We have a l r e a d y noted e a r l i e r the s e t t i n g up of ain i n t e r n a l 
enquiry i n the M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h i n t o the p r i v a t e enter-: 
p r i s e housing a f t e r the war, (The Pole Committee). The b r i e f 
of t h i s Committee was to f i n d out the c o n d i t i o n s i n which the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r could o p e r a t e . One of the c r u c i a l problems f o r 
g e n e r a l b u i l d e r s was the problem of what to do w i t h t h e i r 
e s t a t e s l e f t p a r t i a l l y completed a f t e r the d e c l a r a t i o n of war. 
1. B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r i e s Survey V o l . VII.No.3. 1941-2 DP.122-3. 
T h i s was the organ of the B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r i e s N a t i o n a l 
C o u n c i l a summit o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r the whole i n d u s t r y s e t 
up a f t e r the 1931 c u t s and i n c l u d i n g unions, merchants and 
m a t e r i a l s m anufacturers. 
2. Cab 124/395 Correspondence with the B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r i e s 
N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l 11th J u l y 1944. Memo from the B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r i e s N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l on B u i l d i n g ajid P l a n n i n g . 
3. Works 45/63. Adv i s o r y C o u n c i l on the B u i l d i n g and C i v i l 
E n g i n e e r i n g I n d u s t r i e s meeting 13th December 1944. 
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Some of t h i s was j u s t d e r e l i c t l a n d but o t h e r s had . developed 
s i t e s on which t h e r e w e i e p a r t i a l l y completed houses."^ 
I t i s apparent from evidence given to the Committee that^ 
i n t h i s and i n other i s s u e s ^ those who saw themselves as the 
main c o m p e t i t o r s to l o c a l a u t h o r i t y housing were the s m a l l e r 
b u i l d e r s orgamised i n the H o u s e b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n and the 
F e d e r a t i o n of Master B u i l d e r s . B u i l d e r s such a s C h a r l e s Boot's 
F i r s t N a t i o n a l Housing T r u s t who wanted to b u i l d f o r l e t or 
those who b u i l t f o r s a l e . Both were anxious to proceed w i t h 
t h e i r own b u i l d i n g s t r a i g h t away. They c o u l d not a f f o r d to 
c a r r y t h e i r c a p i t a l f o r a long time^as c o u l d the b i g g e r buiJ.der^. 
having not been i n v o l v e d i n war work to ajiy s c a l e and they were 
not l i k e l y to get l a r g e C o u n c i l t e n d e r s . Small s c a l e developers 
who bought land and developed s i t e s from bank l o a n s would have 
to pay even bigger i n t e r e s t c h a r g e s on the purchase p r i c e i f 
t h e i r houses were uncompleted and l e f t u n s o l d . These, o f t e n 
f a m i l y f i r m s c o u l d not r a i s e funds from s h a r e s or from 
t h e i r own i n t e r n a l l y guaranteed p r o f i t s ^ s i n c e they d i d not. have 
the s c a l e or v a r i e t y of work to keep them going o v e r a 'stop' 
p e r i o d i n the upper l u x u r y end of the market: the only market 
which could generate p r i c e s high enough to f i n a n c e t h e i r 
e xpensive l o a n s . The on l y way they c o u l d d i v e r s i f y was to extend 
1. HLG 37/67 CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e ( P o l e 
Committee) Minutes and Pape r s . L e t t e r from N a t i o n a l Federa-
t i o n of Housebuilders 19th September 1944 who s a i d they had 
31,200 a c r e s on t h e i r books. The H o u s e b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n 
had lO,580 a c r e s , see l e t t e r from W.H. Heath and Sons, 
February 1944 and l e t t e r from H o u s e b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n 18th 
November 1943. See a l s o : 
Cab 124/601 Correspondence w i t h H o u s e b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n , 
t h e i r l e t t e r 22nd November 1943. 
2. HLG 37/67 CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e undated 
Paper P.E. 37. Evid e n c e from F e d e r a t i o n of Master B u i l d e r s . 
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t h e i r c o n v e r s i o n , maintenance and r e p a i r work and t h i s was 
going to be c u t by the s t a t e . These b u i l d e r s need to s t a r t 
b u i l d i n g as soon as p o s s i b l e i n o r d e r to unlock c a p i t a l sunk 
2 
i n land banks. They r e s e n t e d the f a c t t h a t l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
3 
were pre-empting land from p r i v a t e development. T h e i r second 
problem was t h a t the domination of the b i g b u i l d e r s i n the war 
had meant a h i g h e r c o s t environment. They a t t a c k e d the 'onerous' 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of the guaranteed week, h o l i d a y s w i t h pay, and the 
heavy employers c o n t r i b u t i o n under the Beveridge scheme. S i n c e 
they b u i l t f o r r e n t as w e l l as s a l e , r e n t d e c o n t r o l and r e n t 
i n c r e a s e s were advocated, -^ he H o u s e b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n which 
r e p r e s e n t e d many f a m i l y f i r m s and i n c l u d e d the N a t i o n a l B u i l d e r s 
C o l l a t e r a l Defence Committee, argued t h a t without such changes 
they would have to be s u b s i d i s e d to the same e x t e n t as l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s w i t h s i m i l a r p r i v i l e d g e s , r e g a r d i n g cheap borrowing. 
By A p r i l 1945 i t became q u i t e c l e a r t h a t the government's Rent 
Act of 1939, which had extended c o n t r o l to a l l houses b u i l t 
a f t e r 1919, was going to c o n t i n u e f o r ten y e a r s and although 
houses f o r r e n t b u i l t post 1945 would be t e c h n i c a l l y f r e e , ^ 
1. HLG 37/67 CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e . J o i n t 
D eputalion of H o u s e b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n and the F e d e r a t i o n 
of Master B u i l d e r s . They wsinted e x p e n d i t u r e to be f r e e of 
l i c e n c e up to £1,000. 
2. To a s s i s t them some landowners had granted a moratorium on 
the debt by a l l o w i n g the b u i l d e r s to r e t u r n the l a n d a t an 
a g r i c u l t u r a l r e n t u n t i l the c e s s a t i o n of i n s t i t u t e s , see 
HLG 37/67 CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e Evidence 
of J . J . W i l l i a m s P r e s i d e n t o f Land Agents S o c i e t y and 
P r i n c i p a l Agent to the E a r l o f S e f t o n . 
3. Cab 124/601 Correspondence w i t h H o u s e b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n 
C h a r l e s Boot to Herder ( M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h ) 22nd November 
1943 w i t h h i s e n c l o s u r e 'Post War Housing' a l s o i n HLG 37/67 
4. HLG 37/67 CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e House-
b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n E v i d e n c e 18th November 1943. 
5. Report of the I n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l Committee on Rent C o n t r o l 
Chairman Lord R i d l e y ) . M i n i s t r y of He a l t h (London, H.M.S-0. 
A p r i l 1945). 
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the terms on which p e r m i s s i o n to b u i l d would be gran t e d would 
i n c l u d e a maximum re n t c o n d i t i o n t h a t would e f f e c t i v e l y r u l e 
out the k i n d s of r e n t c h a r g e s a n t i c i p a t e d . The s m a l l b u i l d e r s 
however argued t h a t tenants c o u l d a f f o r d h i g h e r r e n t s w i t h f u l l 
employment and high ivages. The money v a l u e of e x i s t i n g rents, 
they maintained^had d e c l i n e d s i n c e they were pegged i n 1939 and 
c o s t s had r i s e n s u b s t a n t i a l l y . " ^ 
D e s p i t e the f a i l u r e of B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s to lend on houses 
b u i l t to l e t i n the b u i l d i n g f o r s a l e boom of the 30*s and s t a t e 
encouragement f o r i t i n the Housing ( F i n a n c i a l P r o v i s i o n s ) Act 
of 1933 and 1936, the b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s had made another 
promise i n 1943.^ I n es s e n c e the 1933 l e n d i n g scheme had failed 
because, they sai-d, t h e r e was no p r o v i s i o n f o r a r e s e r v e to 
cover l i a b i l i t i e s f a l l i n g on them f o r d e p o s i t o r s money loaned 
a t a lower r a t e than u s u a l . T h i s margin they s a i d the s t a t e 
should pay. But t h i s arramgement r e q u i r e d high r e n t s s i n c e the 
loan p e r i o d was not so long as l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . " ^ They would 
not l e n d to b u i l d e r s u n l e s s the government p a i d a su b s i d y to 
cover the high post-war b u i l d i n g c o s t s . T h i s seemed to meaji a 
double subsidy, one to the b u i l d i n g s o c i e t y and one to the 
b u i l d e r , and was r e j e c t e d by the government. I f the s t a t e , as 
1. Cab 124/601. Boot to Herder l o c . c i t . 
2. HLG 37/67 CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e . Speech 
of Chairman of B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s A s s o c i a t i o n Mr. W i l l i a m 
McKinnel 14th A p r i l 1943 and memo 'Houses f o r L e t t i n g * 
26th J u l y 1943. 
3. For the A c t s of 1933 and 1936 see HLG 52/758 Guarantees to 
B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s . For the new p r o p o s a l s see HLG 37/68 
CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e - M i s c e l l a n e o u s 
Papers l e t t e r from H a l i f a x B u i l d i n g S o c i e t y 22nd J u l y 1942 
and HLG 37/67 l e t t e r from B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s 8 t h November 
1943. 
4. Cab 87/8 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Paper 20th June 1944 
P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e i n Housing a f t e r the War. Memo by the 
M i n i s t e r of Hea l t h . 
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seemed l i k e l y ^ a l s o i n t e r v e n e d to s e t a maximum p r i c e f o r tix)se 
houses b u i l t f o r s a l e the s m a l l b u i l d i n g s e c t o r would be 
s e v e r e l y squeezed. 
The b i g g e r b u i l d e r s i n housing were r e p r e s e n t e d by the 
N a t i o n a l F e d e r a t i o n of R e g i s t e r e d H o u s e b u i l d e r s (N^F.R.H.B.) 
whose C o u n c i l s were dominated by Comdens* C a l v e r l e y and Sons, 
T a y l o r Woodrow, Watesf John L a i n g , George Wimpey a s w e l l as 
m i d d l e - s i z e d b u i l d e r s who were p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n b u i l d i n g 
f o r s a l e to owner o c c u p i e r s . They d i d not argue a g a i n s t the 
b e t t e r wages and c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r workers. T h i s had been 
d e a l t with by 'both s i d e s of i n d u s t r y ' , and they wrote of the 
' i l l c o n s i d e r e d p u b l i c i t y about c o s t s ' which, once the s p e c i a l 
f a c t o r such as lower output due to the predominance of o l d 
workers and the shortage of b r i c k s had d i s a p p e a r e d , they c o u l d 
bear. I f a s u b s i d y was needed i t was to be more i n terms of 
e q u i t y - i f the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s got one^so s h o u l d they. But 
J . Uaing suggested that i t was o n l y r i g h t , then, to a c c e p t the 
need f o r c o n t r o l over s e l l i n g p r i c e s i n c l u d i n g r e s a l e . I n 
a d d i t i o n , because the s e l l i n g p r i c e was l i k e l y to be t e m p o r a r i l y 
high, i t should go to the p u r c h a s e r a t the demand end of the 
market to induce a s a l e . P u r c h a s e r s would not come forward i f 
houses b u i l t l a t e r c o s t l e s s and d e v a l u e d a n y t h i n g bought now. 
T h i s p>osition c o n t r a s t e d with the s m a l l e r b u i l d e r s who, being 
more concerned about t h e i r i n t e r n a l p o s i t i o n , wanted the subsidy 
to go to them a s a lump sum per house. R e v i v a l a t t h i s s t a g e 
f o r the N.F.R.H.C. seemed l e s s a m atter of l i f e and death, and 
although the revivaJ. of l a r g e - s c a l e s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d i n g i n 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of demand c o u l d not be w r i t t e n o f f i n the immediate 
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p e r i o d ^ , they were q u i t e prepared to a c c e p t the s p e c i a l 
measures of the t r a n s i t i o n period^ e s p e c i a l l y f o r those who 
2 
could not a t the moment a f f o r d to purchase . George M i t c h e l l 
of Wimpeys agreed with L a i n g ^ a l l new b u i l d i n g by p r i v a t e e n t e r -
p r i s e should be l i c e n c e d f o r the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d w i t h l u x u r y 
work excluded aind r e p a i r and maintenaJice r e s t r i c t e d . ^ 
The C o a l i t i o n had come to s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n s ^ h a v i n g 
a l r e a d y agreed t h a t the v a s t m a j o r i t y of houses should be 
provided by l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s as the only agency c a p a b l e of 
d i s t r i b u t i n g a c c o r d i n g to r e l a t i v e need a t a time of high 
b u i l d i n g c o s t , m a t e r i a l and l a b o u r s h o r t a g e s . I t had accepted 
the p r i n c i p a l t h a t p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e should have the same sub-
s i d y where i t was meeting the same need."^ But the p r o j e c t e d 
output of new p r i v a t e b u i l d i n g , g i v e n the above assumptions, 
f o r two y e a r s was only 50,000 p l u s some r e b u i l d i n g of houses 
d e s t r o y e d . ^ Out of the 200,000 expected to be completed i n two 
y e a r s t h i s 50,000 was 25% or a 1:4 r a t i o i n f a v o u r of l o c a l 
1. The B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s had p l e n t y of money to l e n d because 
of war s a v i n g s , repayments on e x i s t i n g mortgages and the 
stop on the g r a n t i n g of new l o a n s . T h e i r a s s e t p o s i t i o n was 
very s t r o n g and they were ready f o r expajision, see HLG 37/67 
CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e Housing Paper by 
B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s A s s o c i a t i o n 11th February 1943. 
2. HLG 37/67 Paper from N.F.R.H-B. 18th February 1944. 
3. HLG 37/67 CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e E v i d e n c e 
Submitted by John L a i n g and George M i t c h e l l o f Wimpeys. 
4. H.C. Debs Vol.398.Col.278. 15th March. Debate on Housing; 
a l s o H.C. Deb. Vol.409. C o l . l 0 2 7 . Debate on Housing. 
5. Cab 87/8 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Paper. 1 s t June 1944. 
P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e Housing A f t e r the War. Memo by the 
M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h . 
6. HLG 101/474. p r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e i n Housing A f t e r the War. 
March 1945. D r a f t Notes on i e g i s i a t i o n f o r a s u b s i d y ; see 
a l s o Cab 87/5 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee meeting. 10th J u l y 
1944. 
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a u t h o r i t i e s . T h i s was the r a t i o e v e n t u a l l y adopted by the 
Labour government as a guide to l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . The Pole 
Report, p u b l i s h e d i n J u l y 1944, had o u t l i n e d the l i k e l y s t a t e 
of the market as being unfavourable f o r new s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d i n g 
f o r owner o c c u p a t i o n : demand would be s a t i s f i e d f o r the time 
being on the supply of cheaper e x i s t i n g accommodation than more 
c o s t l y new housing. To the e x t e n t t h a t TJrTceivrose, 
o v e r a l l demand would be checked. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e was a 
r a t i o n a l e f o r l i m i t e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n of p r i v a t e b u i l d e r s i n the 
housing programme, i f only 'to g e t t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n i n o r d e r 
and f i t them f o r the t a s k s a h e a d ' . T h e r e p o r t a l s o recommended 
on grounds o f e q u i t y , a subsidy which would go to the p u r c h a s e r 
to encourage him to buy a h i g h e r p r i c e house, which the g e n e r a l 
o p i n i o n was, was l i k e l y to be devalued when b u i l d i n g c o s t s came 
down. The s u b s i d y based on t h i s assumption was around £150 per 
house. T h i s was a c o n c e s s i o n r i n g e d by the c o n d i t i o n t h a t the 
houses b u i l t should be s u b j e c t to some measure of c o n t r o l on 
the s e l l i n g p r i c e ( a maximum of £1,200 was f i x e d ) and s t a n d a r d 
of s i z e and c o n s t r u c t i o n to ensure t h a t the houses were not of 
a luxury type but roughly s i m i l a r to those of l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
The subsidy would operate f o r f i v e y e a r s on houses b u i l t by 
the end of 1947 and th e r e would a l s o be a ban on r e - s e l l i n g 
f o r f i v e y e a r s . N e i t h e r the Pole Report nor the C o a l i t i o n ' s 
d r a f t l e g i s l a t i o n i n 1945^ had as i t s o b j e c t i v e the s u b s t i t u t i o n 
1. P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e Housing. Report o f the Sub-Committee of 
the G e n e r a l Housing Ad v i s o r y Committee. M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h 
(London, H.M.S.O. J u l y 1944) p a r a . 90. 
2. Cab 87/37 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee Sub-Committee on Housing 
Paper, 2nd June 1944. P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e A f t e r the War. 
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of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e f o r l o c a l a u t h o r i t y h o u s e b u i l d i n g i n the 
y e a r s a f t e r the war, n e i t h e r was i t s o b j e c t i v e s p e c u l a t i v e 
b u i l d i n g i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of demand. The aim was to b u i l d f o r a 
l i m i t e d number of known p r o s p e c t i v e purchasers."^ The p r i c e and 
s i z e o f the house would be f i x e d and a l i c e n c e to b u i l d i s s u e d 
on t h a t b a s i s : l i c e n c e s b eing i s s u e d o n l y i n s o f a r a s they d i d 
not i n t e r f e r e with the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y programme. I n t h i s 
environment ther e would be no encouragement to t h e b u i l d e r to 
p r e f e r occupants who co u l d a f f o r d g r e a t e r amounts because the 
b u i l d e r would be p r e c l u d e d from r e c e i v i n g h i g h e r sums. P r i v a t e 
b u i l d i n g would mean v i r t u a l l y working f o r l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s ^ 
even i f not o f f i c i a l l y c o n t r a c t e d to them i n these c a s e s . When 
Bevan took over the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Housing i t was de c i d e d 
to c a r r y over the C o a l i t i o n ' s arrangements but without the 
subsidy. While the needs of p r o s p e c t i v e owner o c c u p i e r s had to 
wai t , they had a r i g h t to c o n s i d e r a t i o n and t h i s was the maximum 
th a t c o u l d be done f o r them i n the t r a n s i t i o n . ^ The same p r i c e , 
s i z e and r e - s e l l i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s of the C o a l i t i o n were agreed 
by the C a b i n e t and i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the government's f i r s t housing 
b i l l - ^ E x p l a i n i n g why he had c a n c e l l e d the s u b s i d y , he p o i n t e d 
1. E s p e c i a l l y married men with no o t h e r home of t h e i r own, see 
T161 Box 1244 S51518/02 s u b s i d i e s f o r P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e 
Housing undated H. George ( M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h ) to E. Hale 
T r e a s u r y ) ; see a l s o Cab 87/6 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee meeting 
26th June 1944. 
2. Cab 87/37 Housing Committee meeting. 5th September 1945* 
3. Cab 128/1 Ca b i n e t meeting CM(45)41. 15th October 1945. The 
Treasury had been lukewarm about a su b s i d y to p r i v a t e e n t e r -
p r i s e t h i n k i n g t h a t ' i t l o s e s i t s v i r t u e ' b y such a s s i s t a n c e 
but had agreed so long as there was s u b s t a n t i a l l o c a l auth-
o r i t y c o n t r o l over t e n a n t s and s e l l i n g p r i c e , s e e S i r Bernard 
G i l b e r t to Mr. Padmore. 30th May 1944. T161 Box 1244 S51518/02 
s u b s i d i e s f o r P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e Housing. 
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out i t was not r i g h t to g i v e equal p r i o r i t y to those who c o u l d 
o b t a i n a measure of p r i o r i t y f o r themselves by t h e i r a b i l i t y 
to pay.^ As i t subsequently turned out^many l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
over i s s u e d l i c e n c e s and Bevan was forced- to f o r m a l i s e the 
C o a l i t i o n ' s assumption t h a t a t o t a l of 25% was the most l i k e l y 
share f o r p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e by i n s t r u c t i n g l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
i n March 1946 t h a t they should d i v i d e the programme i n a r a t i o 
of 4:1 i n f a v o u r of c o u n c i l housing,^ C i r c u l a r s a l s o t i g h t e n e d 
up on c r i t e r i a f o r the i s s u e of p e r m i t s f o r maintenance and 
repaiir to ensure the ' d e f e c t i v e ' got p r i o r i t y o v e r the 
' d e c o r a t i v e ' . 
A f t e r the immediate post war p e r i o d , the b i g b u i l d e r s had 
every e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t they would resume s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d i n g 
i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of demand i n the long term and devoted t h e i r 
time i n t h i s p e r i o d to making p l a n s to t h i s e f f e c t . The i s s u e 
t h a t pre-occupied them i n t h i s p e r i o d was the q u e s t i o n of 
e n s u r i n g t h a t the s t a n d a r d s they would b u i l d to were r e c o g n i s e d 
by b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s and government a l i k e , moves which brought 
them i n t o d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h the s m a l l e r b u i l d e r s . As the 
l a t t e r were the s t r o n g e s t opponents of government p o l i c y t h i s 
d i v i s i o n prevented a u n i t e d a t t a c k on the p r i n c i p l e and p r a c t i c e 
of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the housing market. The i s s u e of the 
R e g i s t r a t i o n C o u n c i l brought t h i s to a head. The N a t i o n a l 
F e d e r a t i o n of B u i l d i n g Trade Employers (N.F.B.T.E.) had helped 
1. H.C. Deb V o l . 414. Col.1206-1321. 17th October 1945. Debate on Housing. 
2. HLG 102/103 Defence R e g u l a t i o n 56A L i c e n c i n g by L o c a l 
A u t h o r i t i e s C i r c u l a r March 1946. 
148 
form i t s h o u s e b u i l d i n g members i n 1917 i n t o the N a t i o n a l 
F e d e r a t i o n of H o u s e b u i l d e r s . They had b u i l t t w o - t h i r d s of i n t e r 
war houses and i n 1937 they s e t up a H o u s e b u i l d e r s R e g i s t r a t i o n 
C o u n c i l . The o r i g i n s of t h i s body l a y i n the b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s 
h o s t i l i t y to j e r r y b u i l t houses which were poor s e c u r i t y on 
which to l e n d and the b i g b u i l d e r s o p p o s i t i o n to being under-
mined by cheap c o m p e t i t i o n . The c o u n c i l , composed of r e p r e s e n t -
a t i v e s of iN.F.H. and b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s , agreed to a model 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n of work and m a t e r i a l s to be used. B u i l d e r s 
conforming to t h i s were e n t i t l e d to be r e g i s t e r e d as c e r t i f i e d 
b u i l d e r s . The c o u n c i l would arrange i n s p e c t i o n s w h i l e b u i l d i n g 
was i n p r o g r e s s , w h i l e the b u i l d e r would agree to make good any 
d e f e c t s appearing two y e a r s a f t e r c o m p l e t i o n . Houses so 
c e r t i f i e d would get advances to p u r c h a s e r s guaranteed by the 
b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s . -^ he N.F.H. now wanted the s t a t e to v a l i d a t e 
the arrangement, and r e c o g n i s e t h a t only new houses so c e r t i f i e d 
c o u l d be s o l d v i a b u i l d i n g , s o c i e t y advances. To the s m a l l e r 
b u i l d e r s t h i s r e p r e s e n t e d an attempt by the b i g c o n t r a c t o r s and 
the b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s to squeeze them out. They were not 
r e p r e s e n t e d i n any of t h e s e o r g a n i s a t i o n s and i f they j o i n e d 
the scheme they would have to j o i n the N.F.H. (now the N a t i o n a l 
F e d e r a t i o n of R e g i s t e r e d H o u s e b u i l d e r s ) and work to new uniform 
s t a n d a r d s , not s u i t e d to the v a r i e t y they p r e f e r r e d ( b u i l d i n g 
very cheap houses and s m a l l l u x u r y t y p e s ) . Above a l l , the 
1. f o r d e t a i l s see Cab 124/583. P r o p o s a l s on the P o s t War 
B u i l d i n g Programme., by the N a t i o n a l F e d e r a t i o n of 
R e g i s t e r e d H o u s e b u i l d e r s . 
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scheme would tend to add to c o s t s . ^ Many q u e s t i o n e d the 
n e c e s s i t y for a r i g i d code of s t a n d a r d s . S i r John McTaggart, 
V i c e P r e s i d e n t of the H o u s e b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n and owner of 
tenement f l a t s i n Glasgow as w e l l as l u x u r y houses i n London, 
argued t h a t locaJ. bye-laws were s u f f i c i e n t . ^ The government 
s e n t o b s e r v e r s to a co n f e r e n c e of b u i l d e r s and noted the unco-
o p e r a t i v e a t t i t u d e of the " s e p a r a t i s t * s m a l l b u i l d e r s and t h e i r 
d e s i r e to reduce c o s t s by b r e a k i n g the wages and c o n d i t i o n s • 
agreements s e t du r i n g the war.*^ The Labour government on 27th 
November, 1946, approved the scheme and put i t on a s t a t u t o r y 
b a s i s as p a r t of the l e g a l framework s u p e r v i s i n g b u i l d i n g 
4 
s o c i e t i e s . For t h i s f a v o u r the government r e c e i v e d the tharks 
of S i r Jonah Walker Smith, P r e s i d e n t of the N.F.B.T.E,^ While 
e x p r e s s i n g the hope th a t s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d i n g would s t a r t soon^ 
w i t h regard to the e x i s t i n g p o l i c y of l i c e n c e s he would be 
o b l i g e d i f the government would i n c r e a s e the p r i c e r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on p r i v a t e houses. The f i g u r e f i x e d i n May, 1945 was no l o n g e r 
s u f f i c i e n t to cover r i s i n g c o s t s . The government responded i n 
While we have no e v i d e n c e of a s u b s t a n t i a l 
February 1947^. , 
1. HLG 37/67 CHAC Sub-Committee on P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e . J o i n t 
Deputation by the H o u s e b u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n said F e d e r a t i o n 
of Master B u i l d e r s . 18th February 1944. 
2. HLG 37/67 evidence by S i r John McTaggart. L o c a l bye-laws 
covered only e s s e n t i a l h e a l t h and f i r e r i s k r e g u l a t i o n s but 
McTaggart seemed to be i m p l y i n g they c o u l d be stre n g t h e n e d 
to i n c l u d e o t h e r a s p e c t s of b u i l d i n g . 
3. HLG 101/313 N a t i o n a l H o u s e b u i l d e r s R e g i s t r a t i o n C o u n c i l : 
Conference on 23rd November 1944. 
4. HLG 101/314 N a t i o n a l H o u s e b u i l d e r s R e g i s t r a t i o n C o u n c i l : 
Approval of Scheme. 23rd November 1946. 
3. HLG 101/314 N a t i o n a l H o u s e b u i l d e r s R e g i s t r a t i o n C o u n c i l : 
S i r Jonah Walker-Smith to S i r John Wr i g l e y . 27th November 1946 
6. Cab 134/320 Housing Committee. C i r c u l a r 25th February 1947 
i n c r e a s e d the p r i c e l i m i t from £1,200 to £l,300 and announced 
th a t l i c e n c e d p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e houses would form p a r t of 
the governments t a r g e t . 
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a t t a c k on government p o l i c y . i n t h i s phase from the b i g b u i l d e r s , 
we can surmise t h a t t h i s would have developed the longer the 
government continued to o p e r a t e i t s s p e c i a l measures and the 
longer they had to w a i t b e f o r e re-assuming a f u l l r o l e . They 
r e c e i v e d comfort from government a s s u r a n c e s which, continued to 
s t r e s s the r o l e of s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d i n g i n the long run. Green-
wood had commented a t the very f i r s t meeting of M i n i s t e r s on 
the s u b j e c t t h a t the p r i o r i t y p o l i c y f o r l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s d i d 
not d e t r a c t from the ' u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e of owner occupation*.^ 
To one b u i l d e r the M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h s t r e s s e d t h a t i t d i d not 
i n t e n d to p r o h i b i t b u i l d i n g by p r i v a t e d e v e l o p e r s as a long 
term p o l i c y . The p r e s e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s were due o n l y to shortages 
of b u i l d i n g labour and m a t e r i a l s and the need to c o n c e n t r a t e 
on the p r o v i s i o n of s m a l l houses f o r those i n g r e a t e s t need. 
The main body of complaint i n these e a r l y y e a r s came from s m a l l 
b u i l d e r s who s t r e s s e d they were being crowded out by t h e i r 
e x c l u s i o n from c o m p e t i t i o n f o r the l a r g e c o u n c i l house t e n d e r s ? 
The government responded w i t h a measure which enabled l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s to i n v i t e s m a l l e r b u i l d e r s who a l r e a d y had s i t e s 
i n t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n to b u i l d houses and s e l l the developed 
e s t a t e to l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s on completion. They would i n 
r e t u r n have to agree to b u i l d to l o c a l a u t h o r i t y s t a n d a r d s and 
a c c e p t a s p e c i f i e d p r i c e . T h i s a r r a n g e m e n t ^ i t was hoped^would 
h e l p s o l v e the problem of l o c k e d up c a p i t a l , a p a r t i c u l a r l y 
p r e s s i n g problem f o r s m a l l f i r m s . By b eing c o n t r a c t e d to l o c a l 
1. Cab 124/450. Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e P o s t War Housing P o l i c y 
Meeting of M i n i s t e r s on Housing. 8th August 1945. 
2. HLG 101/461 B u i l d i n g A s s o c i a t i o n s : P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e 
b u i l d e r s and i n d i v i d u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 1945-58. 
3. i b i d . 
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a u t h o r i t i e s , they would a l s o get the b e n e f i t of 'low g e a r i n g ' 
by which c o u n c i l s gave i n s t a l m e n t payments on the t o t a l p r i c e 
as b u i l d i n g proceeded, thus e a s i n g f u r t h e r the debt problem. 
An added bonus was the p r o v i s i o n t h a t (where the l a n d was s o l d 
to l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s f i r s t ) the market r a t h e r than the 1939 
v a l u e would be p a i d . There a r e no f i g u r e s on the t o t a l response 
to the scheme although ther e i s i n d i v i d u a l e v i d e n c e of take up.*^  
As f o r those s m a l l e r j o b b i n g f i r m s , i n a d d i t i o n to t h e i r s t i l l 
e x t e n s i v e work on p r i v a t e maintenance and r e p a i r , they were 
a l s o encouraged to s u b c o n t r a c t to l a r g e r f i r m s on housing 
2 
schemes. 
By p r o t e c t i n g the p o s i t i o n of p r i v a t e b u i l d e r l a r g e and 
smallthrough t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n as agents i n c o u n c i l house 
b u i l d i n g ( d i r e c t l abour c o u n c i l b u i l d i n g being l i t t l e used) 
the government ensured the c o - o p e r a t i o n of the i n d u s t r y i n i t s 
p r i o r i t y programme. Once i t had been decided, as e a r l y as 1943, 
t h a t the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s were to use the l a r g e s t share of 
house b u i l d i n g r e s o u r c e s , the medium to l a r g e b u i l d e r s , not 
anxious i n any way to b u i l d e x t e n s i v e l y i n a. h i g h c o s t market 
a t a time when consumer demand was r e s t r i c t e d by heavy d i r e c t 
and i n d i r e c t t a x a t i o n , got the b e s t terms they c o u l d f o r t h e i r 
own p r i v a t e work i n a s i t u a t i o n of s hortage of l a b o u r and 
m a t e r i a l s . Meanwhile a nationwide mass 'market', e n a b l i n g a 
good turnover on t o t a l c a p i t a l was guaranteed by c o n t r a c t i n g 
1. HLG 101/409 E r e c t i o n of Houses by s m a l l b u i l d e r s : C o r r e s -
pondence, C i r c u l a r to t h i s e f f e c t e n c l o s e d 30th A p r i l 1946. 
T h i s p o l i c y r e p l a c e d the more tougher l i n e where s i t e s 
developed by s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d e r s had been taken over by 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s under compulsary purchase w i t h the b u i l d e r 
only being allowed to complete h i s houses i f he c o u l d get a 
l i c e n c e per house i n the normal way see Cab 134/320 Housing 
Committee meeting. 28th March 1946. 
2. Cab 134/320 Housing Committee C i r c u l a r dated 4 t h February 1947 
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to l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s on tender. As i t turned out the w i t h -
drawal of the subsi d y f o r p r i v a t e sponsored b u i l d i n g by Bevan 
di d not a l t e r the b a s i c assumptions made by b u i l d e r s and 
government a l i k e - t h a t l a r g e p r i v a t e b u i l d i n g f o r owner 
occupation would have to w a i t . The o f f e r of a s u b s i d y was 
always i n terms of a p o l i c y of l o c a l l i c e n s e s f o r known and 
q u a l i f i e d buyers and t h e r e f o r e d i d not d i f f e r q u a l a t i t i v e l y 
from working f o r the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t . Both i n v o l v e d 
production f o r use or o r d e r r a t h e r than s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d i n g i n 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of demand. The c o n t e n t i o n of Michael Foot t h a t 
the grant of a subsidy would have enabled b u i l d e r s to t u r n 
a s i d e from the 'planned' s e c t o r l i e s on a ve r y ' s h a k y foundation 
f o r t h i s p e r i o d . I t i s w i t h a l l t h i s i n mind t h a t we have 
c a l l e d t h i s s e c t i o n the p l a c i n g r a t h e r than the e x c l u s i o n of 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . We s h a l l see i n c h a p t e r 7 t h a t the main 
c h a l l e n g e to the housing programme i n R e c o n s t r u c t i o n came from 
ot h e r s o u r c e s -
C o n c l u s i o n 
I n t h i s long c h a p t e r , we have d e s c r i b e d i n a number of 
a r e a s how a d i s c r e t e housing programme emerged and how the 
government b u i l t i n t o i t a number of d e v i c e s which, i t b e l i e v e d , 
would ensure i t s p r i o r i t y and i n s u l a t e i t from c h a l l e n g e . We 
have seen that i n terms o f f i n a n c e , the government, p o s s e s s i n g 
l i m i t e d c o n t r o l over the c o s t of b u i l d i n g , ensured t h a t the 
1. During the war the number of b u i l d i n g f i r m s d e c l i n e d from 
70,000 i n 1939 to 40,000 i n November 1944. By 1948 the 
i n d u s t r y had more than r e c o v e r e d a t 7 3 , O i l h e l p e d by the 
a b o l i t i o n of the ban on new e n t r a n t s i n January 1946. 
see Working Party Report on B u i l d i n g l o c . c i t . pp.4-5. 
2. Foot, Bevan. p.74. 
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the programme would not f a l t e r on the grounds of i t s high c o s t 
and guaranteed the n e c e s s a r y money to s u s t a i n i t . We have 
demonstrated t h a t , i n terms of the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f l a b o u r and 
m a t e r i a l s , the government s e t up p r i o r i t i e s and a l l o c a t i o n 
d e v i c e s to g i v e p r e f e r e n c e to new permanent housing, and s e t 
up an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system to c o n t r o l and s a n c t i o n the whole 
p r o c e s s . Having pointed to the weaknesses and i n s t a b i l i t y o f 
t h i s s t r u c t u r e i n terms of the performance of i t s o b j e c t i v e s , 
we noted t h a t the d e t e r m i n a t i o n to push forward w i t h b u i l d i n g 
new houses was not h e l d back by the r e c o g n i t i o n o f these 
weaknesses and t h a t housing was p r o t e c t e d from the supposed 
r a t i o n a l a p p r a i s a l a t v a r i o u s s t a g e s i n the f o r m a t i o n of the 
b u i l d i n g manpower budget by wartime guarantees made to the 
b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y over employment. In l a t e r c h a p t e r s .we s h a l l 
show how and why the demand f o r the adjustment and c u t i n the 
housing programme, which as we have shown s u r f a c e d d u r i n g the 
p l a n n i n g of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , re-emerged and the o r i g i n , n a t u r e 
and c o n t e n t of the c h a l l e n g e s i t r e c e i v e d . We s h a l l show t h a t 
although these c h a l l e n g e s now gathered more p o l i t i c a l weight 
behind them, they f a c e d the problem t h a t w h i l e the admin-
i s t r a t i v e system could not f u l l y guarantee a l l o f the s t a t e d 
o b j e c t i v e s ( f o r i n s t a n c e a r a p i d r a t e of c o m p l e t i o n ) , the 
mechanism and r a t i o n a l e behind i t was s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g to 
produce r i g i t i e s which the c h a l l e n g e r s c o u l d not guarantee to 
s u c c e s s f u l l y remove. 
CHAPTER IV, 
The S e t t i n g of C o n s t r a i n t s : 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and the Debate on Trade 
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INTRODUCTION 
I n Chapter 1 the importance was s t r e s s e d of l o c a t i n g the 
determinants of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p o l i c y , and p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
housing programme, as wi d e l y a s p o s s i b l e . C o n s i d e r a t i o n would 
be giv e n not only to o r i g i n , p r o g r e s s , and d e c i s i o n making 
w i t h i n the programme i t s e l f , c o n c e i v e d as a d i s c r e t e e n t i t y , 
but a l s o to f a c t o r s which a f f e c t e d i t s s u c c e s s but would 
o t h e r w i s e be the s u b j e c t of a s e p a r a t e o b j e c t of a n a l y s i s . One 
of these was the Trade programme and the impact o f the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy. To understand these e f f e c t s we cannot 
assume t h a t they can be added on to our concerns a s some s o r t 
of d i f f i c u l t y impinging e x t e r n a l l y on the programme as a 
' c r i s i s of the balance of payments' which suddenly c r a s h e s 
down on proximate d e c i s i o n makers from o u t s i d e . I n s t e a d we 
have c o n c e p t u a l i s e d r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and h o u s e b u i l d i n g w i t h i n 
i t , as a p o l i c y not immediately g i v e n to a n a l y s i s but whose 
meaning and s t r u c t u r a l c o m p l e x i t y i s given i t s v e r y form and 
content by f a c t o r s o u t s i d e the immediate f i e l d . These 
c o n d i t i o n s were not ' f a c t s ' o f the economy but a combination 
of elements s u b j e c t to p o l i t i c a l management and which helped 
to forge the r e l a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d between the i n t e r n a l and 
e x t e r n a l economy. I t i s t h e s e r e l a t i o n s t h a t p r o v i d e d a 
'hidden agenda' f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Such r e l a t i o n s however 
should not be t h e o r i z e d a c c o r d i n g to some i n f l e x i b l e and 
n e c e s s a r y l o g i c read o f f a b s t r a c t l y from the re q u i r e m e n t s of 
c a p i t a l i s m as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. An agenda can always 
be modified even though a meeting must take p l a c e . 
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The r o l e o f p o l i t i c a l i n t e r v e n t i o n can be found i n the 
way t h a t r e l a t i o n s between the i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l s e c t o r s 
are e s t a b l i s h e d . I t i s not j u s t a q u e s t i o n of the management 
of c o n s t r a i n t s with t h e i r accompanying problems o f or d e r and 
consent s i n c e the form i n which the c o n s t r a i n t s emerge i s 
i t s e l f m a n ipulable.^ The r e l a t i o n s i n the i n t e r n a l economy as 
we have seen i n Chapter 2 were e s t a b l i s h e d by a p a r t i c u l a r 
balance of c l a s s f o r c e s which emerged from the home f r o n t i n 
war and r e s u l t e d i n an e s s e n t i a l l y b u r e a u c r a t i c framework f o r 
the management of domestic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economic r e l a t i o n s , u n l i k e I n t e r s t a t e R e l a t i o n s , can 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y o p e r a t e w i t h i n a system o f command and c o n t r o l 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of which i s l i m i t e d i n the l a t t e r c a s e by the 
f a c t t h a t to impose such commands on u n w i l l i n g s u b j e c t s r e s o r t 
2 
must be made to war. R e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r economies can be 
s u b j e c t to c o n t r o l by v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t the r e l a t i o n s 
are based on exchange with the wi t h d r a w a l of one p a r t y to the 
exchange a u t o m a t i c a l l y forcing the o t h e r i n t o a c c e p t a n c e t h a t 
trade i s no longer p o s s i b l e . Such a c o e r c i o n need not 
d i r e c t l y i n t e r f e r e with the p o l i t i c s or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the 
1. I n c o n v e n t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s the i d e a t h a t the e s s e n c e of 
p o l i t i c s l i e s i n the management o f c o n f l i c t w h i l e the 
r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t s which h e l p s t r u c t u r e such c o n f l i c t 
a r e e s s e n t i a l l y problems of ' s c a r c i t y * - the s u b j e c t o f a 
se p a r a t e d i s c i p l i n e , e c o n o m i c s , i s i m p l i c i t f o r i n s t a n c e i n 
M i l l e r , J.D.B. The Nature o f P o l i t i c s (Harmondsworth 
Penguin 1965)ppl7-18 and e x p l i c i t i n Brown, A,L., Rule s and 
C o n f l i c t ; a n i n t r o d u c t i o n to P o l i t i c a l l i f e and i t s study. 
(iNew J e r s e y P r e n t i c e H a l l 1981) pp.183-4. 
2. T h i s i s an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n i n p r a c t i c e * Country A may 
be a b l e to coe r c e Country B by d i p l o m a t i c and t r a d e 
s a n c t i o n s , ^ t h o u g h there a r e l i m i t s to t h i s ^ s e t u s u a l l y 
by the p o l i t i c s of Country B and the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f 
Country A. 
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country concerned because i t can be e n f o r c e d by a r e s t r i c t i o n 
on the i m p o r t e r s and e x p o r t e r s of the i n i t i a t i n g s t a t e . There 
appear to be l i m i t s to such a b u r e a u c r a t i c framework i n t h i s 
a r e a . The f i r s t i s the seemingly logical deduction t h a t 
'where goods cannot c r o s s b orders s o l d i e r s w i l l * . T h i s appears 
to be d e d u c i b l e from e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e of the 1930s where a 
system of p r o t e c t i o n i s t economic b l o c k s was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
re-armament and the outbreak of war. T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n or c o r -
r e l a t i o n was c h a l l e n g e d by what we s h a l l c a l l the b i l a t e r a l i s t 
f a c t i o n i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s who argued t h a t a system of t r a d e 
ajid exchange c o n t r o l would be a p p r o p r i a t e f o r peace. The 
second l i m i t appeared to be t h a t such a system would contradict 
the requirements of c a p i t a l i s m as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic 
order, such requirements b e i n g . e s s e n t i a l f o r the expomsidn of 
the dominant f r a c t i o n of c a p i t a l . Trade and exchange c o n t r o l 
would appear to mutate the c o u r s e o f r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n t h a t 
would o t h e r w i s e be determined by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of p r o d u c t i v i t y . Such a mutation however i s p r e c i s e l y the 
form of p o l i t i c s t h a t i s d e s i r e d and to a l a r g e e x t e n t ^ 
p r a c t i s e d by the s o c i a l democracy of weaker n a t i o n s t a t e s 
anxious to p r o t e c t t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c y from the c o s t s of an 
adjustment to the dominant economic l o g i c without s a c r i f i c i n g 
i t s b e n e f i t s . The l i m i t s o f such ' p r o t e c t i o n ' and whether 
these c o s t s were t r a n s f e r r e d , postponed or e l i m i n a t e d w i l l be 
d i s c u s s e d i n c h a p t e r 6. 
The purpose of t h i s c h a p t e r i s to examine the i n i t i a l 
adoption of Free Trade Commitments, the weakness o f the 
b i l a t e r a l i s t a l t e r n a t i v e and thp e v e n t u a l p o l i c y mix t h a t 
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p r o v i d e s t h e s e t t i n g a g a i n s t w h i c h l a t e r t r a d e o f f s between 
t h e e x p o r t , c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t and h o u s i n g p r i o r i t i e s w i l l 
be examined. The e x t e n t t o w h i c h Home R e c o n s t r u c t i o n was 
c o n f l a t e d t o t h e p r o b l e m o f e x t e r n a l c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s i s a t t h e 
h e a r t o f c h a p t e r 7. From t h i s c h a p t e r i t w i l l be a p p a r e n t 
t h a t d i s c r e t i o n was n o t removed t h r o u g h t h e emergence o f 
p o l i c i e s s e t t i n g c o n s t r a i n t s between 1942 ajid 1945. On t h e 
o t h e r hand w h i l e i t i s t r u e t o say t h a t d i s c r e t i o n r e m a i n e d , 
t o t a l k i n terms o f p o l i c y ' c h o i c e * so t h a t some d e c i s i o n 
making by p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s becomes t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e 
i s t o u n d e r e s t i m a t e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e 
e x i s t e n c e o f a c t i o n i n a f o r m w h i c h can r e v e a l s t r u c t u r e s and 
p r o c e s s e s i n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t o u t s i d e t h e i r i m m e d i a t e c o n t r o l . 
Even p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s have a s c r i p t , and we s h a l l show t h e 
c h i e f weakness o f t h o s e t h a t a d v o c a t e d a p r o t e c t i o n i s t 
s t r a t e g y t o match t h e p l a n n i n g o f i n t e r n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h 
a more s e c u r e b i l a t e r a l i s m i n e x t e r n a l t r a d e , ( - t h e ext<5nsi-ve 
programming o f s o c i a l s e c u r i t y i n i t s w i d e s t sense, ) was a 
f a i l u r e t o r e c o g n i z e t h e c o n s t r a i n t s i m p l i c i t i n t h e c o u r s e 
t h e y a d v o c a t e d . T h i s f a i l u r e was compounded by t h e i r s t r a t e g i c 
weakness i n t h e sense o f t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o f o r m t h e p o l i t i c a l 
a l l i a n c e s t h a t were e s s e n t i a l i f t h e y were t o cap:ture and 
c o n t r o l t h e d e c i s i o n making a p p a r a t u s . 
What emerges f r o m t h i s c h a p t e r i s a d i a l e c t i c between 
c h o i c e and d e t e r m i n a t i o n by c o n s t r a i n t , c r e a t i n g t h e room f o r 
' p o l i c y space' where p o l i t i c i a n s c o u l d p r a c t i c e t h e i r a r t s . 
T h i s space w o u l d n a r r o w as t i m e e l a p s e d s i n c e one o f t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s t h e B r i t i s h government a g r e e d t o i n n e g o t i a t i o n 
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w i t h t h e Americans was t o renounce d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e l o n g r u n . 
But t h e s h o r t r u n was what R e c o n s t r u c t i o n was a l l a b o u t . The 
r e a l argument w o u l d c e n t r e l a t e r on how f a r t h e f o r m e r was t o 
be used i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e l a t t e r . 
S e c t i o n I : AMERICA AND MULTILATERALISM 
The R e s t o r a t i o n s i d e o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a 
d e s i r e t o a b o l i s h b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t r o l s was t h e d o m i n a n t t r e n d 
i n t h e U.S.A. a f t e r .the war. A d e f o r m e d system o f t r a d e and 
payments had grown up i n Europe i n t h e 1930s. To a d v o c a t e a 
r e t u r n t o t h e ' N a t u r a l ' p r i n c i p l e s o f m a r k e t c o m p e t i t i o n a f t e r 
t h e war was i d e o l o g i c a l l y v e r y sound. Was i t n o t s e l f - e v i d e n t 
t h a t t h e s t a t e r u n ' t o t a l i t a r i a n * i n s p i r e d system o f b l o c k e d 
a c c o u n t s , i m p o r t c o n t r o l s , e x p o r t d i r e c t i o n and c u r r e n c y 
r a t i o n i n g l e d i n e x o r a b l y t o t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e w o r l d i n t o 
economic b l o c s and t h e n c e t o war as t h e o n l y way one b l o c 
c o u l d p e n e t r a t e a n o t h e r f o r s o u r c e s o f raw m a t e r i a l i t d i d n o t 
possess?"^ I t seemed r e a s o n a b l e t o assume, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e 
a b o l i t i o n o f r e s t r i c t i o n s and t h e breatkup o f t h e b l o c s w o u l d 
l e a d t o t h e m a i n t e n a j i c e o f peace w i t h f r e e exchanges and f r e e 
t r a d e l e a d i n g t o l i b e r t y and f r e e d o m i n g e n e r a l ^ . I t a l s o 
happened t o be a c o n v e n i e n t c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t t h i s ' n a t u r a l * 
system was t h e b e s t way t h e A merican government c o u l d f u r t h e r 
the i n t e r e s t s o f American c a p i t a l i n t h e i n t e r - i m p e r a l i s t 
s t r u g g l e : as t h e s t r o n g e s t competitor i t c o u l d a t f f o r d 
1, The D o l l a r - B l o c , t h e S t e r l i n g a r e a , t h e N a z i New O r d e r , 
t h e Japanese C o - p r o s p e r i t y Sphere e t c . e x i s t e d w i t h 
v a r i o u s d e g r e e s o f h o s t i l i t y f r o m t h e 1930s t o 1945. 
2. Cab 87/64 Committee on t h e Economic A s p e c t s o f 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Speech by Summer W e l l e s t o New Y o r k 
Trade C o n v e n t i o n O c t o b e r 1941 r e l a y e d by H a l i f a x t o F o r e i g n 
O f f i c e . 
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a f r e e c l i m a t e . The American government c o u l d t h e r e f o r e 
f u r t h e r such an i n t e r e s t w h i l e g i v i n g t h e appearance o f 
f u r t h e r i n g p r i n c i p l e s whose u n i v e r s a l c o n n e c t i o n w i t h peace 
was s e l f - e v i d e n t . 
The Free Trade Movement i n A m e r i c a l e d by t h e economic 
l i b e r a l Summer W e l l e s and S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , C o r d e l l H u l l , 
was d e t e r m i n e d t o b r e a k a l l p r o t e c t i o n i s t d e v i c e s such as 
p r e f e r e n c e s . S t a t e t r a d i n g and b u l k p u r c h a s e a l l o f w h i c h , 
i n c i d e n t a l l y , a l s o c u t o u t t h e b a n k i n g and i n s u r a n c e middlemen. 
For W e l l e s t h i s was a ' c o e r c i v e t o t a l i t a r i a n s ystem o f t r a d e * . 
The c o n n e c t i o n between t h i s and t h e pot e n t i a l damage to 
American C a p i t a l i s m was c l e a r . U.S. e x p o r t s w o u l d have t o 
be r e s t r i c t e d t o what d i d n o t compete w i t h o t h e r n a t i o n s s i n c e 
o t h e r n a t i o n s w o u l d n o t a l l o w i n goods t h e y c o u l d make them-
s e l v e s and w h i c h a s s i s t e d home employment i r r e s p e c t i v e o f 
w h e t h e r U.S. p r o d u c t i o n was che a p e r . The p r o b l e m a f t e r t h e 
war was t h a t U.S. i n d u s t r y w o u l d have s u r p l u s p r o d u c t i v e 
c a p a c i t y . Her p r o d u c t i o n , b o t h a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l , 
had been g r e a t l y s t i m u l a t e d as a r e s u l t o f b e i n g a war s u p p l i e r 
The r a p i d i t y o f r e c o n v e r s i o n back t o c i v i l i a n p r o d u c t i o n had 
o n l y i n t e n s i f i e d t h i s . Come t h e peace she w o u l d want t o 
r e a l i z e t h e v a l u e o f h e r e x t e n d e d c a p a c i t y ( w h i c h c o u l d n o t 
be absorbed i n h e r own home m a r k e t ) i n v e s t e d i n mass p r o d u c t i o n 
by c o n t i n u e d s a l e s . To do t h i s she needed t o remove b l o c k a g e s 
on access t o t h e w o r l d m a r k e t . I n i t i a l l y U.S. i n d u s t r y had 
grown on t h e b a s i s o f a mas s i v e home m a r k e t backed by a h i g h 
t a r i f f w a l l . But a l t h o u g h t h e U.S. t a r i f f s t i l l r e m a i n e d , U.S. 
spokesman c o n t i n u e d t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n between t a r i f f s as 
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d e f e n s i v e i n s t r u m e n t s t o h e l p i n f a n t i n d u s t r i e s and t h e 
a g g r e s s i v e B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e s whose o b j e c t seemed t o 
be t o e x t e n d and make e x c l u s i v e s p h e r e s o f i n f l u e n c e on t h e 
w o r l d m a r k e t f o r o l d e r i n e f f i c i e n t p r o d u c e r s . 
American c a p i t a l i s t s ^ when t h e y l o b b i e d Congress, 
c o n s t c i n t l y s t r e s s e d t h e p r o b l e m o f excess c a p a c i t y . The r a i l -
r o a d companies wanted i n c r e a s e d t r a d e t o i n c r e a s e f r e i g h t , t h e 
t obacco t r a d e wanted s t a b i l i t y aind r e l a t i v e f i x i t y on t h e 
f o r e i g n exchanges ( f l u c t u a t i o n s i n t h e 20s and 30s had been so 
f r e q u e n t t h a t revenue f r o m s h i p m e n t s c o u l d n o t be p r e d i c t e d ) . 
C o n v e r t i b l e c u r r e n c y t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e f r e e s p e n d i n g a b r o a d by 
i m p o r t e r s was a g r e e d by a l l . The M o t i o n P i c t u r e I n d u s t r y sav/ 
i t as a means o f e n s u r i n g t h a t r e n t a l s and r o y a l t i e s on f i l m s , 
p r o f i t s on p r o d u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s and h o l d i n g s i n t h e a t r e s and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a g e n c i e s c o u l d be f r e e l y r e p a t r i a t e d w i t h o u t a 
b l o c k i n g mechanism o f exchange c o n t r o l . The e l e c t r i c a l 
i n d u s t r y , m a s s i v e l y o v e r e x p a n d e d i n war, w a n t e d an i n c r e a s e i n 
t r a d e p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t h e r a d i o s i d e . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
t h e e x p o r t t r a d e cind d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t was a r g u e d by t h e 
P e t r o l e u m i n d u s t r y . I n v e s t m e n t s i n o i l f i e l d s and r e f i n e r i e s 
had t o be f i n a n c e d f r o m t h e s u r p l u s r e a l i z e d i n e x p o r t 
m a r k e t s . A g a i n exchange c o n t r o l w o u l d p r e v e n t c o n v e r s i o n o f 
p r o f i t i n t o d o l l a r s e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e s a l e s were t o c o u n t r i e s 
i n t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a ( b a s i c a l l y t h e B r i t i s h e m p i r e and s p h e r e s 
o f i n f l u e n c e ) where c u r r e n c y r a t i o n i n g was managed i n London 
w i t h t h e e x p r e s s e d d e s i r e t o r e s t r i c t t h e s p e n d i n g o f d o l l a r 
and g o l d r e s e r v e s . Excess c a p a c i t y and t h e c o n s e q u e n t c o l l a p s e 
o f p r o f i t s a f t e r t h e c e a s i n g o f war p r o d u c t i o n was a p a r t i c u l a r 
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f e a r f o r t h e American T e x t i l e i n d u s t r y . C o t t o n and wool 
p r o d u c t i o n was 50% up on l e v e l s o f 1938. The h i g h l y 
p r o d u c t i v e U.S. a u t o m o b i l e i n d u s t r y was i n a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n . 
I n a d d i t i o n i t had i t s d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t s i n t he f o r m o f 
bra n c h m a n u f a c t u r e and assembly p l a n t s i n t h e U.K. on w h i c h 
p r o f i t s must be f r e e l y r e p a t r i a t e d ^ . F u l l employment p o l i c y 
i n t h e U.S.A. was dependent on f i n d i n g a p r o f i t a b l e avenue 
f o r s u r p l u s c a p i t a l . P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t spoke o f ' t r e b l i n g 
o u r e x p o r t s * ^ as t h e way o f c o u n t e r a c t i n g any U.S. d e p r e s s i o n 
and p r o t e c t i n g j o b s . T h a t r e q u i r e d f r e e a ccess t o m a r k e t s 
and i n v e s t m e n t o u t l e t s b o t h d o m e s t i c and i m p e r i a l . Free access 
would a l s o be n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p u r c h a s e o f an i n c r e a s i n g 
volume o f new m a t e r i a l s and m i n e r a l s n e c e s s a r y f o r i n c r e a s e d 
t r a d e . 
For A m e r i c a j i c a p i t a l t o be s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e Postwar 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l economic o r d e r t h e B r i t i s h , i t seemed, would 
have t o s u r r e n d e r much o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f i m p e r i a l c u r r e n c y 
and t r a d e p r a c t i c e s i n c l u d i n g p r e f e r e n c e s cind i n c o n v e r t i b i l i t y 
w h i c h had e v o l v e d i n t h e i n t e r w a r p e r i o d and i n t e n s i f i e d 
d u r i n g t h e war. But i n B r i t a i n many t h o u g h t i t w o r t h w h i l e 
r e t a i n i n g and u t i l i z i n g t h e s e i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e a p l a n n i n g 
o f and s e c u r i t y i n th e management o f f o r e i g n t r a d e - These 
n e o - m e r c a n t i l i s t s o r B i l a t e r a l i s t s as we s h a l l c a l l them 
a d v o c a t e d an o p t i o n w h i c h the y t h o u g h t w o u l d be p r o t e c t i o n i s t 
i n t h e w i d e s t sense i n c l u d i n g t h e i n s u l a t i o n o f Home 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n f r o m t h e e f f e c t s o f an a n a r c h i c w o r l d t r a d e i n 
1. T236/162 P u b l i c i t y Papers i s s u e d by t h e U.S. B u s i n e s s and -
I n d u s t r y Committee f o r B r e t t o n Woods R o o s e v e l t H o t e l New Y o r k . 
2, Speech o f R o o s e v e l t O c t o b e r 1944 q u o t e d i n Brady, R. , Co:'isis 
i n 3 r i t a i n : P l a n s and Achi e v e m e n t s o f t h e Labour Government. 
(Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press 1930)p.619. 
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w h i c h t h e l e s s e f f i c i e n t w o u l d l o s e o u t . L a t e r we s h a l l 
i d e n t i f y t h e a d v o c a t e s o f t h i s o p t i o n amd t h e i r weaknesses, 
b u t f i r s t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o o u t l i n e t h e key t e n e t s o f t h i s 
t h i n k i n g . 
SECTION II:BILATERALIST THEORY 
The B i l a t e r a l i s t t h e o r y assumed t h a t f o r e i g n t r a d e w o u l d 
be c o n d u c t e d t h r o u g h p r e v i o u s l y n e g o t i a t e d agreements o r 
c o n t r a c t s . C o u n t r y A w o u l d agree w i t h c o u n t r y B t h a t i t w o u l d 
e x p o r t a c e r t a i n q u o t a o f c o m m o d i t i e s a t a c e r t a i n p r i c e . T h i s 
w o u l d g i v e t o C o u n t r y A t h e g u a r a n t e e t h a t i t s s c a l e and c o s t s 
o f p r o d u c t i o n w o u l d be r e a l i z e d i n f u t u r e s a l e s p r o t e c t i n g i t 
f r o m l o s s t h r o u g h a guara^nteed m a r k e t . C o u n t r y B would a g r e e 
t o r e c e i v e t h e goods i n r e t u r n f o r i t s e x p o r t s b e i n g a c c e p t e d 
by c o u n t r y A. Both c o u n t r i e s A and B w o u l d have an exchange 
agreement w h i c h p r e v e n t e d each o t h e r f r o m u s i n g t h e s e f o r e i g n 
c u r r e n c y e a r n i n g s i n o r d e r t o buy t h e c u r r e n c y o f a t h i r d 
c o u n t r y . T h i s w o u l d p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t weaker s t a t e s w i t h h i g h 
c o s t u n c o m p e t i t i v e p r o d u c t i o n who c o u l d e n s u r e t h a t c o u n t r i e s 
t h e y i m p o r t e d f r o m w o u l d n o t use t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e i r s a l e s 
f o r a n y t h i n g e l s e b u t f o r r e c i p r o c a l p u r c h a s e s f r o m them, 
i r r e s p e c t i v e o f w h e t h e r t h e same c o m m o d i t i e s c o u l d be o b t a i n e d 
f r o m a t h i r d c o u n t r y w i t h cheaper p r i c e s . By r e m o v i n g t h e 
c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t p r i n c i p l e i t w o u l d d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t 
t h o s e c o u n t r i e s whose c h e a p e r mass p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s 
would o t h e r w i s e p e n e t r a t e m a r k e t s . I n d e e d one o f t h e 
m o t i v a t i o n s o f t h e weaker c o u n t r y i n o p t i n g f o r such b i -
l a t e r a l i s m w ould be t o e x c l u d e t h e more h i g h l y p r o d u c t i v e . 
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T h i s system was e s s e n t i a l l y m e r c a n t i l i s t ^ because,^ i n s t e a d 
o f s e e i n g c o m p e t i t i o n , p r o d u c t i v i t y g a i n s f r o m t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r , and c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n t a g e as t h e key 
co n c e r n s f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n o f a s u c c e s s f u l i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e 
p o l i c y i t n a r r o w l y c o n c e i v e d t h e N a t i o n as t h e b a s i c u n i t o f 
t r a d e . W i t h i n t h e N a t i o n i n t e r e s t s o f t h e s t a t e i n t h e manage-
ment o f t r a d e w o u l d be s e t t l e d by d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y c h o i c e 
r a t h e r t h a n i m p e r s o n a l m a r k e t f o r c e s . Trade w o u l d n o t f r e e l y 
o p e r a t e , as i n M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade, a c c o r d i n g t o r e l a t i v e p r i c e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ( p u r c h a s e s i n t h e c h e a p e s t and s a l e s i n t h e 
d e a r e s t m a r k e t s ) w i t h t h e o v e r a l l b a l a n c e o f t r a d e ( T o t a l 
e x p o r t s - T o t a l i m p o r t s ) b e i n g t h e s p o n t a n e o u s l y g e n e r a t e d 
outcome o f p r o d u c t i v i t y g a i n s o r l o s s e s . I n t h e b i l a t e r a l i s t 
scheme, on t h e c o n t r a r y , t r a d e w o u l d be b u i l t on s a l e s and 
purc h a s e s b e i n g b a l a n c e d on a N a t i o n t o N a t i o n b a s i s : payment 
b e i n g t a k e n i n goods n o t c u r r e n c y . M a x i m i z i n g t h e s t a t e o f 
the Reserves would be one o f t h e f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and n o t 
s a c r i f i c i n g g o l d and d o l l a r s by a l l o w i n g them t o be drawn on 
f o r ' i n e s s e n t i a l s ' . The s t a t e w o u l d d e c i d e t h e ' p r i o r i t y ' o f 
i m p o r t and r a t i o n o u t t h e means o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l payment 
a c c o r d i n g l y . T h i s w o u l d be e s p e c i a l l y so where o u r r e s e r v e s 
o f a f o r e i g n c o u n t r y ' s c u r r e n c y were low because we had n o t 
e x p o r t e d t o i t s h i g h l y c o m p e t i t i v e home m a r k e t and t h e r e f o r e 
e a r n e d i t s c u r r e n c y . T h i s was t h e case w i t h t h e U.K. e x p o r t s 
t o t h e U-S.A, and h e l p e d p r o d u c e t h e famous ' D o l l a r s h o r t a g e ' . 
The h i g h p r o d u c t i v i t y o f t h e U.S.A. meant t h a t t h e y h e l d most 
o f t h e w o r l d ' s g o l d and d o l l a r s u p p l y . The emphasis o f 
b i l a t e r a l i s m was t o buy f r o m such c o u n t r i e s o n l y i f we c o u l d 
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n o t buy anywhere e l s e and engage i n a programme o f i m p o r t 
s u b s t i t u t i o n as f a r as p o s s i b l e t o a v o i d such a dependence. 
The B i l a t e r a l i s t s t a t e - was t h e r e f o r e d i s c r i m i n a t i n g i n i t s 
t r a d e p r a c t i c e s . U n l i k e m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m i t was n o t i n d i f f e r e n t 
t o i t s s o u r c e s o f s u p p l y and s o u g h t t o d i r e c t l y e s t a b l i s h t h e 
s o c i a l n e c e s s i t y o f c o m m o d i t i e s f o r t r a d e : such t h i n g s as 
l u x u r y p r o d u c t i o n and f o r e i g n t r a v e l b e i n g s t r i c t l y c o n t r o l l e d . 
Under such a system i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e and exchange c o u l d 
p r o c e e d b u t i n so f a r as i t s a t i s f i e d use v a l u e . 
The b i l a t e r a l i s t o p t i o n summed up i n t h e p h r a s e 'we buy 
f r o m them: t h e y buy f r o m us' seemed t o o f f e r s e c u r i t y t o t h e 
weaker N a t i o n s . B e h i n d i t s e r e c t e d w a l l s p r o t e c t i o n was n o t 
o n l y g i v e n f r o m t h e c o m p e t i t i v e t h r u s t o f more p r o d u c t i v e 
c o u n t r i e s who were n o t g o i n g t o d e v o t e so much o f t h e i r 
r e s o u r c e s t o s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , b u t a l s o f r o m any p o t e n t i a l 
slump i n o v e r s e a s w o r l d demand w h i c h o c c u r r e d a f t e r commodites 
earmarked f o r e x p o r t had been p r o d u c e d , t h r e a t e n i n g f u l l 
employment. Under a p u r e g o l d s t a n d a r d e q u i l i b r i u m was 
supposed t o be r e - e s t a b l i s h e d by a f a l l i n p r i c e s c o n s e q u e n t 
on t h e l a c k o f demand, t h e l o s s o f f o r e i g n r e s e r v e s and t h e 
c o n s e q u e n t c o n t r a c t i o n o f c r e d i t . Because b i l a t e r a l d e a l s 
s p e c i f i e d q u a n t i t y and p r i c e i n advance, t h e b u y i n g c o u n t r y 
w o u l d agree i n c o n t r a c t o r t r e a t y t o t a k e i m p o r t s i r r e s p e c t i v e 
o f w h e t h e r i t s own p r i c e l e v e l had f a l l e n and i t s own i n f e r i o r 
s u b s t i t u t e s were now more a t t r a c t i v e . C o n v e r s e l y i f t h e r e was 
w o r l d w i d e i n f l a t i o n i m p o r t s c o u l d be g o t a t t h e o l d a greed 
p r i c e . 
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Of c o u r s e t h i s i s v e r y a b s t r a c t , cind s i m p l i f i e d ^ t h e 
degree o f i n s u l a t i o n w o u l d v a r y w i t h t h e t y p e o f b i l a t e r a l i s t 
system a d o p t e d . The v e r s i o n d e s c r i b e d h e r e i s a f o r m o f b a r t e r 
o r d i r e c t exchange o f d e f i n i t e c o m m o d i t i e s . A l e s s b u r e a u c r a t i c 
f o r m t h a t does n o t e l i m i n a t e t h e i n d i v i d u a l t r a d e r , i s t h e 
payments agreement where t h e p r o c e e d s o f e x p o r t a r e earmarked 
f o r p u r c h a s e s i n t h e same c o u n t r y b u t w i t h o u t a r e s t r i c t i o n o f 
choice. Lhderaich.Clearing Agreements a l l payments a r e c r e d i t e d o r 
d e b i t e d t o a C e n t r a l A c c o u n t , payments f r o m t h a t amount can 
o n l y be made w i t h p e r m i s s i o n . S h o u l d any d e f i c i t o c c u r betv/een 
t h e two c o u n t r i e s t h e n s p e c i a l f a v o u r s a r e g r a n t e d t o b a l a n c e 
o u t t h e a d v a n t a g e . 
To summarize t h e b i l a t e r a l i s t o p t i o n was f o r c o n s c i o u s 
p l a n n i n g o f t r a d e t o a l e s s e r o r g r e a t e r e x t e n t ^ . Under m u l t i -
l a t e r a l i s m t r a d e i s t h e r e s u l t o f t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f a number 
o f a number o f e x p o r t e r s and i m p o r t e r s , none o f w h i c h knows 
w h e t h e r h i s p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s a c t i o n w i l l be o f f s e t by somebody 
e l s e ' s i n t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n o r w h e t h e r t h e r e w i l l be a 
s u r p l u s o r d e f i c i t as a r e s u l t . B i l a t e r a l i s m s u b s t i t u t e s 
s e c u r i t y f o r e f f i c i e n c y , t h e r e d u c t i o n o f u n c e r t a i i n t y f o r r i s k 
1. There were v a r i a t i o n s . C o n s e r v a t i v e s t e n d e d t o want t o p l a n 
by monetary means: p r i c e s u p p o r t s , t a r i f f s , p r e f e r e n c e s . 
The S o c i a l i s t v a r i a n t p r e f e r r e d i m p o r t / e x p o r t B o a rds, b u l k 
p urchase ( s t a t e t r a d i n g ) . B oth s u p p o r t e d t h e i d e a o f 
i n c o n v e r t i b l e c u r r e n c y b l o c s and b i l a t e r a l a greements o f 
one k i n d o r a n o t h e r . S h i n w e l l , t h e c h i e f l a b o u r a d v o c a t e , 
wanted p l a n n e d b i l a t e r a l t r a d e w i t h an expanded s t e r l i n g 
a r e a and n o t j u s t c o n f i n e d t o t h e e m p i r e . Y e t he s h a r e d w i t h 
C o n s e r v a t i v e i m p e r i a l i s t s a c o n c e r n w i t h e m p i r e d e v e l o p m e n t 
and e x p a n s i o n and was a l l f o r u s i n g s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s f o r 
the purposes o f c a p i t a l e x p o r t (H.C. Deb, V o l . 3 9 9 , C o l s . 
1977-1988 l O t h May 1944. Debate on Mon e t a r y P o l i c y ) . 
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t h e v i s i b l e f o r the unknown and p r o d u c t i o n f o r a g u a r a n t e e d 
m a r k e t as t h e aim and outcome o f t h e p r o c e s s . 
SECTION I I I ; THE U.K. COMMITMENT TO MULTILATERAL!ST PRINCIPLES 
To a c h i e v e t h e b e n e f i t s o f b i l a t e r a l i s m i n t h e B r i t i s h 
p o s t w a r c o n t e x t c e r t a i n a s s u m p t i o n s and i n s t r u m e n t s had t o be 
p r e s e n t . The m u l t i l a t e r a i i s t s , o r t h o s e t h a t a d v o c a t e d f r e e 
t r a d e , a r gued t h a t t h e s e i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s were a b s e n t , t h e 
b i l a t e r a l i s t s t h a t t h e y were p r e s e n t . We s h a l l now o u t l i n e 
t h e b i l a t e r a l i s t case and l o c a t e i t s a d v o c a t e s . 
The b i l a t e r a l i s t case was d e v e l o p e d d u r i n g t h e war and 
a f t e r as a response t o t h e American d i p l o m a t i c o f f e n s i v e on 
t h e m e r i t s o f a r e t u r n t o a l i b e r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic 
o r d e r . T h i s began w i t h t h e w a r t i m e s t a t e m e n t a g r e e d between 
C h u r c h i l l and R o o s e v e l t i n August 1941. The s o - c a l l e d 
' A t l a n t i c C h a r t e r ' had s p e c i f i e d i n a d d i t i o n t o n a t i o n a l 
( p o l i t i c a l ) s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n 'equal access t o t h e t r a d e and 
raw m a t e r i a l s * f r o m a l l t h e w o r l d . I t was f o l l o w e d by t h e 
d i s c u s s i o n s , t h a t c e n t r e d a r o u n d A r t i c l e V I I o f t h e M u t u a l 
A i d T r e a t y , F e b r u a r y 1942, by w h i c h lend l e a s e s u p p l i e s were 
g i v e n t o t h e U.K. The a r t i c l e p r o m i s e d t h a t w h i l e t h e a i d 
wou l d n o t be g i v e n i n such a way as t o s a d d l e t h e r e c i p i e n t 
c o u n t r y w i t h a p o s t ivar d e b t , i t n e v e r t h e l e s s embodied a 
' p r i c e ' o f s o r t s i n t h e agreement e x t r a c t e d f r o m t h e B r i t i s h 
government t h a t i t would u n d e r t a k e t o move t o w a r d s a p o l i c y 
o f r e m o v i n g d i s c r i m i n a t o r y t r a d e p r a c t i c e s - The i m p l i c a t i o n 
was c l e a r , A r t i c l e V I I was e x p r e s s e d l y f r a m e d u s i n g t h e word 
' c o n s i d e r a t i o n ' i n r e l a t i o n t o l a n d l e a s e s u p p l i e s . Congress 
i n s i s t e d such generous a i d s h o u l d show some b e n e f i t t o t h e 
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U.S. and B r i t a i n had t o a c q u i e s c e i n A m e r i c a ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
t o impose and e x t e n d her economic power i n t h e w o r l d . 
J.M. Keynes, s e n t t o n e g o t i a t e t h e f o r m o f words i n t h e 
a r t i c l e , r e c o r d e d h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Dean Acheson i n J u l y 
1941 when t h e e a r l y d r a f t s were b e i n g p r e p a r e d . 
" I asked w h e t h e r o u r a c c e p t a n c e o f t h i s a r t i c l e 
w o u l d p r e c l u d e a system o f i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e . 
He s a i d i t w o u l d . I asked hira w h e t h e r i t w o u l d 
p r e c l u d e i m p o r t and exchange c o n t r o l . Mr. 
Acheson s a i d i t m i g h t be i n t e r p r e t e d t h a t way ... 
( t h e P r e s i d e n t ) wanted a p o l i c y ' o f e x c l u d i n g 
s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s on n a t i o n a l i s t o r i m p e r i a l i s t i c 
l i n e s * . I n view o f t h e b e n e f i t s t o be r e c e i v e d 
now he t h o u g h t we s h o u l d n o t be l e f t as f r e e as 
a i r a f t e r t h e war t o a d o p t any economic syste m 
we t h o u g h t f i t . " ^ 
To e n s u r e t h a t B r i t a i n w o u l d be weeJc enough t o k e ep h e r s i d e 
o f t h e b a r g a i n a f t e r t h e war, t h e U.S. government w o u l d n o t 
g i v e lend l e a s e u n t i l B r i t i s h g o l d and d o l l a r r e s e r v e s had 
been reduced below a c e r t a i n l e v e l . We a l s o had t o p r o m i s e 
n o t t o use any o f t h e m a t e r i a l s i n t e n d e d f o r . w a r p r o d u c t i o n i n 
2 
e x p o r t . 
The U.S. government gave e a r l y w a r n i n g s t h a t i t w o u l d n o t 
t o l e r a t e t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f l e n d l e a s e a f t e r t h e war t o h e l p 
t h e U.K. o v e r i t s b a l a n c e o f payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . Congress 
w o u l d w a j i t t o know why A m e r i c a n s u r p l u s e s should be t a x e d 
away t o b o l s t e r up t h e weaker c a p i t a l i s t s . " ^ A f t e r t h e 
r e j e c t i o n o f t h e f i r s t d r a f t a r t i c l e , t h e second was a g r e e d 
and c o n t a i n e d t h e b e g i n n i n g s o f a compromise p o s i t i o n whereby 
1. Prem 4 17/3 C o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r Lend Lease. Memorandum o f 
Keynes c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Mr. Dean Acheson o f t h e S t a t e 
Department J u l y 28 1941 a l s o i n Cab 117/23 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
S e c r e t a r i a t O f f i c e Memorandum. 
2. Gardner, R. , S t e r l i n g - D o l i a r Diplomacy (New Y o r k , McGraw-
H i l l 1969 e d i t ) pp.173-4. 
3 . i b i d p.186. 
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t h e U.K. w o u l d do what t h e U-S. wanted i n t h e l o n g r u n , b u t 
o n l y by e n g a g i n g i n d i s c u s s i o n s t o t h a t end ' i n t h e l i g h t o f 
economic co n d i t i o n s ' " ' ' . The B r i t i s h had s u c c e s s f u l l y i n s e r t e d 
a p r o v i s o t h a t t h e Americans a l s o c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n i n 
f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n s o f how t h e New i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic o r d e r 
c o u l d g u a r a n t e e f u l l employment, so t h a t t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c o u l d be matched by p o l i c i e s f o r t h e ' e x p a n s i o n 
o f p r o d u c t i o n , employment and exchange'. I n t h e s p r i n g o f 1943 
t h e C a b i n e t d e c i d e d the b a s i s on w h i c h i t w o u l d open n e g o t i a t i o n s 
I t w o u l d t r y t o c o - o p e r a t e w i t h m u l t i l a t e r a l o b j e c t i v e s i n t h e 
l o n g r u n , b u t f o r t h e s h o r t r u n i t w o u l d seek t o r e t a i n o u r 
r i g h t s t o p r o t e c t i o n . The two s e t s o f l a r g e l y t h e o r e t i c a l 
d i s c u s s i o n s g o t under way between o f f i c i a l s o f b o t h governments 
i n September 1943. 
The p r o b l e m f o r B r i t a i n was t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o s e l l i n g 
many o f i t s f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s aind r u n n i n g down i t s r e s e r v e s , 
i t had d e v e l o p e d a s e r i e s o f d e b t s t o i t s own d o m i n i o n s and 
c o l o n i e s . (The s o - c a l l e d S t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s ) . These were t h e 
r« 
m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e i n t h e e m p i r e w h i c h were f r o z e n and h e l d 
i n t h e f o r m o f T r e a s u r y B i l l s and p r o m i s e s t o pay u n t i l such 
t i m e as we c o u l d redeem t h e d e b t e i t h e r i n e x p o r t s t o them, o r 
i n w h a t e v e r c u r r e n c y t h e y c a l l e d f o r i n a c o n v e r t i b l e c u r r e n c y 
system. 
e s u l t o f c o l o n i a l e x p o r t e a r n i n g s t o t h e U.K. and B r i t i s h 
1. Gardner, R., S t e r l i n g - D o l l a r D i p l o m a c y pp 56-9. 
2. Cab 65/34 C a b i n e t m e e t i n g UM(43)50, A p r i l 8 t h 1943 
170 
I n t h e meantime t h e g o l d and d o l l a r e q u i v a l e n t o f t h e s e 
T r e a s u r y b i l l s were h e l d i n a London managed ' D o l l a r p o o l * so 
t h a t d o l l a r e x p e n d i t u r e c o u l d be r a t i o n e d f o r t h e e m p i r e as a 
w h o le: p e r m i s s i o n h a v i n g t o be g r a n t e d f o r t h o s e w i s h i n g t o 
draw on t h e p o o l f o r U.S. goods. The i n c o n v e r t t b i l i t y o f 
s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s , and t h e d o l l a r p o o l system, i f c o n t i n u e d 
i n t o t h e peace t h r e a t e n e d t o d i v e r t t r a d e away f r o m t h e U.S. 
and encourage a h i g h l e v e l o f exchange between s t e r l i n g a r e a 
c o u n t r i e s a t U.S. expense. Now, i f c o n v e r t i b i l i t y was t o be 
a c c e p t e d i n an e n v i r o n m e n t where, because o f a weakened and 
d e v a s t a t e d Europe, t h e A m ericans w o u l d be d o i n g a l l t h e 
s e l l i n g , a s i t u a t i o n w o uld soon a r i s e where B r i t a i n , i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , w o u l d l o s e even t h e s m a l l amount o f l i q u i d r e s e r v e s 
o f g o l d and d o l l a r s n e c e s s a r y t o h o l d a g a i n s t a s h o r t t e r m 
d e f i c i t . 
By t h e m i d d l e o f t h e war, Keynes, as a d v i s o r t o t h e 
B r i t i s h T r e a s u r y on t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , had m o d i f i e d h i s e a r l i e r 
p o s i t i o n t o w a r d s n a t i o n a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y on t h e a s s u m p t i o n 
t h a t i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o overcome t h e n e g a t i v e i m p a c t o f 
Free Trade on weaker c o u n t r i e s by p e r s u a d i n g t h e s t r o n g e r ones 
t o p r o v i d e enough a i d t o o b v i a t e t h e need f o r d e f l a t i o n . ^ He 
p r oposed a C l e a r i n g Union P l a n whose aim was t o m i t i g a t e t h e 
e f f e c t s o f t r a d e d e f i c i t s on u n d e r - e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s . The 
C l e a r i n g Union ( t h e B r i t i s h v e r s i o n o f what l a t e r became t h e 
IMF) was t o be an autonomous agency f u n d e d by p e n a l i s i n g 
1. For Keynes e a r l i e r B i l a t e r a l i s t p o s i t i o n see B r e t t , £., 
G i l l i a t t , S. and Pople, A. * P l a n n e d Trade, Labour P a r t y 
P o l i c y and U.S. I n t e r v e n t i o n : t h e successes and f a i l u r e s 
o f Post war R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' . H i s t o r y Workshop J o u r n a l 
13 S p r i n g 1982 p.131. 
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g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d a t t h e t i m e as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e 
w o r k i n g c l a s s i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ) , wanted t h e U.K. p r o p o s a l s 
f o r a C l e a r i n g U n i o n amended so as n o t t o i n v o l v e any c o u n t r y 
i n t h e c o m p u l s o r y improvement o f i t s b a l a n c e o f payments by 
d e f l a t i o n and d e a r money. T h i s B e v i n b e l i e v e d w o u l d cause 
unemployment and w o u l d amount t o a r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e g o l d 
s t a n d a r d . ^ 
2 
The Keynes p l a n whose key p r i n c i p l e s o f v e r y generous 
c r e d i t o r a s s i s t a n c e was u n a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e U.S. i n 1943-44 
wou l d , by 1947, i n t h e f o r m o f t h e M a r s h a l l p l a n , be f a r more 
generous b e i n g based on f e a r o f a S o v i e t t h r e a t . Then t h e 
Americans w o u l d see t h e need t o a s s i s t even i t s p o t e n t i a i l 
Europeain c o m p e t i t o r s , r a t h e r t h a n have p a r t s o f t h e w o r l d 
t a k e n o u t o f t h e C a p i t a l i s t w o r l d m a r k e t . I n 1943-44 t h e 
S o v i e t s were a l l i e s , and t h e key q u e s t i o n i n t h e minds o f 
Congress and t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was how t o e n s u r e t h e b r e a k u p 
o f t h e p r o t e c t i o n i s t c u r r e n c y and t r a d e b l o c s t h a t t h r e a t e n e d 
t h e o u t l e t s f o r excess Americain p r o d u c t i o n . The Keynes p l a n 
was based on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e s e c o u n t r i e s w o u l d e n t e r 
open t r a d i n g o n l y i f American c a p i t a l and bsmking i n t e r e s t s 
r e c y c l e d t h e p r o f i t s o f t r a d e t h r o u g h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n (on w h i c h t h e i r v o t i n g and c o n t r o l powers were 
i n a d e q u a t e ) . The j o b o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n w o u l d be t o p r o v i d e 
1. Cab 65/34 C a b i n e t m e e t i n g WM(42)55 May 1 s t 1942. The 
d i s c u s s i o n c e n t r e d a r o u n d Cab 87/2 Committee on Reconstruc-
t i o n Problems Paper 2 4 t h March 1942 E x t e r n a l M o n e t a r y and 
Economic P o l i c y . 
2. For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s on t h e P l a n , t h e N e g o t i a t i o n s and t h e 
e v e n t u a l B r e t t o n s Wood package i n 1944, see G a r d n e r 
S t e r l i n g D o l l a r D iplomacy. 
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c r e d i t s f o r t h o s e i n d e f i c i t . Thus c o u n t r i e s t h a t had r e g i s t e r e d 
a f a i l u r e i n t h e c o m p e t i t i v e p r o c e s s w o u l d g e t t h e use o f 
r e s e r v e s n o t e a r n e d by p r e v i o u s p r o d u c t i o n f o r e x p o r t . T h i s 
w o u l d g i v e them a f a c i l i t y f o r i m p o r t w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o engage 
i n a d e f l a t i o n a r y r e s p o n s e . A l t h o u g h such a scheme p r i m e d 
w o r l d demand and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e demand f o r A m e r i c a n e x p o r t s , 
i t seemed t o t h e Americans t h a t t h e y w o u l d be p a y i n g f o r t h e i r 
own t r a d e . A l l t h e l i a b i l i t i e s f e l l on t h e c r e d i t o r - r a t h e r i n 
sound b a j i k i n g p r a c t i c e - t h e d e b t o r . T h e r e was even a t h r e a t 
i n t h e d e v a l u a t i o n r i g h t g r a n t e d t o d e f i c i t c o u n t r i e s . Even 
though t h i s was hedged w i t h r e s t r i c t i o n s , one o f t h o s e 
r e s t r i c t i o n s a l s o h i t t h e c r e d i t o r , s i n c e t h e y p r e v e n t e d a 
r e t a l i a t o r y d e v a l u a t i o n move b e i n g t a k e n a g a i n s t a d e f i c i t 
c o u n t r y a t t e m p t i n g t o a c h i e v e i n s t a n t c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s . The 
s a n c t i o n s such as t h e y were appeared a g a i n t o h i t t h e c r e d i t o r . 
I t was up t o him t o u n d e r t a i c e an i n c r e a s e i n c r e d i t and wages 
i n o r d e r t o s t i m u l a t e f o r e i g n i m p o r t s . A l l o f w h i c h p r o p o s a l s 
c o u l d h a r d l y be e x p e c t e d t o a p p e a l t o U.S. e x p o r t e r s . The 
Keynes p l a n , as Gardner shows, was t h e r e f o r e c o u n t e r e d by t h e 
W hite p l a n w h i c h e s s e n t i a l l y r e f l e c t e d t h e b a n k i n g and i n s u r a n c e 
p r i n c i p l e . I n t h i s scheme t h e e x t e n t o f b o r r o w i n g was t o be 
matched by t h e amount c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e Fund a f t e r w h i c h 
f u r t h e r b o r r o w i n g c o u l d o n l y be g r a n t e d w i t h s t r i c t c o n d i t i o n s 
i n c l u d i n g a r a t e o f commission. No new i n t e r n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c y 
was e n v i s a g e d as Keynes had s u g g e s t e d w i t h h i s 'bancor'. F i x e d 
exchange r a t e s were p r o p o s e d t y i n g each c u r r e n c y t o a g o l d / 
d o l l a r s u p p l y w h i c h o n l y 1 0 % d e v a l u a t i o n c o u l d r e l i e v e . A 
h i g h e r m a r g i n had t o be a greed by t h e f u n d . The v o t i n g powers 
173 
o f d e b t o r s on t h e g o v e r n i n g b o a r d were r e d u c e d and c r e d i t o r s 
i n c r e a s e d . F i n a l l y , more emphasis was t o be p l a c e d on t h e 
p o l i c i n g power o f t h e Fund i n o r d e r t o encourage c o u n t r i e s i n 
'f u n d a m e n t a l d i s e q u i l i b r i u m ' t o c o r r e c t i t w i t h i n s p e c i f i c t i m e 
l i m i t s . 
The a d v o c a t e s o f b i l a t e r a l i s m a r g u e d t h a t t h e d i s c u s s i o n s 
w i t h t h e Americans were p r e m i s e d on t h e i d e a , t h a t a re m o v a l o f 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n was b e n e f i c i a l when t h e y , b e l i e v e d t h a t a b e t t e r 
b a r g a i n l a y o u t s i d e t h e A m e r i c a n embrace. W i t h i n t h e C o a l i t i o n 
Leo Amery, l i f e l o n g C o n s e r v a t i v e i m p e r i a l i s t , l e a d i n g l i g h t o f 
t h e Empire I n d u s t r i e s A s s o c i a t i o n i n t h e 20s and 30s, and now 
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r I n d i a , a d v o c a t e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t r a d e 
and exchange and an e x p o r t s p o l i c y based on i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e . 
He f o u n d t h e American p r o p o s a l s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h any p l a n n e d 
o r g r o u p p o l i c y o f e x p a n s i o n . He a t t a c k e d A m e r i c a n i n d u s t r i a l -
i s t s who wanted t o deny p r o t e c t i o n t o o t h e r s , ... 
and. American f i n a n c i e r s who- wanted., us t i e d , "to t h e 
g o l d t h e y h e l d most o f . ^ I f c o n v e r t i b i l i t y was i m p l e m e n t e d 
h o l d e r s o f s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s w o u l d r u s h t o exchange t h e i r 
pounds f o r d o l l a r s . Amery r e j e c t e d t h i s 'C19th i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m * 
I 2 
i n f a v o u r o f ' N a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f mo n e t a r y ajid economic p o l i c y . . 
He knew C h u r c h i l l ' s s e n t i m e n t was e s s e n t i a l l y i m p e r i a l i s t and 
i n 1944 drew up h i s ' A l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y ' . ^ He r e h e a r s e d t h e 
1. Cab 66/40 C a b i n e t Paper WP{43)388 2nd Sept. 1943. An 
E x p a n s i o n i s t Economy Memo by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r 
I n d i a . 
2. Cab 66/44 C a b i n e t Paper IVP(43)576 2 0 t h December 1943 A n g l o -
Americatn D i s c u s s i o n s under A r t i c l e V I I Memo by t h e S e c r e t a r y 
o f S t a t e f o r I n d i a . 
3. Cab 66/47 C a b i n e t Paper WP(44)129 2 3 r d Feb.1944. The 
Washington C o n v e r s a t i o n s : A n A l t e r n a t i v e P o l i c y Memo by 
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r I n d i a . 
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case f o r i m p o r t c o n t r o l s , p r e f e r e n c e s , b i l a t e r a l s t a t e t r a d i n g 
aind t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a c u r r e n c y b l o c , a l l o f w h i c h w o u l d p r o v i d e 
us w i t h t h e ' e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y ' we needed. 
Amery saw one way o f redeeming t h e s t e r l i n g d e b t i n t h e 
r e q u i r e m e n t o f d o m i n i o n s and c o l o n i e s t o buy B r i t i s h i n s t e a d o f 
a l l o w i n g c o n v e r s i o n i n t o a n o t h e r c u r r e n c y . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e r e 
w ould be a system o f b l o c k e d a c c o u n t s and r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
purchases f r o m o u t s i d e t h e a r e a where p r i c e s m i g h t be c h e a p e r . ^ 
For Amery t h e s t e r l i n g d e b t was a way o f k e e p i n g t h e e m p i r e 
t o g e t h e r as an economic b l o c w i t h weakened B r i t i s h c a p i t a l i n 
a g u a r a n t e e d m a r k e t . 
I f t h e y ( s t e r l i n g d e b t s ) a r e t h r o w n o u t s i d e t h e 
m a r k e t t h e y w i l l d e p r e c i a t e t h e v a l u e o f 
s t e r l i n g t o go back on i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e 
( w o u l d mean) t h a t 'American c a p i t a l w o u l d s e i z e 
t h e o p p > o r t u n i t y o f g e t t i n g i n h e r e o r i n t h e 
d o m i n i o n s i n o r d e r t o s e c u r e a s h a r e i n o u r 
e x p a n s i o n . • 
I n t h e e a r l y 1940's b i l a t e r a l i s m a t t r a c t e d s t r o n g s u p p o r t f r o m 
m a j o r f o r c e s o u t s i d e t h e m a c h i n e r y o f t h e War C a b i n e t where i t 
was i n a m i n o r i t y . I t had t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e main p r e s s u r e 
group f o r B r i t i s h c a p i t a l The F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s 
( F . B . I . ) who were u n c o n v i n c e d o f t h e b e n e f i t s o f open t r a d i n g , 
p r e f e r r i n g ' t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n and c o n t r o l o f f o r e i g n t r a d e ' 
a l o n g b i l a t e r a l l i n e s w i t h i m p o r t , exchange and i m p e r i a l 
p r e f e r e n c e . They r e g a r d e d A m e r i c a n m u l t i l a t e r a l i d e a s as t h e 
2 
r o a d t o ' N a t i o n a l b a n k r u p t c y ' . , and wanted a m o n e t a r y p o l i c y 
w h i c h would ' m a i n t a i n p r i c e s a t a f i g u r e a t w h i c h p r o d u c t i o n 
be c a r r i e d on w i t h r e a s o n a b l e p r o f i t and promote s t a b i l i t y i n 
1*, Cab 66/52 C a b i n e t Paper WP(44)368 3 r d J u l y 1944. The S t e r l i n g 
Problem. Memo by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r I n d i a . 
2. R e c o n s t r u e t i o n ; R e p o r t o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h 
I n d u s t r i e s , May 1942, p.9 copy i n Cab 117/199 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
S e c r e t a r i a t F . B . I . R e p o r t s . 
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t h e p r i c e s t r u c t u r e w i t h p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e home m a r k e t ' . ^ 
Elsewhere t h e y t a l k e d o f open t r a d i n g b e i n g d e r i v e d f r o m 
' d o c t r i n a i r e e c o n o m i s t s ' and wondered 
I f you buy a g r i c u l t u r a l goods f r o m a c o u n t r y 
w h i c h makes i t s own i n d u s t r i a l goods where a r e 
you g o i n g t o g e t r i d o f y o u r m a n u f a c t u r e d goods. 
I f t h e r e was t o be s e c u r i t y a t home t h r o u g h t h e 
f u l l employment p o l i c y why n o t e x t e n d t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e t o f o r e i g n t r a d e . ' 2 
I t seemed as i f t h e r i s k s f o r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l were t o o g r e a t . 
They were n o t s h o r t o f c h a s t i s e m e n t f o r t h i s l a c k o f c o u r a g e . 
The 'Economist* wondered w h e t h e r B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y l o s t i t s 
c o m p e t i t i v e s p i r i t ? Why was t h e r e no m e n t i o n o f t h e need f o r 
g r e a t e r t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y ^ h i g h e r p r o d u c t i v i t y o r t h e 
development o f new i n d u s t r i e s ? ^ I n a f u r t h e r a t t a c k on t h e 
se a r c h f o r ' g u a r a n t e e s ' t h e Econ o m i s t warned a g a i n s t ' s o f t 
o p t i o n s ' i n w h i c h l e n d e r s l e n d , d e b t o r s need n o t pay, and where 
t h e U.S- was 'Santa C l a u s ' . A d a p t a b i l i t y t o t h e c h a n g i n g 
t e c h n i c a l and m a r k e t c o n d i t i o n s was what B r i t a i n needed f o r t h e 
p o s t war w o r l d n o t s e c u r i t y a t home and p r o t e c t i o n a b r o a d . The 
s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g c o u l d n o t be p r o t e c t e d . I t w o u l d be 'measured 
4 
by t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y o f i t s p e o p l e ' . 
T h a t t h e F.B.I, was l o o k i n g f o r s e c u r i t y r a t h e r t h a n a 
c o m p e t i t i v e w o r l d market d i d n o t d e t e r t h e C a b i n e t f r o m 
e n t e r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r what i t b e l i e v e d was i n t h e l o n g term 
1- R e c o n s t r u c t i o n : R e p o r t o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h 
I n d u s t r i e s , May 1942, pp. 27-8. copy i n Cab 117/199 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n S e c r e t a r i a t F . B . I . R e p o r t s . 
2. The F u t u r e o f Our E x p o r t T r a d e ; R e p o r t by t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f 
B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s Feb. 1943. p.12 copy i n Cab 117/199 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n S e c r e t a r i a t F . B . I . R e p o r t s . 
3. The Economist June 6 t h 1942. 
4. The Economist Aug. 1 s t 1942. 
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i n t e r e s t s o f B r i t i s h C a p i t a l i s m , w h a t e v e r e x i s t i n g B r i t i s h 
C a p i t a l i s t s m i g h t t h i n k . Many e c o n o m i s t s had moved t o a 
m u l t i i a t e r a l i s t p o s i t i o n i n c l u d i n g key r e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t s i n 
t h e Economic S e c t i o n o f t h e C a b i n e t O f f i c e l e d by L i o n e l 
Robbins. There were however n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n s such as H u b e r t 
Henderson. 
The Bank o f England a l s o a p peared t o be a g a a n s t t h e 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f A r t i c l e V I I " ^ . However t h e y t r i e d t o r a t i o n -
a l i z e t h i s o p p o s i t i o n , t h e r e was no d o u b t t h a t , as spokesman 
f o r t h e Wider C i t y o f London, t h e y f e a r e d a t h r e a t t o f i n a n c i a l 
b u s i n e s s i f t h e r o l e o f s t e r l i n g as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c y 
d e c l i n e d t o a p o i n t a t w h i c h t h e C i t y ' s p o s i t i o n as a w o r l d 
f i n a n c i a l c e n t r e became p r o b l e m a t i c . 
A n o t h e r s t r a n d o f b i l a t e r a l i s m was t h e l a n d e d i n t e r e s t i n 
t h e T ory P a r t y r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e C a b i n e t by R o b e r t Hudson, the 
M i n i s t e r o f A g r i c u l t u r e . They v i e w e d f r e e T rade w i t h s u s p i c i o n 
i f i t l e d t o cheaper f o r e i g n f o o d s u p p l i e s aoid p r e v e n t e d t h e 
k i n d o f s u b s i d y : t h o u g h t n e c e s s a r y f o r home p r o d u c e . The move 
t o w a r d a g r i c u l t u r a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y i n t h e war had l e d t o a 
massive e x p a n s i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n on what was, i n some ca s e s , 
m a r g i n a l l a n d . Hudson t h o u g h t , l i k e a l l b i l a t e r a l i s t s , t h a t t h e 
American p r o p o s a l s w o u l d l e a d t o an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e system o f 
demand and s u p p l y t h r e a t e n i n g i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y , employment 
and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y i n t h e w i d e s t sense. 
1. Prem 4 18/1 A n g l o - A m e r i c a n D i s c u s s i o n s on A r t i c l e V I I 
C h e r w e l l t o C h u r c h i l l 9 t h F e b r u a r y 1944 drew a t t e n t i o n t o 
t h e Banks o p p o s i t i o n . 
2. Cab 66/44 C a b i n e t Paper VP{43)566 1 4 t h December 1943 A n g l o -
American D i s c u s s i o n s u n d e r A r t i c l e V I I : Commercial P o l i c y 
Memo by t h e M i n i s t e r o f A g r i c u l t u r e . 
177 
The b i l a t c r a l i s t v i e w was a l s o s u p p o r t e d by t h e TUC who 
d i d n o t agree t h a t s o l u t i o n s s h o u l d be based on a f r a g i l e 
e x p o r t programme based on ' c u t t h r o a t c o m p e t i t i o n * . I n s t e a d 
p u b l i c r e g u l a t i o n and t h e p l a n n i n g o f f o r e i g n t r a d e was 
e s s e n t i a l . ^ The C o n s e r v a t i v e imperfafjsts p a r t i c u l a r l y 
B e a verbrook, a t t e m p t e d t o b u i l d a c r o s s - p a r t y b r i d g e t o t h e 
Labour P a r t y by i d e n t i f y i n g t h e Americam p r o p o s a l s as a r e t u r n 
2 
t o t h e G o l d S t a n d a r d . The Labour P a r t y had p a r t i c u l a r 
memories o f t h i s f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t i n 1929-31 and t h e i s s u e 
had p r e o c c u p i e d them a t C o n f e r e n c e s s i n c e then."^ They wainted 
t o e l i m i n a t e t h e e x t r a - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v e t o by what were seen 
as n o n - a c c o u n t a b l e , n o n - e l e c t e d , f o r e i g n . . f i n a n c i a l c i r c l e s 
o v e r d o m e s t i c p o l i c y . Labour l e a d e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y B e v i n , 
remembered the way i n w h i c h t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e G o l d P a r i t y 
i n 1924 had l e d c a p i t a l i s t s t o s e a r c h f o r c o s t r e d u c t i o n s 
t h r o u ^ wage c u t s . The g o l d s t a n d a r d was i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
unmanageable and i n e v i t a b l e wage c o n f l i c t between c a p i t a l and 
4 
l a b o u r . T h i s was s o m e t h i n g a t r a d e u n i o n b u r e a u c r a t l i k e 
Sevan a n x i o u s t o b a r g a i n and w i t h memories o f t h e G e n e r a l 
s t r i k e w i s h e d t o a v o i d . The G o l d S t a n d a r d had a l s o meant a 
ne c e s s a r y r e s t r i c t i o n o f c r e d i t t h a t t h r e a t e n e d f u l l employment, 
1 . Report on Employment. (London: Trade Union Congress O c t o b e r 
1944) q u o t e d Amery, L., The Awakeninq:Qur P r e s e n t C r i s i s and 
the Way Out. (London, MacDonald 1948) p.111. 
2. Cab 66/46 C a b i n e t Paper IVP(44)95 9 t h Feb. 1944. A n g l o 
American D i s c u s s i o n s under A r t i c l e V I I Memo by t h e L o r d 
P r i v y S e a l . The C o n s e r v a t i v e i m p e r i a l i s t s had made a more 
f o r m a l a p p r o ach t o t h e Labour HDvement on P r o t e c t i o n i n t h e 
1930*s see Gupta, P.S., I m p e r i a l i s m and t h e B r i t i s h Labour 
Movemebt 1914-64 (London, M a c M i l l a n 1974) pp.68-9. 
3. f o r i n s t a n c e LPCR 1944. 
4. Cab 65/49 C a b i n e t M e e t i n g lvM(45)9 2 5 t h J a n u a r y 1945. 
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i n c r e a s e d i n t e r e s t r a t e s d e s t r o y i n g t h e l a s t p o s t war h o u s i n g 
d r i v e and a b a l a n c e d b u d g e t t h a t had l e d t o c u t s i n s o c i a l , 
s e r v i c e s . Amery and B e a v e r b r o o k a r g u e d t h a t f i x e d exchange 
r a t e s t i e d t o t h e D o l l a r w h i c h was l i n k e d t o GoJd.was i n e f f e c t 
G old S t a n d a r d and t h e p r o p o s e d IMF R u l e s t h a t n o t o n l y a l l o w e d 
a 10^ d e v a l u a t i o n c o n f i r m e d t h i s . ^ A l t h o u g h t h e r e was no 
a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n t o f i x t h e i n t e r n a l p r i c e l e v e l i n d i r e c t 
r e l a t i o n t o the r e s e r v e s , t h e need t o r e c t i f y a d e f i c i t i n a 
s i t u a t i o n when abandoning t h e p a r i t y was e x c l u d e d , made a 
d e f l a t i o n e s s e n t i a l . Any system w h i c h s o u g h t e x t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y 
a t t h e expense o f t h e i n t e r n a l p r i c e l e v e l and t h e e x p a n s i o n o f 
p r o d u c t i o n , t h r o u g h a d e f l a t i o n a r y r e s p o n s e , was a Gold 
S t a n d a r d . 
F i x e d exchange r a t e s a r e c o n d u i t s t h r o u g h 
w h i c h economic i l l s f l o w and s p r e a d a c r o s s ^ 
b o u n d a r i e s s h a c k l i n g t h e weak t o t h e s t r o n g . 
The p r e l i m i n a r y d i s c u s s i o n by o f f i c i a l s i n W a s h i n g t o n on 
t h e a r t i c l e V I I commitments had been summarized i n a r e p o r t 
t o t h e Cabinet."^ The o n l y c o n c e s s i o n t h e U.S. was p r e p a r e d 
t o make was f o r a 1 y e a r T r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d , where we w o u l d be 
a l l o w e d some use o f i m p o r t and exchange c o n t r o l . The b i -
l a t e r a l i s t p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y o f a p p e a l i n g t o C h u r c h i l l ' s 
• i m p e r i a l c o n s c i e n c e ' t h r o u g h Beaverbrook' s many p r i v a t e and 
o f f i c i a l memos and by s t i r r i n g up f e a r s i n L a b o u r M i n i s t e r s 
d i d n o t unnerve t h e m u l t i l a t e r a l i s t f a c t i o n i n t h e C a b i n e t . 
1. Cab 66/47 C a b i n e t Paper WP(44)95 l o c c i t 
2. Amery, The Awakening, p.98. 
3. Cab 66/44 C a b i n e t Paper WP(43)559. 17 December 1943. A n g l o -
American D i s c u s s i o n s under A r t i c l e V I I Memo by M i n i s t e r 
o f S t a t e a t t a c h i n g R e p o r t o f d i s c u s s i o n between . 
U.K. and American o f f i c i a l s . 
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R a ther t h a n be on t h e d e f e n s i v e t h e y mounted a s t r o n g c o u n t e r -
a t t a c k . The M i n i s t e r o f S t a t e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , 
R i c h a r d Law ( l a t e r L o r d C o l e r a i n e ) , had drawn up a paper on 
th e c r u c i a l p r i n c i p l e s and i s s u e s a t s t a k e . ^ H i s p a p e r s o u g h t 
t o undermine t h e b i l a t e r a l i s t a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e i r o p t i o n , 
w o u l d l e a d t o s e c u r i t y t h e r e b y p r o t e c t i n g home r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Law b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e raultilateralist a l t e r n a t i v e c o n t a i n e d 
aJLl t h e n e c e s s a r y s a f e g u a r d s axid made no u n r e a l i s t i c 
a s s u m p t i o n s . 
The p l a i n b l u n t t r u t h t h a t must be f a c e d i s 
t h a t t h e r e i s no m e c h a n i c a l d e v i c e by w h i c h 
we can ensure t h a t t h e r e s t o f t h e w o r l d w i l l 
m a i n t a i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e s e i s l a n d s a t a 
s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g h i g h e r t h a n t h a t w h i c h i t 
i s e n t i t l e d by i t s economic a c t i v i t y . T hat 
w o u l d depend on t h e e n e r g y , s k i l l and p r o d u c t i v i t y 
o f i t s p e o p l e No amount o f w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g 
o r o f H e g e l i a n l o g i c w i l l s o f t e n t h e h a r s h n e s s 
o f t h i s f o r m i d a b l e t r u t h . 2 
He drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f demand 
f o r o u r e x p o r t s abroad w h i c h was g r e a t e r t h a n o u r e l a s t i c i t y 
o f demand f o r i m p o r t s . I n o t h e r words, f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s 
c o u l d do w i t h o u t o u r e x p o r t s more t h a n we c o u l d do w i t h o u t 
t h e i r i m p o r t s . I t t h e r e f o r e f o l l o w e d we had more t o g a i n by 
l i f t i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s and maocimizing w o r l d t r a d e . The r e a l 
p r o b l e m w h i c h s t r u c k at the heart of the b i l a t e r a l i s t case was t h e 
f a c t t h a t 'we d o n ' t s e l l i n t h e same n a r k e t s as we buy', hence 
m u l t i l a t e r a l c l e a r i n g w o u l d be b e n e f i c i a l , e n a b l i n g p u r c h a s e s 
i n one p a r t o f t h e w o r l d t o be o f f s e t by t h e p r o c e e d s o f s a l e s 
i n a n o t h e r . The a l t e r n a t i v e system o f c u r r e n c y b l o c s and 
1. Cab 66/46 C a b i n e t Paper WP(44)81 7 t h F e b r u a r y 1944. The 
Washington C o n v e r s a t i o n s on A r t i c l e V I I Memo by t h e 
M i n i s t e r o f S t a t e . 
2. i b i d . 
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and b i l a t e r a l t r a d e agreements d e s i g n e d t o b a l a n c e p u r c h a s e s 
and s a l e s may have seemed s e n s i b l e i n s o f a r as i t m i g h t seem 
ab s u r d t o buy so much f r o m A r g e n t i n a u n l e s s t h e y b o u g h t f r o m 
us, b u t t o f o r c e m a n u f a c t u r e r s t o p r o d u c e f o r m a r k e t s t h e y had 
p r e v i o u s l y i g n o r e d would p u t them i n a ' s t r a i t jacket' . They 
w o u l d n o t be p r o d u c i n g t h e t h i n g s f o r w h i c h t h e y had a 
c o m p e t i t i v e advantage and a p t i t u d e b u t t h o s e s p e c i f i e d by t h e 
s t a t e f o r c o u n t r i e s we were i m p o r t i n g f r o m . I n t h e l o n g t e r m , 
Law m a i n t a i n e d , o u r b i l a t e r a l p a r t n e r s w i l l want t o p r o t e c t 
t h e i r i n f a n t i n d u s t r i e s s t i m u l a t e d as a r e s u l t o f a l a c k o f 
B r i t i s h m a n u f a c t u r e d e x p o r t s d u r i n g t h e war. Our s o u r c e s o f 
raw m a t e r i a l and f o o d s u p p l y w o u l d t h e n d r y up. For i n s t a n c e 
t h e d e v e l o p i n g Bombay C o t t o n i n d u s t r y was n o t l i k e l y t o a l l o w 
B r i t i s h C o t t o n i n and I n d i a w o u l d go e l s e w h e r e f o r c heaper 
and more a v a i l a b l e c a p i t a l goods i n t h e p r o p o r t i o n she needed 
them. Law n o t e d t h a t o u r e x p o r t s t o i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e 
c o u n t r i e s had a l r e a d y f a l l e n by 1938"^. The l i k e l i h o o d o f o u r 
n e e d i n g f u r t h e r f i n a n c i a l a i d f r o m t h e U.S. meant t h a t we 
sh o u l d n o t encourage by o u r example a w o r l d w i d e s t r u c t u r e o f 
p r o t e c t i o n e q u i v a l e n t t o a d e c l a r a t i o n o f war on the'U.S. 
That w o u l d mean we would be ' d e l i b e r a t e l y o r g a n i s i n g t h e w o r l d 
i n t o r i v a l economic g r o u p i n g s i n w h i c h n o t p r i v a t e e n t r e -
p r e n e u r s b u t p o w e r f u l governments w i l l be t h e p r o t a g a n i s t s . ' 
1. T h i s was a d m i t t e d even by Amery, Only 48.3% ( l e s s t h a n o f 
1938 e x p o r t s went t o e m p i r e see Amery, -The Awakening, p*65^ 
Labour P a r t y a d v o c a t e s o f m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m a r g u e d t h a t i f 
c o u n t r i e s were n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t by t h e e m p i r e t h e y 
w o u l d i n t u r n have more t o spend on o u r e x p o r t s . R.W.G. McKay 
M.P. gave i m p r e s s i v e f i g u r e s . Between 1928-1936 t h e r e " w a s a 
10% i n c r e a s e i n i m p o r t s t o t h e U.K. f r o m t h e e m p i r e and o n l y 
a 5% i n c r e a s e i n e x p o r t s t o t h e e m p i r e . 6 0 % o f f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t m e n t was o u t s i d e t h e e m p i r e . A u s t r a l i a was t r a d i n g more 
w i t h Japan t h a n us and c o u n t r i e s i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g such as 
Malaya, S . A f r i c a and I n d i a w o u l d have l e s s need f o r manufactured 
goods f r o m a b r o a d . McKay, R.W.G. B r i t a i n i n Wonderland, 
(London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z 1948) pp.120-5. 
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Law a rgued we must be w i l l i n g t o l i s t e n t o t h e A m e r i c a n s and 
l o o k t o the l o n g term r a t h e r t h a n c o n c e n t r a t e on g u a r a n t e e s 
f o r a weak e x t e r n a l p o s i t i o n . 
We Ccuinot a p p l y t o o u r e x t e r n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s 
f o r Post war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e p r i n c i p l e we 
have chosen t o a p p l y t o o u r i n t e r n a l 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , namely, t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e 
t r a n s i t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s . 1 
Law was d e v e l o p i n g t h e case t h a t w o u l d be a r g u e d l a t e r by 
m u l t i l a t e r a l i s t s t h a t t h e r i s k s t o r e c o n s t r u c t i o n w o u l d be 
g r e a t e r by ' g o i n g i t a l o n e * t h a n by a g r e e i n g t o U.S. p l a n s w i t h 
t h e p o s s i b l e a i d o f a b r i d g i n g l o a n . 
'Pood, homes, t h e d o m e s t i c programme and any h e l p ( w o u l d 
depend o n ) . . . d i s c u s s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n s o f p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t 
t o t h e Americans.'2 H i s p a p e r went on t o d i s c u s s t h e b i -
l a t e r a l i s t a l t e r n a t i v e s i n d e t a i l . On t h e p r o s p e c t s o f a 
s t e r l i n g b l o c b e i n g c o n t i n u e d t o s h e l t e r B r i t a i n Law was 
s c e p t i c a l . Canada was n o t even i n t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a and i n t h e 
e v e n t o f such a c o n t i n g e n c y w o u l d e r e c t h e r own t a r i f f s - S. 
A f r i c a w o u l d n o t renounce t h e A m e r i c a n s as t h e l a t t e r t o o k h e r 
G o l d w h i l e t h e A u s t r a l i a n s were b u y i n g and s e l l i n g on t h e U.S. 
m a r k e t . As he g r a p h i c a l l y p u t i t ; 'would A u s t r a l i a w i s h t o 
f o r e g o U.S. r e f r i g e r a t o r s and r a z o r s i n o r d e r t o p i l e up a t 
g r e a t f i n a n c i a l r i s k i n London h a r d c u r r e n c i e s w h i l e i t s p e o p l e 
went w i t h o u t . ' 
Law had h i n t e d a t t h e f a t a l f l a w i n t h e d o l l a r p o o l system: 
The n e c e s s i t y f o r c o m p u l s i o n . I n t h e war i t had w o r k e d on a 
1. WP(44)81 l o c . c i t . 
2. W-P(44)81 l o c . c i t . 
3. WP(44)81 l o c . c i t . 
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v o l u n t a r y b a s i s ^ a l l t h e s u r p l u s d o l l a r e a r n i n g s o f c o l o n i e s 
and d e p e n d e n c i e s b e i n g p o o l e d i n London and s p e n t o n l y on 
u r g e n t and a greed needs a f t e r d i s c u s s i o n , . - T r a n s a c t i o n s 
w i t h t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d ^ i n c l u d i n g p u r c h a s e s o u t s i d e t h e s t e r l i n g 
area.were r e g u l a t e d by exchange c o n t r o l . The p r o b l e m now was 
c o u l d we e x p e c t t h e I n d i a n s , t h e E g y p t i a n s and t h e I r i s h t o 
hand o v e r t h e p r oceeds o f t h e i r e x p o r t s t o America- t o t h e U.K. 
T r e a s u r y t o use as we d e t e r m i n e d w h i l e we compensated them 
w i t h i n c o n v e r t i b l e s t e r l i n g w h i c h t h e y c o u l d o n l y spend i n t h e 
B r i t i s h sphere?' What i f t h e y r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t b l o c k e d 
a c c o u n t s o f s t e r l i n g t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t c o n v e r t and c o u l d use 
o n l y t o pay f o r t h e i m p o r t s f r o m us t h a t we c o u l d n o t s u p p l y ? 
Could we i n s i s t t h a t t h e y o n l y c o n v e r t t o t h e e x t e n t t h e y 
e a rned d o l l a r s t o r e p l a c e t h o s e t a k e n f r o m t h e p o o l . 
Whether t h e S t e r l i n g A r e a c o u l d be m a i n t a i n e d i n i t s wartime 
f o r m was dependent on how f a r m e r c a n t i l i s t i m p e r i a J i s m c o u l d 
be imposed. T h a t w o u l d depend on t h e r e t e n t i o n and even t h e 
e x t e n s i o n o f f u l l p o l i t i c a l a j i d r e p r e s s i v e c o l o n i a l i s m i n t h e 
m i d s t o f g r o w i n g N a t i o n a l i s t movements. Such a s t r a t e g y was n o t 
l i k e l y t o appeal t o t h e B r i t i s h Government i n t h e l o n g t e r r a . 
The p o s i t i o n o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , C h u r c h i l l , on t h e w hole 
i s s u e was a m b i v a l e n t : he had y e t t o commit h i m s e l f . H i s 
a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e r o m a n t i c i d e a l o f e m p i r e c o n t r a s t e d w i t h h i s 
a d m i t t e d d i f f i c u l t y i n u n d e r s t a j i d i n g economic i s s u e s . Y e t he 
was wary o f l e t t i n g h i m s e l f f a l l p r e y t o e x p e r t s whose o p i n i o n s 
may have had consequences f o r t h e f u t u r e t h e y and he were n o t 
c o m p l e t e l y aware o f . Such a s i t u a t i o n had s u r r o u n d e d 
C h u r c h i l l ' s d e c i s i o n t o i m p l e m e n t i n 1924 a r e t u r n t o t h e Gold 
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S t a n d a r d a t t h e pre-war p a r i t y . On t h e i s s u e s o f t h e moment 
he was r e c e i v i n g c o n f l i c t i n g a d v i c e . H i s f r i e n d E e a v e r b r o o k 
kept h i s i m p e r i a l c o n s c i e n c e w h i l e h i s s c i e n t i f i c aiide and 
a d v i s o r P r o f e s s o r F r e d e r i c k Lindemann ( L o r d C h e r w e l l s i n c e 1941) 
l o o k e d a f t e r t h e ' f a c t s ' and was g i v e n an i m p o r t a n t r o l e as an 
economic p o l i c y a d v i s e r . ^ C h u r c h i l l t r i e d t o s o l v e h i s 
dilemma by r e f e r r i n g Beaverbrook's . and o t h e r memos to. C h e r w e l l . 
C h e r w e l l p o r t r a y e d b i l a t e r a l i s m as a s y s t e m o f u n r e a l i s t i c 
b a r t e r w i t h n o o n e - t o b a r t e r w i t h . Too many o f o u r p r e - w a r 
2 
t r a d i n g p a r t n e r s were p r o d u c i n g t h e i r own m a n u f a c t u r e d goods. 
The C a b i n e t t h a t met t o d i s c u s s R i c h a r d Law's p a p e r was h e a t e d . 
B e a verbrook c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t t h e f i x i t y o f exchange r a t e s , 
t h e b l o c k s on d e v a l u a t i o n and r e p e a t e d h i s a c c u s a t i o n t h a t t h e 
IMF system meant a r e t u r n t o t h e G o l d S t a n d a r d . F i n a l l y he 
argued we w o u l d be ' t h r o w i n g away t h e e m p i r e ' . The C h a n c e l l o r 
o f t h e Exchequer S i r John Anderson r e p l i e d t h a t l a r g e r 
d e v a l u a t i o n was a l l o w e d and t h e r e l a t i v e f i x i t y was n e c e s s a r y 
i n o r d e r t o a v o i d t h e c o m p e t i t i v e d e v a l u a t i o n s o f 1931. I m p o r t 
and exchange c o n t r o l s w o u l d be a l l o w e d f o r t h e T r a n s i t i o n a l 
p e r i o d ( c o n s t r u e d as one o f s h o r t t e r m b a l a n c e o f payments 
d e f i c i t ) u n t i l we had saved enough g o l d and d o l l a r s f o r o u r 
r e s e r v e s t o make c o n v e r t i b i l i t y f e a s i b l e . C h u r c h i l l s e n s i n g 
t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e C a b i n e t were f o r p r o c e e d i n g a t t h e 
l e a s t w i t h f u r t h e r m u l t i l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s a g r e e d t o l e t them 
1. C h e r w e l l was head o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r ' s S t a t i s t i c a l 
S e c t i o n s t a f f e d by e c o n o m i s t s and s c i e n t i s t s . 
2. Prem 4 18/1 A n g l o American D i s c u s s i o n s on A r t i c l e V I I 
C h e r w e l l t o C h u r c h i l l 9 t h F e b r u a r y 1944. 
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go ahead on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s were k e p t 
v o c a l . ^ B e a v e r b r o o k c o n t i n u e d t o p l y C h u r c h i l l w i t h memos 
2 
d e f e n d i n g t h e p r e f e r e n c e s and C h e r w e l l c o n t i n u e d t o keep t h e 
Prime M i n i s t e r r e a d i n g t h e f a c t s as he saw them. The l a t t e r 
drew a t t e n t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f 
d e v a l u a t i o n w i t h o u t r e t a l i a t i o n , t h e r i s k s o f l o s i n g U.S. c o -
o p e r a t i o n i n any l o a n , and t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m i n k e e p i n g 
I n d i a and t h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n d e p e n d e n c i e s i n a p o s i t i o n where 
t h e y c o u l d n o t use t h e i r e a r n e d s t e r l i n g t o buy f o r e i g n goods.^ 
C h u r c h i l l e v e n t u a l l y drew up a compromise f o r l i m i t e d C a b i n e t 
c i r c u l a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e r e was t o be a move t o w a r d s American 
p r i n c i p l e s p r o v i d i n g t h e r e was 
no f e t t e r i n g o f o u r c o u n t r y d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y 
t o a G o l d S t a n d a r d and no abandonment o f i m p e r i a l 
p r e f e r e n c e u n l e s s o r u n t i l we a r e i n t h e p r e s e n c e 
o f a v a s t scheme o f r e d u c i n g t r a d e b a r r i e r s i n 
w h i c h t h e U.S. i s t a k i n g a l e a d . ^ 
The compromise was a n e a t one. A v i c t o r y f o r t h e b i -
l a t e r a l i s t s w o u l d have i m p l i e d a d r a m a t i c c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h 
t h e U.S. o v e r a key p a r t o f Postwar p l a n n i n g a t a t i m e when 
U.S. Lend Lease a i d was v i t a l and t h e o p e n i n g o f a second f r o n t 
i n Europe on D.Day was, w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l A merican p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
a few months away. The C h a n c e l l o r drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e 
c o n t r a c t u a l n a t u r e o f p o l i c y m a k i n g i n t h i s f i e l d . I f we had 
1. Cab 65/41 C a b i n e t m e e t i n g VvM(44)18 1 1 t h F e b r u a r y 1944; 
see a l s o same m e e t i n g f u l l d e t a i l s i n Cab 65/45 
C o n f i d e n t i a l Annexe. 
2. Prem 4 17/10 o p p o s i t i o n t o I n t e r n a t i o n a l M onetary P o l i c y : 
Beaverbrooke t o C h u r c h i l l 2 4 t h Feb. 1944. 
3- Prem 4 17/10 un d a t e d C h e r w e l l t o C h u r c h i l l on B e a v e r b r o o k e s 
F e b r u a r y C a b i n e t Paper lvP(44)95 l o c . c i t . 
4.,- Cab 66/47 C a b i n e t Paper V;P(44)145 3 r d March 1944. 
D i s c u s s i o n s under A r t i c l e V I I N o t e by t h e Prime M i n i s t e r . 
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r e j e c t e d t h e U.S. p r o p o s a l s we w o u l d t h e n have r e c e i v e d Lend 
Lease on f a l s e p r e t e n c e s and they i n t u r n w o u l d p r o b a b l y b r e a k 
t h e i r p r o m i s e t o us i n A r t i c l e V I I t h a t we w o u l d i n c u r no p o s t -
war d e b t s ( a s i n 1918) as a consequence o f war a i d . ^ The 
government c o u l d c e r t a i n l y p r e d i c t t h a t h a v i n g r e j e c t e d 
American p r o p j o s a l s i t would f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t , i f n o t i m p o s s i b l e , 
t o n e g o t i a t e any p e a c e t i m e l o a n t o r e p l a c e l e n d l e a s e , t h e 
n e c e s s i t y o f w h i c h was soon t o be p r e s s e d by Keynes. 
The weakness o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e b i l a t e r a l i s t s l a y n o t 
o n l y i n t h e i r m i n o r i t y p o s i t i o n i n C a b i n e t b u t t h e i r i n a b i l i t y 
t o m a i n t a i n t h e c o a l i t i o n o f p r e s s u r e g r o u p s o r t o p e n e t r a t e 
any p o l i t i c a l p a r t y on a s c a l e s u f f i c i e n t t o d e t e r m i n e p o l i c y ; 
p r e v i o u s s u p p o r t e r s d e f e c t i n g t o t h e m u l t i l a t e r a l i s t camp. 
T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e case w i t h t h e Labour movement and 
key Labour member o f t h e c o a l i t i o n . T h e i r c o n s i s t e n t c o n c e r n 
had been a b o u t s e c u r i t y and t h e n e c e s s i t y o f p r o t e c t i n g 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Y e t t h e y began t o s i d e w i t h m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m 
p r i n c i p a l l y because i t seemed t o p r o m i s e t h e b e s t o f b o t h 
w o r l d s w i t h g u a r a n t e e s f o r t h e s h o r t r u n w h i c h was r o u g h l y 
e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e R e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d . The 
m u l t i l a t e r a l i s t o p t i o n , i t seemed, w o u l d g i v e B r i t a i n t h e 
b e n e f i t s o f open t r a d i n g w i t h o u t t h e i m m e d i a t e p e n a l t i e s 
f a l l i n g on a N a t i o n t h a t f a i l e d t o i m p r o v e i t s c o m p e t i t i v e 
p o s i t i o n i n t i m e . Such a p r o m i s e a l s o e v e n t u a l l y l e d t o a more 
s y m p a t h e t i c l i n e b e i n g t a k e n t o m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m by t h e 
F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s . The l i f t i n g o f immediate 
, p e n a l t i e s was l a r g e l y due t o t h e s u c c e s s f u l n e g o t i a t i o n o f 
:e 
a 
^' ?Q2/PO^I Committee on Commercial P o l i c y Paper 1 9 t h SqDtembe 
1944 Post War Commercial P o l i c y Memo by t h e C h a n c e l l o r . 
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' t r a o i s i t i o n a l s t a g e * when p r o t e c t i o n i s t d e v i c e s c o u l d be used. 
T h i s p o l i c y 'space' p r o v i d e d t h e g u a r a n t e e s r e q u i r e d . The 
b i l a t e r a l i s t s by p o i n t i n g t o t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f B r i t i s h 
c a p i t a l i n an u n b r i d l e d m u l t i l a t e r a l r e g i m e had n o t l o s t a l l . 
They had pushed t h e C a b i n e t t o w a r d s a m i d d l e p o s i t i o n w h i c h 
i n v o l v e d a s t r a t e g y c o n d i t i o n a l l y a c c e p t i n g t h e A m e r i c a n 
p r o p o s a l s so l o n g as d e f l a t i o n a r y r e s p o n s e s t o a b a l a n c e o f pay-
ments c r i s i s c o u l d be a v o i d e d , a t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d o f 
p r o t e c t i o n c o u l d be g u a r a n t e e d and to r e m o v a l or r e d u c t i o n i n 
imperiaLl p r e f e r e n c e s would be matched by a s i m i l a r movement i n 
U.S. t a r i f f s . 
As i t t u r n e d o u t t h e i n c l u s i o n o f t h e A m e r i c a n t a r i f f i n 
t h e Commercial n e g o t i a t i o n s made f r e e m u l t i l a t e r a l t r a d e 
d i s c u s s i o n s a l o n g drawn o u t p r o c e s s . They began i n Geneva i n 
1947, and were n o t f u l l y c o m p l e t e d u n t i l t h e Kennedy r o u n d i n 
1967.'^ Mamy o f t h e key p r e f e r e n c e s and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s 
would as a r e s u l t c o n t i n u e t o be o p e r a t i v e t h r o u g h o u t t h e p e r i o d 
2 
o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and i n t o t h e 1950's. The l e n g t h o f t h e 
t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d was i m p o r t a n t i n so f a r as i t i n d i c a t e d 
w hether the Americans w o u l d f o r c e a dash f o r c u r r e n c y 
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y sooner o r l a t e r . U n l i k e t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e 
removal o f p r e f e r e n c e s t h e removal o f i n c o n v e r t i b i l i t y w o u l d 
have im m e d i a t e e f f e c t s on government economic p o l i c y and t h e r e -
f o r e on t h e i m m e d i a t e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n programme. The B r e t t o n 
Woods C o n f e r e n c e h e l d i n t h e summer o f 1944 ^ f i n a l l y a g r e e d a 
1. See Gardner S t e r l i n g - D o l l a r D i p l o m a c y pp.356-380 
2. i b i d p.360 
3. i b i d p.121. 
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t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d o f 5 y e a r s w i t h s p e c i a l r i g h t s t o c o n t i n u e 
i t a f t e r t h i s . Even a t t h e end o f a 5 y e a r t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d 
t h e I.M.P. c o u l d o n l y p r o pose r e m o v a l i n e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s . The r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t M i n i s t e r s had t o c o n s u l t t h e 
Fund a f t e r 3 y e a r s w h i c h e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n s had a g r e e d .''"was 
2 
a l t e r e d t o 5 a t B r e t t o n Ivoods. The F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h 
I n d u s t r i e s began t o warm t o m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m w i t h i t s p o s s i b l e 
d e v a l u a t i o n f l e x i b l y o f f e r i n g t h e p r o s p e c t o f i n s t a n t compet-
i t i v e n e s s . They a l s o l i k e d t h e i d e a o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l s t a g e 
and hoped i t c o u l d be lengthened.'^ 
4 
E a r l y i n 1945 t h e C a b i n e t met t o d e c i d e on t h e n e x t move. 
The C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer s u g g e s t e d a d e b a t e i n the 
Commons when t h e government w o u l d a r g u e t h a t t h e r e was n o t h i n g 
dangerous t o o u r i n t e r e s t s and t h a t p r o g r e s s i v e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n 
w o u l d be o u r g o a l now t h a t we had a c h i e v e d t r a n s i t i o n a l s a f e -
g u a r d s . The C a b i n e t d i s a g r e e d , i t wanted t o see w h e t h e r t h e 
i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e American Government as t o how B r e t t o n Woods 
w o u l d be a p p l i e d were g o i n g t o be m o d i f i e d by t h e l i n e t h e y tcck. 
w i t h t h e i r own l e g i s l a t u r e , t h e Congress. T h i s was deemed 
e s s e n t i a l b e f o r e making a f i n a l r ecommendation t o P a r l i a m e n t . 
1 . J o i n t S t a t e m e n t by E x p e r t s on t h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an IMF 
Onnd. 6519 (London H.M.S.O..April 1 9 4 4 ) . 
2. A r t i c l e s o f Agreement - UN C o n f e r e n c e a t B r e t t o n Woods 
Grand 6546 (London H.M.S.O. J u l y 1 9 4 4 ) . 
3. I n t e r i m R e p o r t o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s 
on t h e F i n a l A c t o f t h e UN Mo n e t a r y and F i n a n c i a l 
C o n f e r e n c e . November 1944 IN Prem 4 17/14 IMF D i s c u s s i o n . 
4. Cab 65/49 C a b i n e t M e e t i n g ,WM(45)9 2 5 t h J a n u a r y 1945. 
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B e v i n q u e s t i o n e d w h e t h e r t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s were 
f o r l o n g enough. He wanted 8 y e a r s r a t h e r t h a n 5 and hoped 
t h a t t h e i d e a o f s t a b l e exchanges w o u l d n o t l e a d us i n t o having 
t o adopt t h e s o r t o f d e f l a t i o n a r y r e m e d i e s w h i c h v/ould o n l y 
a g g r a v a t e any unemployment we had. We s h o u l d n o t have t o ask 
p e r m i s s i o n f r o m o u t s i d e o u r b o r d e r s f o r t h e r i g h t t o d e v a l u e . 
C a u t i o n was s t i l l t h e wa t c h w o r d f o r t h e C o a l i t i o n . F u r t h e r 
d e c i s i o n on t h e American p r o p o s a l s r e m a i n e d suspended u n t i l 
t h e whole i s s u e became i n s e p a r a b l y l i n k e d w i t h B r i t a i n ' s 
i m m e d i a t e f i n a n c i a l p r o b l e m . 
The n a t u r e o f t h i s p r o b l e m was a p r e d i c t e d b a l a n c e o f pay-
ments d e f i c i t o c c a s i o n e d by t h e l o s s o f r e s e r v e s a j i d t h e s a l e 
o f o v e r s e a s i n v e s t m e n t s . T h i s had been i n t e n s i f i e d by a 
d e c l i n i n g income f r o m i n v i s i b l e s , t h e s t e r l i n g d e b t and t h e 
l o s s o f o u r d o l l a r e x p o r t m a r k e t s , p r i n c i p a l l y i n S. Ame r i c a , 
as a consequence o f i n a b i l i t y t o s u p p l y d u r i n g t h e war. The 
l e a d i n g s e c t i o n s o f b o t h p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s knew even b e f o r e 
t h e e v e n t u a l c a n c e l l a t i o n on VJ day t h a t t h e U.S. government 
was n o t l i k e l y t o c o n t i n u e l e n d l e a s e f o r t h e T r a u i s i t i o n a l 
p e r i o d . The C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer had i n f o r m e d t h e 
C o a l i t i o n t h a t t h e Americans n o t o n l y f a i l e d t o r e a l i z e o u r 
p o s i t i o n and o u r need f o r l e n d l e a s e f o r a t i m e a f t e r t h e war 
b u t were g o i n g t o i n s i s t on b e i n g p a i d f o r e v e r y t h i n g i n cash . 
T h i s he sai.d was l a r g e l y a f u n c t i o n o f p o l i t i c s i n t h e U.S. 
where t h e S e r v i c e D e p a r t m e n t s were a n x i o u s t o r e d u c e e x p e n d i t u r e 
and a v o i d t h e c h a r g e o f extravag^mce d u r i n g r e c o n v e r s i o n . I n 
the s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s we w o u l d have t o p u t up a good case f o r a 
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new assistance."^ As a r e s u l t o f t h e i r v i c t o r y a t t h e e l e c t i o n 
t h a t case w o u l d have t o be p u t by a Labour Government whose 
M i n i s t e r s had been most a n x i o u s t o s a f e g u a r d and i n s u l a t e 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n w h i l e members o f t h e c o a l i t i o n . The c o n t i n u i t y 
o f t h e i r s t a n c e on t h e i s s u e , w h i c h amounted t o moderate and 
c o n d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m w o u l d depend on how 
much o f th e B r e t t o n Woods b a r g a i n c o u l d be r e t a i n e d i n any 
n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a l o a n and how f a r t h e y c o u l d manage t h e b i -
l a t e r a l i s t s i n t h e i r own P a r t y b o t h i n P a r l i a m e n t and i n t h e 
C a b i n e t . U l t i m a t e l y , as we s h a l l see, such management p r o v e d 
f e a s i b l e because t h e b i l a t e r a l i s t s t h e m s e l v e s d i d n o t w i s h t o 
push t h e i r p o i n t s and u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e i r a l t e r n a t i v e i n v o l v e d 
as many i f n o t more p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l c o s t s t h a n a n y t h i n g 
t h a t was b e i n g n e g o t i a t e d . 
SECTION I V : SHORTENING THE SHORT RUN : THE AMERICAN LOAN 
I t i s now r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e e c o n o m i s t J . M. Keynes came 
n o t o n l y t o have t h e o r e t i c a l i n f l u e n c e on B r i t i s h economic 
p o l i c y b u t a l s o a r o l e i n t h e making o f p o l i c y t h r o u g h t h e 
a d v i c e he gave on f i n a n c i a l m a t t e r s d u r i n g and a f t e r the war 
and by b e i n g e n t r u s t e d by t h e Labour Government w i t h 
n e g o t i a t i o n s i n Washington. I n h i s e a r l i e r a d v i c e , he had given 
lukewarm s u p p o r t t o t h e u t i l i z a t i o n o f b i l a t e r a l i s t p r a c t i c e s 
w i t h o u t a p p e a r i n g t o be c o m p l e t e l y a g a i n s t t h e A m e r i c a n 
p r o p o s a l s . O p t i m i s m on t h e e x p o r t p r o s p e c t s i n a s e l l e r s 
m a r k e t w i t h w e s t e r n Europe d e v a s t e d and Germany and Japan 
1. Cab 66 / 5 2 - C a b i n e t Paper WP(44)360 1 s t J u l y 1944. Our 
Overseas Resources and L i a b i l i t i e s . Memo by t h e C h a n c e l l o r 
o f t h e Exchequer. 
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e f f e c t i v e l y removed from the c o m p e t i t i v e p r o c e s s was r e f l e c t e d 
i n h i s d e s i r e t h a t any n e c e s s a r y peacetime l e n d l e a s e o r 
br i d g i n g loan should be r e j e c t e d i f i t i n v o l v e d terms which 
encroached on our f i n a n c i a l independence. I t s h o u l d be on our 
terms not t h e i r s * I f not, and the Americans, i n s i s t e d on 
imposing on us t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic system, then we 
should go i t alone, even i f t h i s meant: *a postponement of much 
tha t the p u b l i c has been l e d to ex p e c t * . ^ 
T h i s i m p l i e d t h r e a t to r e c o n s t r u c t i o n d e r i v e d from Keynes 
r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t b i l a t e r a l i s m would not n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d to a 
high standard of l i v i n g : i t was no ' s o f t o p t i o n ' . A f t e r the 
war the s i t u a t i o n would be d i f f e r e n t , but 
The f i n a n c i a l problems of the war have been 
surmounted so e a s i l y and so s i l e n t l y t h a t the 
average man sees no reason to suppose t h a t 
the f i n a n c i a l problems of the peace w i l l be 
any more d i f f i c u l t ... f o r the supply departments 
the T r e a s u r y provided ... and money was no o b j e c t 
... That s u c c e s s i s the g r e a t e r o b s t a c l e to 
g e t t i n g the problems o f peace a c c e p t e d . ^ 
More or l e s s a year l a t e r Keynes moved i n t o h o s t i l i t y to b i -
l a t e r a l i s m . Some of the r e a s o n s f o r t h i s cam be gleaned from 
h i s memo c i r c u l a t e d to members o f C h u r c h i l l ' s p r e - e l e c t i o n 
c a r e t a k e r C a b i n e t . ^ The s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t s were now the e x t e n t 
to which b i l a t e r a l i s m c r e a t e d d i s s o n a j i c e w i t h the ideolo g y of 
c a p i t a l i s m , a f e a r of U.S. r e t a l i a t i o n and the p o s s i b l e t r a n s -
l a t i o n of d i s a p p o i n t e d e x p e c t a t i o n s over r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n t o 
s o c i a l u n r e s t . The consequences o f ' e t a t i s t e b i l a t e r a l i s m * as 
1. Cab 66/52 12th June 1944 E x t e r n a l F i n a n c e i n the 
T r a n s i t i o n Memo by Keynes a t t a c h e d to CheLncellors paper 
WP(44)360 l o c . c i t . . 
2. i b i d . 
3. Cab 66/65 Cab i n e t Paper WP(45)301 15th May 1945 Overseas 
F i n a j i c i a l P o l i c y i n Stage 11 Memo by Keynes. 
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he now c a l l e d i t , i n v o l v e d the continuance of war r a t i o n i n g 
aind c o n t r o l s more s t r i n g e n t than the p r e s e n t f o r up to 5 y e a r s , 
and a system of t r a d i n g ' i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the r e s t o r a t i o n of 
f r e e e n t e r p r i s e . * T h i s was because i t i n v o l v e d i n c r e a s i n g 
the power of the s t a t e , r e d u c i n g e x p o r t e r s and i m p o r t e r s to 
agents i n a Foreign Trade p l a n who would soon see i t as 
u n p r o f i t a b l e p u l l i n g out and l e a v i n g a s t a t e monopoly i n t r a d e 
'somewhat on the Russian model'. He noted t h a t b i l a t e r a l i s m 
was advocated by 'near communists' and i t would r e s u l t i n 
American 'wrath'. The U.S. would persuade those n o n - c o l o n i a l 
members of the s t e r l i n g a r e a i n W. Europe and the Middle E a s t 
to r e f u s e to f a l l i n w i t h us. The consequences f o r 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a breakdown i n n e g o t i a t i o n s amd the un-
a v a i l a b i l i t y of a d o l l a r c r e d i t would be p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l 
d i s r u p t i o n and even s t a r v a t i o n . Rather than ' r e t i r e as R u s s i a 
d i d between the wars to s t a r v e and r e c o n s t r u c t he hoped the 
Americans c o u l d be persuaded to g i v e a generous and j u s t loan 
making i t p o s s i b l e to p a r t i c i p a t e i n arrangements 'which we 
o u r s e l v e s p r e f e r ' . Although he f e l t t h i s would a l l o w 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n without the very s e r i o u s c o s t s i n v o l v e d i n an 
a u t a r k i c s o l u t i o n he n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n s i d e r e d t h a t our 
acceptance should not be u n c o n d i t i o n a l . I f the o f f e r was not 
s u f f i c i e n t l y generous or i n v o l v e d s t r i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s we 
should be w i l l i n g to 'keep a l i v e the d i s a g r e e a b l e , indeed the 
d i s a s t r o u s a l t e r n a t i v e , without, however, d i s g u i s i n g from our-
s e l v e s i t s t r u e c h a r a c t e r . ' Ke a l s o hoped he c o u l d get a l o a n 
without having to go back on the good b a r g a i n we got a t 
B r e t t o n Woods. The 'sweet b r e a t h of j u s t i c e between p a r t n e r s ' 
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could win out."^ As Keynes found l a t e r i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s t h i s 
was not to be the c a s e but he never c o n s i d e r e d b i l a t e r a l i s m as 
anything more than a b a r g a i n i n g c o u n t e r and l a t e r on spoke of 
the nonsense of a: 
se p a r a t e economic b l o c which excluded Cajiada and 
c o n s i s t s of c o u n t r i e s to which we a l r e a d y owe 
more than we can pay, on the b a s i s of t h e i r a g r e e i n g 
to l e a s e us money they have not got and buying only ^ 
from us and one another goods we are unable to supply. 
I t was the Labour government,however,that had to take the 
c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n . K e y n e s began to draw gloom a s soon a s they 
took o f f i c e . I n the same week a s the Japanese war .ended and 
le n d l e a s e was ab r u p t l y brought to am end Keynes s e n t h i s memo 
to the C a b i n e t v i a the C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer on the coming 
' F i n a n c i a l Dunkirk*.^ I f b i l a t e r a l i s t s thought t h a t the aim of 
p o l i c y should be to p r o t e c t the R e s e r v e s f o r a s e c u r e 
m e r c a n t i l i s m Keynes s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e r e would soon be no 
r e s e r v e s to p r o t e c t * A f t e r n o t i n g t h a t the s a l e o f American 
investments, and the l o s s of shipping had reduced i n v i s i b l e 
e a r n i n g s by 30% which amounted to d i s i n v e s t m e n t , he d e s c r i b e d 
how the export trade had been run down because of the war so 
that v i s i b l e e x p o r t s were a t "^/lOths o f t h e i r 1938 l e v e l . 
Export production had been s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d as manpower and 
m a t e r i a l s had s h i f t e d to the war e f f o r t . Wartime l e n d l e a s e , 
the s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s , the s a l e of a s s e t s and the running down 
of r e s e r v e s had enabled us to put a l l our p r o d u c t i v e r e s o u r c e s 
1. WP(45)301 Memo by Keynes, l o c . c i t . 
2. Speech i n House of Lords 18th December 1945 quoted B a r t l e t t , 
C.J., A H i s t o r y of Post War B r i t a i n 1945-75. (London, 
Longmans 1977) p.25. 
3. Cab 129/1 Cabinet Paper CP(45)112. 14th August 1945 
Our Overseas F i n a n c i a l Problems . An A p p r e c i a t i o n by Keynes. 
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i n t o m u n itions, and to spend abroad and import without 
e q u i v a l e n t s being given i n exchange. The war had mecint a 
d i s t o r t e d system of supply and an overdependence on U.S. 
imports, 
Keynes drew a t t e n t i o n to a weakness i n the b i l a t e r a l i s t 
c a se l i n k e d to the argument he put e a r l i e r , i n the c o n t e x t of 
the c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r the maintenance of a s t e r l i n g a r e a 
i n a form b e n e f i c i a l to B r i t a i n , i . e . the n e c e s s a r y r e l a t i o n s 
of c o e r c i o n . Keynes drew a t t e n t i o n to the massive o v e r s e a s 
m i l i t a r y and i m p e r i a l e x p e n d i t u r e . He was c h a l l e n g i n g the b i -
l a t e r a l i s t s on the c o s t s of t h e i r e s s e n t i a l l y c o l o n i a l i s t 
s t r a t e g y . They argued t h e r e was s e c u r i t y i n i m p e r i a l i s m . Keynes 
drew a t t e n t i o n to the c o s t o f d e f e n d i n g t h a t s e c u r i t y i n a 
per i o d of home r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
How v i v i d l y do departments and m i n i s t e r s r e a l i z e 
the gay and s u c c e s s f u l f a s h i o n i n which they 
undertake l i a b i l i t i e s a l l over the world ajid s l o p 
out money to the u n f o r t u n a t e r e p r e s e n t s a v a s t 
o v e r p l a y i n g of our hand the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of which 
w i l l come to am end and i n the near f u t u r e u n l e s s 
we o b t a i n a new source o f a s s i s t a n c e . ^ 
Keynes then went on to d e t a i l f i g u r e s on the p r o s p e c t i v e debts 
and balance of payments d e f i c i t over the y e a r s of the T r a j i s -
i t i o n . M i n i s t e r s should a c c e p t t h a t the economic b a s i s f o r 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n was absent w i t h o u t a massive expansion o f exports, 
a c u t i n o v e r s e a s expenditure and U.S. a i d . Keynes hoped we 
could get a gr a n t r a t h e r than a lo a n and suggested the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f o f f e r i n g the Americans bases and p a c i f i c i s l a n d s ^ 
1. CP(45)112 l o c . c i t . 
2. Bevan took up t h i s i d e a and suggested C h r i s t m a s I s l a n ^ i . 




U n l e s s t h e s e p o i n t s were r e c o g n i z e d t h e r e would have to be 
a u s t e r i t y worse tham the war, w i t h the b e s t hopes o f the 
government postponed• 
The top labour m i n i s t e r s met and agreed to adopt a 
n e g o t i a t i n g s t a j i c e i n which the l o a n would be put a s a c o n d i t i o n 
f o r any c o n c e s s i o n s on commercial policy."^ Key m i n i s t e r s agreed 
t h a t the l e n g t h of the T r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d d u r i n g which c o n t r o l s 
would be o p e r a t i v e should not be f i x e d i n advaoice but should 
2 
be dependent on our c i r c u m s t a n c e s . By October 1945 i t became 
apparent from Keynes t e l e g r a p h s from Washington t h a t the i d e a 
of a Grant with no s t r i n g s a t t a c h e d was out of the q u e s t i o n as 
f a r as the Americans were concerned.^ Even i f the n e g o t i a t o r s 
had agreed to i t t h e r e was no p r o s p e c t of g e t t i n g i t through a 
Congress s u s p i c i o u s of p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e and a n x i o u s f o r t a x 
r e d u c t i o n s . The C a b i n e t d e c i d e d to t e l l Keynes to inform the 
U.S. t h a t the government would keep the t r a n s i t i o n a l s a f e g u a r d s 
and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n f o r a longer p e r i o d u n l e s s they agreed to a 
4 
Grant. Keynes r e p l i e d t h a t the U.S. were now i n s i s t i n g not 
only on a loan with i n t e r e s t but of t y i n g i t to the c u r r e n c y 
and commercial p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s by f o r c i n g Bri-tain- to determine 
i t s f i n a l a t t i t u d e to B r e t t o n Woods.^ Dal ton proposed the 
government agree to t h i s so long as the U.S. agreed to a c c e p t 
our d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t nothing i n the f i n a l a c t would r e q u i r e us 
to adopt an i n t e r n a l d e f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c y a t a time of unemplov-
ment, an obvious reminder to the Americans and the Labour 
1. Prem 8/35 F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1945 Meeting of M i n i s t e r s 3 1 s t August 1945. 
2. i b i d 14th September 1945. 
3. i b i d 5th October 1945. 
4. i b i d 26th October 1945. 
5. i b i d Keynes r e p l y 28th October 1945. 
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b i l a t e r a l i s t s of the e a r l i e r guarantee of d e v a l u a t i o n r i g h t s . ^ 
2 
A f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n took p l a c e on the 6 t h November. Dal ton 
repeated the d e v a l u a t i o n r i g h t s and the guarantee of a 
t r a i n s i t i o n p e r i o d of * s e v e r a l y e a r s d u r a t i o n ' and th a t we 
would determine i t s l e n g t h . S h i n w e l l the M i n i s t e r of Fuel , 
l e a d i n g the b i l a t e r a l i s t s i n the Cabin e t ^ a r g u e d t h a t i t was 
f o l l y to break up the s t e r l i n g a r e a . He advocated g e t t i n g 
tough with the Americans on the assumption t h a t they needed 
our massive market to s e l l i n so they would not make t h i n g s 
too d i f f i c u l t f o r us. Aneurin Bevan, the Health M i n i s t e r , and 
A l b e r t Alexander, the F i r s t Lord of the Adm i r a l t y , supported 
him. There was however, a weakness i n S h i n w e l l ' s argument 
con c e r n i n g the dependence of U.S. e x p o r t e r s on the U.K. market. 
T h i s was not, a t l e a s t i n the s h o r t run, r e a l . A f t e r a l l 
there was no shortage of i n t e r n a t i o n a l demand, and w i t h a l l 
o t h e r major e x p o r t e r s out of commission, American e x p o r t s 
could e a s i l y be dropped on o t h e r markets a t the a s k i n g p r i c e . 
E r n e s t Bevin although upset a t d i c t a t i o n by the U.S., thought 
the l e f t ' s a l t e r n a t i v e i n v o l v e d a s k i n g the B r i t i s h people to 
endure more a u s t e r i t y than needed. S h i n w e l l conceded the 
p o i n t , but thought o f a p p e a l i n g to the people i n another 
General e l e c t i o n . That s u g g e s t i o n was not d i s c u s s e d . Dalton 
drew the p i c t u r e of a b i l a t e r a l i s t B r i t a i n l i v i n g on bread 
and potato r a t i o n s , a l a c k o f timber f o r housing and a 
shortage of raw m a t e r i a l s f o r p r o d u c t i o n . M o r r i s o n , i n the 
1. Cab 129/4 C a b i n e t Paper CP(45)270 6 t h November 1945 
Washington F i n a n c i a l T a l k s Note by C h a n c e l l o r . 
2. Cab 128/4 C a b i n e t meeting GM(45)50 6th November 1945. 
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absence of A t t l e e , summed up the m a j o r i t y view. The loan would 
give us b r e a t h i n g space to b u i l d up our export t r a d e . 
The n e c e s s i t y of b u i l d i n g up the e x p o r t t r a d e was 
c o n t i n u a l l y being pushed by dominamt l a b o u r m i n i s t e r s and was 
j u s t i f i e d on r e c o n s t r u c t i o n grounds r a t h e r than on any 
c o m p e t i t i v e l o g i c . An export d r i v e was n e c e s s a r y to the e x t e n t 
to pay f o r i n c r e a s e d imports of food and raw m a t e r i a l s t h a t 
would be n e c e s s a r y to c a r r y f u l l employment. F u l l employment 
could a l s o be maintained through the i n c r e a s e d consumption of 
the masses made p o s s i b l e by extended s o c i a l s e c u r i t y , the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e s and a d o u b l i n g o f r e t i r e m e n t 
pensions. Y e t to p o s i t such immediate consumption l e v e l s was 
to assume t h a t home production would p r o v i d e f o r i t v i a a 
m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t . Yet with very l i t t l e c a p a c i t y to spare, 
given the demands of p h y s i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n aind the housing 
programme, p l u s the r e s o u r c e s and men s t i l l being tciken by the 
armed f o r c e s , the investment n e c e s s a r y f o r any import 
s u b s t i t u t i o n t h a t was p o s s i b l e would take time. I f import 
s u b s t i t u t i o n was not p o s s i b l e then the only a l t e r n a t i v e was to 
expand e x p o r t s c i n d t h a t meant c a p t u r i n g new markets by com-
p e t i t i v e s e l l i n g . The b i l a t e r a l i s t system of having r e s e r v e d 
markets f o r c e r t a i n e x p o r t e r s would not a c h i e v e the i n c r e a s e d 
150% of the 1938 l e v e l thought n e c e s s a r y . There was a l s o am 
i n h e r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n the b i l a t e r a l i s t wish to export non-
e s s e n t i a l s to o t h e r c o u n t r i e s y e t p r e v e n t i n g i m p o r t s of the 
same. U l t i m a t e l y the l o g i c seemed to p o i n t towards a B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t i n m u l t i l a t e r a l trade i n the long term. I n the mean-
time the Loam would guaramtee the purchase of the n e c e s s a r y 
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imports. 
The Americans having obtained the f i r s t v i c t o r y by 
a l t e r i n g the r e q u e s t f o r a grant i n t o a c c e p t a n c e o f a l o a j i w i t h 
i n t e r e s t moved foovard to e x t r a c t f u r t h e r c o n c e s s i o n s . Dal ton 
o u t l i n e d the new American p r o p o s a l s , and summed them up as 'a 
money l e n d e r ' s c h a r t e r ' r e q u i r i n g the i m p o s i t i o n o f an a u d i t 
on the s t a t e o f our r e s e r v e s * . The Americans were now demanding 
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y f o r a l l c u r r e n t e a r n i n g s i n c l u d i n g those of the 
s t e r l i n g a r e a and the r e l e a s e of the s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s by the 
beginning of 1947. Our T r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d , i t seemed was 
being eaten away. They were proposing t h a t by the end of 1946, 
d o l l a r and s t e r l i n g r e c e i p t s from c u r r e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s of a l l 
s t e r l i n g a r e a c o u n t r i e s had to be ' f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r c u r r e n t 
t r a n s a c t i o n s i n ajiy c u r r e n c y a r e a w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n * w i t h 
the r e s u l t t h a t any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a r i s i n g from the d o l l a r -
s t e r l i n g pool would end. T h i s would ensure f o r them t h e i r 
o b j e c t i v e of b r e a k i n g up the s t e r l i n g a r e a and encouraging such 
c o u n t r i e s to use t h e i r d o l l a r s to buy American i n s t e a d of from 
each ot h e r . Quantitative import c o n t r o l s and exchange r e g u l a t i o n s 
guaranteed f o r the T r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d would now have to end 
1 2 i n December 1946. Key m i n i s t e r s met i n s e c r e t s e s s i o n . A l l 
were angry a t the c u t i n the T r a j i s i t i o n p e r i o d of 5 - 1 y e a r . 
Dal ton even went so f a r as to suggest c a l l i n g a h a l t to 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . C r i p p s d i s a g r e e d and a consensus was reached 
when Sevan suggested t r y i n g to appeal to the Americans :to t h i n k 
again. N e v e r t h e l e s s the Americans stood f i r m . Dalton next t o l d 
1. Prem 8/35 F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1945. Paper 23rd November 1945. 
F i n a n c i a l T a l k s Memo by Dalton. 
2. Cab 78/37 Gen 89/6 Meeting of M i n i s t e r s 23rd November 1945. 
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the f u l l C a b i n e t t h a t ' i x was the b e s t we can hope for'.*^ The 
2 
f u l l C a b i n e t d i s c u s s e d the p o s i t x o n a day l a t e r . S h i n w e l l saw 
the p r o p o s a l s a s : 
inc o m p a t i b l e with the s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n o f 
a planned economy 
amd repeated the argument c o n c e r n i n g the n e g o t i a t i n g weapon of 
our own l a r g e i n t e r n a l market. Bevan l e n t support to S h i n w e l l * s 
argument t h a t they amd the non-inner C a b i n e t should have more 
time to c o n s i d e r the p r o p o s a l s which had been l a r g e l y negotiated 
with key m i n i s t e r s . Y e t the m a j o r i t y were f o r proceeding along 
the l i n e s of the Dalton memo. Dalton next proposed t h a t i n 
consequence of the American c o n d i t i o n s the loa n document be 
t i e d to the B r e t t o n Woods Agreements B i l l s i n c e to gain member-
s h i p of the IMF a b i l l had to be passed b e f o r e the 3 1 s t 
December. T h i s pr o p o s a l ensured t h a t the Loam Agreement c o u l d 
not be delayed as the l e f t wanted."^ A s m a l l e r committee on 
which t h e i r presence was excluded approved the d r a f t b i l l and 
a u t h o r i s e d arrangements to rush i t through the Commons. The 
Americans were s t i l l s t a n d i n g f i r m on the t r a m s i t i o n p e r i o d 
and again the Ca b i n e t d i s c u s s e d whether n e g o t i a t i o n s should be 
broken o f f . Dalton argued the loan would be the e q u i v a l e n t o f 
p a r t of the p r e v i o u s l y agreed l a r g e r t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d e n a b l i n g 
1. Cab 129/5 C a b i n e t Paper CP(45)312 28th November 1945. 
Washington F i n a n c i a l T a l k s Note by C h a n c e l l o r . 
2. Cab 128/4 Ca b i n e t Meeting CM(45)57 29th November 1945. 
3. Cab 129/5 Ca b i n e t Paper CP(45)319 30th November 1945 
Bre t t o n Woods Agreements B i l l Memo by C h a n c e l l o r . 




to r e h a b i l i t a t e our i n d u s t r y and t r a d e and a t 
the same time make some improvement i n the 
s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g o f our people 
without the loan t h e r e would have to be c u t s i n food r a t i o n s , 
tobacco and raw m a t e r i a l s ? the l a t t e r c a u s i n g unemployment i n 
many i n d u s t r i e s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the l a b o u r i n t e n s i v e t e x t i l e s 
which r e l i e d i n p a r t on U.S. c o t t o n ) . We should t r y to get . 
them to grant a 2 y e a r t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d but i f not we c o u l d 
not break o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s . S h i n w e l l s a i d the l e n g t h of the 
t r a n s i t i o n d i d not matter as f a r as he was concerned he was 
prepared to accept h a r d s h i p s i n the s h o r t term but l i k e Bevan 
would not p r e s s h i s o b j e c t i o n s . We had based our o r i g i n a l 
p o l i c y on an approach to the Americans and we had to go on."*" 
The U.S. n e g o t i a t o r s s t u c k to a one y e a r p e r i o d but made the 
c o n c e s s i o n of one y e a r a f t e r Congress had r a t i f i e d , which, 
given the a n t i p a t h y to the l o a n shown by the b u s i n e s s o r i e n t a t e d 
Congress, would be some time.^ 
A t t l e e signed the agreement on the 6th December and then 
committed the government to a debate from which the r e s u l t 
would have to be YES and w i t h i n lO days be f o r e C h r i s t m a s . 
I n the white paper, Dalton p r e s e n t e d the n e g o t i a t i o n s to 
the p u b l i c as though the U.S. had g i v e n us the l o a n to h e l p 
towards our immediate d e f i c i t thereby a s s i s t i n g us to e n t e r the 
m u l t i l a t e r a l system.^ I n f a c t , we had been f o r c e d to undertake 
1. Cab 126/4 Cabinet meeting GM(45)58 3rd December 1945, 
and OM(45)59 5th December 1945. 
2. Congress d i d not agree u n t i l J u l y 15th 1946, so the 
e f f e c t i v e date f o r the end of the t r a n s i t i o n was J u l y 
15th 1947. An e f f e c t i v e p e r i o d of 18 months from B r i t i s h 
r a t i f i c a t i o n i n December 1945. 
3. F i n a n c i a l Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. Cmnd. 
6708 (London, H.M.S.O. Dec. 1945) para.3. 
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a more s w i f t commitment to the l a t t e r than t h a t e n v i s a g e d by 
the c o a l i t i o n i n order to get the l o i i n . T h i s was c e r t a i n l y the 
way the U.S. a d m i n i s t r a t i o n argued to Congress. Congress was 
1 2 t o l d by the c h i e f n e g o t i a t o r C l a y t o n and by P r e s i d e n t Truman , 
that the loa n would a c h i e v e the more speedy removal of t r a n s -
i t i o n a l c o n t r o l s than the B r e t t o n Woods Agreement had provided 
f o r . C l a y t o n in p a r t i c u l a r , d i s l i k e d the more p e r m i s s i v e 
arrangements n e g o t i a t e d by White, who he c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a 
'New d e a l e r ' . He had ensured the s t r i n g s a t t a c h e d to the l o a n 
were t i g h t enough to commit the U.K. government on a s p e c i f i c 
3 
t i m e t a b l e . Apparently C l a y t o n was g e t t i n g l e t t e r s from U.S. 
c a p i t a l i s t s , i n the form of the N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of 
Manufacturers and Chambers of Commerce, t h a t t h e i r support f o r 
the IMF funding was c o n d i t i o n a l on g e t t i n g a q u i c k e r break i n 
I m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e s , the d o l l a r p o o l and import and exchange 
c o n t r o l s . The U.S. p r e s s was c o n s t a n t l y r e - i t e r a t i n g t h a t the 
loan should not st r e n g t h e n the B r i t i s h Empire and t r a d i n g b l o c . 
Congressmen argued they should not be asked to shore up 
B r i t i s h ' s o c i a l i s m a t home and i m p e r i a l i s m abroad'. C l a y t o n 
argued back t h a t the a b o l i t i o n of the d o l l a r p o o l would mean 
th a t s t e r l i n g a r e a c o u n t r i e s would no lo n g e r have t h e i r earnings 
f r o z e n and p a i d i n e i t h e r s t e r l i n g debt o r goods from B r i t a i n 
but would have c o n v e r t i b l e r i g h t s which meant p u r c h a s e s on any 
goods they l i k e d . Another j u s t i f i c a t i o n g i v e n was t h a t the 
proceeds of the loan to B r i t a i n would be bound to be spent on 
U.S. goods s i n c e the p r o s p e c t i v e d e f i c i t was a d o l l a r d e f i c i t . 
1. Gardner, S t e r l i n g - D o l l a r Diplomacy p.196. 
2. i b i d p.245. 
3. i b i d p.196. 
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As f o r the t r a n s i t i o n a l quantitative import control^ operated 
v i a a Quota l i c e n c i n g system these would be quantitative 
r e s t r i c t i o n s f o r balance of payments d e f i c i t not a qualitative 
or d i s c r i m i n a t i n g p r o t e c t i o n t h a t s e l e c t e d out s o u r c e s o f supply. 
So i f imports of U.S. tobacco were r e s t r i c t e d so would the 
Rhodesiaji s u b s t i t u t e . A r t i c l e 9 of the l o a n agreement only gave 
consent to S t a t e Trading and bulk purchase i f i t was i n the 
cheapest market and was i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether a n y t h i n g was 
exported i n exchange. The b i l a t e r a l i s t i m p e r a t i v e whereby A 
bought from B because B bought from A was e f f e c t i v e l y removed. 
Congress was a l s o promised t h a t the lo a n would not be used 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to pay o f f s t e r l i n g debts: e i t h e r d i r e c t l y 
by u s i n g the proceeds o f the lo a n o r i n d i r e c t l y by e x p o r t i n g to 
c o u n t r i e s who expected nothing save the c a n c e l l a t i o n o f an lOU. 
The loan agreement r e q u i r e d the U.K. government to block the 
s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s by w r i t i n g some o f f ( d e f a u l t i n g ) , funding 
them i n longer term g i l t edged s t o c k , o r g e t t i n g the governments 
concerned (many of them poor c o u n t r i e s l i k e Egypt and I n d i a ) to 
r e l e a s e them by agreement. T h i s l a s t p o s s i b i l i t y never r e a l l y 
went f u r t h e r than w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g a s many b i g debt h o l d e r s 
r e f u s e d to ' w r i t e o f f a cent*."^ Here, ag a i n , our l a c k of 
c o e r c i v e power over the s t e r l i n g a r e a prevented a reduction 
of debt j u s t a s i t prevented the b i l a t e r a l i s t s from extending 
I t 
I n December, 1945, the Commercial P o l i c y White Paper was 
ready^ and together w i t h the l o a n agreement was debated over 2 
1. Dalton, H., High Tide and A f t e r : .Memoirs 1945-60 (London, M u l l e r 1962) p.73. 
2. Pr o p o s a l s f o r C o n s i d e r a t i o n by an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Trade and Employment Cmnd.6709. (London, H.M.S.O. Dec. 1945. 
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days i n Pa r l i a m e n t ^ . T h i s l a t t e r document s t a t e d the agreed 
m u l t i l a t e r a l o b j e c t i v e s and made p r o p o s a l s about n e g o t i a t i o n s 
f o r am end to trade b a r r i e r s , p r e f e r e n c e s , quantitative 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , s u b s i d i e s amd s t a t e t r a d i n g . These p r i n c i p l e s 
were q u a l i f i e d by the n o n - d e f l a t i o n a r y guaramtee and the U.S. 
quid-pro quo on t a r i f f s . 
'^he p o i n t made i n the debate was t h a t t h e s e were not 
o p e r a t i v e commitments but only commitments to e n t e r i n t o d i s -
c u s s i o n s on the b a s i s o f p r o p o s a l s i n the White Paper. A r t i c l e 
7 s a i d only we were o b l i g e d to 'enter i n t o arramgements f o r 
ending*, There was to be no immediate abandonment o f the 
p r e f e r e n c e system only a commitment to b a r g a i n and the White 
Paper was to be a b a s i s f o r d i s c u s s i o n . We seemed to be f r e e 
to judge any p r o p o s a l s t h a t emerged from the c o n f e r e n c e on 
t h e i r m e r i t s . T h i s p o i n t was made by C r i p p s i n the debate to 
i l l u s t r a t e the government's s u c c e s s i n o b t a i n i n g p o l i c y 'space' 
i n which to manoeuvre.^ Here we see the j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f the 
s h o r t term w i t h i t s p o l i c y 'space* and long term commitments. 
Our hands i t seemed were t i e d f o r the long term. While i n the 
immediate p e r i o d we c o u l d r e t a i n the p r e f e r e n c e s ! we n e v e r t h e -
l e s s agreed to a l l the main p o i n t s i n the o b j e c t i v e s . We c o u l d 
h a r d l y t h e r e f o r e defend the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s ' o f the p r e f e r e n c e s 
given such agreement. Although the p r o c e s s o f n e g o t i a t i n g the 
ev e n t u a l e l i m i n a t i o n of p r e f e r e n c e s would . — 
1. H.C. Deb Vol.417 C o l s 422-558 12th December 1945. Anglo-
American F i n a n c i a l D i s c u s s i o n s and C o l s 641-739 13th 
December 1945. 
2 . i b i d Col 490-493 12th December 1945. 
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be a lengthy one, a d e f i n i t e u n d e r t a k i n g or i n i t i a l s t e p was 
takcru by which we agreed t h a t no p r e f e r e n c e s s h o u l d be 
i n c r e a s e d and no new p r e f e r e n c e s should be i n t r o d u c e d on f u r t h e r 
c l a s s e s of goods.^ But although t h i s t i e d our hands so t h a t no 
i n c r e a s e i n i m p e r i a l p r o t e c t i o n would be p o s s i b l e i n the i n t e r i m , 
e x i s t i n g p r e f e r e n c e s c o u l d c o n t i n u e to operate u n t i l n e g o t i a t e d 
away. That was a c o n s i d e r a b l e advantage f o r a f i x e d term 
government anxious to operate i n the s h o r t term. 
The b i l a t e r a l i s t s l a s t and r a t h e r d e s p e r a t e a t t a c k on the 
m u l t i l a t e r a l package was on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds. I n t h i s 
they s a i d they had ' r i g h t ' on t h e i r s i d e to the e x t e n t t h a t the 
i s s u e had never been put to the e l e c t o r a t e . No P a r t y had 
d i s c u s s e d i t i n the r e c e n t e l e c t i o n and t h e r e were only vague 
h i n t s i n the m a n i f e s t o s . V o t e r s c o u l d h a r d l y be expected, even 
i f they wished, to have r e g i s t e r e d t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s w i t h the 
absence of i n f o r m a t i o n . The 1945 e l e c t i o n had been fought 
maiinly on domestic i s s u e s . The b i l a t e r a l i s t s f e l t c h eated. 
Although there had been debates on p r i n c i p l e s and a s f a r back 
as May 1944 when the i n i t i a l A r t i c l e V I I d i s c u s s i o n s were 
reported, a t each stage i t was s t a t e d t h a t P a r l i a m e n t would not 
be approving amy t h i n g only a g r e e i n g to approve papers t h a t were 
the b a s i s f o r d i s c u s s i o n , or, as i n the c a s e of the May 1944 
debate, ' p r o v i d i n g a s u i t a b l e f o u n d a t i o n f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h a view to improved monetary c o - o p e r a t i o n after 
1. The 1947 G e n e r a l Agreement on Trade and T a r i f f s (G.A.T.T.) 
l i m i t e d the r i g h t s of s i g n a t o r i e s to i n c r e a s e p r e f e r e n c e 
margins or i n t r o d u c e new ones. But even a f t e r t h i s a 
s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n of the p r e f e r e n c e s remained, see 
Gardner, S t e r l i n g - D o l l a r Diplomacy pp,356-60. 
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the war'^. I n what was to be the f i n a l debate on the q u e s t i o n 
which the government saw as a n e c e s s a r y r a t i f i c a t i o n , the Tory 
b i l a t e r a l i s t s , l e d i n the absence of Amery by Robert Boothby, 
argued t h a t the Commons had not been g i v e n a f u l l o p p o r t u n i t y 
f o r d i s c u s s i o n : the f a c t t h a t the lo a n and the B r e t t o n Woods 
B i l l were t i e d and had t h e r e f o r e to go together meant t h e r e was 
'a f l a g r a n t breach of u n d e r t a k i n g ' ^ . 
The e v e n t u a l vote i n P a r l i a m e n t r e f l e c t e d the u s u a l P a r t y 
d i s c i p l i n e w ith accompanying C a b i n e t s o l i d a r i t y . Bevan, 
S h i n w e l l and Alexander voted w i t h the government a l o n g w i t h the 
bulk of the Labour P a r t y . The m a j o r i t y of the NO votes came 
from Tory i m p e r i a l i s t s . The o f f i c i a l -^ory o p p o s i t i o n l e d by 
C h u r c h i l l and Anderson a b s t a i n e d l a r g e l y f o r t a c t i c a l r e a s o n s 
and the d e s i r e to demonstrate to the p u b l i c t h a t they f e l t they 
c o u l d have done b e t t e r than l a b o u r i n o b t a i n i n g terms f o r the 
loa n . The handful of S o c i a l i s t b i l a t e r a l i s t s t h a t voted 
a g a i n s t , most notably the young Michael Foot and B a r b a r a C a s t l e 
were more than compensated by backbench l e f t w i n g e r s v o t i n g w i t h 
the government i n c l u d i n g the m i l i t a n t a n t i - A m e r i c a n Denis P r i t t 
ancl W i l l i G a l l a g h e r the Communist M.P. The l a t t e r thought the 
loan gave us a b r e a t h i n g space i n which to b u i l d up our assets'^. 
S t r a i g h t a f t e r t h i s vote a second r e a d i n g was g i v e n to the 
Br e t t o n Woods Agreement B i l l which approved the p r o v i s i o n a l 
arrangements f o r our j o i n i n g the IMF and our f i n a n c i a l 
s u b s c r i p t i o n s . The government and the speaker r e f u s e d a debate. 
1. P a r l i a m e n t agreed to Cmnd 6519 l o c . c i t . Without a vote 
H.C. Deb Vol.399 Col.2046 l O t h May 1944. Debate on 
Monetary P o l i c y . 
2. H.C. Deb Vol.417.Col.741. 13th December B r e t t o n Woods 
Agreements B i l l . 
3. i b i d Col.556 
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They were t o l d t h a t the p r e v i o u s debate had r e s o l v e d the i s s u e 
. . - 1 of p r i n c i p l e . 
The ambivalent a t t i t u d e of the l e f t b i l a t e r a l i s t s towards 
the loan meant t h a t the l a b o u r government had l i t t l e to f e a r 
from i n t e r n a l d i s c o n t e n t on the i s s u e . I t had defended i t as 
the e q u i v a l e n t of a t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d , e n a b l i n g us to have 
the b e n e f i t s of d o l l a r t r a d e w i t h o u t i t s c o s t s . The l e f t began 
to r e a l i z e t h a t t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n a l t e r n a t i v e would r e q u i r e a 
regime i n which c o n d i t i o n s would be such t h a t , as Jenny Lee 
put i t , 
our people who had s u f f e r e d so much a l r e a d y would 
s u f f e r even more^ 
T h i s i s the reason why many back bench labour M.P.s 
sympathetic to planned t r a d e d i d not push t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to 
a vote a g a i n s t t h e i r own government. The l o a n and the T r a n s -
i t i o n a l p e r i o d seemed to p r o v i d e the excuse not to plan e x t e r n a l 
trade and y e t a c h i e v e enough i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y to be a b l e to 
proceed w i t h r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h i s c o u l d a l s o take p l a c e without 
having to pay f o r Lend L e a s e which would o t h e r w i s e f a l l a s a 
post war debt. Dalton l a t e r c a p t u r e d the mood of h i s c o l l e a g u e s 
and most of the Labour movement a t t h i s time when he spoke of 
the l i k e l y consequences of f o r e g o i n g the l o a n . These, i n c l u d e d 
the b r e a k i n g of e l e c t i o n promises, going 'deeper i n t o the dark 
v a l l e y of a u s t e r i t y ' ^ worse than a t any time i n the war w i t h 
l e s s food, few c i g a r e t t e s and heavy ajid guowing unemployment 
i n many i n d u s t r i e s and the near f u t u r e as 'black as a p i t .4 
1. H.C. Deb. Vol.417 C o l s . i 7 4 0 - 7 4 1 . 
2. i b i d Col.671. 13th December 1945 Anglo-American F i n a n c i a l 
D i s c u s s i o n s Debate. 
3. Dalton, High Tide and A f t e r pp.84-5. 
4. i b i d , p . 8 7 . 
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CONCLUSION, 
I f t h e l o a n and the t r a o i s i t i o n p e r i o d (however s h o r t ) had 
p r o v i d e d t h e p o l i c y 'space* w h i c h t h e government c o u l d use f o r 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o s u b m i t t o t h e i m m e d i a t e b l a s t 
o f open t r a d i n g , t h a t space had been so s h o r t e n e d i n t h e l o a n 
n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l move f o r t h e government was now 
t o use t h a t t i m e t o p r e p a r e f o r e n t r y i n t o t h e system n e g o t i a t e d 
f o r t h e l o n g t e r m . Even b e f o r e t h e war i t was becoming d i f f i c u l t 
t o b a l a n c e t h e f o r e i g n a c c o u n t w i t h o u t l i q u i d a t i n g f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t m e n t s and d r a i n i n g o u r r e s e r v e s - There was a l s o g r a d u a l l y 
s h r i n k i n g income f r o m i n v i s i b l e s . I n a d d i t i o n i n t e r n a l 
p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y , i f n o t d e s t r o y e d as much as h o u s i n g , had 
been o v e r u s e d i n t h e war. These f a c t o r s a l l i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
t h e r a t e o f a c c u m u l a t i o n needed t o be s t e p p e d up. I t w o u l d 
a l s o be n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v i d e f o r f u l l employment and an i n c r e a s e d 
l e v e l o f i m p o r t . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s l o g i c , r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y s h o u l d have been t h e v i t a l t a s k f o r t h e 
t r a n s i t i o n - a t r a n s i t i o n i n t o t h e new n e g o t i a t e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economic o r d e r . An o u t l i n e o f t h e n e c e s s a r y measures had been 
p l a n n e d by D a l t o n w h i l e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Board o f Trade i n t h e 
C o a l i t i o n . I n o r d e r t o promote e x p o r t s and e f f i c i e n c y i t was 
su g g e s t e d t h a t a s p e c i a l p r i o r i t y f o r exp>orts i n l a b o u r and 
raw m a t e r i a l a l l o c a t i o n s s h o u l d be g i v e n w i t h b e t t e r 
d e p r e c i a t i o n a l l o w a n c e s t o encourage a f a s t e r r e - e q u i p m e n t r a t e , 
r e l i e f on p l o u g h e d back o r u n d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s and c o m p u l s o r y 
1. Walker, G., Economic P l a n n i n g by Programme and C o n t r o l i n 
Gr e a t B r i t a i n , (London, Heinemann 1 9 5 7 ) . T a b l e 4.p.106. 
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r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . " ^ The home m a r k e t s c l a i m f o r raw m a t e r i a l s 
and f a c t o r y space s h o u l d be k e p t as l o w 'as h e a l t h and m o r a l e 
p e r m i t ' . ^ The Board o f Trade s t r e s s e d i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y 
as t h e o n l y way t o a c h i e v e t h e n e c e s s a r y c o m p e t i t i v e p r i c i n g . 
T h i s w o u l d r e q u i r e the e x t e n d e d use o f new p l a i n t and m a c h i n e r y 
and t h a t meant a c h i e v i n g the h i g h r a t e o f a m o r t i z a t i o n p r a c t i c e d 
i n t h e U.S. I n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y and o u t p u t was t h e o n l y 
way t o m a i n t a i n f u l l employment and h i g h wages; t h e c o s t o f 
l a b o u r becoming t h e r e b y a d i m i n i s h i n g p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e v a l u e 
o f t h e o u t p u t . The r e p o r t n o t e d , t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f p r o d u c t i o n 
c o s t s r e p r e s e n t e d by wages had i n c r e a s e d . ^ The Board o f Trade 
had drawn a t t e n t i o n t o t h e need f o r c o n c e n t r a t e on e x p o r t s 
e f f i c i e n c y and c a p i t a l r e - e q u i p m e n t a t t h e e a r l i e s t o p p o r t u n i t y 
r a t h e r t h a n c o u n t i n g on a p e r i o d o f p r o t e c t i o n w h i c h w o u l d 
n o t g i v e t h e i n c e n t i v e f o r i n v e s t m e n t o r t h e d e v elopment o f 
new p r o d u c t s . T h i s a t t a c k on t h e t h e n p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o s i t i o n 
o f ' l e a d i n g i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' i t had c o n s u l t e d w i t h was based 
on a r e a d i n g o f t h e f u t u r e s t a t e o f w o r l d m a r k e t s . W i t h t h e 
p r o s p e c t o f new i n d u s t r i e s w o r l d w i d e , t h e r e - i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n 
o f Germany aind JapaJi> and t h e g r o w t h o f i n d u s t r y i n t h e t h i r d 
w o r l d , t h e B r i t i s h s t a t e s h o u l d h e l p p r o v i d e t h e g e n e r a l 
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t w o u l d e n s u r e t h e a d a p t i o n o f o u r m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
1. Cab 87/14 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committee ( s u b - c o m m i t t e e on 
Post war I n d u s t r i a l Problems and E x p o r t s ) Paper 8 t h 
J u l y 1944. Measures t o promote e x p o r t s and i n d u s t r i a l 
e f f i c i e n c y memo by t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Board o f T r a d e . 
2. Cab 87/14 l o c . c i t Paper 1 2 t h September 1944 E x p o r t 
P o l i c y i n t h e T r a n s i t i o n P e r i o d Memo by t h e P r e s i d e n t 
o f t h e Board o f Trade. 
3. Cab87/3 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Problems Committee Paper 1 5 t h 
June 1943. R e p o r t on t h e Recovery and t h e P r o m o t i o n 
o f t h e E x p o r t T r ade. ''*emo by t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Board 
o f Trade and t h e S e c r e t a r y f o r Overseas Trade. 
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base. The p a s t had o f f e r e d a l a r g e income f r o m f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t m e n t , and a l a r g e number o f m a r k e t s f r e e f r o m i n d u s t r i a l -
i z a t i o n . These were ' w a s t i n g a s s e t s * . I f we c o u l d a c h i e v e 
t h e 'American s t a n d a r d o f e f f i c i e n c y (we c o u l d ) o n B r i t i s h 
wages, l o o k f o r w a r d t o t h e f u t u r e w i t h some c o n f i d e n c e . B u t i f 
we f a i l , we c a n n o t . * ^ T h e o r e t i c a l l y t h e l o a n had g i v e n us t h e 
f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e t o pay f o r i m p o r t s and had r e d u c e d t h e 
immed i a t e u n c e r t a i n t y s u r r o u n d i n g s u p p l y , e n a b l i n g a c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
on t h e improvement o f t e c h n i q u e . Thus t i m e had been g a i n e d f o r 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g . The c o n t r a d i c t i o n l a y i n t h e f a c t t h a t such 
a d j u s t m e n t s were made l e s s l i k e l y by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e immediate 
c o m p e t i t i v e n e c e s s i t y f o r them had been r e d u c e d i n t h e 
t o l e r a t i o n o f a ' t r a n s i t i o n a l s t a g e ' o f p r o t e c t i o n d u r i n g w h i c h 
a i n y t h i n g c o u l d happen. 
, 1. Cab 87/14 l o c . c i t . Paper 2 3 r d June 1944. Po s t War EjqDorts 
Memo by t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Board o f T r a d e . 
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INTRODUCTION 
I n p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s we o u t l i n e d t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r 
s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e c e n t r a l i t y o f h o u s e b u i l d i n g and t h e 
machi n e r y d e v i s e d t o g i v e i t p r i o r i t y . I n t he l a s t c h a p t e r we 
i n t r o d u c e d a w i d e r c o n t e x t i n t o t h e a n a l y s i s by r e l a t i n g t h e 
i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l economy t o i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t . We 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t as a s t r u c t u r e d 
f r a m e w o r k ^ i n t h e sense t h a t i t s e t up c e r t a i n c o n s t r a i n t s o r 
p o s s i b l e c o n s t r a i n t s by v i r t u e o f i t b e i n g a c o m p e t i t i v e system 
where p r o d u c e r s o f c o m m o d i t i e s w i t h i n s t a t e s were a n x i o u s t o 
h o l d o n t o and e x t e n d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s e x t e r n a l l y . We w i t n e s s e d 
t h e c o n f l i c t between p o l i t i c i a n s a j i x i o u s t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r n a l 
f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l by p r e s e r v i n g and e x t e n d i n g t h e a r r a y o f 
s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l s , t h e r e b y h o p i n g t o remove c o n s t r a i n t s ^ a n d t h o s e 
c o m m i t t e d t o a d a p t i n g t h e i n t e r n a l t o t h e e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t 
r a t h e r t h a n t h e r e v e r s e . B a r g a i n e d agreements were made w h i c h 
enatled c o n t r o l s o v e r t h e e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t t o be r e t a i n e d f o r 
t h e s h o r t term w h i l e t h e y w o u l d be abandoned i n t h e l o n g t e r m . 
These b a r g a i n s r e g u l a t e d t h e terms and t h e t i m i n g o f r e - e n t r y 
i n t o t h a t c o m p e t i t i v e framework. W i t h i n t h a t n e g o t i a t e d space 
two p o t e n t i a l c h o i c e s were a v a i l a b l e t o Government. They c o u l d 
use t h e t r a n s i t i o n space i n o r d e r t o plain on t h e b a s i s t h a t i t 
w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y be removed o r t h e y c o u l d r e s t , c o n t e n t t o 
purs u e t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i c i e s w h i c h t h e r e m o v a l o f i m m e d i a t e 
c o n s t r a i n t made p o s s i b l e . 
We a r e n o t y e t i n a p o s i t i o n t o s p e c i f y o r e v a l u a t e t h e 
c o u r s e u n d e r t a k e n . The purpose o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o see what 
l i g h t casi be thr o w n on t h e i r c h o i c e f r o m t h e n a t u r e o f t h e 
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i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a c h i n e r y f o r d e c i s i o n 
making, 'while i n C h a p t e r 3 we l o o k e d a t w a r t i m e d e c i s i o n making 
f o r a m a j o r p e a c e t i m e p r i o r i t y programme, we now l o o k a t 
s t r u c t u r e s and c o n t r o l s d e v i s e d t o r e l a t e programmes o r g o v e r n -
ment a c t i v i t i e s i n a way t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s a t t h e t i m e 
t h o u g h t would a c h i e v e ' c o - o r d i n a t i o n ' . C o - o r d i n a t i o n can be 
d e f i n e d as an a t t e m p t t o o r d e r and f i t d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s o r 
p a r t s o f a whole so t h a t each complements t h e o t h e r and f u n c t i o n s 
i n terms o f o b j e c t i v e s d e f i n e d f o r t h e w h o l e . The. 
n a t u r e o f t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s c a n n o t a l w a y s be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e 
s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e d e c i s i o n msOcers t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s i s because 
these s t a t e m e n t s m i g h t o n l y r e v e a l r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s f o r what 
they were d o i n g - a t t e m p t s t o r e n d e r them c o n s i s t e n t i n a f o r m 
o f words w i t h o b j e c t i v e s h e l d d e s i r a b l e f o r what t h e y s h o u l d be 
d o i n g . T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l o u t l i n e amd a n a l y s e b o t h t h e m a c h i n e r y 
and t h e a s s u m p t i o n s b e h i n d t h e a t t e m p t t o p l a n . 
Given t h e p o t e n t i a l c h o i c e s a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e t r a n s i t i o n 
p e r i o d t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a d e t e r m i n e d commit-
ment t o adapt t h e i n t e r n a l economy t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l com-
p e t i t i v e framework can.be p r e s e n t e d , i . e . c o m p e t i t i o n t h r o u g h 
c o s t and p r i c i n g , d e g r e e s o f l a b o u r m o b i l i t y , i n d u s t r i a l and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n v e s t m e n t , i n s h o r t y a r e - o r d e r i n g o f 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n commitments and p r i o r i t i e s i n o r d e r t o maximise 
t h e e x p o r t programme. But a l t h o u g h a t t e n t i o n t o t h e ' s u p p l y s i d e ' 
would appear t o be i m p e r a t i v e i n economic p o l i c y t h e r e was no 
mechanism a t t h e p o l i t i c a l l e v e l t h a t g u a r a n t e e d t h a t i t d i d 
become t h e key o b j e c t i v e f o r p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n makers. The 
c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t h a t t h e p l a m n i n g m a c h i n e r y 
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d e v i s e d and i t s accompanying a s s u m p t i o n s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d a 
p o s i t i o n whereby * s u p p l y s i d e * o b j e c t i v e s become c o n f l a t e d t o 
t h e p r o b l e m o f managing demand and r e g u l a t i n g s c a r c i t i e s f o r 
th e c o n t i n u a n c e o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r i o r i t i e s . I t was t h e s e 
p r i o r i t i e s and t h e i r m ix t h a t c r e a t e d t h e s c a r c i t i e s i n 
th e f i r s t p l a c e . Any a l t e r a t i o n i n t h e mechanism o f t h e 
m a c h i n e r y c o u l d n o t by i t s e l f b r i n g f o r t h r e v i s e d o b j e c t i v e s 
a l t h o u g h i t m i g h t make i t more p o s s i b l e t o i n s e r t d i s c u s s i o n on 
them more f r e q u e n t l y . Any * c o r p o r a t i s t ' m a c h i n e r y d e v i s e d t o 
i n c r e a s e i n f o r m a t i o n and r e p r e s e n t t h e p r o b l e m s o f i n t e r e s t e d 
p a r t i e s t o t h e government w o u l d n o t o f i t s e l f l e a d t o change. 
The o p e n i n g up o f chamnels o f access a l w a y s seemed t o be p r o n i s e d 
on the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e government c o u l d t h e r e b y r e - i n f o r c e 
g i v e n p r i o r i t i e s r a t h e r t h a n a l l o w them t o be changed. 
SECTION I ; THE MACHINERY FOR CO-ORDINATION. 
A t f i r s t s i g h t t h e i n t e r n a l p l a n n i n g a p p a r a t u s l o o k e d 
i m p r e s s i v e . ^ On t h e m i n i s t e r i a l s i d e t h e r e was t h e L o r d 
P r e s i d e n t ' s C o m m i t t e e ^ r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o - o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e home 
f r o n t i n war, now g i v e n t h e r o l e o f k e e p i n g u n d e r r e v i e w ' t h e 
t r e n d o f o u r economic d e v e l o p m e n t * . I t s n u c l e u s , t h e I n d u s t r i a l 
Sub-Committee on w h i c h key economic m i n i s t e r s s a t , was renamed i n 
2 
1946 t h e M i n i s t e r i a l Committee on Economic P l a n n i n g (M.E.P.) . 
I t ' s b r i e f was t o c o n s i d e r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s s u e s t p r o b l e m s o f 
1. Even more i m p r e s s i v e i f we a c c e p t t h e c l a i m s o f t h e c h i e f 
c o - o r d i n a t o r h i m s e l f , see M o r r i s o n , H., 'Economic P l a n n i n g ' 
P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Vol.XXV.No.1. S p r i n g 1947. pp.3-9. 
2. Cab 129/1 C a b i n e t Paper CP(45)110 i 3 t h A u g u s t 1943. S t a n d i n g 
M i n i s t e r i a l Committees. Note by t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r , see a l s o 
Cab 129/1 C a b i n e t Paper CP(46)176 2 3 r d A p r i l 1946. M i n i s t e r i a l 
Committee on Economic P l a n n i n g : C o m p o s i t i o n and Terms o f 
R e f e r e n c e . Note by S e c r e t a r y o f t h e C a b i n e t (S.W.Edward 
B r i d g e s ) and Cab 71/27 L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee ( I n d u s t r i a l 
Sub-Committee) 1 5 t h September 1945. C o m p o s i t i o n and Terms o f 
Reference Note by S e c r e t a r y o f t h e C a b i n e t . 
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i n d u s t r i a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g , r e v i e w t h e e x p o r t t r a d e and e n s u r e a 
b a l a n c e d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n d u s t r y . An a n a l y s i s o f i t s r e c o r d s 
shows t h a t i t h a r d l y d i s c u s s e d t h e f i r s t t h r e e a t a l l . The 
a r c h i v e s i n d i c a t e i t s p e n t most o f i t s t i m e d i s c u s s i n g v e r y 
s p e c i a l i s t t o p i c s t h a t c o u l d n o t be r e s o l v e d e l s e w h e r e l i k e t h e 
f i r e s e r v i c e , s u p p o r t o f t h e f i l m i n d u s t r y and t h e d i s p o s a l o f 
government owned f a c t o r i e s . The main c o - o r d i n a t i n g f u n c t i o n s 
were r e s e r v e d f o r an i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t t e e composed o f t o p 
c i v i l s e r v a n t s (heads o f d e p a r t m e n t , permanent s e c r e t a r y l e v e l ) 
known as t h e O f f i c i a l S t e e r i n g Committee on Economic Development 
(SC). T h i s was t o r e g u l a r l y c o l l e c t and c o l l a t e i n f o r m a t i o n 
and w i t h t h e h e l p o f r e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t s , a d v i c e m i n i s t e r s on 
t h e d e s i r a b l e a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s betweeen s e c t o r s . Key 
economic i M i n i s t e r s w o u l d e x e r c i s e c o n s t a n t s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r t h i s 
work, r e c e i v i n g t h e S t e e r i n g Committees 'Economic Survey' and p u t t i n g 
i t i n t o f i n a l f o r m b e f o r e i t was seen by t h e f u l l C a b i n e t . 
T h i s degree o f d e l e g a t i o n t o c i v i l s e r v a n t s was q u i t e 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t h r u s t o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h i n k i n g . The 
Department had been g i v e n t h e i r programmes t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f 
w h i c h had been s e t t l e d i n t h e R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Committees d u r i n g 
t h e war. The i d e a t h a t a r e s o u r c e p l a n s h o u l d be drawn up by an 
'economic g e n e r a l s t a f f o f e c o n o m i s t s and p o l i t i c a l a d v i s o r s ^ 
r e l a t i v e l y i n s u l a t e d f r o m d e p a r t m e n t a l p r e s s u r e s ^ was r e j e c t e d by 
t h e Head o f t h e C i v i l S e r v i c e , S i r Edward B r i d g e s , who p r e f e r r e d 
t o 'adapt t h e e x i s t i n g machine'."^ T h i s i n t e r e s t f r o m t h e 
1. Cab 134/186 S t e e r i n g Committee Papers. M i n u t e s o f m e e t i n g on 
th e P l a n n i n g o f Economic Development 1 2 t h September 1945 
d i s c u s s i n g Note by S i r Edward B r i d g e s d a t e d 6 t h September 
1945. 
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o f f i c i a l s i d e i n p r o t e c t i n g t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f d e p a r t m e n t s f e l l 
i n w e l l w i t h t h e government's w i s h t o have a p l a n n i n g system 
t h a t d i d n o t impose s t r a t e g y f r o m on h i g h v i a r e s i d e n t economists 
i n t h e C e n t r a l S t a t i s t i c a l O f f i c e o r t h e Economic S e c t i o n o f t h e 
C a b i n e t : such s t r a t e g i s t s w o u l d work t h r o u g h t h e d e p a r t m e n t a l 
m a c h i n e r y . B r i d g e s was asked i n s t e a d t o draw up p l a n s f o r an 
i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t t e e a s s i s t e d by i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l 
w o r k i n g p a r t i e s - A c c o r d i n g t o B r i d g e s t h i s S t e e r i n g Committee 
would g e t i n d i v i d u a l d e p a r t m e n t s t o send i n t h e i r p l a n s and 
r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r 1 - 5 y e a r p e r i o d s . I t was n o t i t s r o l e 
t o draw up d e t a i l e d s e c t o r p l a n s i n r e s p o n s i b l e d e p a r t m e n t s f o r 
t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s i n a g i v e n f i e l d ( t h e b u i l d i n g 
programme was g i v e n as an i n s t a n c e ) b u t r a t h e r i t was r e s t r i c t e d 
t o d r a w i n g up a s u r v e y based on a c o n s p e c t u s o f d e p a r t m e n t a l 
2 
programmes. The S t e e r i n g Committee m i g h t t a k e a 'view' on t h e 
e x t e n t t o w h i c h b u i l d i n g r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d be d e v o t e d t o h o u s i n g 
as a g a i n s t o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t s b u t i t w o u l d n o t i t s e l f p l a n 
a l l o c a t i o n s , o r have any power t o a l t e r t h e p r i o r i t i e s d e s p i t e 
t h i s q u a l i f y i n g r o l e o f ' t a k i n g a v i e w ' . S i n c e t h e e f f i c i e n c y 
o f a l l o c a t i o n w i t h i n p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s s p o n s o r e d by D e p a r t -
ments was n o t t o be a p r i m e c o n c e r n o f t h e c o - o r d i n a t o r s , i t 
w o u l d be v e r y d i f f i c u l t f o r a c o m m i t t e e w h i c h w o r k e d t h r o u g h 
a g r e e d consensus s u d d e n l y t o b e g i n i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f one o f i t s 
1. Cab 124/890 O f f i c e o f L o r d P r e s i d e n t : G e n e r a l P l a n n i n g o f 
Economic Development. V/iew e x p r e s s e d a t u n m i n u t e d m e e t i n g 
a t No.10 August 2 0 t h 1945 q u o t e d i n l e t t e r t o J . Maud P r i v y 
C o u n c i l s O f f i c e 22nd A u g u s t 1945. 
2. Cab 124/890 O f f i c e o f L o r d P r e s i d e n t : G e n e r a l P l a n n i n g o f 
Economic Development ' P l a n n i n g o f Economic Development' 
6 t h September 1945. Note by S i r Edward B r i d g e s , 
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own members when i t s i n i t i a l b r i e f was t o convey ' r e q u i r e m e n t s ' . 
I f i t d i d ^ a n d i t was q u i t e p o s s i b l e t o i n i t i a t e s u c h e n q u i r i e s 
v i a t h e w o r k i n g p a r t i e s ^ t h e M i n i s t e r c o n c e r n e d c o u l d a l w a y s 
f i g h t a r e a r g u a r d a c t i o n t h r o u g h h i s D e p a r t m e n t ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
on t h e S t e e r i n g Committee i t s e l f o r i n C a b i n e t . 
The p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r D e p a r t m e n t a l s o v e r e i g n t y was a l s o 
r e f l e c t e d i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e r o l e o f t h e T r e a s u r y i n t h e 
p l a n n i n g a p p a r a t u s . T h e r e was a s t r o n g f e e l i n g t h a t t h e 
t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m o f T r e a s u r y s u p e r v i s i o n was n o t l e g i t i m a t e and 
t h a t t h e T r e a s u r y s h o u l d n o t be a b l e t o g e t a d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n 
i n t h e S t e e r i n g Committee. The T r e a s u r y ' s ' d e p a r t m e n t a l 
i n t e r e s t ' was i n e x p e n d i t u r e r e d u c t i o n and t h e r e f o r e p o t e n t i a l l y 
a t h r e a t t o c o - o r d i n a t i o n based on d e p a r t m e n t a l demands. The 
s t r o n g p o s i t i o n o f t h e T r e a s u r y o v e r t h e D e p a r t m e n t s had been 
weakened as a r e s u l t o f t h e war. I t had t h e n been l i t t l e 
i n v o l v e d i n f i n a n c i a l management because i n f l a t i o n was k e p t 
down by d i r e c t c o n t r o l s and f i s c a l p o l i c y and n o t by monetary 
p o l i c y . ^ The C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer had n e i t h e r been i n 
t h e War C a b i n e t n o r was -he Chairman o f t h e M i n i s t e r i a l Econanic 
P o l i c y Committee n o r o f t h e p e a c e t i m e L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s Com-
m i t t e e s e t up as t h e economic ' o v e r l o r d ' . The r e s i d e n t 
e c o n o m i s t s i n t h e economic s e c t i o n o f t h e C a b i n e t O f f i c e worked 
d i r e c t l y t o the L o r d P r e s i d e n t r a t h e r t h a n t h e C h a n c e l l o r . I n 
war t h e p l a n n i n g was p h y s i c a l , p r o v i s i o n o f goods a t any p r i c e 
1. W i l e s , P.J.D., 'Pre-war and Wartime C o n t r o l s ' i n G-D.N. 
Worswick and P.H. Ady ( e d s . ) The B r i t i s h Economy 1945-1950 
- (Oxford The C l a r e n d o n Press 1952) pp. 157-8. 
see a l s o Sayers, R.S., F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1939-45 ( H i s t o r y 
o f t h e Second World War C i v i l S e r i e s H.M.S.O. 1 9 5 6 ) . 
Dow, J.C.R. The Management o f t h e B r i t i s h Economy 1945-60 
(Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1970) p.13. 
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t o o k p r e c e d e n c e o v e r f i n a n c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The b u s i n e s s o f 
t h e T r e a s u r y was t o p r o v i d e money and a v o i d i n f l a t i o n by f i s c a l 
( i . e . tao<ation c h a n g e s ) . Y e t t h e r e a l change came n o t f r o m 
t h e war b u t i n 1931 when B r i t a i n came o f f t h e g o l d s t a n d a r d and 
much o f t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r t i g h t e x p e n d i t u r e c o n t r o l and sound 
money d i s a p p e a r e d . I t was n o t t h a t 'weakening t r a d i t i o n ' and 
t h e l o s s o f p u b l i c s u p p o r t i n P a r l i a m e n t and , 
p r e s s had. r e d u c e d i t s ' e m i n e n c e ' , ^ b u t ' /' 
r a t h e r t h a t t h e Government i n t h e 30's had been f o r c e d by t h e 
consequences o f t h e w o r l d slump t o i n s u l a t e t h e economy f r o m 
autonomous i n t e r n a t i o n a l money f l o w s ^ s o r e d u c i n g t h e T r e a s u r y ' s 
r a t i o n a l e f o r economy. The a l t e r n a t i v e was t o a l l o w t h e complete 
c o l l a p s e o f t h e economy^ t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f s t e r l i n g as an i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c y ^ a n d w i t h i t ^ t h e s t a b i l i t y o f t h e f i n a n c i a l 
system i n London and u l t i m a t e l y t h e Bank o f E n g l a n d i t s e l f . The 
T r e a s u r y p o s t 1945 was l e f t managing t h e r e g u l a t o r y m a c h i n e r y 
o f exchange and i m p o r t c o n t r o l , and h e l p i n g t h e C h a n c e l l o r 
m a i n t a i n cheap money t h r o u g h e x t e n s i o n s o f s h o r t t e r m b o r r o w i n g 
f r o m t h e banks and o t h e r means f o r c r e d i t e x p a n s i o n . I n s h o r t , 
th e T r e a s u r y had t o measure e x p e n d i t u r e a g a i n s t unemployment and 
n o t a g a i n s t revenue as i n t h e b u d g e t - b a l a n c i n g v i e w . As 
d o minant economic l o g i c s h i f t e d i n c r e a s i n g l y d u r i n g t h e war t o 
K e y n e s i a n N a t i o n a l Income a n a l y s i s ^ t h e r e a l c e n t r e f o r economic 
a d v i c e s h i f t e d t o new r e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t s , i n c l u d i n g Keynes him-
1. H e c l o , H., and W i l d a v s k y , A., The P r i v a t e Government o f 
P u b l i c Money. (London, M a c M i l l a n 1974) p.203. 
2, Stone J-R-N., 'The Use amd Development o f N a t i o n a l Income 
and E x p e n d i t u r e E s t i m a t e s * i n D.N, C h e s t e r ( e d . ) Lessons o f 
the B r i t i s h War Economy. (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1951) 
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s e l f , who were s c a t t e r e d a b o u t t h e p l a n n i n g m a c h i n e r y . ^ Top 
T r e a s u r y o f f i c i a l s moved w i t h t h e t i m e s o r a c c e p t e d s m a l l 
c o n c e s s i o n s t o p a s t t h i n k i n g . There i s some e v i d e n c e o f an 
a l l o w a n c e f o r t r a d i t i o n a l t h i n k i n g b u i l t i n t o t h e C o a l i t i o n s 
Employment W h i t e Paper i n 1944. 
P l a n n i n g by manpower t a r g e t r y ^ as w e l l as n a t i o n a l income 
a n a l y s i s ^ m e a n t an i n c r e a s i n g use o f c o - o r d i n a t i o n v i a i n t e r -
d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t t e e . I n t h e case o f t h e Manpower Committee 
t h e c h a i r was g i v e n t o E r n e s t B e v i n , t r a d e u n i o n magnate aind 
p r e v i o u s l y M i n i s t e r o f Labour i n t h e C o a l i t i o n . B e v i n had been 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i n making employment p l e d g e s t o t h e w o r k e r s and 
had been t h e key f i g u r e i n d r i v i n g t h r o u g h t h e l a b o u r i n t e n s i v e 
b u i l d i n g programme. A t t l e e ' s p r e f e r e n c e f o r an e x p c i n s i o n o f 
c a b i n e t committees has been r e l a t e d t o h i s d e s i r e t o expand 
p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l o v e r a r e ^ s w h i c h p r e v i o u s l y had been c o -
o r d i n a t e d , i f a t a l l , t h r o u g h T r e a s u r y c o n t r o l . A t t l e e was 
obsessed w i t h a f e a r o f r e p e t i t i o n o f t h e 1931 c r i s i s when p o l i c y 
seemed t o be d e t e r m i n e d by ' c l o s e d f i n a n c i a l e l i t e s ' . " ^ T h i s 
c o n t e x t makes i t e a s i e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e h o s t i l i t y shown t o t h e 
James Meade, L i o n e l Robbins and R o b e r t H a l l e t c . a l l worked 
i n t h e Economic S e c t i o n o f t h e C a b i n e t O f f i c e w h i c h i n 
p r a c t i c e s e r v e d t h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t . The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s 
s t a t i s t i c a l s e c t i o n i n t h e war had been l e d by P r o f e s s o r 
Lindemann ( l a t e r L o r d C h e r w e l l ) and i n c l u d e d e c o n o m i s t s such 
as Roy H a r r o d . Keynes h i m s e l f was a t t a c h e d t o t h e T r e a s u r y . 
2. The budget would be b a l a n c e d o r even a s u r p l u s w o u l d be 
p l a n n e d f o r good y e a r s so t h a t t h e d e b t f r o m d e f i c i t s p e n d i n g 
i n y e a r s o f unemployment c o u l d be k e p t i n check. 
3. D a a l d e r , H., C a b i n e t Reform i n B r i t a i n 1914-1963. ( S t a n f o r d 
U n i v e r s i t y Press 1963) p.217. 
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T r e a s u r y i n i t s o l d r o l e . The L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s c h i e f c i v i l 
s e r v a n t , J . Maud, made i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t i f t h e T r e a s u r y was 
t o have a r o l e i t was t o be on Keynesiain l i n e s . 
I t i s v i t a l t o t h e w o r k i n g o f t h e f u l l employment 
employment p o l i c y t h a t t h e T r e a s u r y s h o u l d r e g a r d 
i t s e l f as h a v i n g a much w i d e r r o l e and a more 
p o s i t i v e economic f u n c t i o n t h a n i t has e v e r had 
b e f o r e . 1 
B r i d g e s f i n a l l y s u b m i t t e d h i s scheme t o M i n i s t e r s on 1 9 t h 
September, 1945,^ A f t e r i d e n t i f y i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n as a s e t o f 
i n d i v i d u a l programmes;the r e - e q u i p m e n t o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y , 
t h e r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f b a s i c i n d u s t r y , t h e h o u s i n g programme and 
c o n s u m p t i o n f o r ' f a i r s h a r e s ' , he went on t o t a l k a b o u t t h e 
r o l e o f t h e ' r e s p o n s i b l e A g e n c i e s ' . The r e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t s i n 
t h e economic s e c t i o n were t o a d v i s e on t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r t h e 
economy g i v e n t h e demands o f t h e d e p a r t m e n t s f o r t h e c u r r e n t 
p e r i o d . P o s s i b l e p r o b l e m s o f u n d e r s u p p l y and e x c e s s demand 
1. Cab 124/890 L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e : C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g o f 
Economic Development. J.P, Maud t o L o r d P r e s i d e n t . 2 0 t h 
September 1945. 
2. Cab 124/890. L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e : C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g o f 
Economic Development Memo by S i r E. B r i d g e s ' P l a n n i n g o f 
Economic Development' 1 9 t h September 1945, 
The f i n a l S t e e r i n g Committee and i t s W o r king P a r t i e s were as 
f o l l o w s . (Names s u p p l i e d f r o m Cab 134/186 O f f i c i a l S t e e r i n g 
Committee Paper. D r a f t P r o g r e s s R e p o r t . 8 t h November 1945. 
Note by J o i n t S e c r e t a r y ) . 
O f f i c i a l S t e e r i n g Committee on I n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l W o r k i n g 
Economic Development. P a r t i e s and t h e i r Chairmen. 
J. N i c h o l s o n ( L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s 1 . Economic Development 
O f f i c e . ) ( l a t e r Economic S u r v e y ) 
S i r G o d f r e y I n c e ( M i n i s t r y o f (James Meade Economic 
L a b o u r ) S e c t i o n ) 
S i r John Woods (Boar d o f T r a d e ) 2. Manpower ( S i r Norman Brook 
O l i v e r F r a n k s ( M i n i s t r y o f C a b i n e t O f f i c e ) 
S u p p l y ) 3. S t a t i s t i c s (H. Campoin 
S i r B e r n a r d G i l b e r t ( T r e a s u r y ) C e n t r a l S t a t i s t i c a l O f f i c e ) 
James Meade (Economic S e c t i o n 4. B a l a n c e o f Payments 
o f t h e C a b i n e t O f f i c e ) ( S i r W i l f r e d Eady 
Chairman S i r Edward B r i d g e s T r e a s u r y ) 
(Permanent Head o f the 5. I n v e s t m e n t ( S i r B e r n a r d 
Home C i v i l S e r v i c e ) G i l b e r t , T r e a s u r y ) 
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would be i n d i c a t e d b u t i t w o u l d be l e f t f o r m i n i s t e r s t o 
d e t e r m i n e what t o do. A new d i v i s i o n i n t h e T r e a s u r y f o r 
employment p o l i c y w ould be c r e a t e d . The S t e e r i n g Committee 
would be c o n f i n e d t o a s u r v e y o f r e s o u r c e s , c o l l a t i n g and 
f o r e c a s t i n g , h a v i n g no b r i e f t o g e t i n v o l v e d i n a r e a s c o n c e r n i n g 
' t h e s t r u c t u r e , o r g a n i z a t i o n management o f i n d u s t r y ' . The 
' s u p p l y s i d e ' was o n l y i n d i r e c t l y i n j e c t e d i n t o t h e p l a n n i n g 
a p p a r a t u s v i a t h e ' r e s p o n s i b l e d e p a r t m e n t s ' . S t a f f o r d C r i p p s 
a t t h e Board o f Trade was o f f i c i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e 
e f f i c i e n c y o f e x p o r t i n d u s t r y . H i s e a r l y i n i t i a t i v e was l i m i t e d 
t o . s e t t i n g up e n q u i r i e s .so t h a t p e r f o r m a n c e i n key s e c t o r s c o u l d 
be r e l a t e d t o . t h o s e o f other c o u n t r i e s . O t h e r s e c t o r s o f i n d u s t r y , 
w h i c h i n many cases p r o v i d e d t h e i n p u t f o r m a n u f a c t u r i n g , were 
r e p r e s e n t e d by o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s , such as t h e M i n i s t r y o f 
Supply s p o n s o r i n g e n g i n e e r i n g and heavy i n d u s t r y . M i n i s t r y o f 
F u e l and Power t h e b a s i c e n e r g y i n d u s t r i e s w i t h - t h e M i n i s t r y 
o f Works w h i c h rasi t h e b u i l d i n g programme, b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r t h o s e m a t e r i a l i n d u s t r i e s whose p r o d u c t s m i g h t be r e q u i r e d 
i n m a n u f a c t u r e s f o r e x p o r t . This, d i s p e r s a l o f i n d u s t r i a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o v e r s e v e r a l 'spx>nsoring' d e p a r t m e n t s o n l y r e -
i n f o r c e d t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n and l a c k o f o v e r a l l s u p e r v i s i o n 
b u i l t i n t o t h e p l a n n i n g a p p a r a t u s . 
L a r g e l y as a r e s u l t o f d e f i c i e n c i e s i n energy s u p p l y 
o c c a s i o n e d by t h e w i n t e r c r i s i s , " ^ c i v i l s e r v a n t s t r i e d t o 
1. Labour back bencher R i c h a r d Crossman had w r i t t e n a s t r o n g 
l e t t e r t o t h e News C h r o n i c l e 2 0 t h F e b r u a r y 1947 c o m p l a i n i n g 
t h a t t h e s u p p l y s i d e o f t h e economy was d i v i d e d among t o o 
many m i n i s t r i e s w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t w h i l e t h e M i n i s t e r o f 
F u e l and Power needed c o a l and f u e l e q u i p m e n t ^ t h e P r e s i d e n t 
o f t h e Board o f Trade w o u l d be e n c o u r a g i n g i t s e x p o r t . The 
M i n i s t e r o f Labour would be p l a n n i n g l a b o u r a l l o c a t i o n s 
w h i l e t h e s u p p l y o f m a t e r i a l s f o r w o r k e r s t o work on was 
d e a l t w i t h e l s e w h e r e , see P r i t t , D.N., The Labour Government 
1945-51 (London, Lawrence and W i s h a r t 1960) pp.138-9. 
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p e r f e c t t h i s m a c h i n e r y . ^ Permanent s e c r e t a r i e s w e re a l r e a d y 
o v e r w o r k e d a t t h e i r r e g u l a r p o s t s , t h e S t e e r i n g Committee was 
i n a d e q u a t e l y s t a f f e d , and met on an ad hoc b a s i s . ^ I n i t i a l l y 
t h e i d e a f o r ; change cen.tred-oh t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of.::departmental 
' d i r e c t o r o f pLans' who wo u l d s i t on t h e S t e e r i n g Committee. But 
t h i s i d e a was soon .amended i n favour df increasing t h e back up f a c i l i t y 
f o r t h e S t e e r i n g Committee by t h e c r e a t i o n o f a C e n t r a l 
Economic P l a n n i n g S t a f f (C.E.P.S.)^ a t t a c h e d t o t h e C a b i n e t o f f i c e , 
and' " w o r k i n g w i t h t h e Economic S e c t i o n w h i c h i t s e l f was 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i n d r a w i n g up t h e Economic Surveys i n t h e S.C.'s 
own Working P a r t y . C.E.P.S. was t o be a body o f k ey d e p a r t -
m e n t a l c i v i l s e r v a n t s , r e s i d e n t . e c o n o m i s t s and s t a t i s t i c i a n s 
seconded f r o m p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y i n t h e war. The c h a i r m a n o f 
C.E.P.S. ( S i r Edwin Plowden) was t o be t h e government's C h i e f 
P l a n n i n g O f f i c e r . D e s p i t e t h e a m b i t i o u s aim o f h a v i n g a 
p l a i n n i n g s t a f f w i t h i n d e p e n d e n t a n a l y t i c c a p a c i t y a b l e t o send 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o p u t t h e case f o r t h e economy as a wh o l e i n 
s p e c i f i c i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l Committees, t h e body was s m a l l e r 
t h a n i n t e n d e d . D i r e c t o r s o f p l a n s were n e v e r a p p o i n t e d and 
C.E.P.S. c o n t i n u e d t o r e l y on t h e economic s e c t i o n o f t h e 
C a b i n e t O f f i c e , i . e . t h e K e y n e s i a n r e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t s f o r 
a d v i c e . C.E.P.S. t h e r e f o r e f u n c t i o n e d m e r e l y as a n o t h e r l a y e r 
o f r e i n f o r c e m e n t f o r t h e K e y n e s i a n a s s u m p t i o n s a l r e a d y b u i l t i n . 
1. Cab 134/190. S t e e r i n g Committee m e e t i n g 2 6 t h F e b r u a r y 1947 
see a l s o Cab 124/1081 L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e : M a c h i n e r y 
f o r Economic P l a n n i n g and C o n t r o l u n d a t e d n o t e by S i r 
Edward B r i d g e s ' P r o p o s a l s f o r S t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e S t a f f f o r 
Economic P l a n n i n g ' . 
2. Rosenberg, N., Economic P l a n n i n g i n t h e B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y 1945-9. ( P h i l a d e l p h i a U n i v e r s i t y o f P e n n s y l v a n i a 
Press 1961) p.30. 
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On 2 8 t h September on A t t l e e ' s m i n i s t e r i a l r e s h u f f l e C r i p p s 
was a p p o i n t e d t o t h e newly c r e a t e d p o s t o f ' M i n i s t e r f o r 
Economic A f f a i r s ' cind t h e j o b o f ' c o - o r d i n a t i n g ' . v i a .c; E^P. S-
was taJcen under h i s umbrella."^ A g a i n t h i s new p o s t was l a r g e l y 
c o s m e t i c as t h e Prime M i n i s t e r i n s i s t e d : 
There w o u l d be no q u e s t i o n o f i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h ^ 
th e d e p a r t m e n t a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f m i n i s t e r s . 
Q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e l a c k o f ad e q u a t e s t a f f f o r t h i s 
' M i n i s t r y ' do n o t t h e r e f o r e m a t t e r g i v e n t h i s assumption.*^ 
The government l a t e r made moves t o r e l a t e t h e i n t e r n a l t o 
t h e e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t by f u r t h e r changes i n d e c i s i o n 
m a c h i n e r y . I t combined i n one c a b i n e t c o m m i t t e e t h e w o r k done 
by M.E.P,, t h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee and t h e o l d E x t e r n a l 
Economic P o l i c y Committee, T h i s new-Economic P o l i c y Committee 
(E.P.C.) c o n s i s t e d o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , t h e C h a n c e l l o r , t h e 
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , t h e L o r d P r e s d i e n t , and t h e L o r d P r i v y S e a l . 
I t was t o be t h e h i g h l e v e l p o l i c y body and i t s g e n e r a l aims 
on paper were a m b i t i o u s . I t was t o p r o v i d e 
g e n e r a l o v e r s i g h t , on b e h a l f o f t h e C a b i n e t , 
o f Economic p o l i c y , and t o r e c o n c i l e c o n f l i c t s 
between F o r e i g n Trade and I n t e r n a l economic 
r e q u i r e m e n t s . ^ 
I t was t o p l a n d o l l a r e x p e n d i t u r e , s a f e g u a r d t h e r e s e r v e s , 
encourage e x p o r t s and draw up a l i s t o f r e q u i r e m e n t s when 
f u r t h e r a i d f r o m t h e U.S. ( u n d e r t h e M a r s h a l l p l a n ) was o f f e r e d . 
!• So were t h e M a t e r i a l s and F u e l A l l o c a t i o n C o m m i t t e e s , see 
Cab 129/21 C a b i n e t Paper CP(47)280. 9 t h O c t o b e r 1947. 
C a b i n e t Committees Note by t h e Prime M i n i s t e r . 
2. H.C. Debs. Vol.443, C o l . 4 0 . O c t o b e r 2 1 s t , 1947. Debate on 
Address. 
3. C h e s t e r , D.N., 'The M a c h i n e r y o f Government and P l a n n i n g * 
i n G.N. Worswick and P.H. Ady. The B r i t i s h Economy 1945-50" 
( O x f o r d The C l a r e n d o n Press 1 9 5 2 ) . p.347. 
4. Cab 134/215 Economic P o l i c y Committee Memo 9 t h O c t o b e r 1947. 
C o m p o s i t i o n and Terms o f R e f e r e n c e Note by S e c r e t a r y o f t h e 
C a b i n e t ( S i r Norman B r o o k ) . 
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While the E.P.C. was to d e v i s e s t r a t e g y , the P r o d u c t i o n 
Coramittee (P.C.) was to execute i t i n p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d s * , to t u r n 
d i r e c t i v e s i n t o day to day p o l i c y . I n p a r t i c u l a r i t was to 
take over the g e n e r a l m i n i s t e r i a l approved ( p r e v i o u s l y performed 
by M-E.P.) of the d e t a i l s of the investment programme. The 
M i n i s t e r of Economic A f f a i r s was r e s p o n s i b l e fox p r e s e n t i n g . t h e 
investment pl"an aind-.leading d i s c u s s i o n s i n commi t t e e i n p l a c e of 
the Lord P r e s i d e n t . I n November, 1947, when C r i p p s became 
C h a n c e l l o r he took h i s * Economic A f f a i r s ' Department and C.E.P.S 
i n t o the T r e a s u r y with him. The T r e a s u r y o f f i c i a l l y became 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o - o r d i n a t i o n . T h i s was no t h r e a t to the i n t e r -
departmental na t u r e of d e c i s i o n making s i n c e d e c i s i o n s s t i l l 
had to be reached c o l l e c t i v e l y i n Committee or f u l l C a b i n e t 
where the T r e a s u r y was one among e q u a l s and had by now l a r g e l y 
adopted Keynesian assumptions. So by the end of 1947 we f i n d 
a g r e a t e r s t r e s s on command s t r u c t u r e s w i t h i n the p l a n n i n g 
apparatus, but only a t the l e v e l of appearauices. 
What f a c t o r s have been aduced to account f o r t h i s i n t e r -
departmental b i a s i n the machinery o f government? 
^ ' i r s t l y we have noted r e s i s t a n c e to command among the 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e grades of the C i v i l S e r v i c e . S i r Edward B r i d g e s , 
the Head of the C i v i l S e r v i c e had, we ..saw., e a r l i e r , p r e f e r r e d 
* to adopt the e x i s t i n g machinery'. Commentators f o r a l a t e r 
p e r i o d have i d e n t i f i e d the enduring ' s p i r i t u a J . ' v a l u e s of c o -
o p e r a t i o n , h a b i t , p e r s u a s i o n , and compromise, v a l u e s which 
i n f e c t the very body e n t r u s t e d w i t h c o n t r o l over o t h e r s - the 
Treasury."'' T h i s i s , as we have maintained, reproduced a t 
1. A t h e s i s developed throughoutJnHecla and Wildavsky. The 
P r i v a t e Government of P u b l i c Money. 
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m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l by the whole emphasis on Departmental 
s o v e r e i g n t y and c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n making by consensus and 
agreement which i s the hallm a r k of C a b i n e t o p e r a t i o n a l pro-
cedure. We c o u l d expect such a s i t u a t i o n to have r e a l e f f e c t s 
i n the sense of s e t t i n g l i m i t s to ' r a t i o n a l * long term ajid 
s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g . In our p e r i o d departmental s o v e r e i g n t y 
was r e i n f o r c e d by the e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t Departments 
were c l i e n t based. They were to have a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n ; 
t h e i r ' c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ' being spheres o u t s i d e t h e i r admin-
i s t r a t i v e p e r s o n n e l - i . e . they were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 'programmes' 
i n i t i a l l y d e v i s e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e to groups i n t e r e s t e d i n those 
i n i t i a t i v e s . At t h i s time Departments were o f t e n known as 
PRODUCTION departments, who, i n a d d i t i o n to p l a n n i n g ajid 
o p e r a t i n g p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l s i n p a r t i c u l a r s e c t o r s ^ a l s o sponsored 
those s e c t o r s i n r e l a t i o n to the a l l o c a t i o n o f l i c e n c e s a p p l i e d 
f o r to b u i l d , to use raw m a t e r i a l s and l a b o u r . C e r t a i n l y as a 
f i r s t approximation i t would be f a i r to adopt B e e r ' s terminology 
t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d a ' P l u r a l e x e c u t i v e ' . T h i s , a s w i l l be se&i 
l a t e r , i s i n s u f f i c i e n t and does not exha u s t the e x p l a n a t i o n f o r 
the k i n d of p l a n n i n g undertaken. Some a n a l y s t s approaching the 
s u b j e c t and p e r i o d have stopped s h o r t a t the p o i n t of machinery 
and the r a t i o n a l i t y of the d e c i s i o n making a p p a r a t u s . There has 
been a s i l e n t assumption b u i l t i n t o the a n a l y s i s t h a t p o l i c y 
c o n f l i c t s can be smoothed over by the p e r f e c t i o n o f i n s t i t u t i o n s 
w i t h t h e i r c a p a c i t y to r e c o n c i l e and s o l v e the problems posed-
1. Gustafsson, G., and Richardson, J . , "Concepts of R a t i o n a l i t y 
and the P o l i c y P r o c e s s ' European J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l 
Research. Vol.7. i\o.4. December 1979 pp.427-8. 
2. Beer, S. , T r e a s u r y Control:The C o - o r d i n a t i o n of F i n a n c i a l 
and Economic P o l i c y i n Great B r i t a i n . (2nd R e v i s e d e d i t i o n , 
Oxford, The Clarendon P r e s s 1957) pp.117-22. 
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The assumption i s t h a t t h e r e i s a p o t e n t i a l f o r c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
t h a t i s not being pursued because of v a r i o u s f r i c t i o n s such 
as the 'departmentalism' t h a t we have i d e n t i f i e d a s the apparent 
c o n s t r a i n t . ^ The biographer of Morrison, -, f o r insta i n c e , 
c h a r a c t e r i z e s the machinery of economic government a s : - 'Too 
f r a c t u r e d too d i f f u s e - too much a d v i c e , o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g and 
coming i n d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s ' ? Piecemeal 'ad -hocury' i s 
the summary d e s c r i p t i o n B r i t t a n u s e s ^ which s u g g e s t s i n a 
common sense form the language of p o l i c y s c i e n c e s w i t h i t s 
4 
' d i s j o i n t e d i n c r e m e n t a l i s m • • 
Other w r i t e r s have however w r i t t e n a g a i n s t o v e r - s t r e s s i n g 
these f a c t o r s . C h e s t e r argues good p o l i c y cannot emerge 
spontaneously from the r i g h t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e : the 
c r u c i a l f a c t o r s l i e i n the implementation p r o c e s s . ^ C h e s t e r 
s t r e s s e s the importance of the c o - o p e r a t i o n of the trade unions 
i n wage r e s t r a i n t and employers i n a g r e e i n g to s h i f t c a p a c i t y 
to e x p o r t s . ^ Beer and Shore however s t r e s s the l i m i t s of such 
c o - o p e r a t i o n . Beer w r i t e s of the l a c k o f endurance f o r wage 
r e s t r a i n t and of trade union r e s i s t a n c e to the m a n i p u l a t i o n of 
1. Beer, T r e a s u r y C o n t r o l , pp. 92-3. 
2. Donoghue, B. , and Jones, G., Herbert M o r r i s o n : P o r t r a i t o f a 
P o l i t i c i a n . (London, Weidenfeld and N i c o l s o n 1973), p>354. 
3. B r i t t a n , S., S t e e r i n g the Economy. (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1971), p.181. 
4. Braybrooke, D., and Lindblom, C., A S t r a t e g y of D e c i s i o n 
(New York, The Free P r e s s 1963). 
5. C h e s t e r , 'The Machinery of Government and P l a n n i n g ' , pp.361-3. 
6. i b i d , p.363. 
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wage r a t e s and d i r e c t i o n of labour, both of which are i n h e r e n t 
i n manpx)wer pl a n n i n g . ^ Rogrw said Shore l o c a t e c r u c i a l o b s t a c l e s 
i n the l e v e l of r e s i s t a n c e by Trade A s s o c i a t i o n s to the s t a t e 
s u p e r v i s i o n and encouragement of new invest m e n t o v e r -. 
2 
the i s s u e of Development C o u n c i l s . These 
Trade" A s s o c i a t i o n s had prices,- c a p a c i ty.- and 
l o s s making s h e l t e r e d i n the 30*s v i a the p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f and 
by the wartime discouragement o f new e n t r a n t s . These o b s t a c l e s 
a r e t h e r e f o r e i n a d d i t i o n to the o b s t a c l e s o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
p l u r a l i s m i d e n t i f i e d above. The two a r e not, however, u n r e l a t e d 
given the ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' n a t u r e of departments which s e t s up 
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the o b s t a c l e s o u t s i d e a r e ' 
reproduced i n government as 'sponsoring* departments r e f l e c t 
t h e i r c l i e n t s i n t e r e s t s . While i t i s important to r e c o g n i s e the 
r o l e machinery p l a y s as an adapter - more i n f o r m a t i o n y i e l d i n g 
g r e a t e r depth to a n a l y s i s - and w h i l e i t i s c r u c i a l to under-
stand the r o l e t h a t non-governmental f o r c e s p l a y i n the 
implementation of p o l i c y ^ e x p l a n a t i o n i s not exhausted i n these 
p o i n t s . What a government does i n any one moment i n time i s a 
r e f l e c t i o n not j u s t of the p r e s e n t but how i t c o n c e i v e s i t s e l f 
i n r e l a t i o n to the p a s t and i n r e l a t i o n to a f u t u r e i t may have 
mapped out and committed i t s e l f to however s h o r t . I n other 
words d e c i s i o n s made i n the p a s t may be so c r i t i c a l t hat they 
become embodied as given assumptions* I h i s i s even more so i f 
such d e c i s i o n s a r e the r e f l e c t i o n of a theory which d e c i s i o n 
1. Beer, S., Modern B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s . (London, Faber 1969) pp.200-212. ^ 
2. Rogow, A., and Shore, P. The Labour Government A H H B r i t i s h 
I n d u s t r y 1945-51. (Oxford, B a s i l B l a c k w e l l 1935) p,84^ 
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making i n the p r e s e n t i s i n e v i t a b l y c o n s t r a i n e d by u n l e s s those 
t h e o r e t i c a l assumptions a r e up f o r amendment o r p o s s i b l e 
replacement i n the c u r r e n t p o l i c y . I f they a r e not r e p l a c e d and 
i f p r i o r commitments arranged as p r i o r i t i e s become i n s t i t u t i o n -
a l i z e d , then d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a c c e p t i n g those i n s t i t u t i o n s as 
means are by so doing c o n f i r m i n g those p r i o r commitments and 
the accompanying theory. 
D e c i s i o n makers who i n 1945-47 were g r a p p l i n g w i t h the 
problem of s c a r c i t y by means of c o n t r o l s and r a t i o n i n g were 
fa c e d not with the p r e - g i v e n spontaneous emergence of s c a r c i t y 
i n 1945 but with the f a c t t h a t ' s c a r c i t y ' had been c r e a t e d by 
the government's own commitment to theory and the r e s u l t i n g 
p r a c t i c a l assumptions which i t was r e l u c t a n t xo s a c r i f i c e . The 
s c a r c i t y of m a t e r i a l s was due i n l a r g e p a r t to the massive 
Keynesian b u i l d i n g programme f o r which the bulk was pre-empted. 
I t was that b u i l d i n g programme t h a t was the p r i o r d e c i s i o n . 
Once accepted c e r t a i n c o n s t r a i n t s f o l l o w e d . The c o n s t r a i n t s d i d 
not impose themselves on government. I t imposed them on i t s e l f . 
The e f f e c t s of those c o n s t r a i n t s c o n s t i t u t e d p a r t o f the 
c o n d i t i o n f o r the e x i s t e n c e of what co u l d be d e c i d e d l a t e r . 
D e c i s i o n s to remove c o n s t r a i n t would i n v o l v e re-opening the 
assumptions of the p a s t and a r e j e c t i o n of the p a s t as 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the p r e s e n t . Such d e c i s i o n s were u n l i k e l y 
to be taken i f the p a s t was r e l a t i v e l y r e c e n t i n the sense 
t h a t i t s assumptions were s t i l l p a r t o f p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . 
Moreover i f the d e c i s i o n making p e r s o n n e l were s t i l l the same, 
r e j e c t i o n of the p a s t would have i m p l i e d a r e - e d u c a t i o n : a 
p r o c e s s which i s very hard to a c c e p t and r a r e l y undertaken 
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v o l u n t a r i l y . 
T h i s knowledge of s e l f - i m p o s e d c o n s t r a i n t i s something we 
noted i n c h a p t e r 2. The government p e r c e i v e d a p o t e n t i a l threat 
to p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y u n l e s s i t undertook a s o c i a l and f u l l 
employment p o l i c y . I t was not an a c t u a l but a p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t , 
but once the d e c i s i o n was taken to t r e a t extra-governmental 
c e n t r e s of power as i f they were a t h r e a t i t does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w t h a t governments would c r e a t e and f o s t e r 
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t would enable them to p a r t i c i p a t e a t the c r u c i a l 
l e v e l of p o l i c y making. Only i f government has c r e a t e d the 
environment i n which extra-governmental i n t e r e s t s can adapt to 
the s t a t e and adopt i t s assumptions and theory can the govern-
ment open up a c c e s s . But i f the s t a t e has a c h i e v e d q u i e s c e n c e 
by o t h e r s i n i t s assumptions i t does not need to.open very f a r : 
i t need open only to the e x t e n t t h a t i t s p o t e n t i a l opponents 
f e e l they are p a r t of the p r o c e s s . 
The i m p l i c a t i o n of what i s being s a i d here i s t h a t 
corpxjratism b a r e l y e x i s t e d i n the p e r i o d of the post-war Labour 
government. The power of the working c l a s s and i t s p e r c e i v e d 
t h r e a t was r e f e r r e d to i n c h a p t e r 2t d e c i s i o n s were taken w i t h 
r e f e r e n c e to s c e n a r i o s y e t undemonstrated. The power of the 
working c l a s s can be found i n the d e c i s i o n s not the p r o c e s s of 
d e c i s i o n t a k i n g . T h e i r presence was r e a l i n the s e n s e they were 
t a l k e d about - j u s t as i n d u s t r y was - but they were given no 
p l a c e i n sun s h a r i n g j o i n t l y w i t h the government i n s t a t e 
management. What s t r u c t u r e s d i d e x i s t f u n c t i o n e d o c c a s i o n a l l y 
as l i s t e n i n g d e v i c e s but were e s s e n t i a l l y b r o a d c a s t i n g c e n t r e s 
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f o r a government t h a t s e t i t s own p r i o r i t i e s . ^ Government was 
q u i t e capable both of i g n o r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n and a n a l y s i s t h a t 
2 
argued f o r a ' r a t i o n a l ' o p t i o n as w e l l as p r e s s u r e to chajige 
c o u r s e through any open i n f l u e n c e c h a n n e l s . 
Robert Brady has shown t h a t i n the c a s e of the I n d u s t r i a l 
Development C o u n c i l s the government had decided on a 'wet' 
s o l u t i o n before F.B.I, o p p o s i t i o n was a r t i c u l a t e d . " ^ The 
assumption t h a t Labour C o n t r o l s were going to be r e l a x e d was 
made as e a r l y as 1942 and t h a t t h e r e would have to be a degree 
of wage r e s t r a i n t was assumed i n the Beveridge Report where i t 
was noted the s e l l e r s l abour market would be a problem. Once 
f u l l employment and f u l l c a p a c i t y were a s s u r e d the r e s t r i c t i v e 
p r a c t i c e s of non-governmental powers - unions and trade 
a s s o c i a t i o n s had to be 'managed'.' But i t was not t h e i r orga^i-
i z a t i o n a l s k i l l s and c a p a c i t y to r e a c t t h a t gave them power, but 
the government i t s e l f by s u s t a i n i n g the environment. Having got 
i t s e l f i n t o a p o s i t i o n of dependence where i t needed a l l labour, 
however m i l i t a i n t , and a l l output, however c o s t l y and i n e f f i c i e n t , 
i t decided to manage through the use of normative a p p e a l s f o r 
p o t e n t i a l opponents to i d e n t i f y w i t h government assumptions and 
4 
p r i o r i t i e s . The s t a t e would use i t s e x t e n s i v e powers of com-
munication to t r y and t i e the c o n t i n u a t i o n of s p e c i f i c concessions 
to the achievement of a quid proquo. An immediate d i f f i c u l t y was 
encountered i n t h i s management by the f a c t t h a t the government 
1. Deutsch, K., The Nerves of Government:Models of P o l i t i c a l 
Communication and C o n t r o l . (New York, The T r e e P r e s s , 1966) 
esp. P a r t I I I . 
2. see c h a p t e r s 6 and 7. 
3. Brady, R.A., C r i s i s i n B r i t a i n ; P l a n s and Achievements of 
the Labour Government. (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1950)pcb5 
pp.545-567. 
4. For U t i l i t a r i a n v Normative modes of compliance see E t z i o n i , 
A., A Comparative A n a l y s i s of Complex Q r c a n i s a t i o n s (New York 
The Free P r e s s 1961) e s p . P a r t 1. 
229 
seemed to have c r e a t e d an environment from which i t became very 
d i f f i c u l t to withdraw without s u b s t a n t i a l i n r o a d s i n t o the 
r e c e n t assumptions and machinery which had guided the p l a n n i n g 
of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Management by normative appeal p l a y e d an i m p o r t a n t p a r t 
i n the government's attempts to p l a n . W i t h i n the p l a n n i n g 
apparatus under the g e n e r a l s u p e r v i s i o n of the L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s 
O f f i c e ^ w a s a body known as the O f f i c i a l Committee on the 
P r o s p e r i ty Campaign. T h i s was s t a f f e d by c i v i l s e r v a n t s from 
the p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s s i d e o f departments and the C e n t r a l O f f i c e 
of I n f o r m a t i o n . I t s Chairman was F r a n c i s Vvilliams, A d v i s o r on 
P u b l i c R e l a t i o n s to the Prime M i n i s t e r who had been c o n t r o l l e r 
of News and C e n s o r s h i p a t the M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n 1941-5, 
and before t h a t E d i t o r of the D a i l y H e r a l d 1936-40. The essence 
of the p r o s p e r i t y campaign was to supplement economic c o n t r o l s 
and d e a l w i t h the problem of s c a r c i t y by appeals f o r an i n c r e a s e 
i n p r o d u c t i v i t y by the g i v e n e x i s t i n g employed l a b o u r f o r c e . 
The method to a c h i e v e t h i s e f f e c t was the normative appeal i n i -
: t i a l l y made through m i n i s t e r i a l speeches, p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e s and 
b r o a d c a s t s . L a t e r speeches were d i r e c t e d at employee and employer 
co n f e r e n c e s convened e s p e c i a l l y f o r the purpose on a n a t i o n a l 
and r e g i o n a l b a s i s . I n pamphlets and p o s t e r s i t was n e c e s s a r y 
to t r a n s m i t what the government c a l l e d 'mass e d u c a t i o n i n 
elementary economies', i n o r d e r to break down i g n o r a n c e , apathy 
and f r i c t i o n i n c l u d i n g r e s t r i c t i v e p r a c t i c e s i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e 
1. Cab 132/4 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee Paper ( L P ( 4 6 ) 1 7 5 8th 
J u l y 1946. D i s p e r s i o n of Labour to i n d u s t r i e s o f N a t i o n a l 
Importance. Memo by M i n i s t e r of Labour. I t had been r e c o g n i z e d 
here t h a t there were problems w i t h the m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
manpower and 'unproductive' workers. However the two a l t e r -
native:s of Labour d i r e c t i o n o r the d e l i b e r a t e c r e a t i o n of 
unemployment as means of e f f e c t i n g t r a n s f e r s and i n c r e a s i n g 
p r o d u c t i v i t y were ruled out. 
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targets."^ The message was the dependence of the s t a n d a r d of 
l i v i n g and rewards on production and not c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i 
increased p r o d u c t i v i t y was to be a c h i e v e d through i n c r e a s e s i n 
the i n t e n s i t y of work. The P r o s p e r i t y Committee encouraged the 
B. B.C. to d i s c u s s economic i s s u e s , cinemas to show 10 minute. 
C. O.I, f i l m s , economic i n f o r m a t i o n to be sent to women's 
i n s t i t u t e s and f a c i l i t i e s f o r s p e a k e r s to be s e t up i n f a c t o r i e s 
N otice of i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r i e s who had i n c r e a s e d output were to 
get p r i d e of p l a c e i n C.O.I. 'Reports to the Nation* accompanied 
by slogans r e l a t i n g the economy to s i m p l i s t i c a n a l o g i e s on 
housewive's budgeting and 'baking a cake*. The Economic Survey 
i n i t s popular e d i t i o n 'The B a t t l e f o r output' 1947 was sent to 
s c h o o l s . ^ The D a i l y M i r r o r had a r e g u l a r s e r i e s 'Face the 
F a c t s ' and the government bought s t r e e t a d v e r t i s i n g , one of the 
hoardings r e a d i n g * 10% more w i l l do the t r i c k - a message from 
your P.M..', ven/the Labour P a r t y ' s own 'ABC of the C r i s i s * 
was d r a f t e d with the h e l p of N i c h o l s o n , c h i e f C i v i l S e r v a n t 
1. Cab 134/188 S t e e r i n g Committee Paper. 12th October 1946. 
P r o s p e r i t y Campaign P u b l i c i t y . Note by J o i n t S e c r e t a r i e s 
e n c l o s i n g memo from P r o s p e r i t y Campaign ( O f f i c i a l ) Committee. 
A l s o Paper 13th June 1946 P r o s p e r i t y Campaign m a t e r i a l f o r 
l e a f l e t . Note by J o i n t S e c r e t a r i e s . A l s o Cab 134/189 Paper 
15th November 1946. B a s i s f o r F u r t h e r P u b l i c i t y on i n c r e a s e d 
p r o d u c t i o n . Note by J o i n t S e c r e t a r i e s , see a l s o Cab 154/187 
S t e e r i n g Committee meeting 15th October 1946. 
2. T229/35 C.E.P.S. Tenth meeting of the Economic P l a n n i n g Board 
e n c l o s i n g c o p i e s of C e n t r a l O f f i c e o f I n f o r m a t i o n (C.O.I.) 
'Reports to Nation No.l and No.2.' No. 2, c o n t a i n e d the cake 
analogy. Workers were a d v i s e d to 'pin i t up and t a l k i t over* 
See a l s o Hopkins, H., The New Look:A S o c i a l H i s t o r y of the 
40's and 50*s i n B r i t a i n . (London, Seeker and Warbury 1963) 
pp.88-9. 
3. For correspondence and the b o o k l e t ' B a t t l e f o r output* i t s e l f 
see Cab 124/901. Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r 
C e n t r a l Planning of Economic Development. 
4. Hopkins, •'•he New Look. p. 128. 
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at t a c h e d to the campaign.^ I t i s d i f f i c u l t to gauge the success 
of a l l t h i s - The Mass O b s e r v a t i o n Report 'The Language of 
L e a d e r s h i p ' r e v e a l e d t h a t workers had not understood the 
meaning of the 1947 economic survey^ and worse what they had 
understood was completely o p p o s i t e o f what the government 
intended. The statement t h a t 'the gap between r e s o u r c e s and 
requirements would be c l o s e d by 'some requ i r e m e n t s being l e f t 
unmet' was not understood. We: can only surmise t h a t perceptions 
confounded the t r u t h of t h i s statement: s i n c e w i t h r a t i o n i n g , 
food s u b s i d i e s , f u l l employment and extended s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n 
requirements were being met. As f o r the c o n c l u d i n g sentence of 
the White Paper t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s of the government 'embodied 
the government's d e t e r m i n a t i o n to put f i r s t t h i n g s f i r s t ' and 
that democratic p l a n n i n g would p r o t e c t 'maximum freedom of 
c h o i c e ' . T h i s was i n t e r p r e t e d to mean t h a t the government was 
going to put the working c l a s s f i r s t i n a l l t h i n g s . 
I n June, the Lord P r e s i d e n t r e c e i v e d a memo from Mr. S. C. 
L e s l i e of C.O.I, i d e n t i f y i n g a ' b a r r i e r ' between the minds of 
people and the minds of the government. Quoting a newspaper 
survey of people's view of the economy i n the f u e l c r i s i s he 
wrote 
How many M i n i s t e r s would have guessed t h a t 
a t t h a t time housing ranked a s the n a t i o n ' s 
b i g g e s t problem to twice as many people as 
di d c o a l ? 
L e s l i e came c l o s e to i d e n t i f y i n g the management of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
with the management of mind. He t a l k e d o f ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l warfare' 
1. Cab 124/902 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e : O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r C e n t r a l 
Planning of Economic Development. L e t t e r from Labour P a r t y 
to N i c h o l s o n with thanks. 11th October 1947. 
2. Cab 124/900. Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e : O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r C e n t r a l 
Planning of Economic Development e n c l o s e s Mass O b s e r v a t i o n 
Report 20th March 1947 'The Language of L e a d e r s h i p ' . 
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to win acceptance of government news and i d e a s about a complex 
and changing s i t u a t i o n . To do t h i s one would need a s o c i a l 
survey which would get a t the s t a t e of the mind of the people.^ 
Another C i v i l S e r v a n t ^ c l o s e to the campaign argued t h a t , 
without d i r e c t i o n of l a b o u r , c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h the g o a l s of the 
plan c o u l d be a c h i e v e d by removing the us and them a t t i t u d e by 
p r o v i d i n g means f o r a 'genuine community' through j o i n t con-
s u l t a t i o n i n i n d u s t r y . He suggested t h a t Max N i c h o l s o n r e a d 
E l t o n Mayo: a sense of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y c o u l d 
not be o b t a i n e d by emotional a p p e a l s a l o n e . ^ The sense of 
involvement and the need f o r more a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n from 
trade unions and employers on the impact of p o l i c y c o u l d be 
obtained i f those p a r t i e s were p r e s e n t a t some l e v e l i n the 
planning apparatus. T h i s was the r e a l r a t i o n a l e behind the 
Economic P l a n n i n g Board: the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t i n d u s t r i a l mobil-
i z a t i o n depended on e f f e c t i v e communication. To manage e f f e c t -
i v e l y i n c o n d i t i o n s of l i m i t e d c o n t r o l the s t a t e needed to 
provide a means by which those a f f e c t e d c o u l d watch, understand 
andf i t was hoped then h e l p i n t r a n s m i t t i n g i n t e n t i o n s asid. the 
r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s behind them to rank and f i l e members.^ T h i s 
d i d not mean t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s would be given a r o l e i n 
1. Cab 124/900 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e : O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r C e n t r a l 
Planning of Economic Development. June 1947. Economic 
I n f o r m a t i o n and Opinion.- Memo by S.C. L e s l i e C e n t r a l O f f i c e 
of I n f o r m a t i o n . 
2. Cab 124/900 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e : O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r the 
C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g of Economic Development. 5th March 1957. 
L e t t e r of anonymous c i v i l s e r v a n t to N i c h o l s o n . 
3. For the d e s i r e of both s i d e s of i n d u s t r y to be taken i n t o 
c o n f i d e n c e and given the 'facts,"* see Cab 129/8 C a b i n e t Paper 
CP(46)122. 25th March 1946. P r o s p e r i t y Campaign:Report of 
Conferences of 6th and 7th of March with Trade Union 
E x e c u t i v e s and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of employers o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 
233 
f o r m u l a t i n g p o l i c y or t h a t ' b a r g a i n s ' would be s t r u c k i n a way 
t h a t a l l o w s us to c h a r a c t e r i z e t h i s p e r i o d as c o r p o r a t i s t . At 
a meeting of m i n i s t e r s i n March 1947 the government decided t h a t 
p r o v i s i o n should be made f o r a s s o c i a t i n g both 
s i d e s of i n d u s t r y w i t h the work of economic 
p l a n n i n g i n order t h a t i n d u s t r y be s i e z e d of 
a l l the f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d and f e e l a sense of 
j o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the plems.^ 
The government was i n t e r e s t e d i n widening r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n 
order more f u l l y to l e g i t i m a t e i t s own s t r a t e g y ! s y m b o l i c rep-
r e s e n t a t i o n f i r m l y l i n k e d to the i n d u s t r i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n o r 
' p r o s p e r i t y ' campaign. E v e n t u a l l y an Economic P l a n n i n g Board was 
to be s e t up i n which the government's own s m a l l p l a n n i n g s t a f f 
( C E . P . S . ) and i t s Chairmaji, S i r Edwin Plowden, would p r e s i d e 
and meet w i t h c i v i l s e r v a n t s , t r a d e union and employers r e p r e s e n t -
2 
a t i v e s . 
1. Cab 130/17 General S e r i e s 169. Minutes and Papers on Economic 
Planning, meeting of M i n i s t e r s 4/6th March 1947. 
2. See government statements on C.E.P•S./Economic P l a n n i n g Board. 
H.C. Deb, Vol.435. Col.1412-13. 27th March 1947, a l s o H.C. 
Deb, Vol.439. Col.1804-14. 7th J u l y 1947. 
The Economic P l a n n i n g Board c o n s i s t e d of 
CHAIRMAN:Sir Edwin Plowden (Chairman of C.E.P.S., D i r e c t o r of 
B r i t i s h Aluminium, Commercial Union Assurance and the Chemical 
Firm Tennant, Son and Co.Ltd.) 
3 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the F e d e r a t i o n of B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s 
( F . B . I . ) and the B r i t i s h Employers C o r p o r a t i o n . (B.E.C.) 
S i r W i l l i a m Coates ( I m p e r i a l Chemical I n d u s t r i e s ) 
S i r Graham Cunningham ( T r i p l e x S a f e t y G l a s s Co.) 
Andrew Verdon Smith ( B r i t i s h Aerospace Co.) 
3 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the Trade Union Congress General Council. 
Jack Tanner (Amalgamated E n g i n e e r i n g Union) 
Vic Tewson (General S e c r e t a r y of the T.U.C-) 
Andrew Naesmith (Amalgamated Weavers A s s o c i a t i o n ) 
3 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the Home C i v i l S e r v i c e 
S i r John Woods (Permanent S e c r e t a r y Board of Trade) 
S i r George i h c e (Permanent S e c r e t a r y M i n i s t e r o f Labour) 
S i r A r c h i b a l d Rowlands (Permanent S e c r e t a r y M i n i s t r y of Supply) 
3 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s fen the Central Economic Planning S t a f f (C.E.P.S. ) 
The member of s t a f f most concerned w i t h i n v e s t m e n t was 
Hugh Weeks ( D i r e c t o r o f Programmes. Formerly C h i e f S t a t i s t i c a l 
M i n i s t r y of Supply and D i r e c t o r of J . F r y and Sons L t d . ) 
Source:Compiled from Brady, C r i s i s i n B r i t a i n pp.564-5, 
footnote 83. P r i t t , Labour Government, pp.142-3. 
and Cab 124/1081 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e 
Machinery f o r Economic P l a n n i n g and C o n t r o l . 
March 1947-June 1948. E.P.B. Membership l i s t . 
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No b e t t e r i l l u s t r a t i o n of the r o l e of the Economic P l a n n i n g 
Board can be found than i n the d i s c u s s i o n s over the government's 
investment s t r a t e g y from 1948-52. The Board f e l t t h a t c o n t r o l 
over investment was e s s e n t i a l l y i n c o r r e c t and i n s t e a d 
i n c l i n e d to the view t h a t an i n c r e a s e i n the 
c a p i t a l l a b o u r r a t i o was n e c e s s a r y as a b a s i s 
to i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i v i t y 
but 
r e c o g n i s e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f e x t e n s i v e 
re-equipment a t the p r e s e n t time. 
I t went on to suggest f u r t h e r r e f i n e m e n t s to the government's 
s t r a t e g y of r a i s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y by mctoiLization f o r i n c r e a s e d 
i n t e n s i t y o f work emphasizing the need f o r the n a t i o n to work 
together."^ I f the Board had been i n any doubt about i t s r o l e 
Morrison's o f f i c e was q u i t e s p e c i f i c . I t ' s purpose was to 
allo w c o n s u l t a t i o n with i n d u s t r y but a l s o to inform i t o f 
government p o l i c y amd i t was to be no s u b s t i t u t e f o r the normal 
p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c mode of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n v i a i n d i v i d u a l d e p a r t -
ments. I t would have no e x e c u t i v e f u n c t i o n s , the f i n a l d e c i s i o n 
being the governments a l o n e . Any a d v i c e i t d e s i r e d to tender 
would go v i a the Lord P r e s i d e n t , b e f o r e r e a c h i n g the c a b i n e t . ^ 
In w r i t t e n d i s c u s s i o n s on the way to p r e s e n t the board t o the 
p u b l i c and i t s own members th r e e ' f u n c t i o n s ' were o u t l i n e d . 
(1) To c o n s i d e r the g e n e r a l economic s i t u a t i o n and a d v i s e on 
planning over the next f i v e y e a r s . 
( 2 ) To make s p e c i a l s t u d i e s of u r g e n t a r e a s ( i r o n and s t e e l 
f o r i n s t a n c e ) . 
T229/29. Economic P l a n n i n g Board meeting 7th August 1947. 
Cab 124/1081. Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e Machinery f o r 
Economic Planning and C o n t r o l . March 1947-June 1948, 
l e t t e r from J.P. Maud to S i r John Forbes Watson, B r i t i s h 
Employers F e d e r a t i o n . 22nd May 1947. 
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(3 ) To keep i n d u s t r y i n touch w i t h the s i t u a t i o n . 
Morrison p o i n t e d out that the t h i r d f u n c t i o n was b a s i c . 
I t would s e r v e as a s o r t of two way i n f o r m a t i o n exchange, a 
communication c h a n n e l . ^ I n a c o n f i d e n t i a l minute from the 
Cabinet O f f i c e i t was s t r e s s e d t h a t the Board s h o u l d * s t a n d 
c l e a r * from the economic machinery of government. I t would 
merely study the work of the S t e e r i n g Committee and the Economic 
2 
S e c t i o n . D e s p i t e Morrison*s t a l k about i n d u s t r y 'being i n the 
o p e r a t i o n s room as w e l l as the f r o n t l i n e * the s t r e s s was on 
'being the eyes and e a r s of government* g i v i n g o v e r f a c t s so 
t h a t those who mattered would understand the g e n e r a l aims being 
pursued. 
To c o n s i d e r the economic s i t u a t i o n as we p r e s e n t 
i t to you and as you know i t through your 
e x p e r i e n c e , to o f f e r an assessment of i t aiad 
h e l p keep us i n touch w i t h i n d u s t r y views. 
I n e a r l i e r days of h i s statement Morrison r e f e r r e d to the 
4 
government* s r o l e as * commainder * . One c o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n 
commentator, R;A. B u t l e r , who was g e n e r a l l y i n f a v o u r of any 
' p l u r a l i s t ' arrangements of the French Monnet Plan^seems to have 
c o r r e c t l y p e r c e i v e d the e s s e n t i a l l y s ymbolic r o l e o f the Board 
P l u r a l i s t p l a n n i n g means c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h 
i n d u s t r y before you make the p l a n and not 
a t t e n t i o n to i n d u s t r y a f t e r the p l a n has 
been made by a few back room boys.^ 
1. T229/24. Economic P l a n n i n g Board. D r a f t s of L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s 
statement a t f i r s t meeting of Board. 
2. T229/24 Economic P l a n n i n g Board. C a b i n e t O f f i c e C o n f i d e n t i a l Minute. 18th A p r i l 1947. 
3. T229/24. Economic Planning Board. D r a f t s of Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s 
Statement f o r f i r s t meeting. 
4. i b i d . 
5. H.C. Deb. Vol.434. Col.1249-50. 11th March 
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What p r o v i s i o n a l c o n c l u s i o n s can we draw from a l l t h i s : a 
machinery of c o - o r d i n a t i o n t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t -
a l i s t accompanied by the appearance of c o r p o r a t i s m t h a t t u r n s 
out to be very much commanded, r e s t r i c t e d and u t i l i z e d from the 
government s i d e . I f departmentalism i m p l i e s a n y t h i n g i n theory 
i t i m p l i e s l a c k of o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n i n d e c i s i o n making. Y e t 
we appear to have some s o r t of s t r a t e g y to the e x t e n t t h a t a 
l e v e l of i n d u s t r i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n was r e q u i r e d . We cannot a t 
t h i s stage e x p l a i n i n f u l l t h i s apparent paradox, but what we 
can do i s d i s p o s e of one p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the 
p e r i o d . While we can agree w i t h C h e s t e r t h a t i t i s wrong to say 
an economic p l a n e x i s t e d 
I f by economic p l a n i s meant a s e t o f economic 
o b j e c t i v e s , i n t e g r a t e d and c o n s i s t e d i n t h e i r 
assumptions, which the government had decided 
to c a r r y out and which they had the power to 
c a r r y out.1 
We cannot go f u r t h e r and s e t up 'muddling through' by b a r g a i n i n g 
as the e s s e n c e of the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . ^ T h i s reduces p l a n n i n g 
to committee d i s c u s s i o n s where outcomes r e s u l t from r e l a t i v e 
c l a i m s being s e t t l e d by compromise o f t e n a r i t h m e t r i c a l l y devised 
or by 'the d e b a t i n g power of the v a r i o u s committee members.'^ 
I t suggests by i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t s t r o n g d e b a t e r s get t h e i r way 
and t h a t a l l o c a t i o n s a r e s e c u r e d by d i s c u s s i o n . While we have 
h i n t e d t h a t the n a t u r e of p l a n n i n g was l i k e l y to be based on 
departmental demands we have noted t h a t c e r t a i n demands were 
always accorded p r i o r i t y a t the o u t s e t and may t h e r e f o r e rank 
as o b j e c t i v e s . I n o t h e r words, p r i o r c l a i m s had been s e t which 
1. C h e s t e r , 'Machinery of Government and Plauining' p.360. 
2. T h i s phrase appears i n Lindblom, C., 'The S c i e n c e of 
Muddling Through'. P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Review 19:1959. 
pp.77-85. 
3. Jewkes, J . , Ordeal by P l a n n i n g . (London, Macmillan 1948) pp.138-9. 
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d i s t r i b u t e d r e l a t i v e s h a r e s : committee work b e i n g e s s e n t i a l l y 
formal w h i l e those p r i o r i t i e s remained i n t a c t . C l a i m a n t s 
could bargain minor adjustments a t the margin o n l y because the 
margins were a l l t h a t were a v a i l a b l e given the e x i s t i n g p r i o r 
commitments s e t d u r i n g the war. These commitments were 
maintained a f t e r the war by the very committees whose job i t 
was to a l l o c a t e . E r n e s t Bevin^who as M i n i s t e r of Labour i n 
the wartime c o a l i t i o n had pushed f o r and e s t a b l i s h e d the i n i t i a l 
p r i o r i t y f o r the Labour i n t e n s i v e b u i l d i n g programme, was made 
Fo r e i g n S e c r e t a r y i n the Labour Government but was given the 
j o b of c o - o r d i n a t i n g c a l l s on Manpower through the Manpower 
Committee. At one of i t s e a r l i e s t meetings we f i n d the c h a i r -
man demanding measures to i n c r e a s e labour i n the m a t e r i a l s 
and components i n d u s t r i e s and an e x t e n s i o n of arrangements f o r 
the manufacture of housing components i n the s t a t e ' s armament 
f a c t o r i e s , j u s t i f y i n g t h i s move as f o l l o w s : 
There would be f i e r c e c o m p e t i t i o n from the 
a v a i l a b l e manpower i n 1946 from p r i v a t e 
manufacturers whose f a c t o r i e s would soon be 
ready f o r p r o d u c t i o n and i t was important t h a t 
s t e p s should be taken now to get workers i n t o 
f a c t o r i e s which were producing components f o r 
the housing programme.1 
To a c h i e v e t h i s the T r a i n i n g Scheme he had d e v i s e d i n the war 
should be a c c e l e r a t e d . The committee, reminded o f i t s wartime 
commitment agreed. Such p r i o r s c h e d u l i n g of p r i o r i t i e s c o u l d 
only be r e v i s e d by b r e a k i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of the p o s t -
war s e t t l e m e n t o u t l i n e d i n c h a p t e r 2. I t was not so much an 
absence of s t r a t e g y t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d post war p l a n n i n g but 
an argument over the type of s t r a t e g y : the n a t u r e of the 
1. HLG 102/35 B u i l d i n g Components; 24th October 1945, meeting 
of Manpower Committee. 
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o b j e c t i v e s s e t . The s t r e n g t h of the government's commitment 
i n peace to i t s wartime p l a n n i n g f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s 
r e f l e c t e d i n the t h e o r e t i c a l assumptions b u i l t i n t o the 
planning machinery. I t i s to t h i s theory t h a t we now turn as 
i t i s c r u c i a l l y important i n understanding s t a t e management i n 
t h i s p eriod- I n the f i n a l s e c t i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r we look a t 
the o p e r a t i o n of the p l a n n i n g powers i n r e l a t i o n to c o n c r e t e 
e v e n t s . 
SECTION II;GQVERNING ASSUMPTIONS AND THE PLANNING PROCESS. 
(THE THEORY IN THE MACHINE). 
The p r o c e s s of economic p l a n n i n g began on 9th October 1945 
when S i r E. Bridges, Chairman of the Sub Committee c i r c u l a t e d 
to departments a r e q u e s t f o r e s t i m a t e s of demands i n terms of 
manpower and t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e i n c l u d i n g i n v e s t m e n t on p l a n s 
which they were d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r , 
and, f o r the p r i v a t e s e c t o r , e s t i m a t e s of what the market would 
c l a i m . ^ Where Departments were sp o n s o r i n g i n v e s t m e n t demand 
f o r p r i v a t e account^ to the e x t e n t t h i s was l i c e n c e d as i n 
b u i l d i n g ^ the e s t i m a t e s would be t h a t more p r e c i s e . Thus t o t a l 
e x penditure i n the economy would be the r e s u l t of the sum of 
Departmental programmes based on t h e i r c u r r e n t p o l i c i e s and 
e x i s t i n g commitments. T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n once r e c e i v e d would be 
c o l l a t e d by the S t a t i s t i c s Working P a r t y and^. on the b a s i s of 
i t ^ t h e Economic Survey Working P a r t y , c h a i r e d by the r e s i d e n t 
economist James Meade, Head of the Economic S e c t i o n , would 
1. Cab 124/890 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e : C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g of 
Economic Development. 9th October 1945, l e t t e r from S i r 
Edward Bridges to Permanent S e c r e t a r i e s o f Departments, 
see a l s o Cab 124/891. Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e C e n t r a l 
P l a n n i n g of Economic Development. 12th December 1945. D r a f t 
o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Economic P l a n n i n g P r o g r e s s Report note by 
S e c r e t a r y of C a b i n e t . 
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prepare the survey by i n t e g r a t i n g m a t e r i a l p r o v i d e d by the 
balance of payments Working P a r t y . The survey would then • , 
go. to the S.C. . f o r t h e i r c o v e r i n g summary b e f o r e being 
presented to the M.E.P. - then the Lord P r e s i d e n t and f i n a l l y 
to the C a b i n e t , The o b j e c t of the e x e r c i s e being to m a i n t a i n a 
high and s t a b l e l e v e l of employment by way of the maintenance 
of TOTAL expenditure by a c t i n g on the components o f expe n d i t u r e 
taken as aggregate c a t e g o r i e s , investment ( p u b l i c and p r i v a t e ) 
p u b l i c expenditure and p r i v a t e household consumption being l i k e -
wise * consumption *, a l l t h r e e being t o t a l * spending*. T a x a t i o n 
would be c o n s i d e r e d along w i t h b u s i n e s s and i n d u s t r i a l s a v i n g s 
as p a r t of the aggregate TOT.^ s a v i n g intended to f i n a n c e t o t a l 
investment. Manpower budgets would be prepared to h e l p 
achiev:ie the n e c e s s a r y aggregate supply of r e s o u r c e s to match 
the aggregate demand on them by measuring c a p a c i t y of i n d i v i d u a l 
s e c t o r s . So^in the 1947 s u r v e y ^ t h e r e were e x p e n d i t u r e and 
n a t i o n a l income concepts measuring the c a l l on and the l i k e l y 
supply of r e s o u r c e s i n terms o f v a l u e , w h i l e the manpower 
budget d i d the saone thing i n the p h y s i c a l u n i t s of Labour, i . e . 
t o t a l working pop u l a t i o n d i s t r i b u t e d among the s e c t o r s a c c o r d i n g 
to programme requirements- The f i n a l document would have a 
commentary e x p l a i n i n g m a c r o - l e v e l b a l a n c e - the e x t e n t of the 
est i m a t e d i n f l a t i o n a r y or d e f l a t i o n a r y gap ( i . e . the comparison 
between r e s o u r c e s and c l a i m s i n d i c a t i n g the e x c e s s or d e f i c i e n c y 
of demand) and the means of c l o s i n g i t . To c l o s e an i n f l a t i o n a r y 
gap (Departmental demands exceeding s u p p l y ) c u t s i n t o t a l 
requirements were held out as the p o l i c y s o l u t i o n . Expansion 
of requirements was to be met by widening the concept of need 
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w i t h i n programmes and by c r e a t i n g new ones. 
The Keynsian demand mcinagement b i a s iri' the whole p r o c e s s 
had p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t u a l consequences. As f a r as the t r a d e 
programme were concerned^ the f o r e i g n exchange i n p u t i n t o xhe 
survey looked a t e x p o r t s as f u n d i n g ( a s INCOME) f o r f i n a n c i n g 
i n t e r n a l consumption ( t h e ' r e q u i r e d * l e v e l of i m p o r t s ) . But 
s i n c e the production of e x p o r t s r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s then they 
c o u l d be subsumed under 'spending*, along with p r i v a t e con-
sumption and p u b l i c s e c t o r programmes. Investment was l i k e w i s e 
seen as an aggregate m a i n t a i n i n g the i n t e r n a l e x p e n d i t u r e 
n e c e s s a r y f o r f u l l employment and not f o r i t s c o s t - r e d u c i n g 
e f f e c t s which would tend to e x p e l l a b o u r . I t was t h e r e f o r e 
seen as a component of demand which might be c o n s t r u e d as 
e x c e s s i v e given e x i s t i n g c a p a c i t y . P u b l i c and p r i v a t e i n v e s t -
ment being c o n f l a t e d , the d i s t i n c t i o n between inves t m e n t f o r 
p r i v a t e manufacturing (home v e r s u s e x p o r t ) and p u b l i c l y induced 
investment were hidden i n the t a b l e s and were, not p a r t of the 
language of the i h e o r y . The consequence then of adopting 
Keynesian n a t i o n a l income a n a l y s i s was t h a t p l a n n i n g was done 
on the b a s i s of aggregates c o n s t r u c t e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y ^ w h i c h 
u t i l i z e d broad conceptual c a t e g o r i z a t i o n a b s t r a c t e d from the 
r e a l c o n s t i t u e n t s which made up the aggregates concerned. For 
example, to t a l k about consumption and investment a s p a r t of 
the same demand, s t a t e revenue s u r p l u s v i a t a x a t i o n and p r i v a t e 
p r o f i t s as the same s a v i n g and p u b l i c and p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t as 
j u s t ' c a p i t a l formation' was to aggregate on the b a s i s t h a t 
s o c i e t y ha.d somehow a l r e a d y removed the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
l o g i c of p r i v a t e s e c t o r demand, and the l o g i c of s o c i a l demand 
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i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r . Not only werje the i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n -
t a k e r s i n the v a r i o u s components of 'demand* d i f f e r e n t but 
t h e r e was the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e i r demands coiJild c o n t r a d i c t ' . ^ 
The consequences of the K e y n e s i a n paradigm was t h a t 
planning took a p a r t i c u l a r form - appearing i n the economic 
survey as one of mamaging the o v e r a l l b a l a n c e of supply and 
demand. Pl a n n i n g then was e s s e n t i a l l y n e g a t i v e , i n the words 
of the White Paper: 
e s s e n t i a l l y a task of d e c i d i n g which out of 
a number of c l a i m a n t s must go s h o r t - i n o t h e r 
words which a r e the most i m p o r t a n t n a t i o n a l 
p r i o r i t i e s . ^ 
The Keynesian assumed away the problem of p o l i t i c s by a r g u i n g 
t h a t the p r o c e s s of s e t t i n g p r i o r i t i e s aind programmes would not 
be s u b j e c t to r i g i d i t i e s . A c c o r d i n g to Meade^if one wanted to 
keep the p r i v a t e p a r t of the mixed economy h e a l t h y , the 
e s s e n t i a l requirement was f l e x i b i l i t y . R i g i d employment t a r g e t s 
f o r p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s were u n s u i t a b l e when o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
f o r t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y on the supply s i d e reduced the com-
3 
plement of n e c e s s a r y l a b o u r . Meade's p o i n t seemed e s p e c i a l l y 
p e r t i n e n t given the commitment to r e - e n t e r the world market 
environment on terms t h a t would i n e v i t a b l y p e n a l i s e a n a t i o n 
unable to adapt i t s i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e to new markets and 
new i n d u s t r y and c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a f l e x i b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f manpower. 
1. A p o s i t i o n which may be i n t e n s i f i e d i f the problem o f 
b u r e a u c r a t i c behaviour w i t h i n the s t a t e a p p a r a t u s i s a l s o 
r e c o gnized, see Downs, A., I n s i d e Bureaucracy (Boston L i t t l e , 
Brown 1967). 
2. Economic Survey f o r 1947. Cmnd. 7046. (London, H.M.S.O. 
February 1947) para.25. 
3. Cab 134/186. S t e e r i n g Committee Paper 7th November 1945. 
Economic P l a n n i n g by James Meade e n c l o s e d with note by 
J o i n t S e c r e t a r i e s . 
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Meade's argument about f l e x i b i l i t y and economy i n the use 
of labour c a p t u r e d the c o n t r a d i c t i o n f o r most K e y n e s i a n s a t 
t h i s time: the absence of a concern w i t h growth. A dynamic 
c a p i t a l i s m r e q u i r e d v a r i a t i o n s i n c o s t s and p r i c e s , a n e c e s s a r y 
element of u n c e r t a i n t y f o r anyone watching or * i n d i c a t i n g ' a t 
the c e n t r e . Labour t a r g e t s , p r i o r i t y m a t e r i a l s c o n t r o l , p r i c e 
c o n t r o l and s u b s i d i e s i m p l i e d an element of f i x i t y i n the 
s t r u c t u r e o f p roduction c r y s t a l l i s i n g economic r e l a t i o n s between 
producers i n ways which co u l d upset the b a l a n c e s between i n t e r -
mediate and f i n a l goods to the p o i n t where the former had no 
market.''" Quantitative p h y s i c a l p l a n n i n g was s u i t a b l e f o r a war 
economy where the s t a t e was to be the s o l e p u r c h a s e r i n the 
i n t e r n a l market or where b i l a t e r i a l t r a d e guaranteed f o r e i g n 
markets but m u l t i l a t e r a l f r e e t r a d e was u n c e r t a i n t r a d e : qual'itative 
c o m p e t i t i v e c o s t i n g and p r i c i n g b e i n g determinants of s u c c e s s . 
Stronger arguments along these l i n e s of a dynamic c a p i t a l i s m 
were developed by the a n t i - K e y n e s i a n A u s t r i a n School of.. 
Economists whose work on f r e e markets i n f l u e n c e d the e a r l y VJest 
German regime.^ According to dynamic t h e o r i s t s f u l l employment 
1. B a l a n c e s w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e o f p r o d u c t i o n a r e examined 
both t h e o r e t i c a l l y and s t a t i s t i c a l l y by L e o n t i e f ., W. , 
The S t r u c t u r e of the American Economy 1 9 1 9 - 3 9 : a J i e m p i r i c a l 
a p p l i c a t i o n ox e q u i l i b r i u m a n a l y s i s (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 
1 9 5 1 ) . The importance of t h i s 'balance* i s s u e f o r the 
r e l a t i o n between c a p i t a l and consumer good i n d u s t r i e s i s 
i l l u s t r a t e d i n Devons, E., 'The P r o g r e s s of Reconversion* 
The Manchester School f o r Economic and S o c i a l S t u d i e s . 
Vol.XV, No.l. January 1947 pp. 1 - 2 3 . 
2 . For a summary e x p o s i t i o n of the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the e x i s t e n c e 
of dynamic c a p i t a l i s m w i t h i n t h i s s c h o o l , see the works of 
Hayek c o l l e c t e d i n Hayek, P.A., T i g e r by the T a i l : a Porty 
Year Commentary on Keynesianism. (London, I n s t i t u t e o f 
Economic A f f a i r s - Hobart, Paperback 1 9 7 2 ) . 
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achieved by i n j e c t i o n s of monetary demand and s t a t e induced 
production s w e l l s some i n d u s t r i e s a t the expense o f s m a l l e r or 
p o t e n t i a l i n d u s t r y . T h i s l e a d s to a breakdown i n the f u n c t i o n -
i n g of the system of r e l a t i v e p r i c e s and puts b a r g a i n i n g power 
i n t o the hands of wage e a r n e r s p r o d u c i n g uneconomic 
stag n a t i o n , not only where wages ar e i n f l e x i b l e downwards, but 
a l s o i n terms of the unproductive r e s t r i c t i v e p r a c t i c e s en-
gendered i n 'secure' s e t t i n g s - T h i s a s p e c t of the problem 
l e a d s us back to the notion of c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n . I t i s not j u s t 
the c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n of economic r e l . a t i o n s that i s produced by 
such a s t r u c t u r e of p r i o r i t y p l a n n i n g and f u l l employment, but 
a c r y s t a l i i Sation of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . The balance of c l a s s 
f o r c e s would then be s t a b i l i z e d a t a l e v e l which fundamentally 
reduced o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r f l e x i b i l i t y i n h e r e n t i n the concept 
of a dynamic c a p i t a l i s m . 
The problems of f l e x i b i l i t y can be i l l u s t r a t e d i n another 
regard as w e l l . The government wanted to r a t i o n m a t e r i a l s and 
labour i n t e r n a l l y to p r o t e c t ' e s s e n t i a l s ' e i t h e r f o r p r o d u c t i o n 
f o r s o c i a l need such as housing and s c h o o l s ^ o r f o r p r o d u c t i o n 
i n export i n d u s t r i e s t h a t q u a l i f i e d as labour i n t e n s i v e such 
as t e x t i l e s , c o a l and s t e e l . Y e t the m u l t i l a t e r a l i s t c a s e 
i m p l i e d that the export d r i v e should be t o t a l i n which c a s e 
luxury production of ' i n e s s e n t i a l commodities' would probably 
be as important as the t r a d i t i o n a l export i n d u s t r i e s . Such 
t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u s t r i e s ^ a l t h o u g h c r u c i a l f o r the maintenance 
of employment ( e s p e c i a l l y i n the top p r i o r i t y development a r e a s )^ 
might be s u r p l u s on the world market i f c o u n t r i e s p r e v i o u s l y 
1. Hayek, F.A., F u l l Employment a t Any P r i c e ? (London, I n s t i t u t e 
of Economic A f f a i r s O c c a s i o n a l Paper No.45, 1975), 
\ 
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buying from us began to produce t h e i r own commodities of t h a t 
type. T h i s was a n o t i c e a b l e c o n s t r a i n t on the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n 
of t e x t i l e e x p o r t s . 
I n c o n c l u s i o n , then, we a r g u e , . c o n t r a r y to B e e r \ t h a t 
the post war p l a n n i n g system was e s s e n t i a l l y K e y n e s i a n i n 
assumptions and c o n t e n t . The u n i t s o f measurement were p h y s i c a l 
and monetary v a l u e . The machinery f o r c o - o r d i n a t i o n r e f l e c t e d 
demand r a t h e r than supply s i d e p r e f e r e n c e s and t h a t p r e f e r e n c e 
i t s e l f was a r e f l e c t i o n of the c o n t i n u i n g s e a r c h f o r s e c u r i t y 
r a t h e r than the change and i n s t a b i l i t y i n h e r e n t i n moving 
towards d e c o n t r o l , c o m p e t i t i v e a c c e s s to r e s o u r c e s and r e -
s t r u c t u r i n g f o r c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e i n v e s t m e n t . The s o c i a l demand 
f o r labour i n t e n s i v e investment and f o r b u i l d i n g r a t h e r than 
manufacturing was e a s i l y a s s i m i l a b l e w i t h i n the K e y n e s i a n 
r a t i o n a l e and became i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n the p r i o r i t y c l a s s -
i f i c a t i o n s of the a l l o c a t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s . Having s e t the p a r a -
meters the role of o v e r a l l c o - o r d i n a t i o n was to ba l a n c e aggregate 
demand with the aggregate supply o f r e s o u r c e s , the export 
programme being seen as the only one a s p e c t of the former. 
I n o rder to examine the maintenance of t h i s system a g a i n s t 
the background of continuous c h a l l e n g e s the f o l l b w i n g s e c t i o n 
i l l u s t r a t e s the o p e r a t i o n of the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . The major 
c h a l l e n g e s t h a t o c c u r r e d i n the summer of 1947 and onwards a r e 
the s u b j e c t of a s e p a r a t e c h a p t e r i n v o l v i n g as they do the 
i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p between e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l p l a n n i n g : a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p which can be only h i n t e d a t here mainly because 
1. Beer, Modern B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s , pp.190-4. 
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the two were f o r c i b l y brought together through the medium of 
a c r i s i s consequent upon r e - e n t r y to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. 
I n the next s e c t i o n we examine c o - o r d i n a t i o n and the p r o c e s s 
of p r e s e r v i n g the p r i o r i t i e s i n r e l a t i o n to events s o l e l y 
w i t h i n the i n t e r n a l c o n t e x t . 
SECTION I I I : T H E COURSE OP ECONOMIC PLANT-JING: THE MACHINERY IN 
OPERATION 1945-7. 
Between August 1945 and w e l l i n t o 1946, as planned i n the 
war, the b u i l d i n g labour f o r c e r o s e as a p r o p o r t i o n of the 
t o t a l workforce and w i t h i n t h a t p r o p o r t i o n the amount devoted 
to housing purposes rose t i l l i t was s t a b i l i s e d around 60>^ o. ^  
Yet t h i s d i d not go unchallenged. The Lord P r e s i d e n t Morrison 
wrote to the C h a n c e l l o r l a t e i n 1945 about the l e v e l of 
b u i l d i n g c o s t s . He argued t h a t housing was t a k i n g too l a r g e a 
share of our n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s and demanded g r e a t e r T r e a s u r y 
s u p e r v i s i o n of c o s t s . D e s p i t e a c l a i m by the M i n i s t e r of Works 
that p r i c e c o n t r o l s kept the expense o f the programme i n c o n t r o l 
Morrison maintained t h a t the programme was too b i g c i n d a t ' the 
expense of v i t a l needs' such as the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of manu-
f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y . High b u i l d i n g c o s t s c o u l d o n l y impede 
economic r e c o v e r y . ^ The c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n here was th a t factory 
maintenance and r e p a i r would be e x p e n s i v e i f those c o s t s were 
not s t a b i l i z e d . C e r t a i n l y Morrison was on s t r o n g e r ground than 
the M i n i s t e r of Works^ Tomlinson^ i n t h a t wage i n c r e a s e s designed 
to a t t r a c t workers i n t o the b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s i n d u s t r y r a i s e d 
1. Cab 71/21 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s Paper No.131. 14th August 1945. 
Na t i o n a l B u i l d i n g Programme Memo by the M i n i s t e r of Works 
August-December 1945. see a l s o Cab 132/2 Lord P r e s i d e n t s 
Paper 121, 181, 236 on N a t i o n a l B u i l d i n g Prograinme Demands 
and proposed c e i l i n g s . 
2. Cab 124/485 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e , B u i l d i n g C o s t s . 14th 
December 1945, Morrison to Dalton. 
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c o s t s , when the p r i c e c o n t r o l l e r s had to a l l o w them to be 
r e f l e c t e d i n p r i c e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s p r i o r d e c i s i o n s on m a t e r i a l 
c o n t r o l , p r i c e r e g u l a t i o n and the p r o v i s i o n of s u b s i d y o u t l i n e d 
i n chapter 3, had been taken as a way of coping w i t h such a 
contingency, and a t t h a t e a r l y stage of the b u i l d i n g programme 
nobody seemed concerned to q u e s t i o n the adequacy of the c o n t r o l 
f a c t o r s . 
The i n i t i a l assumption r e g a r d i n g manufacturing investment 
as one amongst e q u a l s i n aggregate demand.or the t o t a l c a l l on 
resources^was b u i l t i n from the s t a r t . A paper went be f o r e the 
Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee prepared by the Economic Section."^ 
I t was recognized t h e r e would be a heavy demand from i n d u s t r i a l -
i s t s f o r a r r e a r s of maintenance and r e p a i r - a backlog b u i l t up 
because of the wartime stop on a l l e x c e p t the armaments 
i n d u s t r i e s . But the l a r g e unspent funds of s a v i n g s and wartime 
ex c e s s p r o f i t s tax r e b a t e s ^ w h i c h would monetize t h i s c a p i t a l 
expenditure, c o u l d on the other hand, merely add to e x c e s s con-
sumer demand. I n a d d i t i o n under investment the c a l l on l a b o u r 
a s s o c i a t e d with the b u i l d i n g programme had to be doubled to 
r e f l e c t the complementary workers r e q u i r e d to make f i t t i n g s , 
b r i c k s and components. Another c o m p l i c a t i o n was r e v e a l e d i n 
t h a t w h i l e r e c o g n i z i n g the n e c e s s i t y ^as f a r as e x p o r t s were 
concerned^for investment i n new f a c t o r i e s and manufacturing 
equipment, the b l u e paper went f o r s e c u r i t y and ' s a f e t y f i r s t ' 
and i t i s worth quoting t h i s i n f u l l . 
1. Cab 71/21 Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee Paper. 16th August 1945. 
'Survey ox the G e n e r a l Economic P o s i t i o n ' prepared by the 
Economic S e c t i o n of the C a b i n e t O f f i c e . 
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C a p i t a l investment to r a i s e the N a t i o n a l Income 
of the f u t u r e can only be undertaken a t the r i s k 
of home consumption a t the p r e s e n t ... a f t e r 6 
ye a r s of war some people are e n t i t l e d to an 
i n c r e a s e i n immediate p l e a s u r e .... p o s t e r i t y 
may be l e f t to provide f o r i t s e l f f o r a w h i l e ... 
moreover when aggregate demand i s s t r o n g i t i s a 
maxim of employment p o l i c y to encourage f i r m s to 
postpone investment e x p e n d i t u r e u n t i l the flo w 
of investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s r e l a t i v e to s a v i n g s 
t h r e a t e n s to dry up so t h r e a t e n i n g maintenance of 
f u l l employment ... . I t i s important, i f t h a t 
p o l i c y i s to succeed^ t h a t t h i s should be 
a p p r e c i a t e d by p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s e s and t h a t 
e x h o r t a t i o n s to g r e a t e r e f f i c i e n c y should not be 
taken to i n v o l v e on approval of i n d i s c r i m i n a t e 
development i n a p e r i o d when r e s o u r c e s a r e s c a r c e . 
The b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e i s an a b s o l u t e p r i o r i t y f o r 
c a p i t a l development f i t s as i l l w i t h the f a c t s of 
the contemporary s i t u a t i o n as the b e l i e f t h a t a l l 
r e s t r a i n t s on consumption can be immediately 
abandoned. 
(my emphasis). 
T h i s b i a s i n pl a n n i n g was r e v e a l e d i n a c t i o n when the d r a f t 
economic survey of 1946 i n d i c a t e d a manpower d e f i c i t f o r 1946."^ 
T h i s d e f i c i t was reproduced i n value terms when the aggregate 
of departmental programmes r e v e a l e d an ' i n f l a t i o n a r y gap' o f 
£470m. I n theory, s e v e r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s were open: a cu t i n 
new housing and some war damage r e p a i r ; a c u t i n the amount o f 
consumer spending by households e f f e c t e d by t i g h t e r r a t i o n i n g 
c o n t r o l s ; or r a i s i n g i n d i r e c t t a x a t i o n and i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s . T h i s -third o p t i o n was not r u l e d out on 
t e c h n i c a l grounds: i t would have been p o s s i b l e to s h i f t to 
exports a t the expense of f a m i l y consumption and s t a n d a r d s o f 
l i v i n g , but g i v e n the f u l l employment p o l i c y , any r a i s i n g of 
p r o d u c t i v i t y would have r e q u i r e d some dent i n t h a t commitment. 
Cab 129/6 C a b i n e t Paper CP(46)32. 30th J a n u a r y 1946. Economic 
Survey f o r 1946 Memo by Lord P r e s i d e n t . The 'survey' had been 
approved by the M i n i s t e r i a l Committee on P l a n n i n g (then Lord 
P r e s i d e n t ' s I n d u s t r i a l Sub-Committee) on 2 1 s t January 1946 and 
took the form of a memo by the Lord P r e s i d e n t summarizing the 
S t e e r i n g Committee's r e p o r t . 
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Edward B r i d g e s put i t thus: 
I n view of the e x h a u s t i o n of the n a t i o n a f t e r 
6 y e a r s of d e p r i v a t i o n t h e r e must be some 
a m e l i o r a t i o n of the p r e s e n t s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g 
i f we a r e to o b t a i n the n e c e s s a r y e f f o r t d u r i n g 
t h i s y e a r . The f o r e i g n e r must not be the o n l y 
one to b e n e f i t from the i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n . 
Under the t i t l e 'Background to p l a n n i n g : the t h r e a t of 
i n f l a t i o n * the survey noted t h a t e x p e n d i t u r e a l l o w e d f o r l i c e n c e d 
p r i v a t e investment would be l i t t l e h i g h e r than the pre-war and 
'probably s u b s t a n t i a l l y l e s s than b u s i n e s s men would want to 
undertake*. While a d m i t t i n g the r e l e v a n c e of re-equipment f o r 
e x p o r t s t h e r e was mention of i m p o r t i n g machinery and c u t s of 
£110m. i n the £710m. of p r i v a t e investment through a r e g u l a t i o n 
of the * l e s s e s s e n t i a l * ' . . Many of the papers a t t a c h e d to the 
Economic Survey operated w i t h the r e f e r e n c e p o i n t of a * t y p i c a l * 
pre-war y e a r f o r investment u s u a l l y 1937 or 1938. The p l a n n e r s 
seemed to have regarded t h a t s e l e c t i o n as unproblematic f o r 
comparison. Yet the l a t e 30*s were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a . h e s i t a n t 
recovery from slump s t i m u l a t e d l a r g e l y by re-armament and a 
p r i v a t e h o u s e b u i l d i n g boom. 
An e a r l i e r d r a f t of the d r a f t ^ u n c o n s i d e r e d by M i n i s t e r s ^ 
t a l k e d of long term p r o j e c t s l o c k i n g up p l a n t and machinery 
r e s o u r c e s , making them u n a v a i l a b l e f o r c u r r e n t supply f o r e x p o r t 
or home consumption, and t h e r e f o r e argued t h a t any c u t s should 
come^not from e s s e n t i a l r e s t o r a t i o n s and c a p i t a l equipment^but 
through a re-examination of the housing programme, c u t t i n g back 
numbers under c o n s t r u c t i o n and s t o p p i n g l a b o u r expansion i n t h a t 
f i e l d . Thus consumer s u p p l i e s c o u l d be kept up without c u t t i n g 
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i n t o export p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s e x p l i c i t recommendation d i d not 
occur l a t e r and t h e r e i s no e x p l a n a t i o n why. We can only 
assume that the Economic Survey working party, composed as i t 
was of r e s i d e n t economists,had recommended what the o f f i c i a l s 
i n the S t e e r i n g Committee thought too u n p a l a t a b l e f o r the eyes 
of M i n i s t e r s at t h i s stage,By s u b s t i t u t i n g the more s l i p p e r y 
concept of the ' l e s s e s s e n t i a l ' m i n i s t e r s were s t i l l l e f t alone 
to determine what t h a t meant. The C a b i n e t however decided to 
r e l a t e the q u e s t i o n of i n v e s t m e n t to manpower s h o r t a g e s i n a 
way t h a t d i d not d i s c r i m i n a t e between types of i n v e s t m e n t . ^ 
The Investment Working P a r t y was asked to d e v i s e a scheme f o r 
h o l d i n g back p r o j e c t s i n a r e a s where the l a b o u r s h o r t a g e was 
i n t e n s e . T h i s was h a r d l y a s o l u t i o n to the problem of an e x c e s s 
demand f o r Labour. For t h i s wider problem the C a b i n e t again 
avoided r e c o n s i d e r i n g p r i o r i t i e s . Having agreed w i t h B r i d g e s 
t h a t i n c r e a s e d consumption was e s s e n t i a l and t h a t investment 
should be p r o t e c t e d , s m a l l c u t s were agreed f o r the armed 
s e r v i c e s ^ i n p e r s o n n e l , by speeding up d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , and i n 
the supply of goods and s e r v i c e s to them. Appeals would be 
made f o r women and o l d men to s t a y a t work. I t was a t t h i s 
meeting and i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t the C a b i n e t h i t on the i d e a 
f o r a ' p r o s p e r i t y campaign'. Ap p e a l i n g to i n d u s t r y to i n c r e a s e 
output, the aim was to reduce e x c e s s demand by i n c r e a s i n g out-
put or s u p p l i e s by an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of l a b o u r . More 
production could t h e r e f o r e be got out of the same manpower and 
1. Cab 134/186. S t e e r i n g Committee Paper. 12th December 1945. 
Economic Survey f o r 1946. Note by J o i n t S e c r e t a r y . 
2. Cab 128/5. Ca b i n e t Meeting CM(46)13. 7th February 1946. 
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and the n e c e s s i t y f o r b i g c u t s to c l o s e manpower gaps c o u l d be 
avoided. The l o g i c of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g y was thoroughly 
Keynesian. I n c r e a s e d output, p r o d u c t i v i t y and investment were 
not seen i n terms of t h e i r c o s t ^ and price.., r e d u c i n g e f f e c t s 
(the c o m p e t i t i v e l o g i c of the supply s i d e micro-economic realm 
of the f i r m or the ' i n d u s t r y ' ) - but i n terms of the growth of 
aggregate supply or o u t p u t s made p o s s i b l e , e n a b l i n g demand and 
t h e r e f o r e f u l l employment to be s u s t a i n e d w i t h o u t i n f l a t i o n . 
Such a ' p r o s p e r i t y campaign' was an e s s e n t i a l a d j u n c t to a 
government f o r c e d by i t s own commitments to c o n s i d e r c u t s i n 
' l e s s e s s e n t i a l ' investment. 
The Investment Working P a r t y was ready w i t h i t s f i r s t 
r e p o r t i n March 1946.^ I t i n d i c a t e d the p r i o r i t y c l a s s e s which 
were,housing, production of c a p i t a l goods f o r investment, r e -
equipment f o r import s a v i n g , maintenance and-renewals, f u e l 
equipment and f a c t o r y b u i l d i n g i n development a r e a s . But although 
i t h i n t e d a t c u t s of £150m. or 10?-c i n g r o s s i n v e s t m e n t i t 
h e s i t a t e d on recommendations hoping i n s t e a d t h a t the gap between 
aggregate demand and supply would d i s a p p e a r by end of March. In 
an e a r l i e r d r a f t the Investment Working P a r t y had s a i d t h a t i f 
c u t s went ahead then departments must submit to equal percentage 
r e d u c t i o n s . The S t e e r i n g Committee, r e p r e s e n t i n g departments, 
amended t h i s (on the 15th March 1946) to ensure p r i o r i t y c l a s s e s 
were r e s pected so t h a t the f i n a l d r a f t r e p o r t e v e n t u a l l y 
1. Cab 134/188. S t e e r i n g Committee Paper. 28th March 1946. 
F i r s t Report of the Investment Working P a r t y . 
2. Cab 134/187 S t e e r i n g Committee meeting. 15th March 1946 
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r e c o g n i z e d that departments should not work 
to a uniform r a t e of r e d u c t i o n s i n c e i t i s 
r e c o g n i z e d t h a t departments which i n c l u d e 
p r i o r i t y c l a s s e s w i l l not be a b l e to show the 
same r e d u c t i o n as o t h e r s . ! 
As i t turned out even t h i s m i l d t r i m i n departmental programmes 
di d not o c c u r . M i n i s t e r s met and noted the S t e e r i n g Committees 
c o v e r i n g note to the r e p o r t t h a t the gap was l e s s than envisaged: 
women, had s t a y e d a t work as r e q u e s t e d . M i n i s t e r s d i d , l a t e r , 
however, agree t h a t the M i n i s t r y of Works b u i l d i n g programme 
c e i l i n g s should be s c r u t i n i z e d by the Investment Working P a r t y ? 
The c h i e f r e s i d e n t economist and head of the economic s e c t i o n 
James Meade, bemoaned the f a c t t h a t the o p p o r t u n i t y had not been 
taken to c u t now and he c r i t i c i s e d m i n i s t e r s who went on 
approving b u i l d i n g l a b o u r a l l o c a t i o n s when t h e r e were p o s s i -
b i l i t i e s of c u t s being r e q u i r e d a t a l a t e r s t a g e . 'Too l a r g e 
of a p a r t of our economic r e s o u r c e s were going i n t o t h i s s e c t o r ' 
4 
he added. By December 1946 another D r a f t Economic Survey had 
been prepared by the S t e e r i n g Committee which showed t o t a l 
f i x e d c a p i t a l formation t a k i n g a planned 20% o f N a t i o n a l income 
1. Cab 134/188. Report of Investment Working P a r t y . 
2. Cab 134/503. M i n i s t e r i a l Committee on Economic P l a n n i n g meeting. 16th A p r i l 1946. 
3. Cab 132/1. Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee Meeting. 10th May 1946. 
4. Cab 124/633. Post War B u i l d i n g Programme. J . E . Meade to 
Lord P r e s i d e n t dated 22nd May 1946. 
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a t £l,705m.^ The c o v e r i n g memo by the S t e e r i n g Committee con-
fir m e d the commitments to m a i n t a i n consumption ajid the housing 
programme* i t . noted t h a t the e s s e n c e o f the problem o f planning 
w a s i n t r y i n g to do too much i n expanding e x p o r t s 50%-above t h e i r 
1938 l e v e l by the second h a l f o f 1947, m a i n t a i n i n g a l a r g e 
defence c a p a c i t y , r e - h o u s i n g the p o p u l a t i o n , keeping f u l l employ' 
ment, re-eq u i p p i n g i n d u s t r y i n c l u d i n g r e - i n s t a t e m e n t o f war 
destr o y e d p l a n t and machinery, improving n a t i o n a l i n s u r a n c e 
b e n e f i t s , o l d age pensions and r a i s i n g the s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g 
by food s u b s i d i e s w ithout b i g i n c r e a s e s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y ^ a l l of 
1. Cab 134/503. M i n i s t e r i a l Committee on Economic P l a j i n i n g Paper. 
M.E.P.(46)5. 2 1 s t December 1946. D r a f t Economic Survey f o r 
1946-7. Report by Economic Survey Working P a r t y . 
Table 5 showed the £l,705m. of T o t a l F i x e d C a p i t a l Formation 
was to be d i s t r i b u t e d between s e c t o r s . P u b l i c £ 694m. 
Private£1011m. 
£1705m. 
and d i v i d e d i n t o u s e s 
as f o l l o w s ; - C o n s t r u c t i o n £ 825m. 
P l a n t and Machinery £ 880m. 
£1705m. 
The c o n s t r u c t i o n investment 
was. d i s t r i b u t e d between s e c t o r s 
P u b l i c £ 4a6m. 
P r i v a t e £ 339m. 
£ 825m. 
and d i v i d e d i n t o u ses as 
f o l l o w s : Temporary Housing £ 45m. 
New Housing) 
£227m.Public) ^ 
War Damage R e p a i r £ 3am, 
Maintenance and R e p a i r £ l43m. 
Other work £ 113m. 
New I n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g £ 61m. 
Government B u i l d i n g and -
P u b l i c u t i l i t i e s t: zH^^ 
2. T h i s export t a r g e t had been agreed i n 1946 Cab 128/5 
Cabin e t meeting CM(46)94, 4 t h November 1946. 
which l e d to e x c e s s demand. A l l t h i s was to o c c u r i n an 
environment where f o r e i g n r e s e r v e s were s m a l l e r than pre-war 
and where the e f f i c i e n c y of c a p i t a l equipment has been reduced 
through a l a c k of proper maintenance and r e p a i r i n the i n t e r w a r 
y e a r s and d u r i n g the war. The labour s h o r t a g e s were only i n 
r e s p e c t o f Departmental demands. I f e v a l u a t e d from p r o s p e c t i v e 
consumer demand and p r o s p e c t i v e equipment, e x c e s s demand was 
p o t e n t i a l l y much g r e a t e r but kept down by c o n t r o l s - As f o r 
p r o d u c t i v i t y t h e r e seemed to be no r a p i d s o l u t i o n - i n c r e a s e d 
• mechanization^ i t was noted^ took time and the p r o p o r t i o n of 
c a p i t a l goods was being l i m i t e d by the o v e r a l l manpower shortage^ 
The S t e e r i n g Committee's e a r l i e r note had r u l e d out monetary 
p o l i c y as a means of r e s t r a i n i n g demand by a r i s e i n i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s and i n c r e a s e s i n t a x a t i o n s i n c e t h i s would t h r e a t e n 
2 
a s p e c t s of ' s o c i a l p o l i c y ' . A t o t a l gap of 630,000 men was 
now p r e d i c t e d . The M i n i s t e r i a l P l a n n i n g Committee (M.E.P.) 
had c o n s i d e r e d a^d approved most of Committee's recommendations? 
The l a t e r body had proposed a s o l u t i o n which i n v o l v e d some 
a l t e r a t i o n to the b u i l d i n g prograinme i n p a r t i c u l a r a s m a l l e r 
labour f o r c e of 1,300,000 not 1,370,000, and a break i n the 
automatic p r i o r i t y which gave housing 60% of the men a v a i l a b l e 
a t any one time. The r a i s i n g o f the s c h o o l l e a v i n g age was to 
be postponed, f u r t h e r more s u b s t a n t i a l c u t s i n defence and t h e i r 
supply were agreed with, a greater emphasis on f a c t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
1. Cab 129/16. C a b i n e t Papers CP(47)19. 7 th J a n u a r y 1947. 
Economic Survey f o r 1947 Memo by C h a n c e l l o r e n c l o s i n g 
comments by M.E.P., S t e e r i n g Committee CP(47)20. 
2. Cab 134/503. M i n i s t e r i a l Committee on Economic P l a n n i n g 
M.E.P,(46)5. 21st December 1946. D r a f t Economic Survey f o r 
1946-7. Report by Economic Survey Working P a r t y c o v e r i n g 
note by S t e e r i n g Committee. 
3. Cab 134/503. M i n i s t e r i a l Committee on Economic P l a n n i n g 
meeting. 9th January 1947. 
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The C a b i n e t r e j e c t e d much o f t h i s . S t a f f o r d C r i p p s , P r e s i d e n t 
o f t h e Board o f Trade argued^ a t t h e f u l l two day C a b i n e t 
meeting'^^ t h a t t h e S t e e r i n g Committees recommendations s h o u l d be 
a c c e p t e d . But t h e c u t s i n armed f o r c e s s e r v i c e s and s u p p l y were 
a t t a c k e d by t h e d e f e n c e m i n i s t e r s and s u p p o r t e d by A t t l e e who 
agreed such a move 'would weaken o u r F o r e i g n P o l i c y ' . Dal t o n 
and C r i p p s were a l s o d e f e a t e d o v e r t h e i d e a o f p o s t p o n i n g t h e 
r a i s i n g o f t h e s c h o o l l e a v i n g age and t h e C a b i n e t a d o p t e d t h e 
amendment by M.E.P. t h a t t h e h o u s i n g programme and i t s p r i o r i t y 
f o r l a b o u r s h o u l d n o t be a l t e r e d f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g . The 
Government^ i t was s a i d i n C a b i n e t , w o u l d a v o i d r e t r e a t i n g on 
p l e d g e s as i t had done a f t e r 1918. The c o m m i t t e e a d o p t e d t h e 
sur v e y p r o p o s a l t h a t t h e m e t a l and e n g i n e e r i n g i n d u s t r i e s 
s h o u l d be r e s t r i c t e d i n t e r m s o f l a b o u r ^ c o n c e n t r a t i n g i n s t e a d 
on work f o r r e - e q u i p m e n t w h i c h y i e l d e d q u i c k r e t u r n s i n terms 
o f o u t p u t o f consumer goods o r e x p o r t s . A l t h o u g h t h e e x p o r t 
t a r g e t s t i l l s t o o d , Dal t o n m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e T r e a s u r y and t h e 
Board o f Trade f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s 'ganged up a g a i n s t ' by t h e r e s t 
2 
o f t h e C a b i n e t . The Prime M i n i s t e r A t t l e e had n o t s t o o d by 
them b u t i n s t e a d was s t i l l e m p l o y i n g l a b o u r i n t e n s i t y as t h e 
s o l u t i o n t h r o u g h t h e p r o s p e r i t y campaign. He m a i n t a i n e d t h a t a 
mere i n c r e a s e i n l a b o u r p r o d u c t i v i t y w o u l d be e q u i v a l e n t t o 
a 2^-^ i n c r e a s e i n t h e w o r k f o r c e t h u s r e m e d y i n g t h e 613,000 gap. 
Dal t o n w r i t e s o f t h e u n w i l l i n g n e s s o f t h e C a b i n e t t o ' f a c e 
f a c t s ' . How c o u l d t h e gap be l o w e r e d by a mere 2 ^ i n c r e a s e i n 
p r o d u c t i v i t y i f p r o d u c t i v i t y c o u l d o n l y be a c h i e v e d f r o m l a b o u r 
i n ^ p r o d u c t i v e i n d u s t r y ' . T h i s c o u l d n o t be a c h i e v e d o v e r t h e 
1. Cab 128/9. C a b i n e t M e e t i n g s CM(47)7. 1 6 t h J a n u a r y GM(47)8 
and CM(47)9. 1 7 t h Ja n u a r y 1947. 
2. Dal t o n , H., H i g h T i d e and A f t e r : M e m o i r s I I I 1945-60. 
(London, M u l l e r 1962)p.193-6. 
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whole w o r k f o r c e , e s p e c i a l l y n o t i n t h e armed f o r c e s and p u b l i c 
s e r v i c e s , and t h a t meant t h e i n c r e a s e w o u l d have t o be t h a t 
much g r e a t e r i n t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r and i t would be r e q u i r e d t h a t 
y e a r . How was t h i s t o be a c h i e v e d ? By t h e use o f new and b e t t e r 
m a c h i n e r y and c a p i t a l goods? And how, D a l t o n asked a g a i n , was 
t h i s t o be produced more q u i c k l y and i n g r e a t e r q u a n t i t y ^ w i t h 
a h o v e r a l l manpower s h o r t a g e , o t h e r t h a n by ' p r o v i d i n g more 
l a b o u r i n t h e t r a d e s concerned* - 'no o t h e r need competed w i t h 
t h i s i n u r g e n c y ' . Soon t h e A m e r i c a j i l o a n w o u l d r u n o u t and i m p o r t 
c u t s m i g h t be n e c e s s a r y . The argument used a g a i n s t D a l t o n t h a t 
c u t s i n l a b o u r employed e l s e w h e r e w o u l d n o t , w i t h l a b o u r d i r e c t i o n 
renounced, guaraintee t h a t a l l men w o u l d go i n t o u s e f u l t r a d e s was^ 
f o r him^ an argument f o r r e l e a s i n g even more men t o e n s u r e some d i d . 
I t t o o k a n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r t o g e t m i n i s t e r s t o make even a 
m a r g i n a l change i n t h e h o u s i n g p r i o r i t y . I n t h e f i r s t two 
months o f 1947 t h e c o u n t r y f r o z e up under a b l a n k e t o f snow and 
i c e * Coal s t o c k s d e c l i n e d as t h e demand f o r e n e r g y i n c r e a s e d . 
G e n e r a t i n g c a p a c i t y was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o c a t e r f o r t h e i n c r e a s e d 
demand; p a r t s o f i n d u s t r y were c l o s e d down as power c u t s and 
r a t i o n i n g o f s u p p l y was i n t r o d u c e d . O u t p u t a l s o f e l l i n t h e 
b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l i n d u s t r y ; b u i l d i n g s i t e s were l e f t d e s e r t e d 
and b u i l d i n g w o r k e r s were laJ-d o f f . I t was i n t h i s e n v i r o n m e n t 
2 
t h a t t h e I n v e s t m e n t Working P a r t y p r o d u c e d a n o t h e r r e p o r t 
w h i c h n o t e d t h a t on p r e s e n t e s t i m a t e s by June 1948 
b u i l d i n g demands would exceed l a b o u r by 200,000. I n 
view o f t h e need ' t o i m p r o v e p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y 
1. D a l t o n , H i g h T i d e and A f t e r . p . l 9 5 . 
2. Cab 134/190. S t e e r i n g Committee Paper. 2 8 t h F e b r u a r y 1947. 
I n v e s t m e n t Working P a r t y R e p o r t on B u i l d i n g Programme 
Labour demands and c e i l i n g s 1947-8. 
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by i n c r e a s i n g manpower i n f u e l , power t r a n s p o r t and o t h e r 
e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r y 
There a p p e a r e d t o be no escape f r o m a c u t o f 
t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f 6 0 % t o h o u s i n g . 
The W o r king P a r t y was c o n c e r n e d a t t h e a u t o m a t i c s p i r a l l i n g o f 
e x i s t i n g schemes w h i l e f u e l and power were s h o r t o f l a b o u r by 
27% and i n d u s t r y by 23%. The Board o f Trade demand f o r l a b o u r 
was t h e a g g r e g a t e o f s e p a r a t e cases t h a t had passed t h e a p p r o v a l 
s t a g e f o r l i c e n c i n g . I t i n c l u d e d war damage r e p a i r , e x t e n s i o n s , 
a d a p t i o n s and new f a c t o r i e s i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a r e a s . T h i s 
amounted t o a c a l l on l a b o u r f o r 110,000 w o r k e r s r i s i n g t o 
120,000 by June 1948. Because i t was an e s t i m a t e based on 
l i c e n c e s l i k e l y t o be approved i t made no a l l o w a n c e f o r u n -
l i m i t e d p o t e n t i a l demand w h i c h m i g h t be f o r t h c o m i n g f r o m 
c a p i t a l i s t s were t h e r e no c o n t r o l s - Even l i c e n e - e d demand 
had been p a r e d down t o 109,000. The e v e n t u a l a l l o c a t i o n a g r e e d 
w i t h t h e H e a d q u a r t e r s B u i l d i n g Committee o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f 
Works (H.Q.B.C.) was f o r 69,000. I f t h e Board o f Trade was t o 
g e t m o r e ^ o t h e r s w o u l d have t o be s c a l e d down. A m o d i f i e d s e t 
o f i n s t r u c t i o n s were t o be g i v e n t o H-Q.B.C. The b u i l d i n g 
l a b o u r f o r c e was e x p e c t e d t o grow by 39,000 between June 1947 
and March 1948. I f t h e h o u s i n g p r i o r i t y s t a y e d a t i t s p r e s e n t 
l e v e l o f 6 0 % t h e n t h e r i s i n g demand c u r v e o f i n d u s t r y w o u l d have 
t o be s t a b i l i z e d a t a l o w e r f i g u r e t o f i t what was l e f t o v e r . 
Since the f u e l c r i s i s had meant a l a c k o f o u t p u t o f b u i l d i n g 
m a t e r i a l s ^  t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f a ' m a t e r i a l s h o r t a g e ' , w h i c h had n o t 
seemed u r g e n t i n January^ was now i n e v i d e n c e and i t d i d n o t make 
sense t o expand h o u s i n g any more i f i t c o u l d n o t use a l l i t had 
a t t h e moment. The c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n was t h a t t h e r e w o u l d have 
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t o be a r e d u c t i o n i n new h o u s i n g s t a r t s - The a l l o c a t i o n s 
t h e r e f o r e a g reed f o r March 194B f o r each programme were l e s s 
t h a n what had been r e q u e s t e d . F u e l and power and: i n d u s t r y g o t 
a l l t h e 39,000 i n c r e a s e i n t he a d d i t i o n a l l a b o u r e n t e r i n g t h e 
b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y . F u e l and power a c h i e v e d i t s demand i n f u l l . 
I n d u s t r y g o t 8 3 % i n s t e a d o f t h e 7 7 % o f i t s demand p r e v i o u s l y 
a l l o c a t e d . Labour on h o u s i n g was n o t however, i n c r e a s e d . T h i s 
can be i l l u s t r a t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g T a b l e . 
TABLE 2} DEMANDS AND PLANNED CEILINGS FOR LABOUR IN KEY 
BUILDING SECTORS MARCH 1947. 
( j u a r t e r e n d i n g 30 June 1947. 
Demands A l l o c a t i o n As % 
( C e i l i n g ) o f 
. . Demand 
I n d u s t r y 165,300 127,660 
Fu e l ^ 
Power 47,700 34,350 




TOTAL p o s i t i o n JUNE 1947 
TOTAL BUILDING LABOUR FORCE 
971,000 
Housing 6 0% 
(582,000) 
Q u a r t e r e n d i n g 30 March 1948-
Demands A l l o c a t i o n As % 
( C e i l i n g ) o f 
Demand 
176,700 147,322 83 
53,588 53,588 100 
653,754 582,000 89 
(H^^BC bad. p r o p o s e d 
600,000) 
TOTAL p o s i t i o n March 1948 
TOTAL BUILDING LABOUR FORCE 
1,010,000 
H o u s i n g 5 7% 
(582,000 ) 
T h i s t a b l e c o m p i l e d f r o m t h e f o l l o w i n g s o u r c e s , : - Cab 134/190 
S t e e r i n g Committee Paper. 2 8 t h F e b r u a r y 1947. I n v e s t m e n t 
Vvorking P a r t y R e p o r t on B u i l d i n g programme l a b o u r demands and 
c e i l i n g s . End uses c o m p i l e d f r o m Cab 132/7 L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s 
Paper, 2 4 t h March 1947, B u i l d i n g Programme and HLG 102/261 
H e a d q u a r t e r s B u i l d i n g Committee Paper 3 1 s t J a n u a r y 1947. 
Labour c e i l i n g s and demands f o r y e a r 1947-8. 
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The L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee met"^ and Bevan a g r e e d t o t h e 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e h o u s i n g programme so l o n g as i n d i v i d u a l 
m i n i s t e r s c o u l d a p p r o ach t h e M i n i s t e r o f Works and t h e n a p p e a l 
t o t h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee i n case o f ' s p e c i a l d i f f i c u l t y 
o r i f any cons e q u e n t unemployment r e a c h e d a l e v e l w h i c h 
t h r e a t e n e d t h e c o - o p e r a t i o n o f t h e b u i l d i n g u n i o n s i n t r a i n i n g 
schemes. Bevan j u d g e d c o r r e c t l y t h a t t h e h o u s i n g programme 
had n o t been p o l i t i c a l l y a t t a c k e d s i n c e t h e c u t was o n l y 
r e f l e c t i n g what n a t u r e had imposed t h r o u g h t h e w e a t h e r . There was 
some a t t e m p t t o c o n c e n t r a t e new h o u s i n g on p r o d u c t i v e w o r k e r s . 
The S t e e r i n g Committee o f c i v i l s e r v a n t s had p u t a p a p e r ^ 
d i s c u s s e d a t t h e 2 5 t h A p r i l m e e t i n g ^ s t r e s s i n g t h e ' l i m i t e d 
n a t u r e o f t h e c u t ' and t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f good h o u s i n g i n 
a s s i s t i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y , as w e l l as p r o v i d i n g a s o c i a l s e r v i c e . 
I t a d v o c a t e d a p r i o r i t y w i t h i n a p r i o r i t y by d e v i s i n g i n s t r u c -
t i o n s f o r l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t they g i v e p r e f e r e n c e t o c o a l -
m i n e r s , a g r i c u l t u r a l w o r k e r s and key w o r k e r s i n development 
areas* There i s some e v i d e n c e t h a t t h i s s u g g e s t i o n was t a k e n 
up by l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s but^ as t h e J u n i o r H o u s i n g M i n i s t e r 
n o t e d f i t was v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o i m p l e m e n t o w i n g t o t h e 
p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y o b l i g a t i o n o f l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s t o a l l o c a t e houses a c c o r d i n g t o h o u s i n g need on 
r e s i d e n c e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ^ i r r e s p e c t i v e o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . " ^ As i t t u r n e d o u t t h e a d v i c e t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
1. Cab 132/6 L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee m e e t i n g s . 2 8 t h March and 
2 5 t h A p r i l 1947 d i s c u s s i n g paper i n Cab 132/7 L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s 
Committee Paper 2 4 t h March 1947 N a t i o n a l B u i l d i n g Programme 
1947-8 Memo by M i n i s t e r o f Works. 
2. Cab 134/190 S t e e r i n g Committee Paper. 6 t h March 1947. 
N a t i o n a l B u i l d i n g Programme 1947-8. 
3. Cab.132/7 L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee Paper. 17Th March 1947. 
N a t i o n a l B u i l d i n g Programme 1947-8. Memo by P a r l i a m e n t a r y 
S e c r e t a r y M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h ( L . J . E d w a r d s ) . 
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made l i t t l e o r no d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e programme.^ 
There a r e s e v e r a l t h i n g s we s h o u l d n o t e a b o u t t h i s 
a p p a r e n t a l t e r a t i o n i n t h e h o u s i n g p r i o r i t y . F i r s t ^ i t i n v o l v e d 
t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n n o t o f t h e e x i s t i n g b u i l d i n g l a b o u r f o r c e 
b u t o f t h e 39,000 a d d i t i o n a l w o r k e r s coming i n t o employment i n 
th e programme. Housing s t i l l r e c e i v e d t h e l a r g e s t s i n g l e s h a r e 
w i t h 57% o f a v a i l a b l e l a b o u r and r e c e i v e d t h e same p e r c e n t a g e o f 
i t s demand (39%) as i n t h e p r e v i o u s a l l o c a t i o n . The M i n i s t e r o f 
H e a l t h h i m s e l f r e c o g n i z e d t h e m a r g i n a l n a t u r e o f change and 
t h a t l i m i t s must n e c e s s a r i l y be s e t by t h e u n a v a i l a b i l i t y o f 
m a t e r i a l s and t h e r e f o r e d i d n o t r e g a r d t h e new p o s i t i o n as any-
t h i n g l i k e a s u b s t a n t i a l i n r o a d i n t o t h e p r i o r i t y . A g u a r a n t e e 
o f s o r t s v i a t h e f o r m u l a o f an ' a p p e a l * had been w r i t t e n i n t o 
t h e d e c i s i o n w h i c h appeared t o p r o t e c t i t f r o m t h a t c o n t i n g e n c y . 
C o n c l u s i o n s 
The b u i l d i n g programme^ and w i t h i n i t t h e h o u s i n g p r i o r i t y ^ 
had been i n s u l a t e d f r o m two i m p o r t a n t c h a l l e n g e s . I t had g a i n e d 
p r o t e c t i o n b o t h i n d e c i s i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e f i r s t r e v e a l e d 
o v e r a l l manpower gap and seco n d l y , i n a d j u s t m e n t s d e v i s e d t o cope 
w i t h t h e f u e l c r i s i s . The p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s , e s s e n t i a l l y demand 
d r i v e n by d e p a r t m e n t a l programmes and p r i o r i t i e s s e t i n w a r t i m e , 
c o l l a t e d t h o s e demands and r e l a t e d them i n an a g g r e g a t e t o 
a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s . Any gap r e v e a l e d w o u l d r e q u i r e a t t e n t i o n 
o n l y a t the m a r g i n s because p r i o r i t i e s were s e t and u n c o m m i t t e d 
1. See Crosland, A., 'The Movement o f Labour i n 1948' P a r t I I 
B u l l e t i n o f t h e O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e o f S t a t i s t i c s . 
V o l . 1 1 . No. 7 and 8, J u l y / A u g u s t 1949, p.198. 
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r e s o u r c e s s c a r c e . Those who a r g u e d f o r s u b s t a n t i a l r e -
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f manpower and, t h e r e f o r e , a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h o s e 
p r i o r i t i e s were u n a b l e t o p r e v e n t t h e chosen s t r a t e g y f r o m b e i n g 
pursued i . e . campaigns t o i n t e n s i t y t h e use o f the, e x i s t i n g 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . The p r o s p e r i t y campaign c r i e d 'work o r want' y e t 
t h e message had a h o l l o w r i n g . F u l l employment, s u b s i d i e s and 
' f a i r s h a r e s ' by r a t i o n i n g c o n t i n u e d t o be t h e o r d e r o f t h e day. 
The e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n s w h i c h had s e t t h e p r i o r i t i e s were t h e 
r e s u l t o f commitments u n d e r t a k e n as p a r t o f t h e c o n t r a c t w i t h 
t h e p e o p l e e s t a b l i s h e d i n war and d i s c u s s e d i n c h a p t e r 2. I t 
s h o u l d be r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e government's t o p c i v i l s e r v a n t , S i r 
Edward B r i d g e s , had i n t i m a t e d as much when he t a l k e d i n terms 
o f t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r a m e l i o r a t i o n . These commitments - t h e 
d e c i s i o n t o r e t a i n f u l l employment a f t e r t h e war; t h e d e c i s i o n 
on t h e share o f r e s o u r c e s g o i n g on h o u s e b u i l d i n g ; w h i l e a t t h e 
saune t i m e m a i n t a i n i n g a l a r g e d e f e n c e programme and p u b l i c 
s e c t o r - c r e a t e d t h e v e r y s c a r c i t i e s p l a n n i n g was supposed t o 
remove. The s t r o n g e s t c h a l l e n g e t o r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r i o r i t i e s 
was y e t t o come - i n t h e a p p a r e n t i m p e r a t i v e s i m p l i c i t i n t h e 
d e c i s i o n t o r e - e n t e r t h e w o r l d m a r k e t w i t h i t s e x t e r n a l con-
s t r a i n t s . Such c o n s t r a i n t s were r e f l e c t e d i n a n o t h e r s e t o f 
w a r t i m e commitments, i . e . t o abandon t h e a r r a y o f p r o t e c t i v e 
c o n t r o l s p l a c e d on f o r e i g n t r a d e and c u r r e n c y exchange. Such 
commitments seemed t o i n d i c a t e an i n c r e a s i n g p r i o r i t y f o r t h e 
e x p o r t programme and i n d u s t r i a l i n v e s t m e n t f o r t h e n e c e s s a r y 
c o s t and t h e r e f o r e p r i c e r e d u c i n g e f f e c t s on t h e f o r m e r . T h i s 
commitment, a t i t s f a c e v a l u e , a p peared t o c o n t r a d i c t t h e 
a s s u m p t i o n s about t h e c o n t e n t and s t a b i l i t y o f what had t o be 
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c o - o r d i n a t e d . Indeed i t appeared t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e i n i t i a l 
c o - o r d i n a t e s s h o u l d be r e v i s e d . C e r t a i n p r o b l e m s o u t l i n e d a t 
t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s c h a p t e r s t i l l r e m a i n . When and t o what 
e x t e n t a r e seeming i m p e r a t i v e s t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p o l i t i c a l 
o b j e c t i v e s ? I n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r we examine t h e c a s e o f c r i s i s 
when i m p e r a t i v e s i n s e r t t h e m s e l v e s f o r c i b l y f o r a t t e n t i o n and 
where s t a t e d commitments t o ' p u t f i r s t t h i n g s f i r s t ' and engage 
t h e p r o b l e m head on a t l a s t appear t o remove t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
b e h a v i o u r t h a t i s t h e essence o f p o l i t i c a l management. 
CHAPTER V I 
The C o n v e r t i b i l i t y C r i s i s 
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INTRODUCTION 
C h a p t e r 4 i l l u s t r a t e d t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c o n s t r a i n t s 
i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c e and t r a d e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . The o p e r a t i n g p o i n t o f t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s 
has been f i x e d f o r 1947; meanwhile a p e r i o d o f p o stponement 
o r p o l i c y 'space' had been g r a n t e d made p o s s i b l e by t h e a g r e e d 
use o f t r a d e and exchange c o n t r o l s and t h e f i n a n c i a l f a c i l i t y 
o f a l o a n . The l o g i c , as t h e A m e r i c a n s asid some B r i t i s h 
r e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t s saw i t , was t h a t d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d o f 
g r a c e B r i t a i n w o u l d u n d e r t a i c e c e r t a i n i n t e r n a l a d j u s t m e n t s 
w h i c h w o u l d ' r e f i t ' i t f o r a s u c c e s s f u l r e - e n t r y i n t o t h e 
c o m p e t i t i v e w o r l d m a r k e t . The outcome, as t h e n e x t two 
c h a p t e r s w i l l show, was n o t a r a d i c a l s h i f t i n r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
p r i o r i t i e s . The reasons f o r t h i s were n o t l a c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n 
o r o f r e s e a r c h c a p a c i t y t o r e c o g n i s e t h e p r o b l e m : adequate 
r e v i e w s were u n d e r t a k e n . The n e c e s s i t y appeared t h e o r e t i c a l . 
Knowledge t h a t t h e r e was g o i n g t o be a r e - e n t r y p o i n t , c o u l d 
n o t e x e r t t h e same k i n d o f c o n s t r a i n t on p o l i c y maikers as t h e 
a c t u a l f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g a t t h e r e - e n t r y p o i n t i t s e l f . Neces-
s i t y was n o t y e t a c t u a l i n t h e sense o f c o m p r i s i n g t h e r e a l 
o p e r a t i n g e f f e c t s o f a c r i s i s . T h a t b e i n g so, we saw i n t h e 
l a s t c h a p t e r how t h e I n v e s t m e n t W o r k i n g P a r t y w e i g h t e d a l l 
i n v e s t m e n t , i n c l u d i n g s o c i a l i n v e s t m e n t , e q u a l l y and how t h e 
p l a n n i n g a p p a r a t u s r e f l e c t e d d e p a r t m e n t a l demands. I n t h e 
n e x t two c h a p t e r s we e n t e r i n t o t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g ' b l a c k 
box' a t t h e h e i g h t o f t h e ' c o n v e r t i . b i l i t y c r i s i s ' , and i n 
d o i n g so r e t u r n t o t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h n a t i o n a l and i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l economy i n t e r s e c t , amd where p o l i c y c o - o r d i n a t e s 
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were c a l l e d f o r . I t w i l l t h e n be p o s s i b l e t o j u d g e how f a r , 
even a t t h e p o i n t o f c r i s i s , p o l i t i c i a n s r e c o n s t r u c t e d 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
SECTION 1 ; RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS 
C o n v e r t i b i l i t y a t t h i s t i m e must be u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e 
c o n t e x t o f t h e w o r l d ' " d o l l a r s h o r t a g e - . The m a j o r r e a s o n f o r 
u h d e r - p r o d u c t i v i t y o u t s i d e t h e d o l l a r a r e a was t h e h i s t o r i c 
l a c k o f UK e x p o r t c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s w i t h U n i t e d S t a t e s mass-
pr o d u c e d c o m m o d i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e i r home m a r k e t where 
t a r i f f s c r e a t e f u r t h e r o b s t a c l e s . These f a c t o r s were 
r e i n f o r c e d by t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t o i m p o r t majiy more b a s i c f o o d -
s t u f f s and raw m a t e r i a l s f r o m t h e d o l l a r w e s t e r n h e m i s p h e r e 
as a r e s u l t o f t h e w a r t i m e d e v a s t a t i o n i n t h e Far E a s t and 
E a s t e r n Europe w h i c h had r e d u c e d t h e i r p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y . 
T h i s meant t h a t o u r d o l l a r d e f i c i t was much g r e a t e r t h a n o u r 
o v e r a l l d e f i c i t on b a l a n c e o f payments. These d i f f i c u l t i e s 
were f u r t h e r compounded by t h e s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of B r i t a i n as 
a c e n t r a l banker f o r t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a , w h i l e a t t h e same 
t i m e b e i n g o b l i g e d by t h e t e r m s o f f i n a n c i a l a i d f r o m t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s t o d i s b a n d ' p r o t e c t i v e ' f a c i l i t i e s p r o v i d e d by 
t h e a r e a a t a t i m e when B r i t a i n , g i v e n i t s dependence on 
f o r e i g n d e p o s i t s , c o u l d h a r d l y a f f o r d t o expose i t s e l f f o r 
t h e f i r s t t i m e i n y e a r s t o c u r r e n c y c o m p e t i t i o n and 
s p e c u l a t i o n . C o u n t r i e s s h o r t o f d o l l a r s w i t h i n and w i t h o u t 
t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a c o u l d , commencing t h e f i r s t day o f 
c o n v e r t . i b i l i t y , o b t a i n them by c o n v e r t i n g t h e i r s t e r l i n g 
h o l d i n g s f o r c i n g t h e U.K. i n e f f e c t t o c a r r y t h e d o l l a r 
d e f i c i t s o f t h e e m p i r e p l u s ajiy o t h e r s who c a r e d t o c o n v e r t , 
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Any c o u n t r y c o u l d c a l l on us f o r d o l l a r s t o t h e amount 
r e p r e s e n t e d by i t s f a v o u r a b l e b a l a n c e w i t h us t o g e t h e r w i t h 
t h o s e p a r t s o f t h e s t e r l i n g b a l a j i c e we r e l e a s e d u n d e r t h e 
terms o f U.S.A. a i d . The r e s u l t a n t o u t f l o w o f g o l d and 
d o l l a r s o c c a s i o n e d by t h e c o n v e r t i b i l i t y o b l i g a t i o n c o u l d n o t 
be stemmed by t h e use o f d o l l a r s o b t a i n e d f r o m t h e lo c u i s i n c e 
we were u s i n g t h e s e f o r o u r own c u r r e n t p u r c h a s e s f r o m t h e 
d o l l a r a r e a . Our t r a d i t i o n a l e x p o r t s , c o a l and t e x t i l e s , 
were n o t r e q u i r e d on t h e U.S. home m a r k e t , s i n c e t h e r e were 
cheaper s u b s t i t u t e s . B e f o r e c o n v e r t i b i l i t y we c o u l d use t h e 
d o l l a r and g o l d e a r n i n g s o f t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a t o p a y f o r o u r 
d o l l a r t r a d e s i n c e t h e i r r e s e r v e s w e re i n e f f e c t o u r s . But 
t h i s o n l y worked i n s o f a r as t h e pound s t e r l i n g was 
i n c o n v e r t i b l e between o t h e r c o u n t r i e s and t h e E m p i r e and t h e 
l a t t e r a g r e e d t o have t h e i r d o l l a r s ' p o o l e d ' and managed by 
t h e London Government. Under c o n v e r t i b i l i t y and a l o o s e n i n g 
o f t h e p o o l i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s t h e y w o u l d draw on us f o r a l l t h e 
d o l l a r s t h e y c o u l d g e t . 
The k nowledge and r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e c o n v e r t i b i l i t y 
p o s i t i o n went back t o 1945. I t was n o t t h a t t h e government 
was h i n d e r e d by l a c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e l i k e l y i m p a c t o f 
t h e e x t e r n a l economy. ^ "^ ^ I t was r e c o g n i s e d as a c o n s t r a i n t 
a t t h e o u t s e t . There i s room f o r d i s p u t e as t o how f a r 
d e c i s i o n makers were aware o f how l o n g t h e l o a n was t o l a s t 
i n t e rms o f i t s d o l l a r p u r c h a s i n g power, b u t s i n c e t h e l o a n 
was n e v e r e x p l i c i t l y s e t a s i d e f o r t h e d a t e o f c o n v e r t i b i l i t y 
1 . I n f o r m a t i o n i s a suppxDsed l i m i t on more c o m p r e h e n s i v e 
p o l i c y m a k i n g see L i n d b l o m , C., 'The S c i e n c e o f M u d d l i n g 
Through'. P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Review V o l . 1 9 , ( 1 9 5 9 ) 
pp.79-85. 
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b u t was b e i n g s p e n t as soon as i t was r e c e i v e d i n J u l y 1946 
t h e e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t d e c i s i o n makers were b l i n d t o t h e 
consequences o f s h o r t term s t r a t e g i e s c a n n o t r e a l l y be 
s u s t a i n e d . The Labour M.P., Douglas J a y , s p e c i a l Economic 
A d v i s e r t o t h e Prime M i n i s t e r knew e x a c t l y what w o u l d happen 
and w r o t e t o h i s boss on t h e 1 7 t h December, 1945. The 
s i t u a t i o n was t h a t w ould be r e s t o r i n g c o n v e r t i b i l i t y when a l l 
o t h e r I.M.F. c o u n t r i e s had g o t t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e i n i t i a l 
B r e t o n Woods b a r g a i n w i t h i t s r a t h e r l o n g e r p e r i o d o f t r a n s -
i t i o n up t o 1950. These c o u n t r i e s w o u l d t h u s be a b l e t o 
r e f u s e c o n v e r t i b i l i t y o f o u r e a r n i n g s y e t have t h e r i g h t t o 
t u r n s t e r l i n g e a r n e d by them h e r e i n t o d o l l a r s , t h u s , f o r c i n g 
i n e f f e c t t h e U.K. t o f i n a n c e t h e i r p u r c h a s e s f r o m A m e r i c a . 
Jay's s o l u t i o n was t o maximise t h e use o f t h e s h o r t term 
t r a n s i t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s b e f o r e t h e n u t i l i s i n g t h e 
p r e f e r e n c e s , and by a r r a n g i n g b u l k p u r c h a s e c o n t r a c t s o f f o o d 
w i t h o u r s t e r l i n g p a r t n e r s . ^ He a l s o s u g g e s t e d e n c o u r a g i n g 
t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a c o u n t r i e s t o p l a c e o r d e r s f o r B r i t i s h goods 
i n o r d e r t o r e t i r e t h e s t e r l i n g d e b t . ^ The C h a n c e l l o r , 
D a l t o n r e g a r d e d t h i s o p t i o n as n o t m a t c h i n g t h e s e r i o u s n e s s 
o f t h e p o s i t i o n . What was t h e use o f n e g o t i a t i n g a f a l l i n 
s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s i f we were c o n t i n u i n g t o add t o thera t h r o u g h 
e x p e n d i t u r e i n I n d i a , Egypt and t h e M i d d l e East? Cuts i n 
m i l i t a r y and i m p e r i a l e x p e n d i t u r e s were e s s e n t i a l . ^ A t t l e e 
1 . Prem 8/195 F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1946 1 7 t h December 1945 
Douglas Jay t o P.M. 
2. Prem 8/195 F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1946 6 t h December 1945 
Douglas Jay t o P.M. 
3. Prem 8/195 F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1946 9 t h J a n u a r y 1946 
Hugh D a l t o n t o P.M. 
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responded by d e c i d i n g t h a t t h e C h i e f s o f S t a f f must be 
a l l o w e d t o comment f i r s t . D a l t o n r e p e a t e d h i s p o i n t s l a t e r . ^ 
I f t h i s o p t i o n were n o t t a k e n , c u t s i n r a t i o n s and raw 
m a t e r i a l s w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y c r e a t i n g some unemployment i n 
dependent i n d u s t r i e s . M o r r i s o n and D a l t o n l i n e d up a g a i n s t 
t h e Prime M i n i s t e r i n C a b i n e t , b u t t h e Prime i M i n i s t e r , h a v i n g 
c o n s u l t e d t h e S e r v i c e C h i e f s , s t u c k o u t a g a i n s t c u t s i n 
i m p e r i a l commitments: 'the C a b i n e t s h o u l d r e a l i s e t h a t t h e 
s i t u a t i o n i n ar e a s l i k e I n d i a , M alaya, and P a l e s t i n e made i t 
i m p o s s i b l e t o c o n t e m p l a t e i m m e d i a t e w i t h d r a w a l o f t r o o p s ' . 
The C a b i n e t g r a s p e d o p t i m i s m w i t h b o t h hands when i n A p r i l 
Jay a t t a c k e d D a l t o n ' s paper w i t h e m p i r i c a l r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s 
o f h i s own^. The d e f i c i t w o u l d n o t be t h a t b i g . The success 
o f r e c o n v e r s i o n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e e x p o r t e f f o r t , t h e 
w o r l d f o o d s h o r t a g e w h i c h had f o r c i b l y r e d u c e d o u r i m p o r t s , 
t h e American d e c i s i o n t o p o s t p o n e t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n c o n f e r e n c e ( I . T - O , ) w i t h i t s a n t i - p r e f e r e n c e 
i m p l i c a t i o n s , and t h e d e l a y i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l o f t h e 
l o a n , w o u l d mean t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f c o n v e r t i b i l i t y d e l a y e d 
u n t i l J u l y 1947. Soon a f t e r t h i s d e c i s i o n t h e C a b i n e t a g r e e d 
t o a d d i t i o n a l d o l l a r e x p e n d i t u r e f o r t h e second h a l f o f 1946 
and t h e f i r s t h a l f o f 1947 and, even though i t was r e a l i z e d 
t h a t because p r i c e s had r i s e n i n t h e U.S.A. th e l o a n w o u l d be 
w o r t h l e s s , i t was a g r e e d t h a t we c o u l d a f f o r d more on t o b a c c o , 
1. Cab 129/7 C a b i n e t Paper CP(46)53. 8 t h F e b r u a r y 1946 
Balance o f Payments Memo by t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer 
2. Cab 128/4 C a b i n e t M e e t i n g CM(46)14 1 1 t h F e b r u a r y 1946 
c o n t i n u e d i n Cab 128/7 C o n f i d e n t i a l Annexe. 
3. Cab 129/9 C a b i n e t Paper CP(46)168 1 8 t h A p r i l 1946 
I m p o r t Programmes f o r mid-1946-mid 1947 memo by t h e 
C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Excheauer. 
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f o o d , raw m a t e r i a l s and an e a s i n g o f p e t r o l r a t i o n i n g . The 
b a s i s o f t h i s e a r l y o p t i m i s m was o f c o u r s e t h e e x p o r t boom 
produced by a c o m b i n a t i o n o f i m m e d i a t e p o s t - w a r r e s t o c k i n g and 
t h e l a c k o f German and Japanese c o m p e t i t i o n . T h i s e x p o r t boom 
was o n l y p a r t i a l l y c o n s c i o u s l y s o u g h t . E x p o r t s were n o t g i v e n 
o v e r i d i n g p r i o r i t y as we have a l r e a d y d i s c o v e r e d . A m e e t i n g 
o f those c o n c e r n e d d e c i d e d e x p o r t s w o u l d go t o a l l m a r k e t s 
w i t h o u t c o n c e n t r a t i o n on any p a r t i c u l a r p a r t o f t h e w o r l d , b u t 
t h a t t h e r e w o u l d be no d e l i b e r a t e e x p o r t d r i v e o v e r and above 
what c o u l d be managed a t t h e moment. The need f o r e x p o r t s 
had t o be p r o p e r l y ' c o r r e l a t e d w i t h o t h e r demajids on n a t i o n a l 
r e s o u r c e s ' and w o u l d be p l a n n e d v i a t h e b a l a n c e o f payments 
Working P a r t y o f t h e I n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l O f f i c i a l S t e e r i n g 
Committee"^. Towards autumn 1946 t h e p l a n n i n g m a c h i n e r y t h r e w 
c o l d w a t e r on t h e i d e a o f an i n d i s c r i m i n a t e p o l i c y o f e x p o r t s 
t o a l l m a r k e t s and drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e now r e v e a l e d d o l l a r 
2 
d r a i n . M o r r i s o n was so w o r r i e d t h a t he s a i d t h a t u n l e s s 
s t e p s were t a k e n i t l o o k e d l i k e 1931 a l l o v e r a g a i n . ^ 
A t C a b i n e t D a l t o n o u t l i n e d t h e s i t u a t i o n and t h e new 
p r o p o s a l s . He s a i d t h e l o a n was b e i n g used up r a p i d l y because 
o f t h e r i s e i n U.S. p r i c e s and o v e r s e a s e x p e n d i t u r e . We were 
b u y i n g t o o much amd n o t s e l l i n g enough i n t h e d o l l a r o r h a r d 
c u r r e n c y a r e a s . I f we were t o a v o i d d r a s t i c c u t s i n t h e 
i m p o r t programme t h a t w o u l d d i s c r e d i t t h e government and 
TI Cab 71/27 L o r d P r e s i d e n t s ( I n d u s t r i a l Sub-Committee) 
m e e t i n g 1 2 t h November 1945. 
2. Cab 129/9 C a b i n e t Paper CP(46)401 2 9 t h O c t o b e r 1946 
The I m p o r t Programme 1947 memo by t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e 
Exchequer d i s c u s s e d Cab 128/6 C a b i n e t m e e t i n g CM(46)94 
4 t h November 1946 c o n t i n u e d i n Cab 128/8 C o n f i d e n t i a l 
Annexe. 
3. Cab 134/503 M.E.P. m e e t i n g 2 8 t h O c t o b e r 1946. 
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i n s t e a d o p t f o r a more a m b i t i o u s e x p o r t t a r g e t o f 150% o f t h e 
1938 volume a d i f f e r e n t i a l p o l i c y o f e n c o u r a g i n g e x p o r t s t o 
h a r d a t t h e expense o f s o f t c u r r e n c y a r e a s was needed. I n 
a d d i t i o n i t was n e c e s s a r y t o e f f e c t economies i n i m p o r t s such 
as o i l f r o m h a r d c u r r e n c y a r e a s and i n t e n s i f y ' 
i m p o r t s u b s t i t u t i o n t h r o u g h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f home a g r i c i i L t u r e 
Emmanuel S h i n w e l l d i d n o t t h i n k we needed t o t a k e such 
measures y e t . The d o l l a r d e f i c i t was l a r g e l y a r e s u l t o f 
r i s i n g p r i c e s i n t h e U.S.A. caused by t h e i r a b a n d o n i n g p r i c e 
c o n t r o l - p o s s i b l y t h e s e p r i c e s m i g h t d r o p . As f o r o v e r s e a s 
and m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e i n v i s i b l e income w o u l d compensate 
as s h i p p i n g r e v i v e d " ^ . N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e 1947 Economic Survey 
p u b l i s h e d i n F e b r u a r y 1947 i n c l u d e d t h e new e x p o r t t a r g e t 
( a l t h o u g h i t was p l a n n e d a t 140% o f t h e 1938 volume w i t h a 
r i s e o f 175% i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g goods) • The C a b i n e t o p t e d f o r 
t h e g e n e r a l i d e a o f a more s e l e c t i v e ' p l a n n e d ' e x p o r t 
programme. But t h e p l a n n i n g as y e t was r e l a t i v e l y i n e x p l i c i t . 
A new f e e l i n g f o r e x p o r t s had been e s t a b l i s h e d b u t t h e r e was 
no r e a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f some o f t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n v o l v e d 
i n o p t i n g f o r s e l e c t i v i t y d e t e r m i n e d by t h e s t a t e o f t h e 
r e s e r v e s r a t h e r t h a n c o m p e t i t i o n d e t e r m i n e d by t h e s t a t e o f 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . The f o r m e r s t r a t e g y was e s s e n t i a l l y m e r c a n t a l i s t 
i n t h e sense o f g e a r i n g one's t r a d e t o maximise c u r r e n c y 
h o l d i n g s f o r t h e n a t i o n a l u n i t as a w h o l e . An i n d i v i d u a l 
1. Cab 128/6 C a b i n e t m e e t i n g CM(46)94. 4 t h November 1946 
c o n t i n u e d i n Cab 128/8 C o n f i d e n t i a l Annexe. 
2. Economic Survey f o r 1947 Cmnd 7046 (London HMSG 
Feb r u a r y 1947) p a r a 73 p.18. 
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c a p i t a l i s t , however, might f e e l t h a t he would p r e f e r to buy 
and s e l l i n any market i r r e s p e c t i v e of what was d e s i g n a t e d a 
hard or s o f t c u r r e n c y a r e a by the Government. I t would not 
matter to him whether h i s p r o f i t s came i n d o l l a r s o r l i r e so 
long as i t was c o n v e r t i b l e . S w i t c h i n g to another market 
thought s u i t a b l e by the Government might r e s u l t i n fewer s a l e s 
and t h e r e f o r e l e s s o v e r a l l r e t u r n f o r a p a r t i c u l a r u n i t o f 
c a p i t a l . I n a d d i t i o n the o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y o f buying cheap and 
s e l l i n g dear would improve the o v e r a l l terms of t r a d e i . e . 
an i n c r e a s e i n export over import p r i c e s but a t the expense of 
the c o m p e t i t i v e p r i n c i p l e e s s e n t i a l i n f u t u r e markets where 
s e l l i n g cheap was of the e s s e n c e . Y e t to have to put e x p o r t s 
f i r s t i n 1945-6 would have meant a c o n c e n t r a t i o n on e f f i c i e n c y 
and c o s t of production, r a t i o n i n g of the l o a n f o r v i t a l raw. 
m a t e r i a l s , w i t h d r a s t i c c u t s i n food, tobacco asid f i l m 
consumption, postponement of s o c i a l reform and a s u s p e n s i o n of 
the s h o r t e r working week. Such a shock to pent-up wartime 
e x p e c t a t i o n s would, a c c o r d i n g to one o p p o s i t i o n commentator, 
have been f o l l y given t h a t we c o u l d use a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s 
and i m p e r i a l d e v i c e s to g i v e p r o t e c t i o n i n the allo w e d t r a n s -
i t i o n period"^. Dalton, however, c o n t i n u e d to p r e s s the 
s e r i o u s n e s s of the px^s i t i o n . The r e a l problem was s t i l l the 
d o l l a r d e f i c i t . The s t e r l i n g a r e a was no r e a l s a v i o u r s i n c e 
t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to lodge t h e i r d o l l a r s and gold r e s e r v e s i n 
London would be dependent on the r a t e we were drawing on them, 
and, i n the long run, they would f e a r d e v a l u a t i o n : f a l l i n g 
r e s e r v e s l e a d i n g to a c u m u l a t i v e d r a i n as c o n f i d e n c e i n s t e r l i n g 
I . Amery, L., The Awakening:Qur P r e s e n t C r i s i s and the Way Out" 
(London McDonald 1948) pp 140-1. 
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d e c l i n e d . As f o r s e l e c t i v e import c u t s from the d o l l a r surea, 
A r t i c l e 9 of the loan agreement meant we would have to get 
U.S. p e r m i s s i o n as a temporary measure. Heavy drawings on the 
I.M-F. would be s c r u t i n i s e d and drawing ' r i g h t s * were 
r e s t r i c t e d to £81m. a y e a r up to £325m. I n any c a s e these 
were intended to be f o r temporary d e f i c i t s , not f o r continuous 
d i s e q u i l i b r i u m . Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s Dalton asked the 
C a b i n e t to r e c o g n i s e t h a t the export t a r g e t of 140% of the 
1938 volume would not be reached by December 1947 and would 
have to be put back to w e l l i n t o 1948 (2nd q u a r t e r ) * Dalton 
proposed c u t s i n food r a t i o n s , c o n t i n u e d c l o t h e s r a t i o n i n g , 
c u t s i n tobacco, p e t r o l ajid food r a t i o n s and a d i v e r s i o n of 
s t e e l to export p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s would get us o v e r the next 
y e a r u n t i l we c o u l d apply f o r more U*S. a i d ^ . The C a b i n e t 
trimmed thes e proposed c u t s back to a s m a l l e r f i g u r e and 
opted again f o r optimism^. C r i p p s noted the s t r o n g U.S. 
competition i n manufactures and the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of the 
s e l l e r s ' market, but concluded t h a t a l l t h a t c o u l d be done was 
being done, e s p e c i a l l y i n t e x t i l e s , to f o c u s on h a r d c u r r e n c y 
a r e a s and i n propaganda to a t t r a c t l a b o u r i n t o i n d u s t r y . But 
he admitted "the response was slow" and "no s u b s t a n t i a l 
i n c r e a s e i n output c o u l d be looked f o r u n t i l new machinery had 
been i n s t a l l e d and e x t e n s i v e r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n taken p l a c e . " 
The L e f t r e p r e s e n t e d by Bevan and S h i n w e l l argued again t h a t 
sooner or l a t e r the world d o l l a r shortage would c a u s e the 
1. Cab 129/19 C a b i n e t Paper CP(47)167 28th May 1947 
Import Programme. Memo by C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer 
2. Cab 128/10 C a b i n e t meeting OM(47)52 5th June 1947. 
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Americans to b r i n g f o r t h another o f f e r o f a i d and we should 
w a i t f o r t h i s . Cuts i n r a t i o n s imposed now would impede the 
production d r i v e . The Lord P r i v y S e a l ( A r t h u r Greenwood) and 
M i n i s t e r of Labour agreed. At a f u r t h e r meeting Dal ton argued 
a g a i n s t whSit he saw as complacency^. We c o u l d not w a i t f o r 
f u r t h e r a i d . We had to draw up a c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n on the b a s i s 
of no f u r t h e r a i d and suggested b i g c u t s i n the food programme 
s i n c e c u t s i n raw m a t e r i a l s and the import of machinery would 
endanger i n d u s t r y . John S t r a c h e y , M i n i s t e r of Food opposed 
t h i s on n u t r i t i o n a l grounds l i n k i n g i t i n w i t h arguments about 
Labour i n t e n s i t y : a key p a r t of those whose s t r a t e g y i t was 
to improve p r o d u c t i v i t y without a l a r g e c o n c e n t r a t i o n on new 
machinery. Whatever bravado Dalton was showing i n f u l l 
c a b i n e t the b i g four Attlee, h i m s e l f , C r i p p s and Bevin had 
a l r e a d y decided they would apply to the U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r the 
a i d seemingly a v a i l a b l e s i n c e G e n e r a l George M a r s h a l l ' s speech. 
That c o n c l u s i o n seemed i n e s c a p a b l e because of the unintended 
consequences on our r e s e r v e s of the r i s e i n U.S. p r i c e s , the 
f a l l i n e x p o r t s o c c a s i o n e d by the f u e l c r i s i s , the end of the 
s e l l e r s ' market, the slow r e c o v e r y of n o n - d o l l a r s o u r c e s of 
supply l e a d i n g to a r i s e i n p r i c e s as demand rose, as w e l l as 
looming c o n v e r t i b i l i t y . 
1. Cab 128/10 Cab i n e t meeting CM(47)56 24th June 1947. 
2. Cab 130/19 Meeting of M i n i s t e r s Gen 179/3 13th June 1947 
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The Government d r a f t e d a p l e a to the Americans t h a t was 
worded i n p l a c e s as a t h r e a t . U n l e s s the d o l l a r s h o r t a g e was 
eased B r i t a i n would have to 
c u t imports below even our people's t h r e a d b a r e 
standards or we a r e compelled to abandon the 
whole concept of m u l t i - l a t e r a l t r a d i n g . . . and 
seek out a p a i n f u l e x i s t e n c e on the b e s t terms 
of b i l a t e r a l trade which we can s e c u r e . 1 
Morrison took the C a b i n e t ' s do nothing and w a i t and see 
s t r a t e g y to P a r l i a m e n t , accompanied by the present: statement 
on the near e x h a u s t i o n of the loan, e a r l y i n J u l y and seven 
days before c o n v e r t i b i l i t y . The statement i n c l u d e d the 
f o l l o w i n g : 
the f i r s t duty of t h i s government to our own 
people amd a l s o to the world i s to keep B r i t a i n 
i n f u l l production, i n f u l l employment, i n good 
h e a l t h , and i n good h e a r t ... The government are 
q u i t e c l e a r , having g i v e n deep and prolonged 
thought to the matter t h a t they should not impose 
c u t s o f a s c a l e which would r e q u i r e d r a s t i c 
adjustment i n our s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g u n t i l i t i s 
p e r f e c t l y c l e a r and c e r t a i n t h a t t h i s i s the only 
c o u r s e open to us*^ 
The government, i t seemed, would w a i t u n t i l i t was pushed. By 
August i t f e l t j u s t such a push as- a d r a i n on t h e r e s e r v e s 
s t a r t e d as soon as c o n v e r t i b i l i t y became o p e r a t i v e . The d r a i n 
quickened as c o n f i d e n c e i n s t e r l i n g f e l l . T h i s p r e c i p i t a t e d 
those who f e a r e d a run on s t e r l i n g to p u l l out, h e l p i n g to 
c r e a t e the very outcome they f e a r e d . Two c r u c i a l C a b i n e t 
meetings were h e l d on 1 s t August. Dal ton p r e s e n t e d a memo 
which argued t h a t the c r i s i s should be seen s t r a t e g i c a l l y . I f 
the loan ran out and we got no m a r s h a l l a i d we would have to 
1. Cab 130/19 B r i e f f o r Mr. M a r s h a l l gen 179/10. 
16th June 1947. 
2. H.C. Deb. V o l . 439 C o l s . 2062-3 8 t h J u l y 1947 
Debate on Import Programme. 
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r e v e r t to b i l a t e r a l i s m d e s p i t e i t being i n c o n s i s t e n t with our 
o b l i g a t i o n s to the Americans. That b e i n g so i t was b e t t e r to 
s t a r t out with our r e s e r v e s i n t a c t . R e s e r v e s would a l s o be 
the defences w i t h which we c o u l d f i g h t o f f * any c o n d i t i o n s 
t h a t the U.S. government might impose on us f o r M a r s h a l l a i d ' : 
i t would make the b i l a t e r a l i s t o p t i o n a r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e to 
use as a b a r g a i n i n g c o u n t e r . The measures he i n d i c a t e d 
e s s e n t i a l were an i n c r e a s e i n pro d u c t i o n f o r expo r t , p l u s 
import s u b s t i t u t i o n e s p e c i a l l y by d e v e l o p i n g home a g r i c u l t u r e , 
c u t s i n meat r a t i o n s w i t h s p e c i a l p r e f e r e n c e s to those i n 
manual work, and f o r the f i r s t time, a t h r e a t to the housing 
programme with c u t s on imported timber^. The C a b i n e t f a r from 
g r a s p i n g the n e t t l e of export p r i o r i t y agreed to reduce the 
'impossible* t a r g e t o f 140?o of the 1938 volume f o r the second 
q u a r t e r of 1948; and i n v i t e d C r i p p s to see how a new t a r g e t 
of 160% by the end of 1948 might be a c h i e v e d ^ . At the second 
C a b i n e t some c u t s i n o v e r a l l c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t were agreed 
i n p r i n c i p l e , e s p e c i a l l y on p r o j e c t s not c o n t r i b u t i n g d i r e c t l y 
through q u i c k r e t u r n s on export and import s a v i n g * Some 
r e d u c t i o n i n housing had to be contemplated as the timber c u t s 
c o u l d not f a l l on mining, s h i p b u i l d i n g and ex p o r t packaging, 
and the next b i g g e s t u s e r was the c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y . The 
1. Cab 129/20 C a b i n e t Paper CP(47)221 30th J u l y 1947 
Balance of Payments. Memo by the C h a n c e l l o r o f the 
Exchequer. 
2. Cab 128/10 C a b i n e t meeting CM(47)67 ( 1 s t meeting) 1 s t 
Aug. 1947. The new t a r g e t was f i n a l l y agreed i n September 
see Cab 128/10 C a b i n e t meeting GM(47)75 5 th Sept. 1947. 
Both meetings continued i n Cab 128/11 C o n f i d e n t i a l 
Annexe. 
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The C a b i n e t decided t h a t the o f f i c i a l p l a n n i n g a p p a r a t u s 
- C.E.P.S. i n p a r t i c u l a r - would review the t o t a l s i z e of 
the investment programme and draw up,in c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h 
departments concerned^ a l i s t o f proposed c u t s , r e l a t i v e 
p r i o r i t i e s and measures to e f f e c t them"^. The second p a r t o f 
the c r i s i s d i r e c t i v e s i n v o l v e d the q u e s t i o n of i n c r e a s e d 
production * i n the next few months'. I n the s h o r t run, the 
M i n i s t e r of Labour t o l d the C a b i n e t , an i n c r e a s e i n output 
c o u l d not be achieved by r e o r g a n i s a t i o n s and re-equipment so 
i t would have to come by l e n g t h e n i n g the hours of work i n key 
d o l l a r earning/import s a v i n g i n d u s t r i e s and mining, e i t h e r by 
overtime or by some o t h e r method implemented by j o i n t 
n e g o t i a t i o n machinery . Each i n d u s t r y would work out i t s own 
arrangements a f t e r the government i n d i c a t e d the p r o d u c t i o n 
t a r g e t r e q u i r e d . An e x t r a h a l f hour a day would be worked 
by miners and new p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t s were given f o r s t e e l , 
c o a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r i e s . I n a d d i t i o n a l l o w a n c e s f o r 
1. Cab 128/10 Cab i n e t meeting CM(47)68 (2nd meeting) 1 s t 
August 1947, c o n t i n u e d i n Cab 128/11 C o n f i d e n t i a l Annexe. 
Subsequently a New Committee was appx>inted to determine 
the c u t known as the Investment Programmes Committee 
( I . P . C . ) - J t was to f u n c t i o n as an i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l sub-
committee of the S t e e r i n g Committee (S.CO-^^'t with S i r 
Edwin Plowden, the Government's C h i e f P l a n n i n g O f f i c e r as 
Chairman, the Committee soon became a key forum i n i t s own 
r i g h t . For d e t a i l s o f appointment and terms o f r e f e r e n c e 
see Cab 129/20 C a b i n e t Paper CP(47)231. 13th August 1947. 
Investment Programmes Committee Note by Norman Brook 
S e c r e t a r y of C a b i n e t . 
2. Cab 129/20 C a b i n e t Paper CP(47)220 30th J u l y 1947. 
N a t i o n a l C r i s i s scheme f o r i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i o n . Memo 
by the M i n i s t e r of Labour. 
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t r a v e l l e r s were c u t and p e t r o l r a t i o n s were reduced. There 
was also agreement to r e - e n a c t some degree of compulsory 
d i r e c t i o n of labour v i a the c o n t r o l of engagement o r d e r by 
supplementing the e x i s t i n g c o n t r o l s o p e r a t i v e i n the S u p p l i e s 
and S e r v i c e s ( T r a n s i t i o n a l Powers) Act 1945"^. The T.U.C had 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t they were not opposed i n p r i n c i p l e a l t h ough 
they c o u l d not commit the movement . The c u t s were announced 
i n P a r l i a m e n t on 6th August 1947 where i t was s a i d one o f the 
key i n d u s t r i a l problems accompanying the c u r r e n c y c r i s i s was 
th a t i n some i n d u s t r i e s t h e r e was not enough mampower to make 
f u l l use o f c a p a c i t y , w h i l e i n o t h e r s t h e r e was n o t enough 
m a t e r i a l s to f u l l y employ the manpower t h a t was a v a i l a b l e . 
C o n t r o l s on c a p i t a l i nvestment would h e l p reduce the demand on 
given s u p p l i e s ^ . The knowledge t h a t i n the long term such 
investment c o u l d i n c r e a s e supply on given demand was swept 
away i n the c o n c e n t r a t i o n on the s h o r t term and p a r t of t h a t 
s h o r t term s o l u t i o n i n v o l v e d the export of c a p i t a l goods 
p r e v i o u s l y intended f o r the home market.* 
1. Cab 128/10 C a b i n e t meeting CiM(47)68 2nd Meeting 1 s t August 
1945 c o n t i n u e s Cab 128/11 C o n f i d e n t i a l Annexe. 
2. Cab 128/10 Cabinet meeting OM(47)69 5th August 1947 
continued Cab 128/11 C o n f i d e n t i a l Annexe. 
3. H.C. Deb. V o l . 441.CoLsl486-1511 6 t h August 1947. Speech 
of P.M. on s t a t e of Nation. 
4. T h i s f e a t u r e of the export programme had been noted e a r l i e r 
i n the y e a r . During the f u e l c r i s i s , the government had 
been e x p o r t i n g c o a l , mining machinery, e l e c t r i c i t y power 
g e n e r a t i n g equipment, a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery, l o c o m o t i v e 
wagons, t r u c k s and conveyors. Many of these commodities 
were r e q u i r e d to i n c r e a s e f u e l p r o d u c t i o n , and were r e q u i r e d 
to a i s s i s t m anufacturers whose e x p o r t s were b e i n g hampered 
by the power c r i s i s . s e e H.C. Deb. V o l . 434 C o l s . 1340-1, 
1350, 1379, 1425. 12th March 1947. Debate on Economic 
S i t u a t i o n * 
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I t was not t h a t the government had f a i l e d to r e c o g n i s e the 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s here , D e f e r r i n g the re-equipment 
of our i n d u s t r i e s i n o r d e r to r e l e a s e machinery f o r export " 
would h i t manufacturing i n d u s t r y where the volume o f i n v e s t -
ment was a l r e a d y s m a l l : our long term export p r o s p e c t s would 
s u f f e r i n d i r e c t l y through d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered i n 
maintaiining p l a n t and through the i n a b i l i t y to i n n o v a t e and 
promote new goods f o r e x p o r t o r import s u b s t i t u t i o n . Y e t as 
the government saw i t , q u i c k e r , almost immediate, advantages 
c o u l d be gained f o r the b a l a n c e of payments by d i v e r t i n g 
machinery from i n d u s t r i a l re-equipment to exports'^• 
SECTION I I : NEGOTIATED SPACE AND THE ROLE OF THE IMPERIALISM. 
The announcement t h a t c u t s would take p l a c e was not 
s u f f i c i e n t to stop the gold and d o l l a r d r a i n . The government 
se n t a d e l e g a t i o n of o f f i c i a l s ^ l e d by S i r W i l f r e d Eady of the 
T r e a s u r y over to the Americans to demand some r e l a x a t i o n i n 
our c o n v e r t i b i l i t y and n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y commitments. The 
l a t t e r was n e c e s s a r y g i v e n the C a b i n e t ' s e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n to 
a v o i d hard c u r r e n c y p u r c h a s e s , the former was the o n l y o p t i o n 
l e f t i f the government was to a v o i d the savage d e f l a t i o n t h a t 
would t h r e a t e n r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and f u l l employment which was 
2 
being advocated by many i n the o p p o s i t i o n and p r e s s . Dal ton's 
r e p l y to t h a t o p p o s i t i o n was always to deny the c r i s i s 
• r e l a t e s to what we a r e doing a t home*^. Eady had been 
1. Cab 129/21 C a b i n e t Paper CP(47)250. 5th September 1947. 
The E x p o r t Programme Memo by the P r e s i d e n t of the Board 
of Trade. 
2. For example The Economist 12 J u l y and 9 t h August 1947. 
3. Dal ton, H., High Tide and A f t e r ; Memoirs 1945-60 (London 
M u l l e r 1962) p.260. 
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i n s t r u c t e d to say t h a t w h i l e we agreed with c o n v e r t b i l i t y 
and n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e t h i s was 'an abnormal' 
time f o r adjustment. I n s t e a d c o n v e r t i b i l i t y r i g h t s should be 
f u n n e l l e d through the Bank of England, with each c o u n t r y 
being allowed a r a t i o n and payments agreements n e g o t i a t e d w i t h 
the r e s t ^ . Bevan had argued t h a t i t should be made c l e a r t h a t 
our d e c i s i o n was not n e g o t i a b l e and not a temporary a f f a i r ; 
we were informing them o f what we intended to do and should 
avoid d i s c u s s i o n of m u l t i - l a t e r a l i s m ^ . The C a b i n e t was 
however given a rude shock a day a f t e r Eady a r r i v e d i n 
Washington. He telegrammed back t h a t the Americajis wanted 
'an exchange of l e t t e r s ' w i t h i n the terms and s p i r i t o f the 
o r i g i n a l agreement ( i . e . m u l t i l a t e r a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s ) , and 
u n t i l t h i s had been done they were r e f u s i n g to l e t us make 
any more drawings on t h e i r loan"^. Sevan's d e s i r e to a v o i d 
m u l t i l a t e r a l t a l k and to use the o c c a s i o n f o r the b r i n g i n g i n 
of permanent b i - l a t e r a l t r a d e .seemed thwarted . The 
U.K. Treasu r y suspended c o n v e r t i b i l i t y t h a t n i g h t as promised. 
The exchange of l e t t e r s i n v o l v e d , as the U.S. S e c r e t a r y of 
the T r e a s u r y , John Snyder saw i t , a B r i t i s h coimnitment ' j u s t 
as soon as they c o u l d to r e - e s t a b l i s h to the f u l l e s t e x t e n t 
p o s s i b l e the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y o f c u r r e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s ' ^ . A f t e r -
1. Cab 129/20 Cabinet Paper CP(47)233 16th August 1947. 
Balance of Payments memo by the C h a n c e l l o r of the 
Excheauer. 
2. Cab 128/10 Cabinet meeting CM(47)71 17th August 1947. 
3. Cab 128/10 Ca b i n e t meeting GM(47)72 19th August 1947. 
4. Cab 128/10 C a b i n e t meeting CM(47)71 17th August 1947. 
5. T236/1667 U.S.A. Suspension o f C o n v e r t a b i l i t y . P r e s s 
Conference by U.S. S e c r e t a r y of the T r e a s u r y John Synder 
27th August 1947. 
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d i n n e r d i s c u s s i o n s between Gordon Munroe of the B r i t i s h 
T r e a s u r y ' s Overseas F i n a n c e D i v i s i o n and h i s U.S. e q u i v a l e n t 
Overby c e n t r e d on the means to g e t t i n g c o n v e r t i b i l i t y 'back 
on the r a i l s a g a i n ' . Munroe, w r i t i n g to B r i d g e s , the Head of 
the T r e a s u r y , recommended demonstrating t h a t we c o u l d begin ^ 
to s o l v e the problems o u r s e l v e s b e f o r e we a p p l i e d f o r more 
leeway, and argued that t h i s would i n v o l v e import c u t s , 
i n t e n s i f y i n g export measures, and 'meeting the gap by a gold 
payment'. I n t h i s way 'we should show the U.S. we were 
prepared to run down our r e s e r v e s ' B r i d g e s recommended the 
same to Dalton i n c l u d i n g the pruning of next y e a r ' s 
expenditure e s t i m a t e s by departments. Such a c t i o n would 
enable us to make two drawings on the I.M.F. and u n f r e e z e the 
ver unspent p o r t i o n of the l o a n , which would then t i d e us o 
u n t i l October . On the 13th September Daiton met Snyder, the 
P r e s i d e n t o f the Reserve Bank o f New York, Mr. A l l e n Sproud, 
and the Governor of the Bank o f England and proudly announced 
t h a t they had j u s t o rdered a t r a n s f e r o f £20 m i l l i o n i n gold 
to the Americans. T h i s g e s t u r e Snyder, i n d i c a t e d would make 
i t e a s i e r f o r the U.S. government to render a s s i s t a n c e . A 
paper was then g i v e n to the Americans showing p r o g r e s s i n 
e x p o r t s . F u r t h e r f i g u r e s i t was s a i d c o u l d be o b t a i n e d 'and 
the r e s o u r c e s of Her M a j e s t y ' s T r e a s u r y were a t h i s d i s p o s a l ' . 
Snyder agreed t h a t an approach would have to be made to the 
I.M.F. ajid r e s e r v e s run down thereby e x h a u s t i n g a l l remedies 
1. T236/1667 U.S.A. Suspension of C o n v e r t a b i l i t y . L e t t e r 
Munroe to B r i d g e s 12th September 1947, 
2. T236/1667 U.S.A. Suspension of C o n v e r t a b i l i t y . L e t t e r 
B r i d g e s to Dalton 13th September 1947. 
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before the u n f r e e z i n g of the l o a n would be a c c e p t a b l e to 
Congress. The U.S. would support our a p p l i c a t i o n to the 
I.M.F; now t h a t we had s o l d the gold, and t h i s would enable 
us to apply to draw our f u l l quota. Meainwhile t h e s e moves had 
s u c c e s s f u l l y pre-empted the U.S- commercial n e g o t i a t o r , 
C l a y t o n . He had hoped B r i t a i n would be given no f u r t h e r 
leeway u n t i l a s t r i c t t i m e t a b l e f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n of 
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y and the a b o l i t i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e s had been drawn 
up. T h i s had been r e j e c t e d by the President"^. The f i n a l 
g e s t u r e to the Americans was g i v e n when Dalton wrote to S n y d e r 
another p l e a f o r the r e l e a s e o f the l o a n i n d i c a t i n g t h a t he 
was p r e p a r i n g a l a r g e s u r p l u s f o r the f i r s t h a l f o f 1948, and 
th a t f u r t h e r f i s c a l measures to s t r e n g t h e n the r e s e r v e 
p o s i t i o n and reduce i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e were under way. I n 
November the Americans u n f r o z e the lo a n , but, as we s h a l l see, 
such measures d i d not i n v o l v e the s o r t of d e f l a t i o n t h a t the 
Americans had come to regard as u s u a l where the adjustment of 
a trade d i s e q u i l i b r i u m was c a l l e d f o r . These c o n c e s s i o n s to 
the Americans were formal i n the sense t h a t p e e r i n g below the 
appearance we have to acknowledge the s u b s t a n t i a l c o n c e s s i o n s 
granted by the Americans to us i n the s h o r t term. N e g o t i a t i o n s 
1. T236/1667 U.S.A. Suspension of C o n v e r t a b i l i t y . L e t t e r 
Eady to B r i d g e s 20th September 1947. The C a b i n e t had 
counted on the s u s p i c i o n t h a t C l a y t o n was ' b l u f f i n g ' and 
had no support from the U.S. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . H i s p o l i c y 
would i n any case, C r i p p s b e l i e v e d p l a y i n t o the hands of 
the communists i n western Europe. See Cab 128/10 C a b i n e t 
meeting CM(47)77 25th September 1947 c o n s i d e r i n g Cab 129/21 
C a b i n e t Paper CP(47)266 24th September 1947 T a r i f f 
N e g o t i a t i o n s a t Geneva Memo by P r e s i d e n t o f the Board of 
Trade. 
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on i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e s had begun as e a r l y as the Geneva Trade 
Conference i n A p r i l 1947. C l a y t o n , the U.S. Under S e c r e t a r y 
of S t a t e f o r Economic A / f a i r s had demanded t h e i r comple t e 
e l i m i n a t i o n i n t h r e e y e a r s ^ . The B r i t i s h , as we have seen, 
regarded him as a n e g o t i a t o r who d i d not have the/complete 
backing of the U.S. Government. The U.K. agreed to an 
immediate r e d u c t i o n of 5% on our t o t a l e x p o r t s p r e s e r v i n g the 
r e s t o f the p r e f e r e n c e s i n r e s p e c t of the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e ^ . 
As f o r import c o n t r o l s the r e v i s e d date f o r the end of the 
t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d was s e t a t London i n 1947 f o r the end o f 
1952 and then the proposed I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade O r g a n i s a t i o n 
( I . T . O . ) was only to be a l l o w e d to 'request* removal when 
B r i t a i n c o u l d be shown no l o n g e r to be i n s u b s t a n t i a l disequil-
i b r i u m . Congress c o n s i d e r e d t h i s to be a r a t h e r weak s a n c t i o n 
on d e f i c i t c o u n t r i e s s h o r t on p r o d u c t i v i t y and r e f u s e d to 
r a t i f y the I.T.O. but put n o t hing s t r o n g e r i n i t s p l a c e ^ . I n 
September 1947 a p r i v a t e accommodation w i t h U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
ensured t h a t so long as B r i t a i n was s h o r t of d o l l a r s the U.S. 
would not o b j e c t to ' c o n s e r v a t i o n ' by q u a n t i t a t i v e import 
c o n t r o l s and buying i n s o f t markets^even i f t h i s meant d i s -
c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t cheaper U.S. s u p p l i e s ^ . I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s the 
1. Gardner, R. S t e r l i n g - D o l l a r Diplomacy (New York McGraw-
H i l l 1969 e d i t . ) pp.358-60. 
2. See Amery, The Awakening, p.65. 
3. Gardner, R, S t e r l i n g - D o l l a r Diplomacy p.375. 
4. i b i d , p.335. 
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Americans turned a b l i n d eye to the accompanying c o n t i n u a t i o n 
of the d o l l a r pool. Commonwealth r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s meeting i n 
London i n October 1947 agreed u n t i l June 1948 to v o l u n t a r i l y 
i n c r e a s e export t a r g e t s and the p l a c i n g of r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
d o l l a r import expenditure w i t h i n the s t e r l i n g a r e a , thereby 
r a t i o n i n g c l a i m s on the pool of reserves'^. As a r e s u l t our 
2 
imports from d o l l a r a r e a s f e l l from 46 to 32^b . T h i s co-
o p e r a t i o n ca;ne a t a time when world food and primary 
production was i n c r e a s i n g and s a l e s to the d o l l a r a r e a were 
growing. The U.K. s u r p l u s w i t h the s t e r l i n g a r e a was r e s t o r e d 
and the o v e r a l l d o l l a r d e f i c i t thereby reduced. 
Now i n c o r r e c t l y e v a l u a t i n g the importance of t h i s 
' i m p e r i a l b u f f e r ' we ought to note t h a t i t s u t i l i t y i n a long 
range s t r a t e g y was l i m i t e d . I t i s t r u e t h a t the Labour govern-
ment made attempts, a l b e i t modest and f a l t e r i n g ones, to 
develop the c a p a c i t y of c o l o n i e s to produce and e x p o r t food 
and raw m a t e r i a l s f o r d o l l a r e a r n i n g purposes. Loans from 
the Exchequer were given v i a the C o l o n i a l Development 
C o r p o r a t i o n to the West I n d i e s , West C e n t r a l A f r i c a , and the Far 
E a s t . . The l o a j i s ran from the c o r p o r a t i o n to l o c a l agents, 
and d i s t r i c t commissioners arid thence to B r i t i s h company 
s u b s i d i a r i e s . S t r a c h e y ' s f a t e d groundnut scheme which 
operated v i a U n i l e v e r r a t h e r d i s c r e d i t e d the grander a s p e c t s 
of these i d e a s . . Palme t X i t t ' s i m p r e s s i v e a r r a y of p r e s s , 
1. Strange, S., S t e r l i n g i n B r i t i s h P o l i c y (Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971) p.62. 
2. B a r t l e t t , C . J . , A H i s t o r y of Post War B r i t a i n , (London 
Longmans 1977) pp.66-7. 
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m i n i s t e r i a l speech and s t a t i s t i c a l support f o r the t h e s i s o f 
i m p e r i a l i s t . e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t h i s p e r i o d t u r n s out to be r a t h e r 
ambivalent on c l o s e r examination. I t i s t r u e t h a t d o l l a r 
d e f i c i t s were covered by c o l o n i a l d o l l a r e x p o r t s e s p e c i a l l y 
Malayan Rubber and A f r i c a n Copper but not f o r every y e a r post 
1947. I t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e s c o n t i n u e d 
the unequal exchange of cheap primary p r o d u c t i o n f o r dear 
manufactures, and t h a t the c u r r e n c y r e g u l a t i o n s prevented the 
c o l o n i e s from u s i n g t h e i r e a r n i n g s to i n d u s t r i a l i s e . I n 
a d d i t i o n d i r e c t investment was f i n a n c e d as much by the ' f o r c e d 
l o a n s ' which i n e f f e c t was what s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s turned out 
to be^. Y e t ^ a s Dutt admits^the b e n e f i t s f o r the m e t r o p o l i s 
of dependency were n e g a t i v e l y b a l a n c e d by the c o s t . F i r s t l y 
i t may have l e d to the n e g l e c t of B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y as easy 
p r o f i t s c o u l d be gained and r e p a t r i a t e d from abroad and 
i n e f f i c i e n t i n d u s t r i e s i n the c e n t r e c o n t i n u e d to be s h e l t e r e d 
i n the p r o t e c t e d e n c l a v e s of the p e r i p h e r y . But, j u s t as 
important, the s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l c o s t s of 
i m p e r i a l i s t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e deducted 
from those s u r p l u s e s . More i m p o r t a n t l y , i n the b i g g e s t 
markets where p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l was not c o l o n i a l , t h a t i s , 
the s e l f - g o v e r n i n g dominions, I n d i a , Canada and A u s t r a l i a , 
U.S. e x p o r t s and d i r e c t investment i n c r e a s e d much more than 
2 
our own.. ... In the c o l o n i e s A r t i c l e 5 of the e v e n t u a l 
Marshal A id agreement allowed the Americans e q u a l a c c e s s to 
raw m a t e r i a l s . I n a d d i t i o n the economic c o s t s of s e r i o u s 
1. Dutt, R. Palme C r i s i s of B r i t a i n and the B r i t i s h Empire. 
(London Lawrence and Wishart 1953) pp.76-7. 
2. i b i d pp.156-7. pp.168-70. 
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and e x t e n s i v e c o l o n i a l development i n A f r i c a must a l s o be 
co n s i d e r e d . Large sums o f c a p i t a l would have to be l a i d out 
fo r the c l e a r i n g of j u n g l e and the t r a i n i n g of people. T h i s 
c a p i t a l would be locked up w i t h l i t t l e immediate r e t u r n aind 
would imply a c o n t r a c t i o n of home in v e s t m e n t . I f t h i s was not 
to happen then a balance of payments s u r p l u s . f i r s t to 
f i n a n c e the c a p i t a l e x p o r t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h i s was c o n t r a -
d i c t o r y s i n c e the C o l o n i a l s o l u t i o n of the ba l a n c e of payments 
d e f i c i t c o u l d not be premised on the assumption t h a t t h e r e 
must f i r s t be a s u r p l u s ! B r i t a i n had l o s t her near monopoly 
of world t r a d e a f t e r 1870 and w i t h i t went her ex p o r t surplus-. 
S i n c e i t was from t h i s s u r p l u s t h a t new f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s 
were made the p o s i t i o n from then to the 1930's was one where 
the income from e x i s t i n g f o r e i g n .and i m p e r i a l i n vestment^ 
i n s u r a n c e commissions^and s h i p p i n g were being used to f i n a n c e 
the import d e f i c i t and keep the o v e r a l l b a l a nce of payments 
i n s u r p l u s . But from 1930 to the outbreak of war even t h i s 
was i n s u f f i c i e n t to keep the c u r r e n t account from f a l l i n g i n t o 
the red^. I t can thus be seen t h a t the t r a d e and payments 
c r i s i s was compounded r a t h e r than c a u s e d by the l o s s e s of 
wartime. That being so the government c o u l d not hope :to r a i s e 
c a p i t a l f o r c o l o n i a l development i n or d e r to reduce the o v e r a l l 
1. Walker, G.J., Economic P l a n n i n g by Programme and C o n t r o l i n 
Great B r i t a i n (London, Heinemann 1957) see p . l 0 6 , T a b l e 4 
UK Balance of Payments 1870-1938; see a l s o Hobsbawm, E . J . , 
I n d u s t r y and Empire (Harmondsworth Penguin 1969) pp.144-
153, pp.258-62. 
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d e f i c i t without a deduction from home investm e n t i n the s h o r t 
run. Of c o u r s e once the investment i n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e had been 
made net b e n e f i t s would begin to show. But a l l t h i s assumes 
that^ no o t h e r c o s t s would be i n c u r r e d o t h e r than the i n i t i a l 
o u t l a y . What i s ignored are the c r u c i a l p o l i t i c a l impediments 
to the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f c o l o n i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n i n the l a t e 
1940's. A l r e a d y B r i t i s h troops were having to r e p r e s s 
c o l o n i a l l i b e r a t i o n movements i n Malaya and the Gold C o a s t . 
Advances towards c o l o n i a l self-government were b e i n g pursued 
by the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e : they r e s e n t e d the i d e a t h a t c o l o n i a l 
h e a l t h , education, and w e l f a r e schemes had to be trimmed i n 
order to giv e p r i o r i t y " to . i n c r e a s e s i n food and raw 
m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n designed wholly f o r e x p o r t . The C o l o n i a l 
O f f i c e a t t h i s time was i n f l u e n c e d by the p r o g r e s s i v e F a b i a n 
C o l o n i a l Bureau which argued t h a t i t was u n j u s t to take-out 
more than we put i n as t h i s t h r e a t e n e d c o l o n i a l r i g h t s ^ . As 
f o r the long term u t i l i t y of the d o l l a r pool, the s t e r l i n g 
a r e a ' s d e c i s i o n to r e s t r i c t d o l l a r e x p e n d i t u r e was always 
dependent on the v o l u n t a r y p r i n c i p l e . T h i s was seen to be a 
tenuous arrangement when i n June 1948 the f i r s t p o s t -
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y agreement was broken by I n d i a , South A f r i c a and 
2 
A u s t r a l i a who spent more than t h e i r ' r a t i o n ' . With 
independent and s o v e r e i g n c e n t r a l banks i t was d i f f i c u l t to 
do anything but ac c e p t the f a c t as a f a i t a c c o m p l i ^ , where i n 
e f f e c t the dominions were h e l p i n g themselves to the d o l l a r 
e a r n i n g s of the c o l o n i e s w i t h B r i t a i n l o o k i n g on a s a t t e n d a n t 
1. For the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e and Fabian Bureau view Gupta, P.S., 
I m p e r i a l i s m and the B r i t i c h L a b o u r Movement 1914-64 {London 
MacMillan 1974) pp.321-3. 
2. i b i d p.306. 
3. i b i d p.309 
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a t t h e p o o l ^ . W h i l e Gupta c o r r e c t l y t o n e s down D u t t * s r a t h e r 
u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d t a l k o f a ' l a b o u r a r i s t o c r a c y ' p r o t e c t e d by 
t h e B r i t i s h W e l f a r e S t a t e and f a t t e n e d on i m p e r i a l i s t 
e x p l o i t a t i o n ^ , he goes t o o f a r t h e o t h e r way i n a p p e a r i n g t o 
deny t h a t t h e i m p e r i a l s h e l t e r p r o v i d e d a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o 
economic s t r a t e g y i n t h e s h o r t r u n . He can f i n d l i t t l e 
e v i d e n c e o f l a b o u r M.P.s a d v o c a t i n g i t as a s o l u t i o n i n t h e 
p u b l i c f o r u m . T h i s , however, i n d i c a t e s n o t h i n g . I m p e r i a l 
a r r a n g e m e n t s were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n e f f e c t i n g p e r i o d s o f t r a n s -
i t i o n between c r i s i s and p a r t i a l r e c o v e r y i n 1947/8 even i f 
t h e r e l a p s e w h i c h t o o k p l a c e i n t h e summer o f 1949, when t h e 
U.S. r e c e s s i o n l e d t o a slump i n U.S. e x p o r t s and a r e v i v a l 
o f t h e d o l l a r d e f i c i t , showed t h e t e n u o u s n e s s o f t h e i r 
p r o t e c t i v e power. 
Gupta's m a j o r e r r o r i s t o a s s o c i a t e i m p e r i a l i s m w i t h 
p o l i c i e s f o r e x t e n d e d and i n t e n s i v e e m p i r e d e v e l o p m e n t and 
Bevf.n's p e r s o n a l v i e w s on e m p i r e customs u n i o n ^ . He has t o 
a d m i t t h e e x i s t i n g m a r k e t i n g schemes and c o l o n i a l m o netary 
p o l i c i e s c o n t i n u e d e x i s t i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n , r e t a r d e d t h e 
d e v e lopment o f c o l o n i a l income and i n d i g e n o u s m a n u f a c t u r i n g , 
w h i l e the c o l o n i a l d o l l a r s u r p l u s e s t o o k t h e s t r a i n o f the 
4 
U.K. d e f i c i t . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e v a l u a t e t h e e x a c t r o l e 
p l a y e d by i m p e r i a l p o l i c y i n t h i s p e r i o d , and i n p a r t i c u l a r 
w h e t h e r i t f u n c t i o n e d t o s u s t a i n i n t e r n a l economic r e -
c o n s t r u c t i o n . The most one can say i s t h a t f o r t h e p o s t 
1. Gupta, I m p e r i a l i s m and t h e B r i t i s h Labour Movement.p.348. 
2. i b i d pp.309-10. 
3. i b i d p.305, pp.319-20. 
4. i b i d p.325 and p.337
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c o n v e r t i t > i i i t y p e r i o d , and p r o b a b l y i n t o t h e e a r l y 1950's, i t 
p r o v i d e d a f o r m o f s h e l t e r e n a b l i n g us t o s u s t a i n a h i g h e r 
l e v e l o f i m p o r t t h a n w o u l d o t h e r w i s e have been f K J s s i b l e , and 
c r u c i a l l y i n 1948, i t k e p t us se c u r e w h i l e t h e government 
n e g o t i a t e d M a r s h a l l A i d . The l o n g t e r m u t i l i t y o f p o l i c y 
i n s t r u m e n t s such as t h e p r e f e r e n c e s and t h e d o l l a r p o o l were 
never r e a l l y d e f e n d e d . On t h e c o n t r a r y commitments were 
c o n s t a n t l y b e i n g u n d e r t a k e n and i m p l e m e n t e d g r a d u a l l y t o phase 
them o u t , b u t a t a speed t h e government c o u l d d e t e r m i n e . T h i s 
f a c i l i t y f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e movement o f p o l i c y a t t h e i n t e r -
f a c e between t h e i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l economy i s made 
p o s s i b l e by t h e e x t r a c t i o n o f c o n c e s s i o n s t h r o u g h n e g o t i a t i o n . 
T h i s i s t h e method by w h i c h p o l i t i c a l management can s o f t e n 
th e i m p a c t o f a d j u s t m e n t s on p r e s e n t g e n e r a t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e 
c u r r e n t e l e c t o r a t e s . Such a c o n c e r n f o r s h o r t t e r m s u r v i v a l 
ajid p r o g r e s s i o n o v e r l o n g term g o a l s and r i s k was f r o m t h e 
b e g i n n i n g o f i t s d e v e l o p m e n t seen as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f 
s o c i a l democracy^. We s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h e s e p o i n t s i n t h e 
f i n a l c h a p t e r . 
SECTION I I I . THE CONDITIONS OF MAi^SHALL AID. 
The second l e g o f p o s t - c o n v e r t i b i l i t y s t r a t e g y r e s t e d on 
th e need t o p r o t e c t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h r o u g h more U.S. a i d . I n 
t h i s t h e B r i t i s h Government was f a v o u r e d by t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e . 
t h a t t h e U.S. was g i v i n g a i d t o t h e w h o l e o f Europe and n o t 
j u s t t o B r i t a i n . T h a t t h e Americans were c o n c e r n e d w i t h pump 
p r i m i n g and e a s i n g t h e d o l l a r s h o r t a g e t o t h e p o i n t o f b r e a k i n g 
1. see B e r n s t e i n , E., E v o l u t i o n a r y S o c i a l i s m (New York 
Schocken 1961) pp.202-6. 
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t h e i r own B r e t t o n Woods Agreement was veiry much due t o t h e 
p o l i t i c a l consequences t h a t m i g h t f l o w i f European c o u n t r i e s 
were f o r c e d i n t o v a r y i n g d e g r e e s o f a u t a r c h y t h a t w o u l d 
t h r e a t e n t h e c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f a c a p i t a l i s t s p h e r e i n 
Europe and i t s m u l t i - l a t e r a l i s t u n d e r p i n n i n g s , i s o l a t i n g 
A merica, s t r e n g t h e n i n g R u s s i a and i n c r e a s i n g t h e d e f e n c e c o s t s 
w h i c h American c a p i t a l w o u l d have t o c a r r y . The d e f e a t o f 
Germany had c r e a t e d a power vacuum i n Western Europe. 
Communist p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e governments o f I t a l y and France 
and t h e C i v i l war i n Greece had been r e v e a l e d more c l e a r l y t o 
t h e U.S. Government as a r e s u l t o f C l a y t o n ' s t o u r o f Europe^. 
At- t h e end o f F e b r u a r y 1947 rumours s p r e a d i n W a s h i n g t o n t h a t 
B r i t a i n was t h i n k i n g o f r e d u c i n g i t s o v e r s e a s m i l i t a r y 
commitments and making an e x i t f r o m h e r r o l e i n Greece. 
Truman and M a r s h a l l n o t i f i e d Congress t h a t t h e U.S. wo u l d have 
2 
t o assume t h e d e f e n c e b u r d e n u n l e s s s u b s t a n t i a l a i d was g i v e n . 
One t h i n g was c l e a r , t h e e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s f o r 
a i d s e t up by B r e t t o n Woods c o u l d o n l y l e n d s m a l l amounts on 
a p i e c e m e a l b a s i s l e f t t o t h e i r own r e s o u r c e s . M a r s h a l l t o l d 
Congress i n Ja n u a r y 1948 Europe w o u l d s u f f e r 'enormous 
d i s t r e s s so i n t e n s e , s o c i a l d i s c o n t e n t s so v i o l e n t , p o l i t i c a l 
c o n f u s i o n so w i d e s p r e a d ' as t o t h r e a t e n w o r l d s t a b i l i t y ^ . 
T h i s b e n e v o l e n c e t o Europe was n o t e n t i r e l y a r e v e r s a l f r o m 
t h e p r e v i o u s n e o - l i b e r a l p o s i t i o n o f B r e t t o n Woods as can be 
seen f r o m t h e memoirs o f a l e a d i n g U.S. o f f i c i a l o f t h e t i m e , 
Joseph Jones. W h i l e i t seems a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e U.S. was 
1. Gardner, S t e r l i n g D o l l a r D iplomacy pp.299-300. 
2. B a r t l e t t , H i s t o r y o f Post War B r i t a i n p.38. 
3. Amery, The Awakening, p.224. 
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moving t o s t r e n g t h e n c a p i t a l i s m as a whole and n o t j u s t U.S. 
i n t e r e s t s n a r r o w l y c o n c e i v e d , i t seems c l e a r t h a t t h e l a t t e r 
i n t e r e s t s s t o o d t o g a i n more f r o m t r a d e and i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e 
l o n g r u n i f w i d e r m a r k e t s were k e p t open, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r t h e 
p o s t w a r boom s u b s i d e d . M a r s h a l l A i d was f a r more r a t i o n a l 
f r o m t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e t h a n t h e i d e a t h a t t h e U.S. c o u l d 
d o m i n a t e a s t a g n a n t Europe. Jones n o t e s t h a t 
t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s C o u n c i l o f Economic A d v i s o r s 
e x p e c t e d a s l i g h t b u s i n e s s r e c e s s i o n w i t h i n 
12 months; i f t h e e x p e c t e d e x p o r t d e c l i n e due 
t o f o r e i g n i n a b i l i t y t o pay c o i n c i d e d w i t h 
weakness i n t h e d o m e s t i c economy t h e e f f e c t on 
p r o d u c t i o n and p r i c e s and employment i n t h e 
U.S. m i g h t be most s e r i o u s ^ . 
He a l s o t e s t i f i e s t o t h e f e a r o f Europe f a l l i n g o u t o f 
t h e c a p i t a l i s t camp and i n t o t h e R u s s i a n o r b i t ; and t h e 
d o l l a r and t h e r e f o r e h i g h t a x c o s t o f armaments r e s u l t i n g f r o m 
t h e U.S. h a v i n g t o u n d e r t a k e f u r t h e r d e f e n c e commitments 
t h r e a t e n i n g , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e s h r i n k a g e o f t h e w o r l d c a p i t a l i s t 
2 
m a r k e t , a n o t h e r b i g economic slump • 
A f t e r t h e famous M a r s h a l l speech i n June 1947 European 
c o u n t r i e s were encouraged i n a s e r i e s o f summit m e e t i n g s t o 
draw up a l i s t o f t h e i r f o o d , e n e r g y and raw m a t e r i a l r e q u i r e -
ments on a y e a r t o y e a r b a s i s up t o 1952; t h e d a t e s e t f o r 
* r e c o v e r y ' . C o u n t r i e s e v e n t u a l l y had t o accompany r e q u e s t s 
w i t h d e t a i l e d p l a j i s o v e r 4 y e a r s o f how t h e y aimed t o a c h i e v e 
1. Jones, J. F i f t e e n Weeks Feb 21-June 5, 1947, (New York 
V i k i n g Press 1 9 5 5 ) . p.207. 
2. Jones q u o t e d i n H o r o w i t z , D., The Free w o r l d C o l o s s u s : 
A c r i t i q u e o f America's F o r e i o n P o l i c y i n t h e C o l d War 
(New Y o r k , H i l l and Wang 1 9 6 6 ) . 
pp,126-7. 
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b a l a n c e o f payments s u r p l u s e s by t h e n . They were t o l d t o t r y 
t o t r a d e w i t h one a n o t h e r i n o r d e r t o reduce t h e d r a i n on 
d o l l a r s u p p l i e s , an e x p l i c i t encouragement t o d i s c r i m i n a t e 
a g a i n s t American c a p i t a l i n e x p o r t s w h i c h amounted t o a 
r e v e r s a l o f a p r e v i o u s l y s a c r e d p r i n c i p l e i n U.S. c o m m e r c i a l 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . An Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n A c t was passed i n 1948. 
The a i d e d c o u n t r i e s w o u l d have p e r i o d i c a l l y t o s u b m i t s t a t e -
ments o f t h e i r needs s c r e e n e d f i r s t by t h e 'European 
C o - o p e r a t i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' i n each c o u n t r y , s i g n agreements 
p r o m i s i n g t o i n c r e a s e i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n , 
s t a b i l i s e c u r r e n c y and m a i n t a i n ' p r o p e r ' r a t e s o f exchange, 
c o - o p e r a t e i n r e d u c i n g t r a d e b a r r i e r s , a l l o w t h e U.S. t o draw 
on European raw m a t e r i a l s and t o p u b l i s h t h e uses o f t h e a i d . 
I n o r d e r t o become e l i g i b l e each c o u n t r y w o u l d have t o e n t e r 
a b i l a t e r a l agreement w i t h t h e U.S.A. s i g n i f y i n g i t s i n t e n t i o n 
t o a b i d e by t h e C o - o p e r a t i o n A c t . T h i s was done by t h e U.K. 
l e t t e r o f i n t e n t ^ . Y e t t h e c o n s t r a i n t s were f e w e r t h a n i s 
commonly supposed. As a r e s u l t o f B r i t i s h C a b i n e t i n s i s t e n c e , 
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t o b a l a n c e t h e budget i n each y e a r i n w h i c h 
a i d was g i v e n was changed t o i n c l u d e an i n t e r p e t a t i v e 
d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h i s w o u l d n o t p r e c l u d e d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g f o r 
t h e s h o r t p e r i o d . M i n i s t e r s a l s o s t r e s s e d t h e U.S. w o u l d n o t 
ge be a l l o w e d t o i n t e r f e r e i n o r s e t t h e ' v a l i d r a t e o f exchang '^. 
1- See H.C. Debs. V o l . 452. Co l . 2 0 1 1 S t a t e m e n t ; A g r e e m e n t 
2 9 t h June 1948 UK-USA. 
2. Cab 124/316 M e e t i n g s Economic P o l i c y Committee 8 and 
2 1 s t June 1948; see a l s o Cab 128/13 C a b i n e t m e e t i n g 
CM(48)43 2 5 t h June 1948. 
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The Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n Agreement was s i g n e d 2 6 t h June 1948^. 
A p a r t f r o m t h e vague c o n c e s s i o n s made on r e d u c i n g t r a d e 
b a r r i e r s and f i n a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y . A r t i c l e I I I c o n t a i n e d t h e 
f i r s t e x p r e s s e d p r o v i s i o n by a B r i t i s h government f o r t h e 
l e g i t i m a c y o f U.S. d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t i n c u r s i o n s i n t o t h e U.K. 
and i t s d e p e n d e n c i e s ^ , a p o i n t a b o u t w h i c h Congress had been 
q u i t e e x p l i c i t " ^ . Both t h e U.K. government and Mr. Hoffman, 
t h e European C o - o p e r a t i o n A d m i n i s t r a t o r , w o u l d g u a r a n t e e t h e 
r e p a t r i a t i o n o f t h e p r o f i t s o f p r o j e c t s u n d e r t a k e n i n d o l l a r s . 
The f u t u r e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f m u l t i n a t i o n a l o p e n i n g s were n o t 
a p p r a i s e d . The government saw i t as f r e e i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e 
sense o f U.S. ' a s s i s t a n c e ' r e n d e r e d by a p h y s i c a l a d d i t i o n o f 
p l a n t and know-how, as w e l l as t h e f r e e d o l l a r s w h i c h , as a 
r e s u l t o f t h e i n v e s t m e n t , w o u l d f l o a t r o u n d t h e m o n e t a r y system. 
Some commentators on M a r s h a l l A i d have made much o f t h e 
s u p e r v i s i o n and m o n i t o r i n g by U.S. O f f i c i a l s o f o u r p u b l i c 
4 
e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n n i n g . B o t h P r i t t and D u t t drew a t t e n t i o n t o 
speeches b e f o r e t h e U.S. Senate by t h e c h i e f o f t h e Economic 
M i s s i o n i n t h e U.K. o f t h e European C o - o p e r a t i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
Thomas F i n l e t t e r . A p p a r e n t l y F i n l e t t e r had d e f e n d e d t h e 
1. European C o - o p e r a t i o n Agreement UK/USA 2 6 t h June 1948 
Cmnd.7446 (London HMSO 1 9 4 8 ) . 
2. B.C. Debs. Vol.439. C o l . 2 9 1 . 6 t h J u l y 1948. Debate on 
Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n A c t -
3. i b i d , V0I..439. 
4. P r i t t , D.N., The Labour Government 1945-51. (London 
Lawrence and W i s h a r t 1 9 6 0 ) ; pp.184-6. 
D u t t , C r i s i s o f B r i t a i n , pp.392-4. 
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programme o f a i d t o B r i t a i n on t h e grounds t h a t we w o u l d be 
h o l d i n g down government c o n s u m p t i o n by c u t t i n g back on s o c i a l 
programmes o f h e a l t h , e d u c a t i o n and h o u s i n g i n o r d e r t o b o o s t 
e x p o r t s and c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t s . D e s p i t e b e i n g i n i t i a l l y 
' t r o u b l e d ' about t h e l a r g e 20% o f o u r i n v e s t m e n t programme 
d e v o t e d t o new h o u s i n g he hoped t h e s e n a t o r s w o u l d a p p r e c i a t e 
t h e need t o recoup houses d e s t r o y e d by war and t h e f a c t t h a t 
a s m a l l e r p r o p o r t i o n o f o u r n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t was b e i n g p l a n n e d 
f o r h o u s i n g i n 1949 t h a n i n 1938. A g a i n i t can be a r g u e d 
t h i s i s m e r e l y a f o r m o f words and below t h e l e v e l o f 
appearances l i e s t h e r e a l s u b s t a n c e . The A m e r i c a n was m e r e l y 
r a t i o n a l i s i n g f o r an American a u d i e n c e f i g u r e s drawn up by 
t h e B r i t i s h d e s i g n e d t o g i v e t h e appearance o f s u b s t a n t i a l 
p r i v a t i o n t o j u s t i f y t h e s t a t u s quo. 
How f a r t h e B r i t i s h government made F i n l e t t e r t h e i r m.an 
can be seen f r o m h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e l e v e l o f house 
b u i l d i n g and t h e c o m p a r i s o n s w i t h 1938. The 30's were a p e r i o d 
o f a s u b s t a n t i a l p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e house b u i l d i n g boom amid 
economic slump and u n d e r u t i l i s e d c a p a c i t y ^ . To d e f e n d a 
s i m i l a r l e v e l o f h o u s i n g p r o g r e s s i n a p o s t war economy s h o r t 
o f l a b o u r m a t e r i a l s and i n v e s t m e n t r e s o u r c e s was a d i f f e r e n t 
m a t t e r . W i t h r e g a r d t o c o n s u m p t i o n t h e 1938 s t a n d a r d o f 
l i v i n g , f o r t h o s e i n employment, was one o f t h e b e s t o f t h e 
p o s t w a r y e a r s : r e a l p u r c h a s i n g power i n an e n v i r o n m e n t o f 
s t a b l e o r even f a l l i n g p r i c e s had s u b s t a n t i a l l y i m p r o v e d o v e r 
1. R i c h a r d s o n , H.W. and A l d c r o f t , D. , B u i l d i n g i n t h e 
B r i t i s h Economy between t h e Wars. (London, A l l e n & Unwin, 
1 9 6 8 ) . 
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t h e 1920s.^ To make, however, 1938 t h e s t a n d a r d r e f e r e n c e 
p o i n t f o r an economy where a l l were i n employment and where 
i n f l a t i o n was p r e s e n t h a r d l y r e p r e s e n t e d t y i n g M a r s h a l l A i d 
t o i n c r e a s e d a u s t e r i t y . I n f a c t t h e B r i t i s h g overnment d i d 
p r e c i s e l y t h e o p p o s i t e . When t h e Economic P o l i c y Committee 
met and agreed t h e r e v i s e d i m p o r t programme f o r J u l y 1948 -
J u l y 1949^ p r e p a r e d by d e p a r t m e n t s i t d e c l a r e d t h a t 
B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g i t s aim was t o r e s t o r e t h e 
l e v e l o f f o o d c o n s u m p t i o n m a i n t a i n e d i n 1947/8 
t o make f u l l p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e needs o f i n d u s t r y 
f o r raw m a t e r i a l s and m a c h i n e r y , t o make p o s s i b l e 
t h e agreed i n c r e a s e i n t h e h o u s i n g programme and 
r e s t o r e t h e b a s i c r a t i o n f o r p e t r o l . The U.S. 
a u t h o r i t i e s m i g h t be r e m i n d e d t h a t , a t t h e P a r i s 
c o n f e r e n c e i n 1947, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t c o u n t r i e s 
had a g r e e d t h a t t h e aim . s h o u l d be t o r e c o v e r t h e 
1938 s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g and t h a t t h i s had been 
g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i s e d as a r e a s o n a b l e o b j e c t i v e 
i f t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y o f Western Europe 
was t o be s o u n d l y e s t a b l i s h e d . ^ 
A t a f u r t h e r m e e t i n g M i n i s t e r s n o t e d t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d o f 
l i v i n g w o u l d have f a l l e n b u t f o r M a r s h a l l A i d : i t had 
'bought t i m e ' f o r o u r recovery*^. Bevan, M o r r i s o n and D a l t o n 
a l l conveyed t h i s t o t h e p u b l i c i n speeches - w i t h o u t M a r s h a l l 
1. P o l l a r d , S., The Development o f t h e B r i t i s h Economy 
(London, Edward A r n o l d , 2nd e d i t . 1969) pp.289-94 
see a l s o Stevenson, J . and Cook, C, The Slump: S o c i e t y 
and P o l i t i c s d u r i n g t h e d e p r e s s i o n . (London, J o n a t h a n 
Cape 1977) p.5-6, 9, 16-19 and T a b l e A l p . 2 8 3 ) . T h i s 
book i s t h e f u l l e s t s t a t e m e n t y e t o f t h e ' r e v i s i o n i s t ' 
t h e s i s on t h e 1930's. 
2. Cab 134/216 Economic P o l i c y Committee m e e t i n g 2 3 r d March 
1948. 
3. Cab 134/216 Economic P o l i c y Committee m e e t i n g 1 3 t h May 
1948. 
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A i d f u r t h e r c u t s i n f o o d i m p o r t s , r a t i o n s and i n raw m a t e r i a l s ^ 
threatening employment^ w o u l d have been necessary."^ 
The ease w i t h w h i c l i B r i t a i n surmounded t h e 1947-8 c r i s i s 
must t h e r e f o r e be p a r t l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e ease w i t h w h i c h 
t h e A merican government b r o k e w i t h B r e t t o n Woods t h e m s e l v e s 
by g i v i n g g r a n t s t o Europe s u r p a s s i n g e n t i t l e m e n t s under t h e 
I.M.F., by t o l e r a t i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i n g p r a c t i c e s a g a i n s t t h e 
d o l l a r a r e a , by e n c o u r a g i n g a s e l f - h e l p p r e f e r e n t i a l system 
i n w e s t e r n Europe as w e l l as by t h e use o f e x i s t i n g p r e f e r e n c e s 
by t h e U.K. T h i s t e m p o r a r y ' R e t r e a t t o w a r d s b i l a t e r a l i s m ' as 
2 
Balogh c a l l s i t , gave B r i t a i n a n o t h e r ' P o l i c y Space' w i t h i n 
w h i c h t o manoeuvre. T h i s was o n l y a vague hope i n Au g u s t 
1947 when t h e C a b i n e t d e c i d e d t o c u t c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t and 
make room f o r more e x p o r t s . T h i s i m p l i e d s h i f t i n 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r i o r i t i e s began t o be d i s c u s s e d i n t h e o p e n i n g 
c r i s i s months b u t by the t i m e p r o p o s a l s were ready t h e i n i t i a l 
a s s u m p t i o n s - t h a t t h e r e was a c r i s i s t h a t i n d i c a t e d an 
i n e s c a p a b l e p a t h had been r e p l a c e d by a more s e c u r e and 
n e g o t i a t e d e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h t h e range o f o p t i o n s e x t e n d e d as 
a consequence and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c h o i c e r e - e s t a b l i s h e d . 
We a r e now i n a p o s i t i o n i n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r t o examine t h e 
p r o c e s s o f t h e p l a n n i n g o f c u t s i n more d e t a i l f o r t h e l i g h t 
t h a t i t t h r o w s on p o l i t i c a l r e s o u r c e management. 
1. see D a l t o n , High T i d e and A f t e r p.304; LPCR i S t h May 1948 
(Speech by Sevan) and Cab 129/24 C a b i n e t Paper CP(48/35 
5 t h F e b r u a r y 1948. Economic P r o g r e s s R e p o r t . 
2. B a l o g h , T., The D o l l a r C r i s i s , Cause and Cure. ( O x f o r d 
B a s i l B l a c k w e l l 1949) p.252. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I n t h i s c h a p t e r we s h a l l i l l u s t r a t e how a c h a n g i n g 
r a t i o n a l e f o r r e d u c i n g c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t l e d t o a change i n 
t h e p l a n n e d s c a l e o f c u t s , t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n and t h e 
measures chosen t o e f f e c t them. The s t r a t e g y o f t h e 
government was t o manage t h o s e i n t h e o p p o s i t i o n and t h e 
p r e s s who r e g a r d e d r e c o n s t r u c t i o n as 'overloaded'^ w h i l e a t t h e 
same t i m e t o p r o c e e d w i t h as few a l t e r a t i o n s i n e x i s t i n g 
p r i o r i t i e s and commitments as p o s s i b l e . The c h o i c e s r e v e a l e d 
i n a f u l l e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e c u t s i l l u s t r a t e t h e n a t u r e and 
u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s b e h i n d much o f s h o r t t e r m economic 
management. 
SECTION I ; THE OBJECTIVES 
D e c i s i o n making on t h e s c a l e and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e 
c a p i t a l c u t s was d e l e g a t e d by t h e c a b i n e t t o an I n v e s t m e n t 
Programmes Committee ( I . P . C . ) s e t up f o r t h e p u r p o s e . ^ T h i s 
body was t o be a sub - c o m m i t t e e o f t h e i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l 
S t e e r i n g Committee and w o u l d work ' i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e 
d e p a r t m e n t s ' i n c l u d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m t h e T r e a s u r y (who 
s u p p l i e d t h e c h a i r m a n , F. V i n t e r ) and t h e r e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t s 
i n t h e Economic S e c t i o n o f t h e C a b i n e t O f f i c e . Edwin Plowden, 
who as C h i e f P l a n n i n g O f f i c e r o f CEPS was i n v i t e d on t o t h e 
Committee, began t h e p r o c e s s when he s e n t o u t a l e t t e r t o 
d e p a r t m e n t s i n v i t i n g them t o c u t t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t p r o j e c t s 
and c o n c e n t r a t e i n s t e a d on e x p o r t s and i m p o r t s a v i n g . I t 
was n o t e d t h a t c o n s t r u c t i o n used a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f such 
s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s as t i m b e r and s t e e l and t h a t t h e s e had 
1. Cab 128/10. C a b i n e t m e e t i n g CM(47)68 1 s t August 1947. See 
a l s o Cab 129/20 C a b i n e t Paper 1 3 t h Aug. 1947 I n v e s t m e n t 
Programmes Committee Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e C a b i n e t . 
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a l t e r n a t i v e uses i n e x p o r t and i n d u s t r i e s b u i l d i n g . I n 
a d d i t i o n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s consumed a l a r g e 
s l i c e o f energy o u t p u t . Plowden was q u i t e c l e a r t h a t c u t s 
s h o u l d f a l l : 
Wherever p o s s i b l e on e l e m e n t s i n t h e prograanme 
w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e d o m e s t i c s t a n d a r d o f 
l i f e r a t h e r t h a n on p r o d u c t i v e i n d u s t r y . 
S i n c e , t h e l e t t e r went on , t h i s r e q u i r e d aim c o u l d n o t be 
a c h i e v e d s i m p l y by n o t s t a r t i n g new p r o j e c t s , i t w o u l d be 
n e c e ssary t o r e v i e w p r o j e c t s a l r e a d y i n p r o g r e s s t o see i f 
t h e i r c o m p l e t i o n was j u s t i f i e d and t o c o n c e n t r a t e i n v e s t m e n t 
on c o m p l e t i n g t h o s e a l l o w e d t o go f o r w a r d . ^ I n d r a w i n g up 
p o i n t s o f p r i n c i p l e f o r m i n i s t e r s as e a r l y as A u g u s t 4 t h t h e , 
s t a t e d aim a p peared t o be t o c u t as l i t t l e as p o s s i b l e i n t h e 
e n g i n e e r i n g i n d u s t r y t h a t p r o v i d e d e s s e n t i a l p l a n t and m a c h i n e r y , 
and i n s t e a d t o c o n c e n t r a t e on a r e a s t h a t ' s e t f r e e l a r g e numbers 
o f w o r k e r s and t h i s meant t h e h o u s i n g programme'. Of t h e 
£1600m o f g r o s s i n v e s t m e n t p l a n n e d f o r 1948 £300m was a l l o c a t e d 
f o r h o u s i n g . T h i s s h o u l d be c u t t o £200ra and £195m s h o u l d be 
c u t f r o m p l a n t and m a c h i n e r y . T o t a l c u t s o f £30Om were 
2 
t h e r e f o r e i n d i c a t e d . 
I t was i n t h e f i e l d o f h o u s i n g t h a t t h e c o m m i t t e e 
e n c o u n t e r e d i t s f i r s t c h a l l e n g e . Plowden's l e t t e r t o d e p a r t -
ments had t a l k e d o f c u t s i n t h e p r o p o s e d l a b o u r c e i l i n g f o r 
June 1948."^ Labour d e v o t e d t o h o u s i n g s h o u l d f a l l f r o m 
1. T229/66. I n v e s t m e n t Programmes C o m m i t t e e ; W h i t e Paper on 
C a p i t a l I n v e s t m e n t . L e t t e r f r o m Plowden t o D e p a r t m e n t s 
15 August 1947. 
2. Cab 134/503. M i n i s t e r i a l Committee on Economic P l a n n i n g . 
Memo f o r L o r d P r e s i d e n t a t m e e t i n g o f M i n i s t e r s 4 August 
1947 p r o p o s e d by CEPS(Sir Edward Plowden) 
3. T229/66. L e t t e r f r o m Plowden 1 5 t h August 1947. 
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582-490,000 and w i t h c u t s i n o t h e r a r e a s t h e t o t a l b u i l d i n g 
l a b o u r f o r c e s h o u l d c o n t r a c t t o 820,000. Labour^ m a t e r i a l s 
and s t e e l c a p a c i t y c o u l d t h e r e b y be r e l e a s e d . Plowden 
f i r m e d up h i s v i e w i n a l e t t e r t o M o r r i s o n . We c o u l d n o t 
a f f o r d t o c u t e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g i n o r d e r t o r e -
house b a d l y housed f a m i l i e s o u t s i d e m i n i n g and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
a r e a s where l a b o u r was b a d l y needed.^ No f u r t h e r t e n d e r s 
s h o u l d be approved b e f o r e t h e c o m m i t t e e r e p o r t e d . W h i l e 
Bevan was p r e p a r e d t o a g r e e t o t h i s and had h i m s e l f t e r m i n a t e d 
e x i s t i n g l i c e n c e s f o r t h e b u i l d i n g o f houses f o r s a l e by 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , he and h i s c i v i l s e r v a n t s r e s i s t e d t h e 
s u g g e s t i o n o f Hugh Weekes, t h e D i r e c t o r o f Programmes - CEPS, 
who a r g u e d t h a t t h e r a t e o f m o n t h l y c o m p l e t i o n s s h o u l d f a l l 
f r o m 15 - 11,000, and t h a t t o e f f e c t t h i s e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t s 
o u g h t t o be c a n c e l l e d so t h a t l a b o u r on permanent h o u s i n g w o u l d 
f a l l f r o m 270-200,000. S i r John W r i g l e y , Bevan's C i v i l S e r v a n t , 
a r g u e d however t h a t t h e Government was a s k i n g f o r a l o n g l e g a l 
b a t t l e w i t h companies demanding c o m p e n s a t i o n i f t h i s c o u r s e 
were f o l l o w e d . ^ The f i n a l outcome o f t h i s i s s u e and i n d e e d 
1 . Cab 124/453 L o r d P r e s i d e n t s O f f i c e P o s t War H o u s i n g . 
Plowden t o L o r d P r e s i d e n t 11 August 1947. 
2. Cab 134/437. I n v e s t m e n t Programmes Committee m e e t i n g 2 8 t h 
August 1947. Bevan b e l i e v e d a t t h a t t i m e t h e r e were 240,000 
houses under c o n s t r u c t i o n ( w h i c h c o u l d be f i n i s h e d by t h e 
m i d d l e o f 1948 a t t h e e a r l i e s t ) and 110,000 ( w h i c h c o u l d be 
f i n i s h e d by t h e end o f 1 9 4 8 ) . How, he asked h i s f e l l o w 
m i n i s t e r s , c o u l d he be e x p e c t e d t o d e a l w i t h t h e i l l h o u s e d 
and b l i t z e d c i t i e s such as London, C o v e n t r y and P l y m o u t h i f 
b u i l d i n g was t o be c o n f i n e d t o m i n i n g and a g r i c u l t u r a l a r e a s 
see Cab.132/8 L o r d P r e s i d e n t s Committee Paper 8 t h August 
1947 H o u s e b u i l d i n g Memo by M i n i s t e r o f H e a l t h . 
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t h e whole f a t e o f the h o u s i n g programme w o u l d depend on how 
s e v e r e t h e o v e r a l l c u t i n c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t was t o be and 
t h a t c o u l d n o t be d e c i d e d u n t i l t h e I n v e s t m e n t Programmes 
Committee (IPC) had s o r t e d o u t e x a c t l y what i t t o o k . i t s vague 
b r i e f t o be. 
, From t h e s t a r t t h e r e was a c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n made 
w h i c h w o u l d s t r u c t u r e t h e subsequent p o l i c y i n one o r t h e 
o t h e r d i r e c t i o n , and i t was t h e T r e a s u r y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on 
I.P.C., P.D. P r o c t o r who o u t l i n e d t h i s c h o i c e . He d i v i d e d 
t h e i s s u e o f c u t s i n t o two p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s . The f i r s t 
o b j e c t i v e w o u l d c u t programmes so t h a t t h e y c o u l d be i n b e t t e r 
b a l a n c e w i t h t h e s u p p l y o f m a t e r i a l s . The second o b j e c t i v e 
w o u l d be t o c u t so t h a t t h e l a b o u r and m a t e r i a l s w o u l d be 
r e l e a s e d on a s c a l e s u f f i c i e n t t o s w i t c h r e s o u r c e s f r o m 
e x i s t i n g programmes t o a new e x p o r t p r i o r i t y . ^ B o t h t h e 
M i n i s t r y o f Works r e p r e s e n t e d by C h a r l e s de V i l l i e r s , and t h e 
M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h , r e p r e s e n t e d by S i r John W r i g l e y , l o o k e d f o r 
a m i c r o - l e v e l b a l a n c e w i t h i n e x i s t i n g programmes based on t h e 
f i r s t o b j e c t i v e . The second o b j e c t i v e . p u s h e d by t h e T r e a s u r y ^ 
was an a t t e m p t t o e s t a b l i s h a m a c r o - b a l a n c e f o r t h e economy as 
a whole. The r e a l t e s t i n m a t c h i n g o r c o - o r d i n a t i n g m i c r o t o 
macro w o u l d be t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h any r e d u c t i o n i n new 
b u i l d i n g a p p r o v a l s was t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a r e d u c t i o n o f . l > u i l d i n g 
employment. The f i r s t o b j e a t i v e , as P r o c t o r p o i n t e d o u t i n 
h i s memo, w o u l d l e a v e t h e i n d u s t r y w i t h 900,000 men. T h i s 
w o u l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y p r o d u c e an i n c r e a s e o f e n t r a n t s t o o t h e r 
1. Cab.134/444. IPC W o r k i n g P a r t y Papers 17 Sept. 1947. Note by 
P.D. P r o c t o r ( T r e a s u r y ) on t h e b u i l d i n g programme. 
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i n d u s t r i e s . The main l a b o u r c o n t r o l , t h e Engagement O r d e r , 
o n l y a p p l i e d t o t h o s e a l r e a d y unemployed i t c o u l d n o t t r a n s f e r 
men o u t . That c o u l d o n l y o c c u r i f p r i o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
measures had been t a k e n t o c u t t h e programme t o r e l e a s e 
l a b o u r e r s . The c o m m i t t e e n o t e d w i t h r e g a r d t o h o u s i n g t h a t i f 
Sevan's p o l i c y o f p r o c e e d i n g w i t h t h e 350,000 houses under 
o n s t r u c t i o n and under c o n t r a c t was a g r e e d t o , t h e n t h e 
Committee w o u l d have t o i n c r e a s e t h e a l l o w e d c o m p l e t i o n s p e r 
month t o 15,000 i n s t e a d o f t h e p r o p o s e d 11,000 and t h i s w o u l d 
a f f e c t t h e r e q u i r e d l a b o u r f o r c e . ^ The Committee a p p r e c i a t e d 
t h a t t h e second o b j e c t i v e w o u l d i n v o l v e a s h a r p r e v e r s a l o f 
p o l i c y p u r s u e d s i n c e 1943 o f e x p a n d i n g t h e b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y 
under s t a t e s p onsored g u a r a n t e e s , w h i c h e n c o u r a g e d t h e e n t r y o f 
2 
s k i l l e d o p e r a t i v e s and a p p r e n t i c e s . 
I n August and September 1947 t h e I.P.C. was s w a y i n g between 
t h e s e two o b j e c t i v e s and seems t o have come down i n f a v o u r o f 
a t o t a l c u t I n i n v e s t m e n t o f £200m ( w i t h up t o £100mfrom-.a 
c u t on p l a n t and m a c h i n e r y ) . T h i s appeared t o be l e a n i n g i n 
t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e f i r s t o p t i o n . I t was a t t h i s t i m e t h a t 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f B r i t i s h i n d u s t r i e s come t o t h e government 
w i t h t h e i r much t o u g h e r p l a n . The D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l o f t h e 
( F . B . I . ) , S i r Norman K i p p i n g , s e n t i t p e r s o n a l l y t o t h e Prime 
i M i n i s t e r , " ^ ajid l a t e r t h e y d i s c u s s e d i t v e r b a l l y i n a d e l e g a t i o n 
4 
t o m x n i s t e r s . The F . B . I , m a i n t a i n e d t h e p r o b l e m was n o t ' j a s t an 
1. Cab.134/437 I n v e s t m e n t Programmes Committee m e e t i n g 28 
August 1947. 
2. Cab.134/444.IPC W o r k i n g P a r t y Paper 2nd Sept 1947 Problems 
o f Reducing t h e b u i l d i n g Programme. Note by . J o i n t S e c r e t a r i e s . 
3. F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s I n d u s t r y and t h e Way t o 
Recovery 1947 s e n t t o Prime M i n i s t e r 2 8 t h A u g u s t 1947 see 
T229/63 F.B.I., d i s c u s s i o n o f I n d u s t r y & t h e Way t o Recovery. 
4. Cab.130/19 G e n e r a l S e r i e s 179/28. R e p o r t o f M i n i s t e r s M e e t i n g 
w i t h F.B.I, t o d i s c u s s ' I n d u s t r y & Way t o Recovery' 
5 t h Sept. 1947. 
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e x t e r n a l d o l l a r c r i s i s b u t one p r o d u c e d by an i n t e r n a l p>olicy 
o f i n f l a t i o n a r y b i a s e s w h i c h r e d u c e d c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s . These 
i n f l a t i o n a r y b i a s e s were i n d u c e d by excess demand.!.-. Too many 
a m b i t i o u s schemes had been s t a r t e d w h i c h meant t h a t t h e economy 
was o v e r l o a d e d . P u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e a l s o i n v o l v e d i n c r e a s e d 
demand, drew i n i m p o r t s u s i n g s c a r c e d o l l a r * exchange i n 
p r o d u c t s ^ and p r o d u c e d no r e t u r n i n t h e f o r m o f e x p o r t s . P u b l i c 
e x p e n d i t u r e a b s orbed--capacity majipower and r e d u c e d t u r n o v e r 
t h r o u g h t h e c r e a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l s h o r t a g e s . I n t h e p l a n n e d 
c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t f o r 1948 o f £l,600m t h e F . B . I , drew a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between t h a t i n t h e p u b l i c and p r i v a t e s e c t o r and 
c l a i m e d t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n was 50:50. S i n c e b u s i n e s s and 
p e r s o n a l s a v i n g t o t a l l e d £350m p u b l i c i n v e s t m e n t s h o u l d be 
e q u a l o r l e s s . Cuts o f £450 were s u g g e s t e d on h o u s i n g , 
s c h o o l s , h o s p i t a l r e p a i r and n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s . ^ P u b l i c 
c u r r e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s h o u l d a l s o be r e d u c e d and a l l c o n t r o l s 
phased o u t . A c r u c i a l l a c k o f c o n c e r n was e v i d e n c e d i n t h e 
F . B . I , a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s i n d u s t r i a l r e - e q u i p m e n t . I n c r e a s e d 
o u t p u t t h e y m a i n t a i n e d c o u l d j u s t as e a s i l y r e s u l t f r o m t h e 
minimum e s s e n t i a l e x p e n d i t u r e on r e - e q u i p m e n t . A t t e n t i o n 
s h o u l d be c o n c e n t r a t e d on p r o j e c t s w h i c h w o u l d g i v e q u i c k 
r e t u r n s i n a d d i t i o n a l e x p o r t s o r r e d u c e d dependence on i m p o r t s 
i n t h e s h o r t t e r m . 
The F . B.I, d i j d n o t however appear t o have i n f l u e n c e d t h e 
government t o any degree. The r o l e o f t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n i n 
t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e c u t s s h o u l d n o t be o v e r e m p h a s i s e d . ^ 
1 . I n d u s t r y t h e Way t o Recovery p.3. 
2. As f o r i n s t a n c e i n P r i t t , D.N. The Labour Government 1945-51 
(London Lawrence & W i s h a r t 1960) p.147. 
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The government pointed out they were a l r e a d y p r e p a r i n g t h e i r 
own investment r e d u c t i o n and had a n t i c i p a t e d the F . B . I . 
There was no s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e o f p r i n c i p l e 
between the view of the F e d e r a t i o n and the 
Government on t h i s q u e s t i o n ... but u n t i l the 
complete review the Government c o u l d not a c c e p t 
the F e d e r a t i o n ' s e s t i m a t e o f £430m. as the 
e x t e n t o f the r e d u c t i o n i n the t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t 
programme.^ 
The government had been a d v i s e d by Plowden and C.E.P.S. 
that the F . B . I , had ignored the f a c t t h a t some of the £l,600m 
planned investment was f o r replacement or r e p a i r to make good 
d e p r e c i a t i o n of e x i s t i n g a s s e t s , a b a s i c minimum f o r s u r v i v a l 
I f t h e i r proposed r e d u c t i o n f e l l o n l y on net new i n v e s t m e n t 
i t r e p r e s e n t e d about a 5095 c u t and would t h r e a t e n much 
ne c e s s a r y p u b l i c investment i n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e e s s e n t i a l f o r 
export as w e l l as the p r i o r i t y b u i l d i n g programme. 
I n d i s c u s s i o n s i n v o l v i n g a method f o r c o n t r o l l i n g 
' i n e s s e n t i a l ' investment^the government used the w i l l i n g n e s s 
of the F . B . I , to c o n c e n t r a t e on s h o r t - t e r m r a t h e r than l o n g -
term c a p i t a l equipment ajid asked them to c o n s i d e r ways of 
g e t t i n g t h e i r members to v o l u n t a r i l y reduce e x p e n d i t u r e on 
pl a n t and machinery t h a t d i d not produce the q u i c k r e t u r n f o r 
expor t s t h a t was wanted^or an adequate r e t u r n i n i n c r e a s e d 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . ^ 
1. Cab. 130/19, General S e r i e s 179/28, Report of M i n i s t e r s 
meeting w i t h F . B . I , d e l e g a t i o n to d i s c u s s ' I n d u s t r y and the 
Way to Recovery', 5th September, 1947. 
2. T229/63. F . B . I , d i s c u s s i o n o f I n d u s t r y and the Way to 
Recovery. Plowden to Morrison,. 4th September, 1947. 
3. T229/67, Papers l e a d i n g to 7 t h meeting of the Economic 
Pl a n n i n g Board, 25th September, 1947. 
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The FBI o f f e r e d to do t h i s but i n r e t u r n wanted the 
government to devolve i t s powers o f c o n t r o l over c o n s t r u c t i o n 
through the b u i l d i n g l i c e n c e s to the ' s e l f - g o v e r n i n g ' t r a d e 
a s s o c i a t i o n s . They would then v e t a p p l i c a t i o n s by t h e i r 
f i r m s a c c o r d i n g to t e s t s of whether they c o n t r i b u t e d towards 
the export programme, c l e a r e d b o t t l e n e c k s , s e t f r e e raanp>ower 
and m a t e r i a l s or improved e f f i c i e n c y i n the s h o r t term. Once 
the t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n had approved the sponsoring department 
would a u t o m a t i c a l l y grant the a p p l i c a t i o n . ^ But a t the 5th 
meeting o f the Economic P l a n n i n g Board the government had 
a l r e a d y r e j e c t e d the i d e a of r e d u c i n g i t s e l f to a rubber stamp 
on the q u e s t i o n of b u i l d i n g l i c e n c i n g . ^ The time was not 
r i p e f o r t h i s s o r t o f withdrawal s i n c e the government had only 
r e c e n t l y got the T.U.C. to agree to the m i l d e s t s u g g e s t i o n of 
labour d i r e c t i o n . The c a b i n e t had only r e c e n t l y r e - a f f i r m e d 
t h a t the s p i r i t o f compulsion over employers who produced non-
e s s e n t i a l s f o r the home market should continue."^ Where the 
F . B . I . ' s 'presence' may have been f e l t was i n the government's 
r e l u c t a n c e to r e - i n t r o d u c e the wartime system o f l i c e n c e s to 
a c q u i r e p l a n t and machinery as a means of r e s t r i c t i n g 
e x p e n d i t u r e , p r e f e r r i n g i n s t e a d the 'good sense o f i n d u s t r y ' . 
The i n d u s t r i e s themselves were to d e c i d e which f i r m s should go 
1. T229/67.Economic P l a n n i n g Board:Temporary l i m i t a t i o n o f 
I n d u s t r i a l C a p i t a l E x p e n d i t u r e Note by the F . B . I . 1 s t 
October 1947. 
2. T229/31.Papers l e a d i n g to 5th meeting of the Economic 
P l a n n i n g Board 4th September 1947. 
3. Cab.128/10 Cab i n e t meeting CM(47)75 9th September 1947. 
4. T 2 2 9 / 3 1 . F i f t h meeting o f the Economic P l a n n i n g Board 
4th September 1947 and C a p i t a l Investment i n 1948 Cmnd. 
7268 (London HMSO Dec.1947) p a r a 6. 
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ahead and i n v e s t i n new equipment a f t e r b e ing a d v i s e d by 
government on what was ' e s s e n t i a l ' . But the government d i d 
not. heed the warning of the i n d u s t r i a l i s t S i r Graham Cunningham 
tha t the export of p l a n t and machinery was 'short s i g h t e d ' . ^ 
Even i f the F . B . I , had not been w i l l i n g to co-operate i n the 
r e d u c t i o n of the home use of such equipment the government was 
never e n t i r e l y dependent upon p r i v a t e d e c i s i o n m a k e r s f o r 
r e d u c t i o n s s i n c e some 40% of planned p l a n t and machinery 
production was to have been i n v e s t e d by the s t a t e run p u b l i c 
u t i l i t i e s - w i t h 26% on t r a n s p o r t and s h i p p i n g , some of which 
was again government c o n t r o l l e d . D e c i s i o n makers i n the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r were expected to be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the r e s t . 
Whatever the F B I ' s view on the r e q u i r e d c u t i n the t o t a l 
investment programme the Government went ahead auid announced 
a much lower f i g u r e f o r the g l o b a l c u t .-r. £200m. The 
Tr e a s u r y was not y e t convinced and appeared to s i d e w i t h the 
F.B.I, i n demanding a g r e a t e r r e d u c t i o n . 
P r o c t o r wrote to Plowden i n e a r l y October t h a t the proposed 
c u t s were not enough. He had a ' h o r r i d s u s p i c i o n t h a t i t was 
no bigger than the c u r r e n t i n f l a t i o n o f programmes over 
Resources and not t h e r e f o r e enough to r e l e a s e r e s o u r c e s to 
other forms o f p r o d u c t i o n ' . The FBI were t a l k i n g of a b i g g e r 
cut and t h a t i s what 'people were e x p e c t i n g ' . The r e d u c t i o n 
proposed f o r housing, s a i d Proctor, was 'almost e x a c t l y equal 
1. T229/31 F i f t h meeting of the Economic P l a n n i n g Board, 
4th September 1947. 
2. T229/32 S i x t h meeting of the Economic P l a n n i n g Board 
18th September 1947. 
3. H.C. Deb Vol.443 Col278 23rd October 1947 Debate on the 
Address. 
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to the e s t i m a t e d cut i n f u t u r e s u p p l i e s of m a t e r i a l s ' 3 But 
the government had taken i t s a d v i c e from the i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l 
body i t had s e t up. T h i s Investment Programme Committee was 
ready w i t h i t s r e p o r t on the 8th October. I t i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
i t favoured the f i r s t of two o p t i o n s which i n the e a r l y s t a g e s 
of i t s d i s c u s s i o n s i t had wavered between and which i t now 
proceeded to o u t l i n e . 
( 1 ) The need to c o n c e n t r a t e r e s o u r c e s on e x i s t i n g 
p r o j e c t s to ensure r a p i d r a t e s o f completion, 
t h i s to be independent of any c u t i n the 
c u r r e n t l e v e l o f a c t i v i t y . " 
( 2 ) The second o b j e c t i v e was to reduce the demands 
of home investment f o r s t e e l , c o a l and timber 
and o t h e r m a t e r i a l s i n o r d e r to p r o v i d e g r e a t e r 
q u a n t i t i e s f o r the export programme and o t h e r 
v i t a l needs.2 
T h i s second o b j e c t i v e a c c o r d i n g l y meant a r e a l c u t i n the 
c u r r e n t l e v e l of work and not a paper c u t i n the hopes o f 
Departments as i n v o l v e d i n the f i r s t . 
The f i r s t o b j e c t i v e was a p u r e l y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e one 
i n t e r n a l to the o p e r a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r programmes i n . o r d e r to 
i n c r e a s e t h e i r coherence. I n p a r t i c u l a r the aim was to r e l a t e 
s t a r t s to completions i n a way t h a t p revented the l i m i t e d 
supply of m a t e r i a l s being spread over too many j o b s , d e l a y i n g 
the completion of work, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n b u i l d i n g , i n c r e a s i n g 
the labour turnover time i n v o l v e d and o f t e n r e n d e r i n g labour 
power i d l e . With timber a s c a r c e r e s o u r c e , the d o l l a r 
expenditure on i t r a t i o n e d , and the d i f f i c u l t y of g e t t i n g more 
1. T229/66 Investment Programmes Committee Report on C a p i t a l 
Investment P,D. P r o c t o r to Plowden 30th October 1947. 
2. Cab.129/21 C a b i n e t Paper CP(47)284 Report of the Investment 
Programmes Committee •Sth October 194
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labour i n t o the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r i e s , the o b j e c t i v e of c u t t i n g 
investments to match m a t e r i a l s and c o n c e n t r a t i n g on a s m a l l e r 
t o t a l could almost be c o n c e i v e d as a requirement d i c t a t e d by 
common sense. 
The second o b j e c t i v e a r o s e as a d i r e c t consequence of 
r a i s i n g export t a r g e t s . The government c o u l d e i t h e r do t h i s 
by i n c r e a s i n g output, r e d u c i n g consumption or r e d u c i n g 
investment. 
Y e t the r e p o r t p o i n t e d out 'There i s not i n p r a c t i c e 
complete freedom o f c h o i c e between thes e a l t e r n a t i v e s * . 
Increased production was l i m i t e d by m a t e r i a l supply which 
c o u l d only be o b t a i n e d f o r e x p o r t s by c o n t r a c t i o n s i n consump-
t i o n and investment. B r i c k s and cement were l i m i t e d by the 
c o a l requirements of i n d u s t r y , s t e e l by e x p o r t s , and timber 
by f o r e i g n exchange l i m i t s . 'Moreover the e x p o r t t a r g e t s i n 
themselves r e q u i r e , to the e x t e n t they r e q u i r e i n c r e a s e d 
e x p o r t s of c a p i t a l equipment, c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e d u c t i o n s i n 
investment'. The f u r t h e r c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t c u t s i n i n v e s t -
ment prevented the i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n and the export t a r g e t 
was surmounted by the formula t h a t investment would go ahead 
i n a r e a s where r e t u r n s were y i e l d e d i n the s h o r t r u n . 
Paragraph 8 noted t h a t the r e p o r t was a d i r e c t r e v e r s a l i n 
the t r e n d of f i s c a l p o l i c y which had been to encourage 
i n d u s t r i a l re-equipment. For i n s t a n c e the 1945 Income Tax 
Act had given g r e a t e r i n c e n t i v e s f o r the u n d e r t a k i n g of 
c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e through a p r e f e r e n t i a l r a t e on u n d i s t r i b u t e d 
ploughed back p r o f i t s . Given the commitment to i n c r e a s e 
b u i l d i n g work i n the c o a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r i e s ^ y e t a t 
the same time to reduce the s h a r e of i n v e s t m e n t l o c k e d up i n 
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b u i l d i n g , the r e p o r t s c o n c l u s i o n was t h a t the h e a v i e s t c u t s 
should come i n the housing and i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g f i e l d s which 
made up 60% and 1 2 ^ r e s p e c t i v e l y of the t o t a l and a l s o provided 
the bulk of new work. The Report proposed r e d u c i n g the r a t e 
cf housing s t a r t s from 15,000- 5,000 a month f o r a t l e a s t a 
y e a r . Completions should be reduced to 12,000 a month or 
140,000 i n 1948. C o n t r a c t s should be c a n c e l l e d on houses on 
which no work had been done, and i n some a r e a s work would be 
stopped on those which had not reached the damp c o u r s e l e v e l . 
The programme was ' i n b a l a n c e ' when the number of s t a r t s o r 
those under c o n s t r u c t i o n e q u a l l e d those completed a t 140,000 
and t h i s p o s i t i o n was expected to be r e a c hed by the middle of 
1949. The r e p o r t recommended c u t t i n g the c o s t s o f each house 
b u i l t by c u t t i n g the s t a n d a r d s of s i z e and amenity, d i s p e n s i n g 
w i t h an o u t b u i l d i n g and a second l a v a t o r y . F u r t h e r s a v i n g s 
c o u l d be made i f houses were b u i l t as f l a t s . 
For i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g a complete s t a n d s t i l l for 6 months 
was proposed on a l l but completions f o r the export d r i v e . 
Those new i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g or e x t e n s i o n s on which the s t e e l 
e r e c t i o n stage had not been reached would be postponed. 
Departments would n o t i f y the f i r m s concerned. T h i s was to 
apply from November 1947 to the whole co u n t r y , i n c l u d i n g 
development a r e a s , where a good h a l f of the a p p r o v a l s s i n c e 
1944 had been l o c a t e d . ^ L a t e r i t was l a i d down t h a t 
maiintenance and r e p a i r work was not to exceed the l e v e l o f the 
2 
p a s t 12 months. 
1. Cab.129/21. Report of Investment Programmes Committee 
Appendix on I n d u s t r i a l B u i l d i n g . 
2. HLG 102/278 HQBC - B u i l d i n g p r i o r i t i e s . ECP.43 Re v i s e d 
Arrangements f o r the C o n t r o l of the B u i l d i n g Programme 
3rd December 1947. 
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Although school b u i l d i n g was not to stop, n u r s e r y s c h o o l s , 
community and a d u l t e d u c a t i o n c e n t r e s were c u t . B u i l d i n g f o r 
the h e a l t h programme was to c o n t i n u e only a t a r a t e s u f f i c i e n t 
f o r the maintenance and r e p a i r o f h o s p i t a l s . Road b u i l d i n g , 
new road v e h i c l e s i n c l u d i n g buses and r a i l w a y s t o c k modernisa-
t i o n ( e s p e c i a l l y new l o c o m o t i v e s ) and e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n was to be 
c u t . Work on New Towns would be stopped. T h i s would r e s u l t 
i n a c u t i n b u i l d i n g employment from 985-850,000 ( o r from 
1,200,000 - 1,150,000 f o r the i n d u s t r y as a whole)*^ over the 
p e r i o d up to June 1948. Housing employment would come down 
from 582-490,000. The Committee made a q u a l i f i c a t i o n i n t h a t 
i t regarded i t a s a c c e p t a b l e i f workers went i n t o r e p a i r and 
maintenance below the £10 l i c e n c e l i m i t as t h i s s e c t o r needed 
labour and used fewer m a t e r i a l s . T h i s i m p l i e d a s o f t e n i n g of 
the blow i n the b r e a k i n g o f the 1943 b a r g a i n w i t h the i n d u s t r y . 
I t was pointed out t h a t d e c i s i o n s would have to be c a r e f u l l y 
e x p l a i n e d to the i n d u s t r y i n or d e r to stop ' d e m o r a l i s a t i o n ' . 
The r e p o r t r e c o g n i s e d the d i f f i c u l t y o f c u t t i n g e x p e n d i t u r e on 
p l a n t and machinery i n the p r i v a t e as opposed to the p u b l i c 
s e c t o r given the r e l u c t a n c e to r e i n t r o d u c e the wartime : . ._ . 
system. _ of l i c e n c e s to a c q u i r e . The t h r e a t o f doing so 
might be enough to engender the r e q u i r e d c o - o p e r a t i o n , w i t h 
perhaps some d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a t e r i a l s . ^ 
1. A d i f f e r e n c e made up o f self-employed, c l e r k s , men over 64 
and boy a p p r e n t i c e s . 
2. The Government used i t s own C a p i t a l I s s u e s Committee ( C . I . C . ) 
to help i n the r e s t r i c t i o n o f money c a p i t a l o u t l a y f o r 
c o n s t r u c t i o n and machinery except where immediate g a i n s to 
the b a lance o f payments c o u l d be shown. The C . I . C . was a 
wartime agency c a r r i e d over i n t o peace i n order to c o n t r o l 
the i s s u e of new s h a r e s on the s t o c k exchange. Sec H.C.Debs 
V0I445 C o l 195-7 2nd Dec 1947. O r a l Answer C a p i t a l I s s u e s 
C o n t r o l . 
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T h i s p o l i c y on c a p i t a l equipment the r e p o r t summed up a s 'Make 
do or mend.'. O v e r a l l p l a n t and machinery was to be c u t by 
20%. 
SECTION I I ; MODIFICATIONS IN THE NATURE AND SCALE OF CUTS 
The Report went to the Economic P l a n n i n g Board ( v i a the 
C h i e f P l a n n i n g O f f i c e r Plowden) so to gauge t h e i r r e a c t i o n s 
f o r M i n i s t e r s and C.E.P.S. appended a note h i g h l i g h t i n g the 
problem i d e n t i f i e d by P r o c t o r of g r e a t e r or l e s s e r o b j e c t i v e s . 
The Production Committee gave the s t r a t e g i c m i n i s t e r s a preview 
a t the same time. The S t e e r i n g Committee c o n s i d e r e d i t and 
then together with Departmental comments i t went to the 
C a b i n e t . 
The Department w i t h the most to l o s e i f the r e p o r t was 
implemented was not slow i n responding. S i r John Wrigley 
a t t a c k e d the way the IPC had i g n o r e d h i s e a r l i e r a d v i c e t h a t 
the p o l i c y c a n c e l l i n g c o n t r a c t s would i n v o l v e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
'chaos' f r u s t r a t i o n and resentment not l e a s t among l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s on whom the M i n i s t r y was dependent f o r a c t i o n . 
The p o l i c y of encouraging Maintenance and Repair i n v o l v e d going 
a g a i n s t the wartime commitment to a d d i t i o n a l accommodation 
r a t h e r than the r e c o n d i t i o n i n g of e x i s t i n g s t o c k . With r e g a r d 
to c u t s i n s t andards these c o u l d not be a c h i e v e d f o r houses 
under c o n t r a c t and the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t new s t a r t s c o u l d be 
r e s t r i c t e d to 5,000 a month was a grave u n d e r e s t i m a t e of what 
could be a c h i e v e d . ^ The i m p l i c a t i o n of these arguments was 
t h a t i f c u t s went ahead on t h i s s c a l e and i n t h i s form i t would 
be d i f f i c u l t to r e g a i n momentum i n the housing d r i v e . Having 
lodged a p r o t e s t w i t h the S t e e r i n g Committee Wrigley spent the 
next few days b r i e f i n g h i s M i n i s t e r . 
1. Cab 134/190 S t e e r i n g Committee Papers 12th Oct 1947.Report 
On Investment Programmes Committee Comments o f M i n i s t r y of 
Health. 
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I n o r d e r to c a r r y out t h e i r promises o f g r e a t e r con-
s u l t a t i o n , the Economic P l a n n i n g Board had been a l l o w e d to see 
the Report. D e s p i t e the F . B . I . ' s sympathy i n August w i t h the 
i d e a of c u t s , now t h a t the government had not gone f o r what they 
recommended, i n p a r t i c u l a r a big g e r r e d u c t i o n i n the p u b l i c 
s e c t o r , they became more c r i t i c a l . I n p a r t i c u l a r they opposed 
the c u t s i n c a p i t a l equipment, and a t t a c k e d the export o f p l a n t 
and machinery. The measures were 'too d r a s t i c ' and r e s t r i c t e d 
our c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s . T h i s view was shared by the T.U.C. Some 
c i v i l s e r v a n t s were a l s o w o r r i e d . S i r Godfrey I n c e , Permatnent 
S e c r e t a r y a t the M i n i s t r y of Labour, thought the c u t s of 
b u i l d i n g l a b o u r i n s u f f i c i e n t to r e l e a s e men to the undermanned 
i n d u s t r i e s ; they would j u s t go i n t o maintenance aind r e p a i r . 
S i r John Woods of the Board o f Trade opposed the c u t s i n 
i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g , although S i r Bernard G i l b e r t o f the Tr e a s u r y 
g e n e r a l l y thought i t r e a s o n a b l e not to t i e up our economic 
r e s o u r c e s i n t o too many h a l f f i n i s h e d j o b s . ^ Plowden l e t 
C r i p p s know t h a t the F.B.I , and T.U.C. had r e g i s t e r e d a 
complaint, t h a t , d e s p i t e b eing a b l e to see the r e p o r t b e f o r e 
M i n i s t e r s they had been used 'as a rubber stamp'. Plowden 
thought however t h e i r c a s e was weak: i n a c r i s i s ' d e c i s i o n s 
should be taken without p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n . ' ^ 
Key m i n i s t e r s i n the P r o d u c t i o n Committee d i s c u s s e d the 
p r i n c i p l e s o f the r e p o r t and made i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t i t was 
s t i l l up to 'Departments to adopt the method of s e c u r i n g r e s u l t s . ' ^ 
1. T229/33, 8 t h Meeting o f the Economic P l a n n i n g Board, i S t h 
October, 1947. 
2. T229/34, 9th Meeting o f the Economic P l a n n i n g Board. L e t t e r 
from Plowden to the M i n i s t e r of Economic A f f a i r S f 13th 
October 1947. 
3. Cab.134/635. Production Committee meeting, 13th October 1947. 
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Bevan repeated the arguments a g a i n s t the I.P.C.s h o u s i n g c u t s 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r the r e s t r i c t i o n / of 5,0OO s t a r t s per month. 
He wanted the programme f i x e d a t 180,000 to 200,000 completions 
per y e a r , l e a v i n g i t up to h i s M i n i s t r y to a d j u s t the r a t e of 
a p p r o v a l s . C r i p p s opposed him by a r g u i n g t h a t the housing 
programme should go down to a completion l e v e l of 140,000, but 
the i s s u e was l e f t suspended u n t i l t h e f u l l c a b i n e t Could 
d i s c u s s the r e p o r t . The g l o b a l c u t of £200m on g r o s s domestic 
investment as proposed by I.P.C. was agreed, although the 
c h a n c e l l o r thought t h i s a minimum and p r e f e r r e d a higher 
f i g u r e . 
The C a b i n e t r e c e i v e d the Report on the 16th October a f t e r 
CEPS and the economic s e c t i o n had appended i t s comments Iwhich 
b o l s t e r e d up C r i p p s ' 'note', a l s o appended, t h a t c u t s should 
go ahead. Both the Economic P l a n n i n g Board and the S t e e r i n g 
Committee saw the t o t a l c u t i n i n v e s t m e n t as a minimum. The 
S t e e r i n g Committee wanted more and was v e r y f i r m on the 
f i g u r e f o r r e s t r i c t i n g housing s t a r t s . The note by CEPS and 
the economic s e c t i o n observed t h a t 'the l e v e l of re-equipment 
i n i n d u s t r y which the I.P.C. proposes f o r 1948 i s w e l l below 
what one c o u l d wish on a long term b a s i s ' . But a t the C a b i n e t 
meeting Bevan got the C a b i n e t to r e f u s e to c l o s e the o p t i o n s 
on the housing programme. The housing programme should be 
brought i n t o b a l a n c e but not by b r e a k i n g c o n t r a c t s . 
He understood t h a t the p r o p o s a l to r e s t r i c t t h e 
a l l o c a t i o n o f labour and m a t e r i a l s e s p e c i a l l y timber 
f o r the 1948 programme to the number and q u a n t i t y 
r e q u i r e d f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 140,000 houses would 
not i n f a c t mean th a t the number o f houses a c t u a l l y 
completed would be r e s t r i c t e d to t h a t f i g u r e e s p e c i a l l y 
a s many now under c o n s t r u c t i o n a l r e a d y had timber i n 
them. 
1. Cab 128/10 Ca b i n e t meeting CM(47)81 20th October 1947 
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Bevan d i d not l i k e the i d e a of c o n f i n i n g the programme f o r 
1949/50 to 140,000 a t t h i s stage, and h i s s u g g e s t i o n , taken up 
by the Cabinet, was t h a t the whole p o s i t i o n be reviewed i n 
June 1948.^ The Cabinet had thus ensured t h a t the housing 
prograimme would r e t u r n to the p o l i t i c a l agenda at a time t h a t 
o f f i c i a l s and economists wanted i t f i x e d within f a i r l y s p e c i f i c 
boundaries. The forthcoming agenda as i t turned out would be 
h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by the p o s s i b i l i t y o f more i m p o r t s of timber 
made through the f a c i l i t y of M a r s h a l l Aid. The c h a n c e l l o r 
promised t h a t any r e d u c t i o n i n imports prepared i n the meantime 
would not ' i n v o l v e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the housing programme'. 
S i n c e a d e c i s i o n on M a r s h a l l Aid had not y e t been reached i n 
Congress t h e r e 'would be no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r adopting 
emergency measures which must s e r i o u s l y d i s t o r t the c o u n t r y ' s 
2 
economy. By February 1948 the C a b i n e t was a l r e a d y jumping 
the gun. The timber p o s i t i o n was not q u i t e as bleaic as once 
thought, and work c o u l d s t a r t on many more houses so t h a t the 
output could c o n t i n u e throughout 1949 a t a r a t e of 200,000 
a y e a r . U n l e s s t h i s were done t h e r e would be unemployment i n 
the b u i l d i n g t r a d e . The d e c i s i o n was taken however d e s p i t e 
p r o t e s t s t h a t o t h er i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g would not be g e t t i n g " 
the same c o n c e s s i o n , ^ 
1. Cab.128/10 l o c . c i t . 
2. Cab.128/12 Ca b i n e t meeting GM(48)14 16 February 1948. 
3. Cab.128/12 C a b i n e t meeting GM(48)16 23rd February 1948. 
d i s c u s s i n g Cab 129/24 C a b i n e t Paper CP(48)56 18th February 
1948. The Housing Programme i n 1948-9 memo by the 
C h a n c e l l o r . 
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F u r t h e r p r o t e s t s were made by Plowden who complained to the 
C h a n c e l l o r t h a t too many r e s o u r c e s were going i n t o ' l e v e l l i n g 
up' i n s t e a d of i n d u s t r i a l equipment.^ D e s p i t e t h i s the 
Government went ahead on 25th June and p u b l i s h e d t h e i r 
adjustment i n the Housing Return F i g u r e s . ^ S i n c e the 1949 
completion r a t e would depend on the number of new ap p r o v a l s 
permitted i n the second h a l f o f 1948 t h i s d e c i s i o n e v e n t u a l l y 
dashedlthe I.P.C. aim o f having a r a t e o f completion of 140,000, 
The Cabinet d e c i s i o n i n February was a l l the more s u r p r i s i n g 
s i n c e the e x t r a timber was a l l o c a t e d b e f o r e the M a r s h a l l A i d 
p o s i t i o n was known. Housing was being made a s p e c i a l c a s e 
when I.P.C. had d e c l a r e d such c a s e s s h o u l d be r e s e r v e d f o r 
those p r o j e c t s making a s i g n f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to export 
and import s a v i n g . The September housing r e t u r n s t a t i s t i c s 
r e v e a l e d t h a t t o g e t h e r w i t h the help o f war damage r e p a i r , 
c o n v e r s i o n and adapti o n s the government programme o f new 
houses had topped the t a r g e t o f 750,000 s e t by the C o a l i t i o n 
White Paper i n 1945.^ The Labour government d i d not at t h i s 
p o i n t c o n s i d e r whether, having a c h i e v e d the modest wartime 
committments^the housing programme should stop. No one a t 
the time appeared to n o t i c e t h i s e i t h e r . The programme 
had achieved a momentum o f i t s own r o l l i n g on i n t o 1952 and 
being i n c r e a s i n g l y j u s t i f i e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the r e l i e f o f 
r. Cab.124/453 Lord P r e s i d e n t s O f f i c e Post War B u i l d i n g 
Plowden to C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchquer 30th A p r i l 1948." 
2. Housing Return f o r England and Wales up to 31 May 1948 
Cmnd 7448 (London HMSO June 1948) 
The Announcement was made i n Commons see H.C, Deb Vol.453 
Col.1321 14th J u l y 1948. 
3. Housing Return f o r England and Wales up to 30th Sept 1948 
Cmnd 7552 (London HMSO October 1948). 
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overcrowding.^ N e v e r t h e l e s s the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f h o u s e b u i l d i n g 
could., be j u - s t i f i e d . The p r o v i s i o n of a d d i t i o n a l 
housing f o r g e n e r a l needs was f a r from s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
completed as the 1951 census would e v e n t u a l l y r e v e a l : the 
number of households having grown f a s t e r than the d w e l l i n g s 
2 
provided. 
I n order to account f o r t h i s adjustment i n the c u t s we 
need to r e t u r n to the c r i s i s months of 1947. I n the October 
1947 meeting^the C a b i n e t had r e s e r v e d i t s p o s i t i o n h o l d i n g out 
on the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r e v i e w i n June. I f the government 
needed a demonstration of the p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n t h a t housing 
c u t s would s t i r , i t was soon to be apparent. Deputations were 
r e c e i v e d from the M e t r o p o l i t a n Boroughs Standing J o i n t 
Committee on the 6th November and the L.C.C. 4 days l a t e r . ^ 
The former gave d e t a i l s o f the r i s i n g t i d e o f w a i t i n g l i s t s , 
warned of 'the e x p e c t a t i o n s of the i n a d e q u a t e l y housed' and 
c o n j u r e d up f e a r s of a renewal of the s q u a t t i n g campaign of 
1945. I t was 'the Borough C o u n c i l l o r s on the spot who bore 
the brunt of the disappointment and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ' . Bevan 
decided to r e v e a l h i s hand and calm the d i s c o n t e n t . The 
M i n i s t r y would, v i a the p r i n c i p a l Housing O f f i c e r , help l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s p l a n t h e i r l e t t i n g o f new c o n t r a c t s a f t e r an 
examination o f p r o g r e s s made on e x i s t i n g schemes. The new 
1. Cab.134/445 Investment Programmes Committee Working Party 
Paper 29 A p r i l 1948. Housing Programme 1948-52 Note by 
M i n i s t r y of Health. 
2. B a r t l e t t , C.J., A H i s t o r y of Post War B r i t a i n 1945-75 
(London Longmans 1977) p.60. 
3. HLG 101/414 Deputations c o n c e r n i n g t e n d e r s and l o a n s f o r 
Housing 6th and 10th November 1947, 
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p o l i c y would operate a f t e r March. . .Until that time an emergency 
s t a n d s t i l l was planned. But what p l e a s e d the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
was the promise to review the whole p o s i t i o n i n June 1948. A 
p r e v i o u s c i r c u l a r had t a l k e d o f a s t a n d s t i l l on new te n d e r s 
and c o n t r a c t s to l a s t u n t i l a re v i e w i n August.^ These ^ 
c o n c e s s i o n s by Bevan. given on a departmental b a s i s , were 
p o s s i b l e given the C a b i n e t ' s vagueness on the matter. Foot 
i n summarising t h i s a f f a i r c o n g r a t u l a t e d Bevan on m i t i g a t i n g 
the ' f u l l s e v e r i t y o f the c u t ' and o f ' g e t t i n g a l a s t minute 
r e p r i e v e i n Cabinet which helped remove the worst l i m i t a t i o n s 
2 
on the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s o f the prograjnme ' . T h i s view i s 
supported by Daltonfe memory o f the same events."^ A s u b s t a n t i a l 
p r o t e c t i o n had been e f f e c t e d f o r a programme i n the middle o f 
a c r i s i s . The Cab i n e t had agreed to Bevan' s and "t.^: . M i n i s t r y 
of H e a l t h ' s demands t h a t the p e r i o d to be al l o w e d f o r b r i n g i n g 
the programme i n t o b a l a n c e should be mid-1949 and not end-1948 
as the I.P.C. Report recommended, and i t had been l e f t open to 
the M i n i s t r y o f Health to s e t t l e the methods by which t h a t 
b a l a n c e was to be ac h i e v e d - a f a c t which enabled the M i n i s t r y 
o f H e a l t h to d e a l f l e x i b l y w i t h the c o m p l a i n t s of the l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s . The Cabi n e t had s a i d nothing about c a n c e l l i n g 
c o n t r a c t s , stopping work on houses which had not got beyond 
damp cour s e l e v e l ^ o r c u t s i n s t a n d a r d s , a l l o f which were 
supposed to be ach i e v e d by end 1948. I n d i s c u s s i n g what 
HLG 101/414 Deputations c o n c e r n i n g t e n d e r s and l o a n s f o r 
Housing C i r c u l a r 160/47 dated 24th October 1947. 
Foot, M., Aneurin Bevan; a biography Vol.2 1945-60 
(London Davis-Poynter 1973) p.96. 
Dal ton, H., High Tid e and AfteriMemoirs 1945-60 
(London Muller 1962) p.268. 
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should be s a i d by the government i n P a r l i a m e n t o f f i c i a l s noted 
t h a t the housing d e c i s i o n was a r e f l e c t i o n o f the s o f t e r o f 
the two p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s t h a t had f a c e d I.P.C. They were 
not proposing to c u t the housing programme i n 
the sense o f aiming a t a r a t e o f com p l e t i o n s 
below t h a t p o s s i b l e w i t h labour and m a t e r i a l s 
but to b a l a n c e the programme: to steady the 
fl o w of completions w i t h what a v a i l a b l e . 
The government would not be r e d u c i n g the 
housing prograimme below what the shortage o f 
m a t e r i a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y timber, compelled 
them to do.1 
-The d e c i s i o n s on housing were i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d up with 
d e c i s i o n s on the o v e r a l l l e v e l o f the b u i l d i n g l a b o u r f o r c e . 
While i t i s t r u e to say the former liad consequences f o r the 
l a t t e r , the i n f l u e n c e worked i n the r e v e r s e d i r e c t i o n as w e l l . 
The M i n i s t r y o f Works, r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o - o r d i n a t i n g the 
b u i l d i n g programme as a whole and as sponsoring Department f o r 
the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y , o b j e c t e d to a c u t i n t o t a l o p e r a t i v e s 
down to 850,000 as recommended by I.P.C. Bevan thought the 
c u t of 90,000 was i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s housing compromise.^ 
The M i n i s t e r of Works s a i d he had d i s c u s s e d the g e n e r a l e f f e c t 
o f the r e p o r t w i t h the N a t i o n a l C o n s u l t a t i v e C o u n c i l on which 
both unions and employers i n the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y were 
r e p r e s e n t e d . While the C o u n c i l agreed the b u i l d i n g programme 
was overloaded i n r e l a t i o n to m a t e r i a l s , any n e c e s s a r y 
adjustments had to take account o f s e n s i b i l i t i e s o r r i s k 
1. T229/66 Investment Programmes Committee White Paper on 
C a p i t a l Investment. W.L.Gower-Barnes to Plowden 14th 
October 1947 w i t h e n c l o s e d d r a f t o f p o s s i b l e passage 
f o r i n c l u s i o n i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s speech, on the 
Debate or ad d r e s s . 
2. Cab.134/635 Production Committee meeting 4 November 1947. 
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' d e s t r o y i n g the atmosphere o f c o - o p e r a t i o n ' , thereby endangering 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of f u t u r e expansion."^ The M i n i s t e r o f H e a l t h 
agreed t h a t i f the c u t s were to go ahead the p u b l i s h e d statement 
should be shown i n e x p e n d i t u r e or v a l u e terms, and any f i g u r e s 
t h a t showed the labour employed should not be i l l u s t r a t e d i n a 
form t h a t r e v e a l e d the s c a l e o f the c u t . ^ T h i s s t a t i s t i c a l 
massaging was a p p a r e n t l y a c h i e v e d , as the p u b l i s h e d White Paper 
on C a p i t a l Investment r e v e a l s , d e s p i t e the e a r l i e r o p p o s i t i o n 
of the Chancellor."^ I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t i c e a b l e i n 
housing where the f i g u r e f o r l a b o u r planned a t June 1948 was 
i n d i c a t e d ( a t 525,000) but the f i g u r e f o r June 1947 was not 
4 
shown a t a l l . The r e d u c t i o n i n housing labour was t h e r e f o r e 
lower thasi I.P.C. envisaged (490,000) and f e l l to o n l y 
550,000 i n June 1948.^ D e s p i t e a l l the t a l k s o f c u t s the 
t o t a l b u i l d i n g labour f o r c e was s t i l l going to be l a r g e r than 
1947.^ The government c o u l d not be s u r e o f g e t t i n g i t down 
to the proposed f i g u r e given the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f e n s u r i n g t h a t 
men d i d not d r i f t i n t o l i c e n c e d or u n l i c e n s e d maintenance and 
r e p a i r work, f o r which t h e r e was s t i l l a g r e a t demand.^ 
1. T229/66. IPC White Paper on C a p i t a l Investment. M i n i s t e r of 
Works to C h a n c e l l o r 27th October 1947. F u r t h e r d e t a i l s of 
d i s c u s s i o n s between the M i n i s t r y o f Works and the i n d u s t r y 
v i a the N a t i o n a l C o n s u l t a t i v e C o u n c i l have not been a v a i l a b l e 
to the author s i n c e the r e l e v a n t f i l e i n c l u d e s meetings 
beyond the p e r i o d allowed under the 30 y e a r ^ r u l e . The f i l e 
WORKS 45/64 w i l l be open i n 1985. 
2. Production Committee meeting 4 November. 
3. i b i d and meeting 18 November. 
4. I t was i n f a c t 559,000 i n June 1947 and 575,000 i n October 
see Rosenberg, N., Economic P l a n n i n g i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y ( P h i l a d e l p h i a , U n i v e r s i t y of P e n n s y l v a n i a P r e s s 
1961) p.94, see a l s o C a p i t a l Investment i n 1948 Cmnd 7268. 
5. Rosenberg, Economic P l a n n i n g i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y pp.126-7. 
6. T229/66 IPC White Paper on C a p i t a l Investment Notes f o r 
C h a n c e l l o T by S i r Edwin Plowden 10 December 1947. 
7. i b i d 
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The u n p a l a t a b l e t r u t h i s t h a t theaemen are not 
l i k e l y t o go i n t o o t h e r jobs where we want them 
so long as t h e r e i s a prospect of working i n 
some form o f b u i l d i n g and t h a t the M i n i s t r y o f 
Labour, from a n a t u r a l f e a r o f unemployment^ 
would tend c o n t i n u o u s l y to press f o r such work 
t o be found r a t h e r than to w a i t and see what 
happens when the men have a c t u a l l y had a p e r i o d 
out o f work. 
These p o l i t i c a l aspects were q u i t e r a t i o n a l i n t h e i r way, i n 
the sense o f s t a v i n g o f f p o s s i b l e s o c i a l d i s c o n t e n t and 
r e t a i n i n g the c o - o p e r a t i o n o f the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y , i n the 
event o f f u t u r e expansion. These aspects .are not a p p r e c i a t e d 
by Rosenberg who sees o n l y the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f a i l u r e . ^ Th e 
p o l i t i c s o f the i s s u e i s more complex, Bevan had^as h i s own 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o b u i l d i n g cuts^ t r i e d t o get as much o f the 
r e d u c t i o n as p o s s i b l e from the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . I n August he 
had i n s t r u c t e d l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s to ban the l i c e n s i n g o f 
f u r t h e r b u i l d i n g o f houses by p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . ^ Deputations 
from the N a t i o n a l Federation o f B u i l d i n g Trade employers, and 
the small b u i l d i n g lobby v i a the Master B u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n 
warned Bevan t h e i r businesses might be f o r c e d i n t o l i q u i d a t i o n 
r e s u l t i n g i n f u r t h e r unemployment. Given t h i s , and Bevan's 
keenness t o keep workers i n the i n d u s t r y f o r when p u b l i c 
housing took o f f again, we can understand why the housing and 
and Works m i n i s t r i e s so r a p i d l y gave i n t o the campaign t o 
1. T229/66 l o c . c i t . 
2. Rosenberg Economic Planning i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y pp 141-2. 
3. HLG102/107 N a t i o n a l B u i l d i n g Programme L i c e n c i n g f o r Housing 
C i r c u l a r 134/47 10 August 1947. 
4. HLG102/108 N a t i o n a l B u i l d i n g programme:Licencing f o r Housing 
P o l i c y . L e t t e r from Federation o f Master B u i l d e r s 20 May 
1948; see a l s o HLG102/107 N a t i o n a l B u i l d i n g Programme 
Li c e n c i n g f o r Housing P o l i c y Deputation from the N a t i o n a l 
Federation o f B u i l d i n g Trade Employers and London Master 
B u i l d e r s A s s o c i a t i o n 6 February 1948. 
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r e l a x maintenance and r e p a i r l i c e n c i n g . The c i r c u l a r i n March 
1948 relaxed housing r e p a i r l i c e n c i n g i n l o c a l areas where 
unemployment had appeared: the f i n a n c i a l l i m i t b e i n g i n c r e a s e d 
from £10 to £100. The j M i n i s t r y o f Works and the M i n i s t r y o f 
Labour had discussed the is s u e and t h e former's t o p c i v i l 
servant, Henri de V i l l i e r s , t a l k e d about the ' p o l i t i c a l 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f unemployment'.^ The N a t i o n a l C o n s u l t a t i v e 
Council had made i t s i n f l u e n c e f e l t on the issue o f r e l a x a t i o n s : 
M i n i s t e r s agreed to pursue the case am-everitually. agreed t o - r a i s e 
the exemption l i m i t f o r non-housing b u i l d i n g l i c e n c e s from 
£100 - £1000.^ So i t h a r d l y mattered t h a t the government brought 
• to, an • end the housing p r i o r i t y f o r placements f o r 
unemployed men a t labour exchanges, since unemployment i n the 
b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y was not going t o be fo r t h c o m i n g a t a l e v e l 
which would achieve s u b s t a n t i a l t r a n s f e r o f labour t o non-
b u i l d i n g occupations. T h i s p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l was no longer 
seen as c r u c i a l f o r the suc c e s s f u l continuance o f the housing 
programme. As Bevan noted at the time 'the e s s e n t i a l needs 
o f housing c o u l d be met by o t h e r means'."^ 
So the cu t s were made w i t h no r e a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o 
r e a l l o c a t e workers o u t s i d e the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y o r t o ensures 
r e p a i r and maintenance d i d not absorb those r e l e a s e d from new 
work; a l l o f t h i s o v e r l a i d by f e a r o f unemployment. I n a 
way a r e a l l a c k o f c o n t r a c t i o n was i n e v i t a b l e given the e f f e c t s 
1. HLG102/270 HQBC - L i c e n c i n g o f Maintenance and Repair 
20 Jan.1948 V i l l i e r s to Hugh Weeks C.E.P.S. a t Cabinet 
O f f i c e e n c l o s i n g d r a f t submission t o M i n i s t e r s 14 Jan 1948. 
2. Cab 134/637 Prod u c t i o n Committee Meeting 27 February 1948. 
3. Cab 128/10 Cabinet Meeting CM(47)95 15th December 1947. 
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o f the October housing compromiset t h a t , w i t h the supply o f 
m a t e r i a l s a v a i l a b l e , i t would be p o s s i b l e t o employ a hi g h e r 
labour f o r c e on housing than p r e v i o u s l y envisaged. U n l i k e the 
IPC, which set completions a t 12,000 a month and s t a r t s a t 
5,000, the new I.P.C. p u b l i s h e d White Paper"'' was n o t s p e c i f i c , 
again r e f l e c t i n g the October Cabinet d e c i s i o n t o c u t housing not 
according t o the number o f houses f i n i s h e d ^ b u t the number s t a r t e d . 
The consequences o f t h i s l e s s e n i n g o f the c u t i n the housing 
labour f o r c e by 35,000 ( t o r e f l e c t the f a c t t h a t more houses 
could be completed a f t e r a l l since a l l the timber needed was 
already i n place) meant t h a t housing investment i n 1948 would be 
gr e a t e r i n value by about £20m. (as c a l c u l a t e d by Plowden)• This 
i m p l i e d the c u t i n the gross o v e r a l l c a p i t a l investment would 
have to be lower a t £ia0m. not £200m. The t o t a l r e d u c t i o n i n the 
annual e x p e n d i t u r e on c a p i t a l investment would be £180m. l e s s 
than the £1600m., o r i g i n a l l y f o r e c a s t f o r June 1948, at £l,420m. 
As t h i s r e d u c t i o n was t o be brought i n t o o p e r a t i o n p r o g r e s s i v e l y 
the a c t u a l r a t e o f investment would be h i g h e r a t the beg i n n i n g o f 
1948 and lower a t the end of the year when i t would be r i s i n g a t 
the annual r a t e o f £l,320m. The proposed 1 1 % c u t o f £180m. was a 
c u t i n the a n t i c i p a t e d planned amount n o t a c u t below the 
estimated volume o f c u r r e n t investment. I n terras o f investment 
2 
resources a c t u a l l y used i n 1947 the c u t was sm a l l e r a t £130m. 
1. C a p i t a l Investment i n 1948. 
2. The Economic Survey f o r 1948 noted t h a t planned t o t a l i n v e s t -
ment f o r 1948 o u t l i n e d i n the White Paper on C a p i t a l Investment 
i n 1948 o f £1420m i n c l u d e d only f i x e d p l a n t , equipment and con-
s t r u c t i o n a t 1947 p r i c e s . I t made no p r o v i s i o n f o r increases i n 
stocks and works i n progress over the low l e v e l o f 1947. A l l o w -
i n g f o r t h i s , and the l a r g e r than a n t i c i p a t e d r i s e i n p r i c e s , 
the 1948 survey r e v i s e d the gross investment f i g u r e f o r 1947 t o 
£l,900m or 18% o f G.N.P. compared w i t h the f i g u r e given i n the 
C a p i t a l Investment White Paper o f £l,550m (see Economic Survey 
f o r 1948 Cmnd.7344 (London HMSO March 1948) para 183. For 
f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f unprogrammed miscellaneous investment not 
accounted f o r i n the f i g u r e s , see Rosenberg, Economic Planning 
i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y , pp. 117-18. 
321 
Table 3. GROSS INVESTMENT IN THE U.K. FOR 1948.£m. 
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Oct.1947 
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p a s f o l l o w s : -
770 1550 1600 1420 1320 
-
et Investment 320 900 950 f i g u r e s f i g u r e s 
and Maintenance +450 +650 +650 u n a v a i l -
a b l e 
u n a v a i l -
a b l e 
S i n c e t h e c u t i n c o n s t r u c t i o n i n v e s t m e n t had to be 
r e l a t e d t o an e q u i v a l e n t c u t i n l a b o u r e m p l o y e d , and i t was 
i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o t h i n k i n t e r m s o f r e d u c i n g t h e l a b o u r 
f o r c e g i v e n t h e d e c i s i o n s on h o u s i n g and m a i n t e n a n c e a n d r e p a i r , 
i t was r a t h e r o p t i m i s t i c t o t h i n k t h a t c o n s t r u c t i o n i n v e s t m e n t 
c o u l d f a l l . 
S o u r c e s : C o l . 1/2 and t h e f i g u r e s on Net I n v e s t m e n t d e r i v e d from B u r c h a r d t , F.A., 'Cuts i n C a p i t a l E x p e n d i t u r e ' , B u l l e t i n o f O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e o f S t a t i s t i c s X No. K J a n u a r y 1948. T a b l e 1, p.2, C o l s . 3, 4, 5 from C a p i t a l I n v e s t m e n t i n 1948, p. 7, 
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from £850m ( a t June 1947) t o £700m ( f o r end 1948). As i t 
turned out the r e d u c t i o n i n b u i l d i n g employment WAS much l e s s 
than . a n t i c i p a t e d . I t was, according t o the government, 
expected t o d e c l i n e from 978,000 a t June 1947 t o 890,000 a t 
June 1948 and about 850,000 by the end o f 1948. Yet by 
October labour had r i s e n t o 1,004,000 f a l l i n g t o 978,000 i n 
February 1948 but r i s i n g t o 1,005,000 i n A p r i l , from where i t 
continued t o r i s e u n t i l i t stood a t 1,013,000 i n June^. I n 
terms o f the more comprehensive f i g u r e s , t h a t i n c l u d e d a l l men 
employed as opposed t o j u s t o p e r a t i v e s , t o t a l employment i n 
1948 was 1,357,000. I t had been 1,364,000 i n December 1947, 
The government's p l a n ^ had c a l l e d f o r a c u t o f 164,000 by 
December 1948 to 1,200,000 but the a c t u a l f a l l was 7,000^. 
I n c o n c l u s i o n we may say t h a t the r e d u c t i o n i n new 
b u i l d i n g s t a r t s , and the inc r e a s e d r a t e o f completions were 
not t r a n s l a t e d i n t o reduced employment i n the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y 
because maintenance and r e p a i r took up the s l a c k and increased 
i t s share o f the labour f o r c e , e s p e c i a l l y i n the maintenance 
and r e p a i r o f housing. As a consequence the f i g u r e s f o r 
c o n s t r u c t i o n investment g e n e r a l l y i n value terms were shown i n 
the Economic Survey o f 1949 to have in c r e a s e d over 1948 . 
1. For these f i g u r e s see Cab.129/24 Cabinet Paper CP(48)50 16 
Feb 1 9 4 8 . F o r t n i g h t l y Economic Report Note by Chancellor;Cab 
129/26 CP(48)50 13 A p r i l 1948 d i t t o ; Cabl29/28 CP(48)186 
20 J u l y 1948 d i t t o ; Cabl29/30 CP(48)232 14 Oct 1948 d i t t o ; 
and Cabl29/31 CP(48)288 6 t h Dec 1948 d i t t o . 
2. re-asserted i n Economic Survey f o r 1948 , p..43. 
3. Economic Survey f o r 1949 Cmnd 7647 (London H^ iSO Feb.1949); 
see a l s o Rosenberg Economic Planning i n B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y p . I l l and Wilson, T., 'Manpower' i n G.D.N.Worswick 
and P.H.Ady (eds) The B r i t i s h Economy 1945-50 ( O x f o r d Tht 
Clarendon Press 1952) Table 2 p.235. 
4. Economic Survey f o r 1949 Appendix Table 7; see al s o 
Rosenberg, Economic Planning i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y , p.119. 
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Nevertheless the government had made p r o v i s i o n f o r t h i s 
i n f l e x i b i l i t y having considered t h a t p o s s i b l e l a r g e s s e from 
the Americans i n the form o f M a r s h a l l A i d would make a cut 
unnecessary.^ 
The scale and nature o f the cuts i n c o n s t r u c t i o n i n v e s t -
ment revealed the r e l u c t a n c e o f the Labour government to 
r e s t r u c t u r e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n a way t h a t would f u l l y ' s a t i s f y 
the o p p o s i t i o n , the F.B.I, and c e r t a i n elements i n the Press. 
The t o t a l s t r a t e g y pursued r e f l e c t e d the u n d e r l y i n g commitment 
to f u l l employment and s o c i a l p o l i c y . The package o f c u t s 
announced i n Parliament on the 23rd October^ a l s o preserved the 
commitment to m a i n t a i n overseas m i l i t a r y spending. Only £10m 
o f c uts had been planned i n t h a t f i e l d . The c u t s i n timber, 
s t e e l and food i m p o r t s were much l e s s than t h e Treasury wanted. 
On food the Treasury demand f o r £100m had been pared down by 
the Cabinet to £60m^. As a r e s u l t o f Buch concession c u t s 
i n e x penditure planned f o r i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g and p l a n t and 
machinery were more e x t e n s i v e than the F.B.I, wanted. With 
regard t o i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g , such concessions t h a t were made 
d e r i v e d from a s o c i a l r a t h e r than economic l o g i c : the 
Cabinet agreeing t o exempt the development areas from the more 
4 
s t r i n g e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s . This p r e f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t r e f l e c t e d 
the wartime commitment to r e l i e v e r e g i o n a l l y based unemployment. 
One t h i r d o f f a c t o r y b u i l d i n g had up t o September 1947 been 
concentrated i n such areas.^ 
1. Economic Survey f o r 1948 p.43. 
2. H.C.Deb Vol.443 Col.277-91 23 October 1947.Debate on Address. 
3. Cab.128/10 Cabinet Meeting CM(47)82 23rd October 1947. 
4. Cab.128/10 Cabinet Meeting CM(47)81 20th October 1947. 
5. S t a t i s t i c a l D i gest; i n f o r m a t i o n quoted i n H.C.Debs. 
Vol.445 Col.1958 18 Dec 1947. Debate on C a p i t a l Investment. 
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Since January 1947 t h e r e had been £15m o f l i c e n c e d work on 
f a c t o r i e s , i n d u s t r i a l and commercial premises. £2.8 m i l l i o n 
o f t h a t was new b u i l d i n g , the r e s t r e p a i r and maintenance. 
£8m was t o be cut from the p e r i o d r u n n i n g up t o June 1948. 
£4m o f t h a t would occur because l i c e n c e s were withdrawn from 
b u i l d i n g which had not y e t reached the s t e e l e r e c t i o n stage, 
and the o t h e r h a l f would be under review. As the monthly 
l i c e n c i n g r a t e f e l l anyway due to s t e e l shortages the added 
impact o f I.P.C. cut meant a t o t a l r e d u c t i o n , o f near. 75%.-. 
This was a lower r a t e f o r i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g than i n the next 
worst year 1935.^ While b u i l d i n g l i c e n c e s f o r i n d u s t r i a l 
purposes f o r the l a s t q u a r t e r o f 1947 and the f i r s t q u a r t e r 
o f 1948 were cut down - the l a t t e r being 54% down on the 
p r e v i o u s year - no s i g n i f i c a n t d e c l i n e took place i n the 
l i c e n c i n g p o l i c i e s o f l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s f o r maintenance and 
2 
r e p a i r i n housing. Although r e s t r i c t i o n s were eased i n 
A p r i l 1948 and i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g i n c r e a s e d a f t e r t h e n ^ much 
o f the improvement came i n the s o c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t development 
areas which now contained i n v a l u e h a l f o f a l l f a c t o r y 
4 
b u i l d i n g . 
1. Cab.134/637 Production Committee Paper 18 March 1948 S t e e l 
f o r I n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g memo by Pre s i d e n t o f t h e Board o f 
Trade. 
2. Rosenberg Economic Planning i n the B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y p.100. 
3. i b i d Note 27 p.115. 
4. i b i d p.149 see a l s o B a r t l e t t A H i s t o r y o f Postwar B r i t a i n 
p.82 and Cab.129/30 Cabinet Paper CP(48)255 9 t h November 
1948 Economic Report. Note by Chancellor. 
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With regard t o p l a n t and machinery e x p e n d i t u r e was 
expected t o d i v e from £610m at June 1947 to £527m by the 
end of 1948: a cut o f 14%. The r e d u c t i o n was however g r e a t e r 
a t 23% when taken from the planned investment o f £680m. 
TABLE 4. ESTIMATED GROSS INVESTMENT IN PLANT 
MACHINERY & VEHICLES FOR 1948.1 
Prograjnme o f 












O r i g i n a l 






r a t e then 
£m 
( a ) U t i l i t i e s , ) 
Coal & S t e e l 135 ) 180 
( b ) P r i v a t e Sector 65 ) 590 50 
Other machinery 275 ) 240 
Road Ve h i c l e s 135 90 -
610 680 525 
While some 40% o f a l l newly produced p l a n t and machinery had 
been exported t h i s was to r i s e t o 59% reducing gross supply 
f o r the home market a s shown below: 
TABLE 5. SPECIALISED PLANT AND MACHINERY PRODUCTION 
FOR 1948. 2 







1. T o t a l Production 110 121 
2. Exports 45 72 
3. Production f o r Home 
Market (1-2) 65 49 
4. Imports 2 1 
5. Gross Supplies f o r 
Home Market (3+5) 67 50 
1.Source:Table i n para 27 o f Report o f Investment Programmes 
Committee Cab 129/21 CP(47)284. 
2.Source: Appendix 16 para 2 i b i d . 
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Cripps o u t l i n e d how the government would compensate f o r t h i s . 
The s t r a t e g y was t o be the one f o l l o w e d since 1946 o f i n c r e a s i n g 
p r o d u c t i v i t y by increases i n labour i n t e n s i t y . ^ He spoke o f 
the need f o r the r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n o f labour, an end t o r e s t r i c -
t i v e p r a c t i c e s , the use o f t i m e and motion s t u d i e s , b e t t e r 
u t i l i s a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g machinery and the development o f 
'managerial s k i l l ' - a r e f e r e n c e t o the event u a l government 
support f o r the work o f the I n s t i t u t e o f Personnel Management. 
. The way these decisions were taken i s a l s o i m p o r t a n t . F i r s t 
o f a l l the Cabinet delegates the c u t t i n g e x e r c i s e t o the I.P.C. 
but then having done so places t h e i r recommendations, and 
t h e r e f o r e t h e i r a n a l y t i c c a p a c i t y , i n doubt by proceeding t o 
modify and s e l e c t out the p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s chosen on 
r a t i o n a l l i n e s by the o f f i c i a l s a n y t h i n g which t h r e a t e n s 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r i o r i t i e s . I.P.C., l i k e the Investment 
Working Party before i t , c o u l d not amend or m o d i f i y i n d i v i d u a l 
programmes o f departments: i t had no e x e c u t i v e powers and 
when r e c o n s t i t u t e d on a permanent b a s i s f o r the c o n t i n u a l . 
s u p e r v i s i o n o f the investment programme was a t t a c h e d as a 
sub-committee to the i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l 'demand d r i v e n ' 
2 
S t e e r i n g Committee. 
With respect t o the d e t a i l o f the c u t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n f i e l d the government had been i n f l u e n c e d by 
p o s s i b l e unemployment and l o s s o f support i n the b u i l d i n g 
i n d u s t r y and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , f a c t o r s c r u c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t 
1. H.C.Deb Vol.443 Col277-82 23rd October 1947 Debate on 
Address. 
2. Cab.129/22 Cabinet Paper CP(47)322 5 t h Dec.1947.Investment 
Programmes Committee. Note by the Secretary o f t h e Cabinet 
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f o r p o l i t i c i a n s not anxious t o impose c o n s t r a i n t on the 
b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y beyond what shortages o f m a t e r i a l s made 
necessary. I t was t h i s f a c t o r which l e d the government t o 
t o l e r a t e the seepage o f resources i n t o maintenance and r e p a i r 
and e x p l a i n s why the government d i d not set about t r y i n g t o 
ho l d t h a t back. I t was r e l u c t a n t t o r e i n t r o d u c e t h e wartime 
system which r e g u l a t e d the s e t t i n g up o f new small f i r m s i n 
the f i e l d and was anxious t o keep l a b o u r ; thus the government 
was prepared t o per m i t the r e l a x a t i o n o f l i c e n s i n g l i m i t s . 
To have switched labour and m a t e r i a l s o ut o f b u i l d i n g i n t o 
export would have c o n t r a d i c t e d the commitment.; o f p o l i t i c i a n s 
t o s o c i a l peace. I n terms o f the two p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s the 
I.P.C- had i d e n t i f i e d , the government opted f o r t h e s o f t e r 
o p t i o n o f c u t t i n g programmes t o f i t m a t e r i a l supply and not 
the more ambitious one o f r e s t r u c t u r i n g f o r e x p o r t . Those 
houses which were under c o n s t r u c t i o n and already had enough 
timber i n them c o u l d keep t h e i r l a b o u r . The r e j e c t i o n o f the 
I.P.C. recommendation t o cancel e x i s t i n g p r o j e c t s r a t h e r than 
j u s t r e s t r i c t new s t a r t s meant the housing programme s u r v i v e d 
i n a form t h a t assured i t s f u t u r e expansion. Tougher 
measures were i n s t e a d taken a g a i n s t f a c t o r y b u i l d i n g and 
extensions i n i n d u s t r y , and e n g i n e e r i n g products o f p l a n t 
machinery were d r i v e n t o export r a t h e r than home re-equipment 
because they would s w e l l the e x p o r t streajn immediately w i t h o u t 
i n v o l v i n g much i n t e r - i n d u s t r i a l t r a n s f e r , o f resources. T h i s 
was a r e v e r s a l o f the advice o f the government's C h i e f 
Planning O f f i c e r Plowden^in the e a r l y days o f the I.P.C., t h a t 
the domestic standard o f l i v i n g r a t h e r than i n d u s t r y should be 
reduced and t h a t the b u i l d i n g programme r a t h e r than the 
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engineering i n d u s t r y should s u f f e r . Much o f what the 
government d i d was informed by the s i l e n t assumption t h a t 
f u r t h e r economic a i d was on i t s way, a f a c i l i t y which made 
a str o n g a t t a c k on s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n unnecessary. 
SECTION I I I : THE ALTERNATIVES; DEFLATION, DEVALUATION 
AND ADMINISTRATION 
This s e c t i o n w i l l examine the e x t e n t t o which the 
government considered ways o f r e i n f o r c i n g i t s e x p o r t s t r a t e g y 
by measures oth e r than c u t s i n programmes f o r what t h i s 
i n d i c a t e s furtha: about the nature o f the government's 
p r i o r i t i e s . 
The c l a s s i c a l s o l u t i o n t o the problem o f t r a d e d e f i c i t s 
and e x t e r n a l competitiveness i s t o d e f l a t e home demand and 
thereby the demand f o r i m p o r t s mainly through the o p e r a t i o n o f 
a 'dear money' p o l i c y which r a i s e s i n t e r e s t r a t e s . This should be 
accompanied by c u t s i n government c u r r e n t e x p e n d i t u r e and 
increases i n d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t t a x a t i o n s u f f i c i e n t t o c r e a t e 
a budget s u r p l u s , r e s u l t i n g i n a l e v e l o f unemployment 
th a t s t a b i l i s e s ' i n d u s t r i a l c o s t s . By a r e d u c t i o n i n the supply 
o f money and the easing o f i n f l a t i o n , the g e n e r a t i o n o f sound 
money makes p r i c e c o n t r o l unnecessary. Such a p o l i c y was 
f o l l o w e d i n I t a l y , where a t i g h t c r e d i t squeeze was i n t r o d u c e d 
r e s u l t i n g i n 2.3 m i l l i o n unemployed and i n West Germany where 
the a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y currency r e v a l u a t i o n l e d to the w i p i n g 
out o f Trade Union funds. America had withdrawn p r i c e c o n t r o l s 
i n 1946. According t o d e f l a t i o n i s t s excess purchasing power 
d e f l e c t e d manufacturers from the exp o r t market i n p r e f e r e n c e 
t o an i n f l a t i o n a r y and easy home market. Excess purchasing 
power was c r e a t e d by the hi g h wages bargained at f u l l employ-
ment, p r i c e c o n t r o l , food s u b s i d i e s and demand-creating s t a t e -
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induced c a p i t a l investment. Even when wages were h e l d , as 
they were i n 1948, by wage r e s t r a i n t , a c o n c e s s i o n a l p r i c e was 
e x t r a c t e d from the government i n the form o f c o n t r o l s on p r i c e s 
and d i v i d e n d s , a maintenance o f a shortened working week"^ and 
an increase i n food s u b s i d i e s ^ , the cost o f which had n e a r l y 
doubled i n t h r e e years as import p r i c e s rose^. I n a d d i t i o n 
( a l t h o u g h not s p e c i f i c a l l y t i e d t o s t a t e wage b a r g a i n i n g ) the 
government had grant e d f r e e school m i l k and d i n n e r s , cash 
f a m i l y allowances, increases i n education p r o v i s i o n , housing 
s u b s i d i e s , improved housing standards, a n a t i o n a l h e a l t h 
s e r v i c e , improved s t a t e insurance and pensions - a l l a r e s u l t 
o f wartime and immediate postwar pledges. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n 
massive in c r e a s e s i n s t a t e spending not o n l y from the g r a n t s 
and s u b s i d i e s but a l s o i n the expansion o f the p r o p o r t i o n o f 
the p o p u l a t i o n taken i n on the s t a t e pay r o l l w i t h more 
teachers, d o c t o r s , nurses and d e n t i s t s b e i n g p a i d by the s t a t e , 
and on the equipment t o be purchased on government account 
such as drugs and books on which no economic p r i c e was t o be 
charged t o the f i n a l users. The d e f l a t i o n i s t s i m p l i e d t h a t 
i n order t o e f f e c t the k i n d o f s h i f t and t r a n s f e r s commensurate 
w i t h reducing i n f l a t i o n , i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y and r e s t o r i n g 
c o n v e r t a b i l i t y , the o n l y r e a l s o l u t i o n was t o squeeze out 
other c l a i m a n t s on resources. 
1. Balogh,T., The D o l l a r C r i s i s , Cause and Cure (Oxford B a s i l 
B l a c k w e l l 1949) p.244. 
2. Cab.124/903 C e n t r a l Planning o f Economic Development:verbatim 
r e p o r t o f Deputation t o C h a n c e l l o r o f Exchquer, from the 
Economic Committee o f the T.U.C. 12 J u l y 1948. C r i p p s r e n t i o n e d 
t h a t the T.U.C. coul d o f f e r t h e i r summer conference a govern-
ment promise t o increase s u b s i d i e s from £400-470. See a l s o 
B a r t l e t t A H i s t o r y o f Post War B r i t a i n , p.68. 
3. H.C.Deb. Vol.463. Col.2085 6 t h A p r i l 1949. F i n a n c i a l and 
Economic Statement. 
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A monetary d e f l a t i o n , dear money, and c u t s i n p u b l i c spending 
ivould get c a p i t a l back i n t o the hands o f the r i g h t k i n d o f 
c a p i t a l i s t i . e . those who were cost e f f e c t i v e and whose p r o f i t 
r a t e s were high enough t o pay the i n c r e a s e d i n t e r e s t charge. 
P r o f i t alone would i n d i c a t e the ' d e s i r a b i l i t y ' and the q u a l i t y 
o f investment and not p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n or the ease o f c r e d i t . 
P r o f i t was the best d i s c r i m i n a t o r , whereas cheap money 
favoured the more d o u b t f u l investment p r o j e c t i n c l u d i n g the 
whole panoply o f government induced p u b l i c s e c t o r programmes 
Materials being a l l o c a t e d on a quota b a s i s by bureaucracy t o 
' e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r y ' . f roze production' on a -
prewar b a s i s , b o l s t e r i n g i n e f f i c i e n t and c o s t l y f i r m s a t the 
expense o f new e n t r a n t s and growing f i r m s who c o u l d a f f o r d the 
highe r r a t e o f m a t e r i a l supply. The o n l y t h i n g t h a t c o u l d 
r a p i d l y t r a n s f e r B r i t a i n back t o p r o f i t a b l e p r o d u c t i o n and 
high output would be i f resources were ' f r e e d ' and the best way 
o f doing t h i s was not by margi n a l a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e c o n t r o l s 
but by the c r e a t i o n o f c a p a c i t y ; a pool o f unemployed and 
t h e r e f o r e cheaper i n p u t s , and by c u t s i n p u b l i c investment 
which was not on l y c o s t l y but t i e d o r locked up c a p i t a l f o r 
long periods o f time and made i t unavai T a b l e f o r o t h e r purposes. 
I t was no good c a p i t a l i s t s having money c a p i t a l a v a i l a b l e (as they 
d i d w i t h t h e i r l a r g e unspent reserves gained i n war p r o d u c t i o n 
o r saved i n the form o f d e f e r r e d t ax re f u n d s ) i f shortages o f 
labour and raw m a t e r i a l s prevented the p r o f i t a b l e spending o f i t . 
When we r e f e r t o d e f l a t i o n i s t s we are r e f e r r i n g l e s s t o 
a coherent p o l i t i c a l movement than t o a c u r r e n t o f o p i n i o n ^ 
331 
i n c l u d i n g non-resident economists such as Hubert Henderson^ 
and Frank Paish^ and back bench Conservative M.Ps o f the 
N e v i l l e Chamberlain f a c t i o n such as S i r Waldron Sm-ithers, 
S i r Herbert W i l l i a m s and Alec Erskine-Hi:ll, Chairman o f the 
1922 Committee who had been v o c a l i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e 
p r i n c i p l e o f the Beveridge Report. The o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n 
l e a d e r s h i p l e d by C h u r c h i l l were placed i n an awkward p o s i t i o n 
having agreed to the broad o u t l i n e s o f Labour's p o l i c y when i n 
c o a l i t i o n , a l l they c o u l d argue now was t h a t Labour had gone 
too f a r , too fast"^. The F.B.I, had asked f o r c u t s i n c u r r e n t 
as w e l l as c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e and had t a l k e d o f t h e d o l l a r 
c r i s i s being the r e s u l t o f excess demand, i n f l a t i o n a r y biases 
4 
and uneconomic c o n t r o l s . Another group o f d e f l a t i o n i s t s 
c e n t r e d around the C i t y o f London, i n c l u d i n g s t o c k b r o k e r s 
and merchant bankers, whose views were a r t i c u l a t e d by f i n a n c i a l 
j o u r n a l i s t s . T h e i r p o s i t i o n , e l a b o r a t e d i n . the- media^ . 
classed them . as .popular e x p e r t s and p o w e r f u l c r i t i c s 
o f f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y . ^ What a l l the d e f l a t i o n -
i s t s shared, d e s p i t e d i f f e r e n c e s i n the d e t a i l o f t h e i r 
recommendations, was the b e l i e f t h a t the n a t i o n ' s e x t e r n a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s could not be separated from what happened i n the 
i n t e r n a l economy. By m a i n t a i n i n g excessive aggregate demand 
1. See j o u r n a l . a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n i n t h i s p e r i o d and c o l l e c t e d 
i n Henderson, H., The I n t e r War Years and Other Papers 
(Oxford the Clarendon Press 1955). 
2. see Paish,F., The Post War F i n a n c i a l Problems and Other 
Essays (London MacMillan 1950). 
3. H.C.Deb Vol.435 Col.l003 l O t h March 1947 speech by O l i v e r 
L y t t l e t o n . 
4. see F.B.I. I n d u s t r y and the Way to Recovery. 
5. D e f l a t i o n had been demanded by The Economist on 12th J u l y , 
9 t h August and 20th September 1947. 
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export p r i c e s could not f a l l and the volume o f goods t h a t 
c o u l d be exported was reduced,^ Cheap money, i n s o f a r as i t 
reduced i n c e n t i v e s to save^ i n c r e a s e d consumption and encouraged 
a l l s o r t s o f investment p r o j e c t s whose lo n g term y i e l d would 
not be j u s t i f i e d a t a higher r a t e o f i n t e r e s t . 
We have already mentioned i n Chapter 2 the consensus b u i l t 
up i n wartime f o r m a i n t a i n i n g f u l l employment, government 
spending, cheap money and p r i c e c o n t r o l ^ . , This consensus was 
f a c i l i t a t e d by the d e c l i n i n g power o f Treasury orthodoxy, and 
the r i s e o f the Keynesian r a t i o n a l e . The m i n o r i t y p o s i t i o n 
o f the d e f l a t i o n i s t s was p a r t l y a r e s u l t o f the understanding 
t h a t t h e i r s t r a t e g y i n v o l v e d an immediate and premature 
br e a k i n g o f the consensus and i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f t h e c l a s s 
s t r u g g l e , the moderation o f which had been one o f t h e key 
elements i n the c r e a t i o n o f t h a t consensus. As Balogh puts 
i t governments had opted f o r the 'maintenance o f i n d u s t r i a l 
2 
and s o c i a l peace' . I t seems d i f f i c u l t t o deny t h a t among the 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l consequences o f m a i n t a i n i n g t h e consensus 
was a s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f the neg a t i v e d e f e n s i v e p o s t u r e o f tr a d e 
unions: t h e i r membership having increased by SC% i n the t e n years 
since 1938"^. The concessions^ which were i n e f f e c t a t r a n s f e r 
o f resources across c l a s s l i n e s , were r e f l e c t e d i n the way 
e f f e c t i v e purchasing power o f the working c l a s s ' i n c r e a s e d by 
1691 over t h a t of 1938. A s o c i a l wage o f more than 10% o f 
1. Henderson,H.,'Cheap money and the Budget' i n h i s I n t e r w a r 
Years and o t h e r Essays. 
2. Balogh, D o l l a r C r i s i s p.258. 
3. Hapkin^ H. , The New Look; A s o c i a l H i s t o r y o f t h e 40' s 
and 50's i n B r i t a i n (London Seeker and Warburg 1963) p.114 
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o f n a t i o n a l income, r i s i n g every year w i t h the i n c r e a s i n g c o s t 
o f the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , aJ.so r e s u l t e d from these concessions. 
I n such an environment i t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t o f i n d b e n e f i t s 
accruinq t o c a p i t a l i n a qu i e s e n t l a b o u r f o r c e . Unions 
continue d t o accept the wartime ban on s t r i k e s , and compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n procedures v i a the N a t i o n a l A r b i t r a t i o n T r i b u n a l , 
both o f which were d e r i v e d from the C o n d i t i o n s o f Employment 
Order No. 1305. ' Strvkes were mostly u n o f f i c i a l , w o r king days 
l o s t i n the three post war years were l / 2 0 t h o f those l o s t i n 
the three years o f c l a s s s t r u g g l e a f t e r World War I aind were 
a f r a c t i o n o f those c u r r e n t i n the U.S.A. o r on the c o n t i n e n t 
2 
where the economy had been d e c o n t r o l l e d . On the c o s t s i d e 
however the d e f l a t i o n i s t s would soon p o i n t t o t r a d e union 
a c t i v i t y t h a t l a t e r became d i g n i f i e d w i t h the t i t l e o f 
' r e s t r i c t i v e p r a c t i c e s ' , an e a r l y m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f which occ u r r e d 
i n our period^when dockers r e s i s t e d the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f b u l k 
l o a d i n g equipment unless i t c o u l d be manned by the same number 
of men,"^ But s i m i l a r n e g a t i v e tendencies s e t up by the same 
p r o t e c t i v e environment were apparent on the o t h e r s i d e o f 
i n d u s t r y , a f a c t the d e f l a t i o n i s t s d i d not i g n o r e . This was the 
qu e s t i o n o f how f a r the e x i s t e n c e o f p r i c e c o n t r o l was i n i m i c a l 
to c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s by s t e r e o t y p i n g the p a t t e r n o f p r o d u c t i o n . 
S i r John Woods, Chief C i v i l Servant a t the Board o f Trade 
1. Brady, R.-, C r i s i s i n B r i t a i n : Plans and Achievements o f the 
Labour Government (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press 1950), p.655. 
2. Hopkins, The New look, p.119; Balogh D o l l a r C r i s i s , p.241. 
3. Hopkins, i b i d , p.123. 
4. Cab. 134/89 Wages and P r i c e P o l i c y Committee (Sub-Committee 
on C o n t r o l s and E f f i c i e n c y Committee) Memo by S i r John 
Woods, May 1948
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argued t h a t t h i s was so. I f c o n t r o l s f i x e d the maximum p r i c e 
to cover the costs of the marginal f i r m then e f f i c i e n t 
producers would have l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e t o lower t h e r p r i c e s 
given t h a t they could supply a t lower c o s t , i f they c o u l d earn 
super p r o f i t by not doing so. P r i c e c o n t r o l s took c o s t s as 
given and t h e r e f o r e b u i l t r i g i d i t i e s i n t o the s t r u c t u r e o f 
p r o d u c t i o n which harmed e x p o r t s , c o n t r i b u t e d t o i n f l a t i o n and 
f o s t e r e d the type o f p r o t e c t i v e t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s which t r i e d 
to ban new e n t r a n t s as a r i s k t o t h e i r s h e l t e r e d w o r l d . 
Decontrol would r e s t o r e f l e x i b i l i t y ^ and d e f l a t i o n by removing 
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f easy s a l e s , would g i v e f i r m s every i n c e n t i v e 
to c ut costs and s e l l a t lower p r i c e s . This argument was 
countered by S i r Robert Gould a t the M i n i s t r y o f Labour"^, who 
maintained t h a t the c o n t r o l s d i d a t l e a s t ensure t h a t a l l 
consumers got products at a lower p r i c e than would be the case 
i f excess demand balanced supply. This argument c o u l d not 
s a t i s f y the d e f l a t i o n i s t s whose keen i n t e r e s t was i n removing 
t h a t very excess demand, but i t d i d sway the Committee l o o k i n g 
i n t o economic c o n t r o l s , who, w h i l e agreeing t o a number o f 
r e l a x a t i o n s , l a t e r i n c l u d e d i n Harold Wilson's ' b o n f i r e ^ , 
recognised the nec e s s i t y o f exempting from d e c o n t r o l those 
sectors a s s o c i a t e d w i t h working c l a s s consumption: any o t h e r 
d e c i s i o n was ' p o l i t i c a l l y unfeasible'"^. 
The. government *s r e p l y t o the d e f l a t i o n i s t s was to deny 
there was a problem, t o deny any connection between home 
f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y and the balance o f payments t r o u b l e s : between 
1. Meetinq 15th May. 
2. Cab.134/89 C o n t r o l s & E f f i c i e n c y Committee meeting 
16 August 1948. 
3. i b i d 
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the i n t e r n a l and the e x t e r n a l , Dal ton was q u i t e c l e a r on 
t h i s . This c r i s i s was not r e l a t e d t o what we were doing a t 
home 
The c o n t r a s t i s remarkable between the general, 
d i f f i c u l t y o f the overseas p>osition and the 
r e l a t i v e ease o f the p u r e l y domestic f i n a n c i a l 
p o s i t i o n i n which t h i n g s are very much b e t t e r 
and e a s i e r thaii we had any reason t o expect 
two years ago.l 
Yet d e s p i t e t h i s D a l t o n , p a r t l y as a response t o t h e Americans 
i n the suspension o f c o n v e r t i b i l i t y n e g o t i a t i o n s , p a r t l y t o 
a s s i s t the t r a n s f e r o f resources from home t o e x p o r t market 
decided t o engage on a m i l d d e f l a t i o n o r ' d i s i n f l a t i o n ' . The 
r a t i o n a l e was t h a t where resources were d i v e r t e d t o e x p o r t 
home market supply would be reduced l e a d i n g t o demand i n f l a t i o n 
unless P'^i'chasing power was c u t . But t h i s ' d i s i n f l a t i o n * took 
the form o f f i s c a l not monetary p o l i c y : i n c r e a s e s i n t a x a t i o n 
on p r o f i t s ^ n o t h i g h e r i n t e r e s t r a t e s and c u t s i n p u b l i c 
spending. The November 12 budget doubled the taix on d i s -
t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s t o 25% ajid from 5-10% on u n d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s 
There were increases i n Purchase Tax and d r i n k d u t i e s . Dal ton 
maintained t h a t boom p r o f i t s would d i s t u r b the wage r e s t r a i n t 
p o l i c y , w h i l e excessive d i s t r i b u t i o n o f d i v i d e n d s would add t o 
2 
the c i r c u l a t i o n o f purchasing power. 
1. quoted i n Robertson, D.H., 'The Economic Outlook' i n 
D.H. Robertson, U t i l i t y and A l l That and Other Essays, 
(London, George A l l e n & Unwin 1952), p. 56. DaJ. ton denied 
t h a t our e x t e r n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s c o u l d be blamed on what we 
were doing a t home, see Dalton, High Tide and A f t e r , p.259. 
2. H.C. Deb, Vol.444, Col.401, 12th November 1947, Ways and 
Means budget proposals
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That the government's November budget was not d e f l a t i o n a r y i s 
h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g given the stand taken on the q u e s t i o n twenty 
days p r e v i o u s l y when an unnamed member o f th e Economic Planning 
Board had spoken out o f t u r n on the need f o r a 'pool o f 
unemployment*. He was promptly slapped down i n P a r l i a m e n t . 
However d e v i a n t the view o f d e f l a t i o n was i n 1947 t h e r e 
was a st r o n g economic l o g i c i n the d e f l a t i o n i s t case. 
D e f l a t i o n and unemployment would f o r c e f i r m s t o engage i n a 
p r i c e s t r u g g l e . Since we imported n e c e s s i t i e s and exported 
mainly l u x u r i e s and c a p i t a l goods f o r which demand was u n s t a b l e 
the d e f l a t i o n necessary ( i f t h e r e was a slump i n f o r e i g n 
markets) to l i m i t imports and f o r c e e x p o r t s might have t o be 
2 
very l a r g e indeed given the pent up demand i n post war B r i t a i n 
Since d e f l a t i o n reduced i m p o r t s as purchasing power f e l l , then 
one o f the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s would be d e f l a t i o n a r y r e a c t i o n s 
abroad as o t h e r s c u t t h e i r i m p o r t s i n r e t a l i a t i o n . Incomes 
would f a l l a l l around. Yet d e s p i t e t h i s c u m u l a t i v e d e c l i n e 
i t would work to balance our i n t e r n a t i o n a l payments 'provided 
t h a t t h i s c o untry kept ahead i n c r e a t i n g unemployment and 
r e s t r i c t i n g the standard o f l i v i n g ; " ^ . Because o f t i g h t t r a d e 
union o r g a n i s a t i o n a l a r g e unemployment r a t e would be needed 
t o keep wage co s t s down: unemployment, t h e r e f o r e , f u n c t i o n e d 
as a d i s c i p l i n e as w e l l as a l i b e r a t o r o f resources. We 
have seen,despite the apparent l o g i c i n the d e f l a t i o n i s t case, 
the government opted f o r r a t i o n i n g and c o n t r o l s r a t h e r than 
1. H.C. Deb Vol.443 Col.692-3 28th October 1947 Statement by 
H i l a r y Marquand. 
2. Balogh D o l l a r C r i s i s p.99 
3. i b i d p.197 
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unemployment as a means t o l i m i t home demand and i m p o r t . P u l l 
employment d i d keep the need f o r i m p o r t s h i g h but the government 
staked i t s hopes o f the continuance o f the U.S. l e d world-wide 
boom which would c a r r y our h i g h p r i c e l e v e l and o b v i a t e the 
need f o r adjustments i n c o s t s . The government r e c e i v e d a 
rude shock i n the middle o f 1949 when the U.S. f e l l i n t o 
r e cession, the post war boom having been exhausted i n t h a t 
c o untry. As a r e s u l t o f t h i s , s t e r l i n g area d o l l a r s u p p l i e s 
and primary products sales d e c l i n e d and commodity p r i c e s f e l l ^ . 
The d o l l a r d e f i c i t grew and d o l l a r reserves dropped w i t h 
s p e c u l a t i v e a t t a c k s on the £ adding t o the d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
M arshall Aid could not cover t h i s d r a s t i c d r a i n . Here was 
another c r i s i s s t i m u l a n t . The d e f l a t i o n i s t s were ready. I n 
June 1949 the C i t y had convinced the Treasury and Cripps t h a t 
a t i g h t e r monetary p o l i c y w i t h high i n t e r e s t r a t e s , cuts i n 
subsi d i e s and p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e was necessary. On June 15 
Cripps put h i s case t o a meeting o f the Economic P o l i c y 
Committee. He t a l k e d o f reserves d i s a p p e a r i n g and a complete 
c o l l a p s e of the currency. The Prime M i n i s t e r b e l i e v e d i t was 
2 
*1931 a l l over again A t t l e e , Dal t o n , Bevin, were a l l 
aga i n s t x i e f l a t i o n and i t soon became apparent t h a t another 
o p t i o n was , a v a i l a b l e i n the form o f d e v a l u a t i o n . The Americans 
through Snyder Treasury Secretary^were a p p a r e n t l y prepared 
to w a i t f o r a f u l l r e s t o r a t i o n o f c o n v e r t i b i l i t y g i v e n what 
some saw as an economic c o l l a p s e w i t h openings f o r Communism. 
1. P r i t t The Labour Government p.259. 
2. Donoughue, B. , and Jones, G.W., Herbert M o r r i s o n ;: P o r t r a i t 
o f a p o l i t i c i a n (London Weidenfeld and Nic o l s o n 1973) p.437 
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I n s t e a d they o f f e r e d the c o u n t r i e s r e c e i v i n g a i d t h e s o f t o p t i o n 
o f d e v a l u a t i o n . The I.M.F. was a p p a r e n t l y a l s o i n favour o f 
'exchange adjustments' f o r c o u n t r i e s w i t h d o l l a r d e f i c i t s whose 
c u r r e n c i e s were a p p a r e n t l y over-valued^. 
A long and c o n t e n t i o u s meeting o f the Economic P o l i c y 
Committee f o l l o w e d i n J u l y where these two o p t i o n s were 
rehearsed. A t t l e e and Morrison supported d e v a l u a t i o n and 
opposed cuts i n food s u b s i d i e s and p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e . Harold 
Wilson, President o f the Board o f T r a d e ^ l i n e d up w i t h Cripps 
and the T r e a s u r y - C i t y a x i s i n s u p p o r t i n g d e f l a t i o n i n the hope 
o f a v o i d i n g d e v a l u a t i o n . The C i t y opposed d e v a l u a t i o n as i t 
would h i t s t e r l i n g balances and the confidence o f overseas 
lenders as w e l l as harming f i x e d i n t e r e s t i n v i s i b l e e arning 
from abroad. Dalton, G a i t s k e l l and Jay who had s a t on the 
fence were now ready t o go f o r d e v a l u a t i o n r a t h e r than contem-
p l a t e c u t s i n the w e l f a r e programme, or i n the case o f Bevin, 
2 
i n Defence. 
Devaluation i s an a c t i o n o f the S t a t e where an improvement 
i s gained i n the c o m p e t i t i v e p o s i t i o n o f n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l 
through a simple d e c l a r a t i o n by the c e n t r a l bank. The 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r the success o f d e v a l u a t i o n are f a i r l y s t r a i g h t -
forward i n the sense t h a t the i n c r e a s e i n the volume o f our 
exports must be g r e a t e r than the percentage o f d e v a l u a t i o n i f 
we are t o get the same r e c e i p t s as a t the o l d r a t e o f exchange. 
Unless t h i s i s done e x p o r t s are being g i v e n away,- a 
1. Blackaby,F., 'United Kingdom' i n E.S. K i r s t e n e t a l (eds) 
Economic P o l i c y i n our own Time 1949-61 (Country S t u d i e s ) 
Volume I I (Amsterdam,North Holland 1964) p . l 0 2 . 
2. B a r t l e t t . H i s t o r y o f Post War B r i t a i n p.69. 
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p o s i t i o n made verse i f o t h e r c o u n t r i e s devalue a t the same 
time, a t a s i m i l a r r a t e . One o f the problems o f d e v a l u a t i o n i s 
t h a t i t r a i s e s the p r i c e not o n l y o f i m p o r t s we would r a t h e r 
do w i t h o u t , given t h e i r c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h our own goods, but 
al s o of e s s e n t i a l food ajid raw m a t e r i a l s . As a consequence i t 
can have i n f l a t i o n a r y e f f e c t s r a i s i n g the c o s t of l i v i n g and 
s t i m u l a t i n g wage demands'*" unless there i s al r e a d y a slump i n 
the home market when p r i c e s and wages would not r i s e . ^ This 
c o s t f a c t o r i s only r e a l l y a problem i f , over time, i n t e r n a l 
c ost and f i n a l p r i c e s o u t s t r i p the exchange d e p r e c i a t i o n : wage 
r e s t r a i n t and p r i c e c o n t r o l are t h e r e f o r e suggested as a way 
out o f t h i s problem. The government however found i t d i f f i c u l t 
t o s u s t a i n a p o l i c y o f wage r e s t r a i n t a f t e r an i n i t i a l success."^ 
Despite t h i s , the evidence suggests t h a t d e v a l u a t i o n worked to 
the e x t e n t t h a t a l l o f the l o s s o f reserves was recovered by 
A p r i l 1950. A s i g n i f i c a n t recovery i n d o l l a r e x p o r t s was 
achieved w i t h the U-S* economy r e c o v e r i n g from r e c e s s i o n and 
the s t e r l i n g area s e l l i n g more to them w h i l e c u t t i n g down 
4 
imports - an event a s s i s t e d by the Aniericaiis s h o r t term 
t o l e r a t i o n of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t r a d e . When domestic c o s t s 
caught up w i t h the e x t e n t o f d e p r e c i a t i o n the b e n e f i t s o f 
d e v a l u a t i o n f o r long run co m p e t i t i v e n e s s becQme d o u b t f u l . But as 
a s h o r t term response d e v a l u a t i o n c e r t a i n l y i n v o l v e d fewer s o c i a l 
and p o l i t i c a l costs than d e f l a t i o n . This d i d not mean 
1. Henderson, H., 'The p r i c e system' i n h i s Inter-War Years and 
othe r papers. 
2. Henderson, H. , 'The f u n c t i o n o f exchange r a t e s ' ±)id. 
3. P o l l a r d , S,> The Development o f B r i t i s h Economy 1914-1967 
{London, Edward A r n o l d 2nd e d i t . 1969), p. 395. 
4. Dow, J.C.W., The Management o f the B r i t i s h Economy 1945-60 
(Cambridge Univeraty Press 1970), pp. 46-7. 
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however t h a t t here was no need f o r p o l i c y responses on the 
home f r o n t . I f the volume o f e x p o r t s was to i n c r e a s e the 
resources i n t e r n a l l y devoted t o -them had t o r i s e . T h is meant 
home demand had tD be h e l d back t o leave resources and p h y s i c a l 
c a p a c i t y f r e e t o f l o w i n t o the export t r a d e , - t o prevent 
excess purchasing power d i v e r t i n g p r o d u c t i o n back.the home market 
and t o prevent the same purchasing power from causing 
..excess demand i n f l a t i o n as" producers c o n t r a c t e d home -
su p p l y . What t h i s i n f a c t i m p l i e d , given a government r e l u c -
t a n t t o engage i n d e f l a t i o n was f u r t h e r attempt: along the 
l i n e s o f 1947 to t r y and r e g u l a t e programmes i n c a p i t a l 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , w h i l e being very wary o f cuts i n c u r r e n t 
spending. Nevertheless the urgency o f 'the d i s i n f l a t i o n ' 
seemed demonstrated when France, I t a l y and Germany devalued 
t h e i r c u r r e n c i e s and th r e a t e n e d B r i t a i n ' s e a r l y advantage. 
I n October 1949 the government announced modest measures t o 
save £250 m i l l i o n a year*^. £100m o f t h i s was to be on c u r r e n t 
spending and the r e s t on c a p i t a l p r o j e c t s , deducted from the 
volume o f f i x e d investment o f £2,100m planned t o be e f f e c t i v e 
from i^iarch 1950. £70m o f t h i s was t o come from r e d u c t i o n s i n 
i n d u s t r i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b u i l d i n g and the l o n g term 
investment plans o f t h e f u e l and power i n d u s t r y , the s h i f t i n g 
t o export from home re-equipment o f e n g i n e e r i n g p r o d u c t s , 
p l a n t and machinery and commercial v e h i c l e s . School b u i l d i n g 
was to be maintained- The b i g g e s t s i n g l e c u t was again t o 
f a l l on the housing programme by a r e d u c t i o n i n planned 
a u t h o r i s a t i o n s to y i e l d £30m a year. This would i n v o l v e a 
1. H.C.Deb Vol.468 Col.1016-18 October 24th 1949 Economic 
S i t u a t i o n - Government Proposals? see a l s o Blackaby 'UK* 
i n Economic P o l i c y i n our Time pp.107-9. 
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r e d u c t i o n of 25,000 i n the annual r a t e o f completed houses 
(from 200,000 - 175,000). When Cripps e l a b o r a t e d on this-"" 
i t was apparent t h a t the cut would be e f f e c t e d mainly by 
c u r t a i l i n g a l l l i c e n c e s g r a n t e d t o b u i l d e r s i n the p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r p a r t o f the new b u i l d i n g programme. The l o c a l a u t h o r i t y 
sector would r o l l on. Another £35m would be found by 
t i g h t e n i n g c o n t r o l s on miscellaneous small works maiinly 
maintenance and r e p a i r . 
The cuts i n c u r r e n t e x p e n d i t u r e were very m i l d . I n the 
2 
f i e l d o f defence Bevan had asked Attlee t h a t a cu t i n housing 
be matched by a cut i n defence. This was e v e n t u a l l y agreed 
at £30m'^. Some marginal c u t s i n s o c i a l programmes were made 
f o r the f i r s t time but n o t h i n g was done which r e a l l y undermined 
the post-war s e t t l e m e n t . Food s u b s i d i e s were set according 
t o a c e i l i n g and a penny was added t o school meals. The 
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a s h i l l i n g charge f o r N.H.S. p r e s c r i p t i o n s was 
4 
revoked almost as soon as i t was i n t r o d u c e d , w h i l e the i n c r e a s e 
i n the t a x on d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s from 25-30% was n o t . The 
Conservatives had advocated a cut o f £500m which they f e l t 
should not touch i n d u s t r y . With regard t o the housing 
prograjnme a s i m i l a r b a c k t r a c k i n g o c c u r r e d t o t h a t o f 1947. 
Just under 6 months l a t e r the Chancellor announced i n h i s 
budget 
The c o n t i n u i n g need f o r housing which i s a symptom 
of a b e t t e r standard o f l i v i n g t h a t the people are 
now e n j o y i n g makes i t d e s i r a b l e we b e l i e v e t h a t 
housing should be given a s p e c i a l p r e f e r e n t i a l 
p l a c e i n our c a p i t a l investment programme 
1. H.C.Deb Vol.468 Col.1339 October 24 1949 Economic S i t u a t i o n . 
Debate. 
2. Foot Aneurin Bevan p.276. 
3. H.C.Deb.Vol.468.Col.1016-18. 
4. Dow. Management o f the B r i t i s h Economy p.46. Note 2. 
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He went on t o say t h a t the government would r e v e r t t o the p r e -
d e v a l u a t i o n c u t s programme and t h a t ^ new housing would be 
s t a b i l i s e d a t 200.,000 a year: the government p r o m i s i n g not to 
a l t e r the programme again f o r 3 years up to 1952''". . I n f a c t 
the housing concession d i d not have t o w a i t u n t i l t h e budget 
since d e c i s i o n s had already been taken i n December t o r e s t o r e 
the p r i v a t e h o u s e b u i l d i n g / l o c a l a u t h o r i t y r a t i o n t o 1:9 w i t h 
e f f e c t from February . The e f f e c t o f t h i s promise t o m a i n t a i n 
the housing programme f o r 3 years was t h a t i t was prctected 
a g a i n s t a round of cu t s consequent upon the massive rearmaanent 
programme undertaken i n 1950-51. These c u t s f e l l h e a v i e s t on 
c a p i t a l d e s p i t e t h e r e being some i n r o a d s i n t o the f r e e 
N a t i o n a l Health Service by the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f charges f o r 
spectacles and dentures. Income Tax was r a i s e d , t a x on 
d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s went up from 30-505^ and i n i t i a l 
a l l o w a n cesfor d e p r e c i a t i o n i n c a p i t a l investment by p r i v a t e 
i n d u s t r y were suspended."^ A month a f t e r these c u t s i n May 
1951 the government announced an in c r e a s e i n pensions. 
The d e v a l u a t i o n c r i s i s i l l u s t r a t e s once again the 
r e l u c t a n c e o f the government t o r e c o n s t r u c t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
I n a s i m i l a r way to the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y c r i s i s t h e r e was a 
short term p o l i c y response t h a t i n the l o n g term was adjusted-
away. As Cripps noted^temporary expedients were concocted 
1. H.C.Deb Vol.474 Col.50-1 18th A p r i l 1950. Debate on budget 
statement. Fixed investment i n c r e a s e d i n 1950 compared w i t h 
1949 see Dow Management o f the B r i t i s h Economy p. 46 Note 2., 
2. H.C.Deb Vol.470 Col.122/3 1 Dec.1949 W r i t t e n answer on 
l i c e n c i n g f o r p r i v a t e b u i l d i n g . I n May 1950 t h i s was r e l a x e d 
s t i l l f u r t h e r , back to the p o i n t o f 1:4 see H.C.Deb.Vol474 
Col.1887 4 t h May 1950.Oral Answer p r i v a t e b u i l d i n g r a t i o . 
3. Blackaby 'UK' i n Economic P o l i c y i n our Time p.130. 
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togeth e r q u i c k l y : each c r i s i s was produced because the 
temporary expedients o f the p r e v i o u s c r i s i s became exhausted"^. 
For the government to have pursued l o n g term o b j e c t i v e s o r 
goals, i n p a r t i c u l a r long term e x p o r t c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , i t would 
have been necessary f o r i t t o p r o v i d e a d i s c i p l i n a r y base f o r 
ju d g i n g s h o r t term choice. This d i d not happen and the 
government opted f o r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y . 
The l a s t d i s c r i m i n a t o r y method a v a i l a b l e t o the ; government^ 
given t h a t monetary d e f l a t i o n was r u l e d out^ was t h a t o f 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i r e c t i o n . T h is meant t r y i n g t o u t i l i s e and 
extend the p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l s a v a i l a b l e i n order t o t r a n s f e r 
resources. We must recognise t h a t such c o n t r o l s c o u l d o n l y 
work i f the government accepted the need f o r a cut i n programmes, 
which the government, as we have seen, were not prepared t o 
t o l e r a t e on any scale. Despite this^much o f the e x p l a n a t i o n 
f o r the u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o f o l l o w t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o p t i o n i n 
othe r realms must l i e i n the r e l u c t a n c e t o extend or even 
render e f f i c i e n t e x i s t i n g c o n t r o l s . An .J.de^ological preference 
f o r democratic or persuasive as opposed t o command methods o f 
pla n n i n g had been announced a t the o u t s e t , and i t could h a r d l y 
be reversed w i t h o u t an a l t e r a t i o n i n the balance o f c l a s s 
f o r c e s . 
With regard t o the q u e s t i o n o f labour c o n t r o l the 
measures taken on the 6 t h August 1947 i n v o l v e d a r e s t o r a t i o n 
o f direction.'.y. . Despite what the Conservative opposi t i o n main-
tained i t was q u i t e c l e a r d i r e c t i o n would be a p p l i e d as a l a s t 
1. D u t t . , R.Palme., C r i s i s o f B r i t a i n and the B r i t i s h Empire 
(London Lawrence and Wishart 1953) p.392. 
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r e s o r t , and then only to those workers r e g i s t e r i n g unemployed. 
The areas chosen as undermanned were c o a l - m i n i n g , a g r i c u l t u r e 
and t e x t i l e e xport i n d u s t r i e s . But the unemployed c o u l d r e f u s e 
up to 3 e s s e n t i a l j o b o f f e r s b e f o r e d i r e c t i o n was considered. 
^ t i n i s t e r s made i t q u i t e c l e a r t o the s u s p i c i o u s TUC t h a t t h e r e 
would be no resumption o f general powers o f d i r e c t i o n over 
labour, the i n t e n t i o n was only to stop workers remaining 
un-employed. The r e g u l a t i o n devised d i d not i n v o l v e i n d u s t r i a l 
c o n s c r i p t i o n or compulsory t r a n s f e r s from those i n d u s t r i e s l i k e 
b u i l d i n g , d i s t r i b u t i o n and e n t e r t a i n m e n t s thought t o be 
hoarding labour. Isaacs^the M i n i s t e r o f Labour a t t a c k e d 
suggestions t h a t e n t i t l e m e n t s t o the dole should be t i e d t o a 
p o l i c y on e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s w i t h the argument t h a t ' e s s e n t i a l 
employment was not a d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r i n g i v i n g b e n e f i t , 
o n ly employment^. Since" many o f the i n d u s t r i e s were p o o r l y 
paid a wage p o l i c y a t t r a c t i n g workers by the m a n i p u l a t i o n o f 
wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s seemed p o s s i b l e , b u t was e f f e c t i v e l y r u l e d 
out i n 1948 when the government i n t r o d u c e d wage r e s t r a i n t i n 
order to counter i n f l a t i o n . 
P e n a l t i e s and c o n t r o l s on c a p i t a l i s t s were rendered 
i n o p e r a t i v e by d e c i s i o n s taken e a r l i e r i n the government's 
1, Cab.129/20 Cabinet Paper CP(47)244 28th August 1947 The 
C o n t r o l o f Engagement o r d e r . Memo by the M i n i s t e r o f Labour 
700 D i r e c t i o n s were issued from August 1947 u n t i l d i r e c t i o n 
powers were withdrawn i n March 1950. The m a j o r i t y o f these 
r e q u i r e d men t o remain at jobs i n c o a l m i n i n g or a g r i c u l t u r e 
29 persons were d i r e c t e d t o take^^up new employment a L f t e r 
appearing a t the Labour Exchange. See Walker, G., Economic 
Planning by Programme and C o n t r o l i n Great B r i t a i n 
(London Heinemann 1957) p.89. 
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term and by the r e l u c t a n c e t o i n t r o d u c e • -.^  command p r i n c i p l e s 
i n o p p o s i t i o n to the method o f v o l u n t a r y c o - o p e r a t i o n . The 
programme e n t i t l e d 'export d i r e c t i o n ' was t h e r e f o r e a b i t o f a 
misnomer. I n the middle o f the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y c r i s i s the 
government set about r e - s t r u c t u r i n g the p l a n n i n g apparatus 
concerned w i t h e x t e r n a l t r a d e and the balance o f payments to 
r e l a t e i mports t o export programmes on the assumption t h a t 
d e c i s i o n s i n o t h e r f i e l d s would f u r t h e r the export d r i v e . A 
new balance o f payments ' j o i n t s t a f f ' c o m p r i s i n g the Board o f 
Trade, Bank o f England, Treasury and Economic s e c t i o n s , the 
Lord President and Secretary f o r overseas t r a d e , w i t h Harold 
Wilson as Chairman, was set up to c o - o r d i n a t e the work o f the 
o l d Exchange Requirements Committee and Import L i c e n c i n g 
Committee'^. This new body d i d not i n v o l v e any o f the c l a i m a n t s 
i n import demand. The import programme being submitted 
d i r e c t l y by the Chancellor to the Economic P o l i c y GDmmittee 
o f the Cabinet. , . However, since these l a t t e r bodies 
were t o opt f o r p r o t e c t i n g r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r i o r i t i e s the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s d e p arture from 'departmentalism' c a r r i e s 
l e s s weight, CEPS ran machinery f o r a more d e t a i l e d d i r e c t i o n 
o f exports i n r e l a t i o n t o the i m p o r t s but the f i n a l s t r a t e g i c 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n between the two s t i l l r e s t e d w i t h the i n t e r -
departmental s t e e r i n g committee. There had a l r e a d y been set 
up i n 1946 an' Exports Guidance working p a r t y and an Exports 
Target Committee concerned w i t h t r y i n g t o work out a p o l i c y 
t o prevent exports going t o s o f t currency areas and to d i r e c t 
them to hard currency havens (so c a l l e d u n r e q u i t e d e x p o r t s 
problem). These bodies were now t o be aggregated i n t o a new 
1. Cab.129/21 Cabinet Paper CP(47)287 21 October 1947 I n t e r -
departmental o r g a n i s a t i o n f o r h a n d l i n g Balance o f Payments 
Questions. Note by P.M. 
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Exports Committee concerned w i t h the d e t e r m i n a t i o n and progress 
o f export t a r g e t s , and i n theory a v o i d i n g t h e d i v i s i o n o f the 
export t a r g e t between p r o d u c t i o n departments sponsoring 
v a r i o u s i n d u s t r i e s . E a r l i e r , since the announcement o f a 
sp e c i a l programme i n November 1946, t a l k s had proceeded w i t h 
trade a s s o c i a t i o n s i n order t o press the view that-.not a l l 
export markets were e q u a l l y as good from a n a t i o n a l p o i n t o f 
view. One o f the t e c h n i c a l problems encountered was t h a t 
many f i r m s w i t h long term order books committeed t o s o f t 
currency areas found the hard currency areas such as the USA, 
Canada, S w i t z e r l a n d and Sweden were very c o m p e t i t i v e producing 
f o r t h e i r own home market what we wanted t o export."^ De^iite t h i s 
export quotas were f i x e d f o r each.inc&istry. For i n s t a n c e , motor car 
manufacturers were supposed t o expo r t 75% o f t h e i r gross 
o u t p u t . W i t h i n these quotas, quotas were f i x e d by the 
a s s o c i a t i o n f o r each f i r m . Once the t a r g e t s were arranged 
s t e e l a l l o c a t i o n s f o l l o w e d . The government possessed no 
l e g a l powers t o compel any volume o f expo r t sales nor p r e s c r i b e 
d e s t i n a t i o n s . The government, given i t s r e l u c t a n c e to d e f l a t e 
home demand on a, scale t h a t would e f f e c t t r a n s f e r had t o 
r e s t content. I t could not prosecute f i r m s f o r u s i n g 
2 
m a t e r i a l s f o r home p r o d u c t i o n . Although i t was p o s s i b l e t o 
refuse m a t e r i a l s f o r n o n - p r i o r i t y uses w i t h the a l l o c a t i o n s i t 
d i d grant^ i t was very d i f f i c u l t t o ensure manufacturers used 
1. Cab.134/44 Committee on Exports Memos 27 Sept.1947 D i r e c t i o n 
o f Exports memo by Board o f Trade; 6 t h Dec. 1947 Hard and 
s o f t Currencies Note by Treasury. 
2. Walker Economic Planning by Programme... p.144. 
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th€m_ on commodities o f the government's own choosing r a t h e r 
than t h e i r s . L i k e labour d i r e c t i o n ^ t h i s was ne g a t i v e r a t h e r 
than p o s i t i v e c o n t r o l . 
Decisions taJcen e a r l y i n the government's l i f e d i s c o n t i n u e d 
the l i c e n c i n g o f exports'^. This was a wartime c o n t r o l whose 
e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n was again negative i n the sense of p r e v e n t i n g 
the export o f goods whose s c a r c i t y on the home market t h r e a t e n e d 
the war e f f o r t . More c r u c i a l was the w i n d i n g up o f the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n most capable o f managing the d i r e c t i o n o f ex p o r t s 
and a p o s s i b l e s t a t e monopoly in . f o r e i g n t r a d e , t h e U.K.C.C. 
(United Kingdom Commercial C o r p o r a t i o n ) . The view taken i n 
1945 was t h a t i t was best t o leave i t t o p r i v a t e t r a d e r s t o use 
t h e i r own judgement and a review o f the a c t i v i t i e s o f the 
2 
U-K.CC. was c a l l e d f o r . The chairman o f the U.K.C.C. argued 
t h a t a complete state-monopoly i n f o r e i g n t r a d e was i n c o m p a t i b l e 
w i t h the mixed economy and would go a g a i n s t our i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
commitments t o phase out- bulk purcha^se o f food and raw- " 
material-s.. , As f o r argument t h a t t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
could be used t o manage t r a d e w i t h the S o v i e t :Bloc ' s u r e l y 
the b i g combines l i k e I C I and U n i l e v e r c o u l d arrange t h e i r 
own c o n t r a c t s ' . With regard t o o r d i n a r y t r a d e i t was 
impossible t o c o - o r d i n a t e the p r o d u c t i o n o f 50,00O or so 
1. Cab.71/21 Lord P r e s i d e n t s Committee memo 5 t h September 1945 
Export L i c e n c i n g memo by President o f Board o f Trade 
discussed Cab 71/27 Lord P r e s i d e n t s I n d u s t r i a l Sub-Committee 
meeting 11th September 1945. 
2. Cab.71/27 Lord P r e s i d e n t s I n d u s t r i a l Sub-Committee memo 24th 
October 1945 Development o f the Export Trade Report by 
President o f the Board o f Trade, 
3. Cab.134/165 Committee on E x t e r n a l Economic P o l i c y and Over-
seas Trade Memo 24th A p r i l 1946. The Future o f the U n i t e d 
Kingdom Commercial C o r p o r a t i o n Memo by cha-irman. 
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i n d i v i d u a l f i r m s , and,where i t was p o s s i b l e , groupings were 
already i n e x i s t e n c e w i t h trade a s s o c i a t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s 
agreed t o phase the o r g a n i s a t i o n o u t . L a t e r , however, they 
had t o admit the l a c k o f export c o n t r o l i n r e l a t i o n t o i m p o r t s , 
a f a c t which made any r e v e r s a l t o b i l a t e r a l t r a d e agreements 
t h a t much more d i f f i c u l t since b a r g a i n i n g power was weakened 
by our l i m i t e d a b i l i t y t o d i r e c t e x p o r t s and guarantee 
d e l i v e r i e s ' ^ . Near the end o f 1947 t h e r e was some t a l k o f 
r e v i v i n g an o r g a n i s a t i o n f o r s t a t e t r a d i n g but n o t h i n g came o f 
i t . Attlee had expressed the view t h a t t h e e x p o r t d r i v e c o u l d 
be conducted w i t h the wartime s p i r i t o f s e r v i c e t o the 
community. But t o o t h e r s t h e r e seemed t o be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n : 
i n wartime s e r v i c e t o the community was e a s i e r f o r p r i v a t e 
manufacturers : n o t o nl:y b e c a u s e o f t h e o v e r r i d i n g 
consensus on goals i n war, but because the government i n war-
time guaranteed a market by awarding c o n t r a c t s , ' being more 
or less sole purchaser, and thereby as Devons p o i n t s out 
c o n t r o l l i n g the course o f p r o d u c t i o n ^ . I n peacetime the 
p o s i t i o n was d i f f e r e n t . I t was q u i t e p o s s i b l e f o r the 
government to give the car i n d u s t r y an ex p o r t t a r g e t .^^^d-
t h r e a t e n them t h a t they must not d i v e r t t o home supply when 
1. Cab.134/635 Production Committee meeting 5 t h December 1947 
di s c u s s i n g Framework o f Economic Planning Memo by Chancellor 
o f the Exchquer. A few b i l a t e r a l deals were arranged i n 1948. 
The Anglo-Danish Trade Agreement exchanges d a i r y products 
f o r exports o f c o a l , i r o n and s t e e l , t e x t i l e s and v e h i c l e s 
(see H.C,Deb Vol.448 Col.48-49 2nd March 1948) An Anglo-
A r g e n t i n i a n Trade Agreement f o l l o w e d (see LPCR May 17-21 
1948) . 
2. Devons, E. , 'Economic Planning i n War and Peace' Manchester 
School o f Economic and S o c i a l Studies XVI No.l Jan 1948 
pp.1-29. 
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s e l l i n g abroad became d i f f i c u l t o r face some d i m i n u t i o n i n t h e i r 
a l l o c a t i o n o f raw m a t e r i a l s . But such a t h r e a t would meain l e s s 
i f the losses were l i k e l y t o be g r e a t e r i n s e l l i n g i n a market 
s e l e c t e d f o r them by Government. 
At the c e n t r e o f t h i s m atter l i e s the dilemma o f government 
i n a mixed economy where the s t a t e attempts t o skew the 
d i r e c t i o n o f the economy by a c t i n g a t a d i s t a n c e from the p r i v a t e 
sector through the o f f e r o f i n c e n t i v e s ajid the t h r e a t o f m i l d 
d e p r i v a t i o n . C o n t r a d i c t i o n between two d e c i s i o n making l o g i c s 
complicate the i s s u e s t i l l f u r t h e r . The i n d i v i d u a l f i r m i s 
concerned to maximise p r o f i t s by s e l l i n g i n any market i t chooses 
i n c l u d i n g s o f t currency areas i f these o f f e r the g r e a t e s t r e t u r n . 
I t does not matter whether t h i s r e t u r n i s i n d o l l a r s or l i r a so 
long as a s u r p l u s i s e v i d e n t and t h e r e i s some degree o f con-
v e r t a b i l i t y . The s t a t e on the o t h e r hand might p r e f e r e x p o r t 
t a r g e t s to be f i x e d i n r e l a t i o n t o a macro requirement f o r 
reserves o f hard currency or g o l d . An adequate r e t u r n as f a r 
as the s t a t e i s concerned l i e s i n whether or not e x p o r t s earn 
i m p o r t s , save ex p e n d i t u r e or i n c r e a s e the e x i s t i n g h o l d i n g s o f 
dearer c u r r e n c i e s . As the planners put i t a t the t i m e : -
The f a c t t h a t the e x p o r t e r r e c e i v e d payment f o r 
h i s goods d i d not mean t h a t the c o u n t r y r e c e i v e d 
an adequate r e t u r n f o r them ... the p r i c e the 
e x p o r t e r c o u l d get was not an adequate measure o f 
the advantage to the U.K. o f the t r a n s a c t i o n -
p r i c e s secured i n weak currency markets might be 
r e l a t i v e l y h igh ajid p r i c e s r e c e i v e d i n d o l l a r s 
markets low, but then these l a t t e r markets were 
more d e s i r a b l e . ^ 
TT T229/36 Economic Planning Board 11th Meeting. C.E.P.S. 
Paper Bth November 1947, u n r e q u i t e d e x p o r t s and D i r e c t i o n 
of ExfX)rts discussed 13th November 1947. 
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To the^ p r i v a t e d e c i s i o n m a k e r , as non-agent o f t h e S t a t e and 
s o v e r e i g n s u b j e c t c o n s t r a i n e d o n l y by m a r k e t c o m p e t i t i o n , t h e 
c o n c e p t o f an ' u n r e q u i t e d e x p o r t ' i s d i f f i c u l t t o g r a s p . A l l 
t h a t c o n c e r n s t h e i n d i v i d u a l c a p i t a l i s t i s w h e t h e r t h e commodity 
pr o d u c e d i s p a i d f o r . There i s a r i s k o f l o s s and waste i n t h e 
o u t l a y o f c a p i t a l i f f i r m s b e g i n t o s w i t c h p r o d u c t i o n and s e l l 
i n m a r k e t s s p e c i f i e d by t h e S t a t e . I f t h e government a t t h e 
t i m e needed r e m i n d i n g o f t h e l i m i t s o f p o s s i b l e i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n t h i s f i e l d t h e l e t t e r f r o m W i l l i a m V e r d o n - S m i t h cf t h e F.B.I.^ 
w r i t t e n f r o m h i s B r i s t o l Aerospace Compani^ was w a r n i n g enough* 
He w o u l d 
n o t be a p a r t y t o t h e v e r y b r o a d recommendation 
t h a t t h e Board o f Trade be asked t o t a k e such ^ 
measures as may be a p p r o p r i a t e t o d i r e c t e x p o r t s . 
The p r oblem f o r c a p i t a l i s t s a t t h i s t i m e was t h a t g i v e n s c a r c i t y 
on t h e home m a r k e t f i r m s w o u l d f i n d i t more p r o f i t a b l e t o s e l l 
h e r e t h a n a b r o a d , where f o r e i g n c o m p e t i t i o n and f l u c t u a t i o n s 
i n demand were e v e r p r e s e n t d a n g e r s . I n a d d i t i o n t h e home 
market was a t t r a c t i v e f o r t h e v e r y r e a s o n t h a t p r i c e s c o u l d 
keep pace w i t h t h e p r e s s u r e o f d o m e s t i c c o s t s , w h i c h g i v e n 
i n d u s t r y w i d e u n i o n i s a t i o n a f f e c t e d a l l f i r m s . F o r e i g n m a r k e t s 
m i g h t n o t be so h o s p i t a b l e t o t h e h i g h c o s t p r o d u c e r . 
CONCLUSION 
I n summary t h e n i t can be seen t h a t even i f t h e r e had been 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o c o n s i d e r a t r a n s f e r o f r e s o u r c e s t h r o u g h an a l t e r -
a t i o n i n p r i o r i t i e s t h i s w o u l d have been o f f s e t by t h e i n a d e q u a c y 
o f t h e s t a t e a p p a r a t u s chosen t o a L f f e c t t h e t r a n s f e r : t h i s 
1. T229/36 Economic P l a n n i n g Board 1 1 t h m e e t i n g Verdon-Smith. t o 
Plowden, 1 2 t h November 1947. 
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weakness r e f l e c t i n g n o t t h e i n a d e q u a c y o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
t e c h n i q u e as s u c h , b u t t h e c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o 
t r a n s c e n d i t s own i d e o l o g y - however m y s t i f i e d - o f f r e e s o c i a l 
l a b o u r and t h e independence o f t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r . As f a r as 
t h e i n d i v i d u a l m a n u f a c t u r e r -.is c o n c e r n e d l a b o u r s h o u l d be ccntipLLed 
by nobody e x c e p t f e l l o w c a p i t a l i s t s . As f a r as .trade 
unions .are c o n c e r n e d - b e l i e f i n t h e f r e e s a l e o f l a b o u r 
power remain>s'. an e s s e n t i a l p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e n o t i o n o f 
democracy-. As . P o u l a n t z a s has p o i n t e d o u t , t h e c a p i t a l i s t 
s t a t e p r e s e n t s i t s e l f i n t h e f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
w h i c h do n o t impose o r d i s t r i b u t e r o l e s on i t s c i t i z e n s as 
a g e n t s o f p r o d u c t i o n ^ . Nowhere i n i t s a c t u a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
d o e s ' s t r i c t l y p o l i t i c a l d o m i n a t i o n t a k e t h e f o r m o f a p o l i t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n between dominant c l a s s e s and d o m i n a t e d c l a s s e s ^ . 
The p r o c e s s o f i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n , o r as he p u t s i t ' t h e e f f e c t 
o f i s o l a t i o n ' f i n t h e i d e a l s o f l i b e r t y , f r e e and e q u a l access 
a r e l i n k e d t o an a b s t r a c t and f o r m a l l aw. C l a s s r e l a t i o n s 
appear as i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l commodity c a t e g o r i e s : w o r k e r v e r s u s 
employer w o r k e r v e r s u s w o r k e r , e m p l o y e r v e r s u s e m p l o y e r . The 
Feudal S t a t e d i r e c t l y , t h r o u g h i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s , t i e d 
p r o d u c e r s t o g e t h e r i n r e l a t i o n s o f p e r s o n a l dependence u l t i m a t e -
l y backed by t h e f o r c e o f s t a t e power. For t h e government t o 
have gone i n f o r t h e e x t e n s i v e d i r e c t i o n o f l a b o u r a f f i x i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l w o r k e r s t o e m p l o y e r s and a f f e c t i n g t r a n s f e r s by 
1. P o u l a n t z a s , N., P o l i t i c a l Power and S o c i a l C l a s s e s (London 
New L e f t Books 1973) p.123 
2. ThiH p.188 
3. I b i d p.188-9 
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r e g u l a t i o n w o u l d have meant a f u n d a m e n t a l change i n t h e n a t u r e 
o f t h e S t a t e power. To have r e d u c e d i n d i v i d u a l c a p i t a l i s t s 
t o a g e n ts o f a f o r e i g n t r a d e p l a n w o u l d have meant a regime 
r e s e m b l i n g t h e one j u s t d e f e a t e d i n war. The H o u s i n g 
programme had, i n any case, n o t a c h i e v e d i t s s h a r e d l a b o u r by 
d i r e c t i o n b u t by a d u l t t r a i n i n g , e x t e n s i v e use o f a p p r e n t i c e s h i p 
schemes, encouragement a t t h e l a b o u r exchanges and s p e c i a l 
c a t e g o r y d e m o b i l i s a t i o n . Once t h e s e p r i o r i t i e s were e s t a b -
l i s h e d , and once t h e r e was f u l l employment f o r t h e r e s t , w i t h 
monetary d e f l a t i o n and un-employment r u l e d o u t as a means o f 
a f f e c t i n g changes, t h e government was a p r i s o n e r o f i t s own 
a s s u m p t i o n s . So even i f t h e government had been w i l l i n g , 
g i v e n f u l l employment, t o r e n d e r i t s p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l s o v e r 
i n v e s t m e n t e f f e c t i v e b u t c u t t i n g where t h e y had once expanded 
t h e y f a c e d c r u c i a l l i m i t s a t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s t a g e : l i m i t s 
t h e y t h e mselves r e c o g n i s e d as l e g i t i m a t e . The i d l e l a b o u r 
c o u l d o n l y s w i t c h t o what t h e s t a t e saw as newly e s s e n t i a l 
employment i f o t h e r t r a d e s and a c t i v i t i e s w h i c h had ' v a c a n c i e s ' 
i n t h e f u l l employment boom were banned f r o m t a k i n g l a b o u r and 
t h e l a b o u r e r s a l r e a d y employed were taJcen away f r o m them i n an 
a r b i t r a r y f a s h i o n . A s i m i l a r u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o engage i n 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e measures t o compel e x p o r t e r s t o f i x t h e m s e l v e s 
t o p a r t i c u l a r m a r k e t s r e f l e c t e d t h e same and s u r v i v i n g l i b e r a l 
i d e o l o g y . For a government a n x i o u s t o p l a n t h i s was a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e f e t t e r b u t one o f i t s own making and somewhat 
i n e v i t a b l e f o r t h o s e c o m m i t t e d t o m a i n t a i n s o c i a l peace and t o 
r e c o n s t r u c t w i t h o u t s t e p p i n g on anybody's t o e s . 
CHAPTER V I I I 
The P l a c i n g o f I n v e s t m e n t 
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INTRODUCTION 
I n t h i s c h a p t e r we u n d e r t a k e an a n a l y s i s o f t h e f u n c t i o n 
and s c a l e o f t h e i n v e s t m e n t u n d e r t a k e n i n t h e UK, c o m p a r i n g i t 
w i t h t h e s c a l e s o f i n v e s t m e n t t h o u g h t n e c e s s a r y by r e s i d e n t 
e c o n o m i s t s and w i t h t h a t p u r s u e d a b r o a d . I n C h a p t e r 5 we 
s u g g e s t e d t h a t K e y n e s i a n t h e o r y r e l e g a t e d t h e c a t e g o r y i n v e s t -
ment t o a component o f a g g r e g a t e demand w h i c h m i g h t be e x c e s s i v e 
o r d e f i c i e n t i n r e l a t i o n t o e x i s t i n g p u r c h a s i n g power, w i t h 
g i v e n r e s o u r c e s and r a t e s o f s a v i n g . T h i s v i e w , i t was n o t e d , 
was b u i l t i n t o t h e p l a n n i n g a p p a r a t u s and as such a c c o u n t s f o r 
t h e c h o i c e s a d o p t e d i n t h e c r i s i s o f 1947. However, i n 
c h a m p i o n i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f K e y n e s i a n i s m i n t h e o r y t h e 
government was s t i l l a b l e t o choose and d u l l t h e edge o f i t s 
l e s s p a l a t a b l e recommendations. For i n s t a n c e , i n an i n f l u e n t -
i a l t e x t o f t h e t i m e s , Keynes's p r o t e g e Roy H a r r o d u r g e d t h e 
government t o c u t a l l i n v e s t m e n t - p u b l i c and p r i v a t e " ^ . 
A c c o r d i n g t o H a r r o d t h e b a l a n c e o f payments d e f i c i t was due t o 
'excess c a p i t a l o u t l a y ' , i . e . i n v e s t m e n t - g e n e r a t e d s p e n d i n g 
power w h i c h c o u l d n o t be t a k e n up by t h e a l r e a d y f u l l y employed 
economy, and i n s t e a d g e n e r a t e d demand f o r i m p o r t s f i n a n c e d by 
b o r r o w i n g . I n v e s t m e n t s h o u l d o n l y be p u r s u e d a t p l a n n e d 
l e v e l s i f c u r r e n t c o n s u m p t i o n were h e l d back and more money were 
saved. The government were t r y i n g t o do t o o many t h i n g s a t 
once. I f c o n s u m p t i o n were h e l d t h e n t h e p u r c h a s e o f c a p i t a l 
( p l a n t and m a c h i n e r y ) as w e l l as c o n s t r u c t i o n s h o u l d be h e l d 
back. He a d v o c a t e d c u t s o f £500m t o f a l l m a i n l y on 
1. H a r r o d , R., Are t h e s e h a r d s h i p s n e c e s s a r y ? (London H a r t -
Davis 1947). 
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c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g f a c t o r y b u i l d i n g , h o u s i n g , r a i l w a y 
e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n , b a s i c i n d u s t r y and new Towns'^. W i t h r e g a r d 
t o h o u s i n g he wanted a c u t i n s t a n d a r d s , t h e b u i l d i n g o f f l a t s 
2 
n o t houses and an end t o r e n t r e s t r i c t i o n , none o f .which t h e 
government t o o k up. 
SECTION I : IiWESTMENT AND GRO;^ ^^ H 
We have h i n t e d a t t h e a l t e r n a t i v e argument; t h a t t h e 
Key n e s i a n s , by l u m p i n g t o g e t h e r a l l i n v e s t m e n t i n an a g g r e g a t e 
t o be exceeded o r c u t , were i g n o r i n g t h e need f o r g r o w t h 
p r o d u c e d by t h e v e r y i n d u s t r i a l i n v e s t m e n t s a c r i f i c e d , f o r 
r e a s o n s o f macro-balance. T h i s g r o w t h was a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r 
a c o u n t r y a n x i o u s t o a c h i e v e a p o s i t i v e b a l a n c e o f payments i n 
c o n d i t i o n s where d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t e c h n i c a l d e v e lopment l e d t o 
d i s p l a c e m e n t e f f e c t s on f o r m a l l y e q u a l commodity p r o d u c e r s , and 
where i n v e s t m e n t o f new t e c h n o l o g y l e d t o economies o f t i m e i n 
t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f e x i s t i n g goods and t o t h e dev e l o p m e n t o f 
i m p r o v e d o r new p r o t o t y p e s . The l a b o u r t h u s f r e e d by' t h e 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g p r o c e s s f r o m overmanned s e c t o r s w o u l d f l o w i n t o 
new i n d u s t r y . As c o m m o d i t i e s cheapened and p r o f i t s grew, 
c u m u l a t i v e g r o w t h o r e x t e n d e d a c c u m u l a t i o n w o u l d t a k e p l a c e ^ . 
T h i s p r o c e s s ^ a s B a l o g h and o t h e r s a r g u e d ^ w o u l d be e s s e n t i a l 
once t h e r e v i v a l o f W. Germany and Japan was un d e r way and t h e 
s e l l e r ' s market d i s a p p e a r e d . I n t h e s h o r t t e r m c u t t i n g home 
i n v e s t m e n t s m i g h t be used as a 'shock a b s o r b e r ' f o r a b a l a n c e 
o f payments c r i s i s ^ b u t i n t h e l o n g r u n i t w o u l d a g g r a v a t e t h e 
p o s i t i o n o f d e f i c i t c o u n t r i e s by weakening t h e i r c o m p e t i t i v e 
p o s i t i o n . There was no l a c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n f o r p o l i c y m a k e r s 
1. i b i d pp.41,48. 
2. i b i d pp.93-4. 
3. Balogh,T.,Unequal P a r t n e r s , V o l . I I ( O x f o r d B a s i l B l a c k w e l l 
1963) pp.18-37,236-7. 
4. i b i d p.163-4. 
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a t the' t i m e about t h e l a c k o f p r o d u c t i v i t y i n B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y " ^ . 
I n t h e t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y f o r i n s t a n c e , w h i c h had been s e l e c t e d 
by t h e Government as a key e x p o r t e r , t h e low r a t e o f r e p l a c e -
ment o f t h e equipment was i n e v i d e n c e . O b s o l e s c e n c e , low 
p r o d u c t i o n and t h e r e f o r e l ow p r o f i t s i n t h e machine t o o l 
i n d u s t r y ivas r e i n f o r c e d by a l a c k o f o r d e r s . Those new c o t t o n 
s p i n d l e machines w h i c h were o r d e r e d were e x p o r t e d l e a v i n g t h e 
home i n d u s t r y w i t h s p i n d l e s w e l l o v e r 20 y e a r s o f age^, and i n 
t h e case o f w e a v i n g 40/50 y e a r s . I t was t h e same s t o r y f o r 
c o a l , as t h e Rei d Report had shown, w i t h p r o d u c t i v i t y n o t o n l y 
below t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b u t a l l o u r European r i v a l s i n c l u d i n g 
P o l a n d ^ . The work o f L a s l o Rostas was a n o t h e r i n f o r m a t i v e 
s o u r c e f o r t h e government. Rostas was a r e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t 
employed w i t h t h e Board o f T r a d e ^ . I n two n o t a b l e p i e c e s he 
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t p r o d u c t i v i t y measured as o u t p u t p e r man hour 
i n .American i n d u s t r i e s was two t o t h r e e t i m e s g r e a t e r t h a n 
i n t h e UK^. A s i m i l a r f i n d i n g was e v i d e n t i n Germany and Japan. 
1. Cab.134/211 Economic P l a n n i n g Board Paper 24 1 3 t h J u l y 1948 
T a b l e s P r e s e n t e d by S i r John Woods o f t h e Board o f T r a d e . 
2. Cab.134/210 Economic P l a n n i n g Board m e e t i n g 3 r d June 1948 
P r o g r e s s R e p o r t s on i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
3. Brady, R., C r i s i s i n B r i t a i n : P l a n s and Ac h i e v e m e n t s o f t h e 
Labour Government (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1950) 
pp.537-9, 540. 
4. Young, M., Labours P l a n f o r P l e n t y (London G o l l a n c z 1947) 
pp.23. 
5. i b i d 
6. Cab.134/191 O f f i c i a l Committee on Economic D e v e l o p m e n t ( p r i o r 
t o 26 Nov.1947 known as O f f i c i a l S t e e r i n g Committee on 
Economic Development) m e e t i n g 1 5 t h June 1948 c o n s i d e r i n g 
Paper ED(48)3 4 t h June by S i r John Woods s u m m a r i s i n g and 
append i n g t h e work o f R o s t a s . I t was a g r e e d a t t h e m e e t i n g 
t o l e t Dr. Rostas p u b l i s h h i s f i n d i n g s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f 
government and m i n i s t e r s were t o be a d v i s e d n o t t o r e f e r t o 
h i s work f o r them. 
7. Rostas, L., ' I n d u s t r i a l P r o d u c t i o n , P r o d u c t i v i t y and 
D i s t r i b u t i o n i n B r i t a i n , Germany and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 1 9 3 5 - 7 ' 
Economic J o u r n a l V o l . L I I I No.209 ( A p r i l 1943) pp.39-54 
See a l s o Rostas, L., C o m p a r a t i v e P r o d u c t i v i t y i n B r i t i s h and 
.American I n d u s t r y : O c c a s i o n a l Paper N o . X i l l N a t i o n a l I n s t , 
o f Economic and S o c i a l Research (London Cainbridge U n i v e r s i t y 
P ress 1948).. 
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T h i s r e s u l t was a c h i e v e d by u s i n g more mac h i n e r y p e r w o r k e r . 
The US a n n u a l c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t i n new equipment was s i x 
t i m e s t h e B r i t i s h l e v e l w i t h g r e a t e r use o f a u t o m a t i c and 
m e c h a n i c a l power. R o s t a s ' s t u d i e s were based on f i g u r e s f r o m 
32 i n d u s t r i e s i n t h e mid 1930s b u t t h e gap w i d e n e d a f t e r 1948. 
T h i s was h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g due t o t h e f a c t t h a t B r i t a i n had 
f a i l e d t o r e p l a c e c a p i t a l equipment d u r i n g t h e war t o a much 
g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n t h e USA and n e t i n v e s t m e n t p e r head i n 
m a n u f a c t u r e s s i n c e had been l o w e r . The .Americans i t seemed 
were more p r e p a r e d t o w r i t e o f f and s c r a p f i x e d c a p i t a l and 
r e p l a c e i t w i t h new equipment"^. The g r e a t e r p r o d u c t i v i t y i n 
t h e machine t o o l i n d u s t r y p e r m i t t e d US c a p i t a l i s t s t o p u r c h a s e 
i t a t a r e a s o n a b l e p r i c e . P o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h i s 
d i s p a r i t y o f p r o d u c t i v i t y (much l a r g e r when a c c o u n t i s t a k e n 
o f t h e s h o r t e r US. w o r k i n g week) l o o k t o t h e p e c u l i a r i t y o f t h e 
American market i . e . t h a t t h e p r i m a r y cause may n o t be t h e f a c t 
o f new machines b u t t h e m a s s i v e home marke t s t i m u l a t i n g 
s t a n d a r d i s e d , mass pro d u c e d goods, w h i c h t o g e t h e r w i t h a l a r g e r 
f i r m s i z e , made r a p i d a d d i t i o n s t o t h e s t o c k o f c a p i t a l 
economic^. I n a d d i t i o n l a b o u r i n t h e USA was h i s t o r i c a l l y 
e x p e n s i v e g i v e n t h e need f o r A m e r i c a n c a p i t a l i s t s t o cope w i t h 
t h e p r o b l e m t h a t wage l a b o u r c o u l d escape t h r o u g h o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
on t h e Western f r o n t i e r . The l o n g d u r a t i o n o f unemployment i n 
B r i t a i n f r o m 1922 t o t h e war compared w i t h t h e US boom f r o m 
1919 t o 1929 made B r i t i s h l a b o u r c h e a p e r ^ e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r t h e 
1. Leyland,N.H., ' P r o d u c t i v i t y ' i n G.D.N.Worswick and P.H.Ady 
( e d s ) The B r i t i s h Economy 1945-50 ( O x f o r d C l a r e n d o n Press 
1952) pp.381-98. 
2. E . R o t h b a r t h . 'Causes o f s u p e r i o r e f f i c i e n c y o f USA i n d u s t r y 
as compared w i t h B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y ' Economic J o u r n a l V o l . L V I 
( Sept.1946) pp.383-90. 
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c r u c i a l d e f e a t i n t h e s t r i k e o f 1926. T h i s may have l e d 
B r i t i s h c a p i t a l i s t s t o be i n d i f f e r e n t t o new i n v e s t m e n t i n 
m achinery and t h e unemployment o f t h o s e y e a r s may have r e i n -
f o r c e d u n i o n r e s i s t a n c e t o new t e c h n i q u e ;as r e f l e c t e d i n 
v a r i o u s r e s t r i c t i v e p r a c t i c e s . The p o s t w a r Labour government 
c o n t i n u e d t h i s t r e n d by s t r e s s i n g ' l a b o u r i n t e n s i t y ' as a 
s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y p r o b l e m as e v i d e n c e d i n t h e a l r e a d y 
c i t e d ' p r o s p e r i t y campaign'"^. I n J u l y 1948 t h e more c o n t i n u o u s 
l i a i s o n between t h e UK and t h e US government t h r o u g h t h e 
M a r s h a l l A i d body - t h e European C o - o p e r a t i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
(E.C.A.) - p r o d u c e d t h e A n g l o - A m e r i c a n P r o d u c t i v i t y C o u n c i l 
w h i c h i s s u e d a g r e a t d e a l o f p u b l i c i t y c a l l i n g f o r management 
i n n o v a t i o n and improvements i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . The 
C o u n c i l was composed o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m i n d u s t r y on b o t h 
s i d e s o f t h e A t l a n t i c and i t e x c l u d e d t h e Government. Very 
l i t t l e came o f i t . The government's own Committee on 
I n d u s t r i a l P r o d u c t i v i t y s e t up i n December 1947 d i d however 
i n c l u d e government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and i n a d d i t i o n r e s i d e n t 
e c o n o m i s t s , and members o f t h e Economic P l a n n i n g Board. Much 
o f i t s work was c e n t r e d on t h e 'Panel on Human F a c t o r s ' w h i c h 
2 
s t r e s s e d l a b o u r i n t e n s i t y r a t h e r t h a n r e - e q u i p m e n t . The L o r d 
P r e s i d e n t M o r r i s o n , a n n o u n c i n g t h e c o m m i t t e e i n t h e Commons s a i d , 
1. The s t r e s s on l a b o u r i n t e n s i t y becajne a l l t h e more e s s e n t i a l 
f o r t h e government g i v e n t h e s h o r t e n i n g o f t h e w o r k i n g week 
From V.J. Day t o 1947 some 5%m w o r k e r s had g a i n e d r e d u c t i o n s 
f r o m 3-4 h o u r s f r o m 47 o r 48 t o 44 h o u r s per week. See H.C. 
Debs V o l 439 Col.1622 3 r d J u l y 1947 Debate on P r o d u c t i v i t y . 
2. See Cab.132/31 Committee on P r o d u c t i v i t y . Terms o f 
R e f e r e n c e . 
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i n g e n e r a l i t s h o u l d be added t h a t t h e recommendations 
t o be o f g r e a t v a l u e s h o u l d o b v i o u s l y n o t r e q u i r e any 
c o n s i d e r a b l e c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e i n t h e f u t u r e even i f 
h i g h l y y d e s i r a b l e r e s u l t s c o u l d be a c h i e v e d t h e r e b y ^ 
As t h e 1949 Economic Survey p o i n t e d o u t , g i v e n t h e p l a n n e d 
i n c r e a s e i n t h e e x p o r t o f m a c h i n e r y 'we c o u l d n o t hope t o 
o b t a i n l a r g e i n c r e a s e s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y by i n c r e a s i n g c a p i t a l 
p e r head'. Re-equipment w o u l d be m a i n l y f o r r e p l a c e m e n t and 
m a j o r improvements i n p r o d u c t i v i t y c o u l d be g a i n e d i n s t e a d f r o m 
2 
g r e a t e r s k i l l , e n e r g y , a d a p t a b i l i t y , man mangement and d e s i g n . 
The p a n e l s e t a b o u t i n d e p t h work on t i m e and m o t i o n s t u d i e s , 
i n d u s t r i a l p s y c h o l o ^ , schemes f o r t h e b e t t e r use o f e x i s t i n g 
p l a n t l a y o u t , t e c h n i c a l r e s e a r c h i m p r o v e m e n t s f o r an a v e r a g e 
l e v e l o f o u t p u t , i n t e n s i t y and l e n g t h o f work. Research i n t o 
t h e ' a d a p t a b i l i t y ' o f l a b o u r s t r e s s e d j o i n t c o n s u l t a t i o n and 
schemes f o r i m p r o v i n g m a n a g e r i a l e f f i c i e n c y . The B r i t i s h 
I n s t i t u t e o f Management had a l r e a d y been s e t up under g o v e r n -
ment a u s p i c e s i n J a n u a r y 1948 and one o f i t s l e a d i n g members 
was t h e d a u g h t e r o f t h e c h i e f t h e o r i s t i n t h e f i e l d , a M i s s 
E l t o n P. Mayo, who j o i n e d t h e r e s e a r c h a d v i s o r y g r o u p a t t a c h e d 
t o t h e Committee on P r o d u c t i v i t y ^ 
From t h e o u t s e t Labour had been p r e p a r e d t o r e c o g n i s e t h e 
i m p o r t a n c e o f r e - e q u i p m e n t f o r c o s t r e d u c t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y as 
we had s c a r c e l y been m a i n t a i n i n g c a p i t a l i n t h e l o n g d e p r e s s i o n . 
1 . H.C. Deb V ol.445 Col.1863-6 18 Dec. 1947. o r a l answer. The 
Panel o f Human F a c t o r s was t o be c h a i r e d by S i r George 
S c h u s t e r , member o f l t h e B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e o f Management. 
2. Economic Survey f o r 1949 Cmnd 7647 (London HMSO March 1949) 
p a r a . 1 2 2 . 
3. See Cab 132/31 Committee on I n d u s t r i a l P r o d u c t i v i t y . Terms 
o f R e f e r e n c e and membership l i s t . 
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Moreover, g r a d u a l i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n t h e t h i r d w o r l d w i t h 
t h e i r r i c e s t a n d a r d wages w o u l d mean more competition"*". 
W orking p a r t i e s s e t up by t h e Board o f Trade r e v e a l e d t h i s 
2 
f a c t i n t h e b o o t and shoe i n d u s t r y , c o t t o n , t e x t i l e s e t c . 
W h i l e t h e w o r k i n g p a r t i e s drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e need f o r 
amalgcLmations, t h e need f o r p r o d u c t r e s e a r c h and schemes f o r 
t h e w r i t i n g o f f o f o b s o l e t e p l a n t by means o f s p e c i a l 
d e p r e c i a t i o n a l l o w a n c e s , t h e government s e t about t r y i n g t o 
encourage such schemes by t h e s p o n s o r i n g o f t r i p a r t i t e 
Development C o u n c i l s f o r each i n d u s t r y . The l a c k o f consequent 
r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n and i n v e s t m e n t has o f t e n been blamed on t h e 
o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e FBI and key t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s ' ^ , b u t t h e r e 
seems l i t t l e d o ubt t h a t t h e government i t s e l f e n v i s a g e d ^ f r o m 
t h e s t a r t ^ n o t h i n g more t h a n c o u n s e l l i n g b o d i e s and was i t s e l f 
wedded t o t h e i d e a o f t h e v o l u n t a r y p r i n c i p l e . W i t h r e g a r d 
t o d r a s t i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g t h e W o r k i n g P a r t y on C o t t o n f o r 
i n s t a n c e , d i d n o t recommend any s h e d d i n g o f l a b o u r and t h e 
s u b s i d y a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e p u r c h a s e o f new equipment ( u n d e r t h e 
C o t t o n S p i n d l e s A ct o f 1948) was n o t r e l a t e d t o any measure o f 
e f f i c i e n c y b u t m e r e l y t o t h e s i z e o f t h e p l a n t . By A p r i l 1949 
l e s s t h a n one t w e l f t h o f t h e t o t a l ajnount t h e government a l l o c a -
t e d f o r t h e purpose had been t a k e n up i n o r d e r s f o r new s p i n d l e s 
and t h e s u b s i d y was due t o e x p i r e soon a f t e r t h e n ^ . 
1. Cab.134/189 O f f i c i a l S t e e r i n g Committee Paper ED(46)42 
22nd Nov. 1946 ' D i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e Labour F o r c e : o v e r -
manned and undermanned i n d u s t r i e s ' N ote by J o i n t 
S e c r e t a r i e s . 
2. Brady C r i s i s i n B r i t a i n pp.531-7. 
3. i b i d pp.548-559 see a l s o Rogow, A.A. and Shore, P. 
The Labour Government and B r i t i s h I n d u s t r y 1945-51 ( O x f o r d 
B a s i l B l a c k w e l l 1955) pp.76-92. 
4. H.C. Debs Vol.463 Col.2726 1 2 t h A p r i l 1949 Debate on budget 
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I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o s e l e c t o u t f o r c a u s a l p r i m a c y any 
f a c t o r as b e i n g o f s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h e low r a t e o f i n v e s t m e n t 
and l a c k o f i n t e r e s t i n r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . What we a r e d o i n g 
here i s p u r e l y d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n t o t h e r o l e o f t h e . s t a t e i n 
t h i s f i e l d , i n t h e p e c u l i a r i t y o f B r i t i s h g overnment's 
p o s i t i o n i n d i s c o u r a q i n g i n v e s t m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e beyond a s e t 
s c a l e i n i t s i n v e s t m e n t programming. B e f o r e we go on t o an 
e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e i n v e s t m e n t u n d e r t a k e n i n r e l a t i o n t o i n v e s t -
ment needs, t h e r e i s one more a s p e c t o f t h e p o l i c y w h i c h needs 
t o be examined as i t i n v o l v e s t h e s t a t e t h r o u g h i t s l e g i t i m a t e 
monopoly o f t h e power t o t a x . The l i n k between i n v e s t m e n t 
and a c c u m u l a t i o n o r s a v i n g i s c r u c i a l h e r e i n so f a r as p r i v a t e 
i n v e s t m e n t i n t e n t i o n s may be a f f e c t e d by what t h e government 
i s d o i n g f i s c a l l y . Having a l r e a d y d e t a i l e d t h e r e l u c t a n c e o f 
the government t o d e f l a t e by monetary means^or c u t p u b l i c 
e x p e n d i t u r e and shown i t s p r e f e r e n c e f o r f i s c a l p o l i c y ^ t h e 
i m p a c t o f t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t c a p i t a l can now be shown. 
I n p a r t t h i s was i n t e n d e d and was a r e a s s e r t i o n o f t h e p o l i c y 
o f ' f a i r s h a r e s ' c a l l e d f o r by Labour MPs t o s t i m u l a t e h i g h e r 
l a b o u r i n t e n s i t y among t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s . 
SECTION I I : INVESTMENT AND ACCUMULATION 
A p a r t f r o m t h e c u t s i n programmes t h e m s e l v e s and t h e 
i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t went o u t t o t h e C a p i t a l I s s u e s Committee 
d i s c o u r a g i n g s hare d e a l i n g , i t was n o t u n t i l t h e 1 s t Ja n u a r y 
1947 t h a t t h e w a r t i m e Excess P r o f i t s Tax was removed. Excess 
P r o f i t s Tax (E.P.T.) t o o k t h e whole o f company p r o f i t s i n 
1. A t t l e e Papers l e t t e r f r o m 19 Backbench Labour MPs 
23 r d J u l y * 1 9 4 7 ( O x f o r d ) 
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excess o f a * s t a n d a r d * r a t e s e t on t h e b a s i s o f p r e - w a r 
p r o f i t s ' ^ - I t p e n a l i z e d f i r m s who were t h i n k i n g o f e x p a n d i n g 
p o s t - w a r on a h i g h e r p r o f i t b a s i s . A l t h o u g h much o f excess 
p r o f i t was r e f u n d a b l e , t h e t i m i n g o f t h e r e f u n d s was.at t h e 
government's d i s c r e t i o n . The 1945 Income Tax A c t had been 
s o l d t o i n d u s t r y as a measure t o encourage i n v e s t m e n t by 
a l l o w i n g f i r m s t o w r i t e o f f 1 0 % o f t h e v a l u e o f new f a c t o r y 
b u i l d i n g s when d e c l a r i n g t a x and 205^ on new m a c h i n e r y p u r c h a s e s . 
Ye t by 1947 t h e s e a l l o w a n c e s were n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o a l l o w 
r e p l a c e m e n t a t e x i s t i n g p r i c e s and i t was n o t u n t i l 1949 t h a t 
C r i p p s d o u b l e d t h e i n i t i a l a l l o w a n c e i n r e s p e c t o f newly 
purchased p l a n t and m a c h i n e r y t o 40%^. I n a sense, as many 
i n t h e budget d e b a t e p o i n t e d o u t , i n c r e a s i n g t h e i n i t i a l 
a l l o w a n c e s was o n l y a d v a n c i n g t h e d a t e f o r r e m i s s i o n o f t a x . 
I t d i d n o t h e l p t h e i n d i v i d u a l whose p l a n t was a l r e a d y h a l f worn 
o u t and had t o f i n d t h e c a p i t a l t o r e p l a c e i t . The d o u b l i n g 
o f t h e i n i t i a l a l l o w a n c e s d i d n o t mean any t o t a l a d d i t i o n t o 
t h e a l l o w a n c e s s i n c e sooner o r l a t e r 1 0 0% o f c o s t w o u l d be 
a l l o w e d . I t m i g h t , as O s b e r t Peake p o i n t e d o u t ^ , have been 
b e t t e r t o have reduced t h e a c t u a l i n c i d e n c e o f t a x a t i o n on 
i n d u s t r y by a b o l i s h i n g t h e 1 / - i n t h e pound t a x on u n d i s t r i b u t e d 
( i . e . p l o u g h e d b a c k ) p r o f i t s o r t h e s t a n d a r d r a t e o f income t a x 
w h i c h a t t h a t t i m e was 9/6d o r 47p i n t h e Peake q u o t e d 
1. Young Labour P l a n f o r P l e n t y p.89. 
2. H.C.Debs Vol.463 Col.2097 6 t h A p r i l 1949 Budget Speech. 
Col.2105 see a l s o HC Debs V o l . 4 6 3 Col,2691/2713 1 2 t h A p r i l 
1949 Debate on Budget., 
3. H.C. Debs. Vol.463.Col.2753. 1 2 t h A p r i l 1949 Debate on 
Budget. 
4. Rogow and Shore. Labour Government and B r i t i s h I n d u s t r y . p p . 
119. P r o f i t s Tax had i n c r e a s e d i n e v e r y y e a r 1948-50. 
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T a b l e 6 o f t h e 1949 White Paper on N a t i o n a l Income and 
E x p e n d i t u r e w h i c h showed under 'Company P r o f i t s and D i v i d e n d s ' 
t h e h e a d i n g ' A d d i t i o n t o Free Reserves' t h e f i g u r e s f o r 




Peake n o t e d t h a t i n 1948 a d d i t i o n t o r e s e r v e s t o t a l l e d £l,215m^ 
b u t w i t h p r o f i t s s u b j e c t t o t a x o f one k i n d o r a n o t h e r t o t a l l i n g 
£670m ( o r 5 5 % ) ^ l e s s t h a n h a l f ^ o r £545m^was l e f t a v a i l a b l e f o r 
i n d u s t r i a l r e - e q u i p m e n t . A n o t h e r MP Norman S m i t h i n t h e same 
debate p u t i t more g r a p h i c a l l y g i v i n g t h e example o f a key 
e x p o r t e r i n h i s c o n s t i t u e n c y , R a l e i g h Cycles'^. I n 1948 i t had 
made p r o f i t s o f £1,300,000. T a x a t i o n t o o k £700,000 s h a r e -
h o l d e r s g o t £170,000 and £423,000 was p l o u g h e d back. Put 
a n o t h e r way o f t h e l . l d . s u r p l u s on each b i c y c l e ^ 7 d went t o t h e 
government i n t a x a t i o n ^ l ^ d t o t h e s h a r e h o l d e r ^ and ^h<^ p l o u g h e d 
back. L a t e r r e s e a r c h ^ b a s e d on f i g u r e s g l e a n e d f r o m I n l a n d 
Revenue R e p o r t s ^ t e s t i f i e d t o t h e same o v e r a l l p o s i t i o n i n 1949, 
where Gross B u s i n e s s S a v i n g was some £705m ( a f t e r 
d e d u c t i n g o f d i v i d e n d s ) w h i l e t h e t a x a t i o n on b u s i n e s s s a v i n g 
was shown a t £40Om, l e a v i n g n e t a c c u m u l a t i o n a t £306m. The 
2 
p o s i t i o n was s i m i l a r f o r 1948 . The c u m u l a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e i 
o f such t a x a t i o n p l a c e d r e s t r a i n t s on a c c u m u l a t i o n . The 
reduced demand f o r equipment meant l e s s i n c e n t i v e t o i n v e s t i n 
t h e machine b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y . The r e s t r i c t i o n s by t h e C a p i t a l 
I s s u e s Committee on share d e a l i n g and l e n d i n g on t h e s t o c k 
1. H.C.Debs.Vol,463 Col.2257-8 7 t h A p r i l 1949 Debate on Budget. 
2. H a r t , P.E.(ed) S t u d i e s i n P r o f i t , B u s i n e s s S a v i n g and I n v e s t -
ment i n t h e UK 1920-62 V o l . 1 1 (London George A l l e n & Unwin 
1968) pp.111 T a b l e 13.2 A p p r o p r i a t i o n o f P r o f i t i n C o r p o r a t e 
M a n u f a c t u r i n g 1936-62. 
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exchange meant t h a t l a r g e f i r m s o r w e a l t h y i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h 
b i g r e s e r v e s w o u l d f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o l e n d t o s m a l l f i r m s and 
many f o u n d t h e y c o u l d n o t f l o a t t h e i r own i s s u e s t o r a i s e 
money f o r i n v e s t m e n t ^ e x c e p t where an i m m e d i a t e e x p o r t g a i n 
c o u l d be shown t o f o l l o w . The two t i e r e d p r o f i t s t a ^ was 
d e s i g n e d t o f a v o u r i n t e r n a l s e l f f i n a n c i n g b u t t h e s m a l l e r 
f i r m s r a i s e d c a p i t a l more by s h a r e i s s u e and bank l e n d i n g j 
w h i c h was a l s o r e s t r i c t e d . Taxes on i n h e r i t a n c e h i t t h e 
f a m i l y f i r m and p u r c h a s e ta-xes f e l l e s p e c i a l l y on l u x u r y goods 
which many of t h e s e f i r m s s p e c i a l i s e d i n . Even 
w i t h o u t C a p i t a l I s s u e s C o n t r o l t h e low d i v i d e n d s p r o d u c e d by 
t h e 2 5 % t a x on d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s ( r a i s e d t o 30% i n 1949) 
would d u l l t h e market and h i t s h are v a l u e s . S i n c e t h e ta-x 
burden v a r i e s d e p e n d i n g on t h e r a t e o f economic g r o w t h o r 
a c c u m u l a t i o n and t h a t i t s e l f i s p a r t i a l l y dependent on t h e r a t e 
of e x p e c t e d p r o f i t , and s i n c e i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o have a 
r e a s o n a b l e o r r i s i n g r a t e o f p r o f i t t o c o n v e r t s a v i n g s i n t o 
i n v e s t m e n t , t h e n t h e r a t e o f t a x a t i o n must^as a consequence^ 
have some b e a r i n g on a l l t h e s e a s p e c t s o f a c c u m u l a t i o n . T h i s 
s i t u a t i o n may have had some i n f l u e n c e on t h e way e n t e r p r i s e s 
began t o l o c a t e a b r o a d , and on t h e i n c r e a s e i n t h e e x p o r t o f 
c a p i t a l " ^ . From 1946-9 p u b l i c companies w i t h i s s u e c a p i t a l 
o f o v e r £80m e i t h e r m i g r a t e d o r r a d i c a l l y e x t e n d e d t h e i r 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g c a p a c i t y a b r o a d ^ . 
SECTION I I I : SCALE OF IN^/ESTMENT 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o m a i n t a i n " w i t h any degree o f a c c u r a c y 
t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d a s c a l e o f n e c e s s a r y i n v e s t m e n t w h i c h 
1. Rogow and Shore. Labour Government and B r i t i s h I n d u s t r y pp.119 
2. i b i d D.122 
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s h o u l d have been u n d e r t a k e n i n t h i s p e r i o d , b u t t h e r e a r e 
enough i n d i c a t i o n s o f l e v e l s o f r e q u i r e m e n t deduced f r o m s o c i a l 
and economic changes consequent on f u l l employment. B e f o r e 
d e a l i n g w i t h t h i s i t seems w i s e t o exaimine t h e c l a i m t h a t 
s u b s t a n t i a l i n v e s t m e n t was u n n e c e s s a r y . An i n f l u e n t i a l l i t t l e 
b o o k l e t t h a t c i r c u l a t e d i n t h e f o r c e s p u t t h e m a t t e r so: 
o n l y a s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e t o t a l s t o c k o f 
m a n u f a c t u r e d equipment needs r e n e w i n g a n n u a l l y t o 
produce t h e goods we need. The r e s t i s easy t o 
make up by War Damage r e p a i r and d e p r e c i a t i o n . . . 
( p o s s i b l y i n a y e a r , . . ) F u r t h e r m o r e a g r e a t d e a l 
o f what i s spent on t h e war w i l l r e m a i n u s e f u l i n 
peactime...Many o f t h e f a c t o r i e s now b u i l t f o r 
t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e war can e a s i l y be a d a p t e d t o 
t h e needs o f p e a c e t i m e i n d u s t r y . 
I f t h e government needed a t h e o r e t i c a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n f o r 
t h e i r 'make do and mend' p o l i c y h ere i t was. There were two 
ass u m p t i o n s p r e s e n t i n t h i s argument- F i r s t l y , t h a t t h e r e 
was no c o m p e t i t i v e ' n e c e s s i t y ' n o t j u s t t o m a i n t a i n b u t t o 
c o n t i n u a l l y i m p r o v e t h e c a p i t a l s t o c k a r d t h a t r e p a i r and 
maintenance was adequate f o r a n a t i o n t o r e - e n t e r t h e w o r l d 
market w i t h equipment d a t i n g back t o Queen V i c t o r i a s upplemented 
by w a r t i m e f a c t o r i e s . O t h e r s however t o o k a l e s s o p t i m i s t i c 
v i e w s t r e s s i n g t h a t w a r t i m e l o s s e s due t o d e s t r u c t i o n damage 
and ' d i s i n v e s t m e n t ' ( t h e r e d u c t i o n i n v a l u e f r o m o v e r u s e and 
t h e i n a b i l i t y t o r e p a i r and m a i n t a i n ) were n o t be t o u n d e r -
e s t i m a t e d . The d e c l i n e i n t h e n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l caused by 
l i v i n g o f f and r u n n i n g down o u r c a p i t a l equipment w i t h o u t 
maintenance, r e p a i r o r r e p l a c e m e n t was a l o n e s a i d t o be e q u a l 
t o about 6 y e a r s n e t i n v e s t m e n t a t t h e e x i s t i n g r a t e o f 1938 
o f about £300m. I n a d d i t i o n we needed t o be a b l e t o c a r r y 
1. Joseph,M and K a l d o r , N . Economic R e c o n s t r u c t i o n a f t e r t h e '/.'ar 
Handbook pr o d u c e d by t h e A s s o c i a t i o n f o r E d u c a t i o n i n 
C i t i z e n s h i p (London E n g l i s h U n i v e r s i t i e s Press 1943) p.4. 
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t h e l a r g e r w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h f o l l o w e d f r o m t h e f u l l 
employment p o l i c y a b o s r b i n g p e r h a p s 1,200,000 ; 1,700,000 
unemployed o f 1938, as w e l l as t h e i n v e s t m e n t n e c e s s a r y t o 
s u s t a i n a p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h had i n c r e a s e d by about 6%. I n t o t a l 
t h a t amounted t o an a d d i t i o n t o c a p i t a l equipment o f somexhing 
l i k e 9 y e a r s n e t i n v e s t m e n t c o s t e d o u t as f o l l o w s ; ^ 
TABLE 6 
ESTIMATED SCALE OP REQUIRED INVESTMENT 1945/46 
To make good War Damage - £l,500m-
To mal<e good a r r e a r s o f M a i n t e n a n c e 
R e p a i r and Replacement £3,OOOm 
T o t a l Loss o f C a p i t a l due t o War 
needed t o r e s t o r e p o s i t i o n t o 1938 £4,500m 
P a r t i a l l y o f f s e t by s a l e o f Wartime 
machinery and government f a c t o r i e s - 500m 
£4,OOOm 
To t h i s s h o u l d be added t h e l o s s e s o f o u r 
net e x t e r n a l w e a l t h as compared w i t h 1938 
The s a l e o f f o r e i g n s e c u r i t i e s t o t a l l i n g £l,OOOm 
I n c u r r e d Debts o f - £3,OOOm 
£4,0QQm 
Making grand t o t a l c a p i t a l l o s s due t o War 
o f £8,OOOm e q u i v a l e n t a c c o r d i n g t o P a i s h £8,OOOm 
o f one y e a r ' s N a t i o n a l Income o r l / 5 t h 
o f t h e t o t a l N a t i o n a l S t o c k 
I n a d d i t i o n : To p r o v i d e 6% Growth i n p o p u l a t i o n 
( s c h o o l s e t c ) £l,800m 
I n a d d i t i o n : To employ 1 1 % more men under 
f u l l employment £1,OOOm 
£10,800m 
1. P a i s h , F., 'The F i n a n c e o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' London and 
Cajnbridoe Economic S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n V o l XXV Feb 1 0 t h 1947 
pp 18-23; a l s o r e p r i n t e d i n Bareau, P, The I n d u s t r i a l 
F u t u r e o f Great B r i t a i n - l e c t u r e s a r r a n g e d by London 
U n i v e r s i t y and I n s t i t u t e o f B a n k e r s ' 1947-8 (London Europa 
Press 1948) C h . V I I I . 
See a l s o Robinson, E.A.G., ' B r i t i s h Economic P o l i c y 1945-50* 
London and Cambridge Economic S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n I I 
V o l XJ-CVIII May 1950 pp.41-8. 
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Some a l l o w a n c e had to be made f o r a d d i t i o n a l i n v e s t m e n t t o 
s u s t a i n t h e h i g h e r demand f o r i m p o r t s made p o s s i b l e by f u l l 
employment, and t h e e f f e c t o f t h e r i s i n g p r o p e n s i t y t o consume, 
t h e i n c r e a s i n g numbers o f p e o p l e employed i n t h e s t a t e s e c t o r 
and new and h i g h e r l e v e l s o f p u b l i c s p e n d i n g i n so f a r as t h i s 
be c o n s t r u e d as u n p r o d u c t i v e . ^ 
A l l t h i s i n v e s t m e n t t h e r e f o r e was c o n s t r u e d as 'necessary' 
even b e f o r e t h o u g h t c o u l d be g i v e n o f i n v e s t i n g t o cheapen and 
exoand m a n u f a c t u r i n g , e s p e c i a l l y e x p o r t s ^ a f t e r f o r e i g n 
b o r r o w i n g ceased, o r f o r r e d u c i n g t h e c o s t o f wage goods by 
i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y i n consumer i n d u s t r i e s so t h a t h i g h e r 
wage r a t e s pushed a t f u l l employment c o u l d be f i n a n c e d w i t h o u t 
i n c r e a s i n g c o s t s o f p r o d u c t i o n . I f t h e c o s t o f m a c h i n e r y 
p r o d u c e d f o r t h e consumer s e c t o r c o u l d n o t be cheapened by 
i n v e s t m e n t i n e n g i n e e r i n g i t c o u l d n o t be employed i n manufac-
t u r i n g w i t h o u t r e d u c i n g t h e r a t e o f p r o f i t * 
SECTION IV : I^fVESTMENT UNDERTAKEN 
The s c a l e o f i n v e s t m e n t p l a n n e d i n 1949 had, d e s p i t e t h e 
d e v a l u a t i o n c r i s i s , l a r g e l y d e t e r m i n e d t h e o u t l i n e o f s t a t e 
p o l i c y up t o 1952, The I n v e s t m e n t Programmes Committee had i n 
1949 drawn up a Re p o r t on C a p i t a l I n v e s t m e n t f o r 1950 
recommending t h a t p l a n t and m a c h i n e r y i n v e s t m e n t be c u t u n l e s s 
i t c o u l d make a d i r e c t and e a r l y c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e b a l a n c e o f 
2 
payments . I n v e s t m e n t g e n e r a l l y was t o be h e l d a t l e v e l s o f 
1948, w i t h t h a t d e v o t e d t o s o c i a l s e r v i c e s a l s o m a i n t a i n e d a t 
t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r ' s l e v e l . A t t e m p t s i n t h e r e p o r t t o slow 
1. For a modern d i s c u s s i o n see Bacon, R and E l t i s , W. B r i t a i n s 
Economic Problems: t o o few p r o d u c e r s (London M c M i l l a n 1976) 
2. Cab.134/191 O f f i c i a l ( S t e e r i n g ) Commi t t e e on Economic 
Development m e e t i n g 2 0 t h J u l y . 
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t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f houses t o be l o w t h e 1948 l e v e l were v e t o e d 
by M i n i s t e r s ^ . The d e c i s i o n t o c u t p l a n t and m a c h i n e r y 
r e f l e c t e d t h e IPC d e s i r e t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e 
e x p o r t t a r g e t a g a i n t h r o u g h t h e e x p o r t o f some 4 5 % o f p l a n t 
and machinery p r o d u c t i o n ^ . These d e c i s i o n s were l a t e r 
c o n f i r m e d by M i n i s t e r s , d e s p i t e t h e known o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e 
FBI on t h e Economic P l a n n i n g Board"^ (who were a l s o u p s e t a t 
t h e a l l o c a t i o n f o r i n d u s t r i a l b u i l d i n g b e i n g k e p t w e l l below 
demand), and t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Board o f T r a d e , H a r o l d 
4 
W i l s o n . 
D e c i s i o n s taicen about t h e t r a d e o f f between i n v e s t m e n t and 
e x p o r t were c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e p o l i t i c s o f c u t s i n 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . I f e x p o r t s o f ma c h i n e r y were chosen f o r t h e i r 
i m m e d i a t e s w e l l i n g o f t h e e x p o r t s t r e a m , t h e n t h e C a b i n e t c o u l d 
hope t o a c h i e v e i t s t a r g e t w i t h o u t s w i t c h e s and t r a n s f e r s i n 
manpower- I n November 1947 t h e C a b i n e t n o t e d t h a t e x p o r t s 
were a l r e a d y a t 114% o f t h e 1938 l e v e l compared w i t h a t a r g e t 
o f 140% by mid 1948, and 160% f o r December 1948, and hoped t h a t 
t h e e x t r a 150,000 w o r k e r s t o a c h i e v e t h e f o r m e r and a f u r t h e r 
250,000 f o r t h e l a t t e r w o u l d be u n n e c e s s a r y . At t h a t t i m e i t 
e x p r e s s e d t h e hope t h a t s u p p l i e s t o t h e home m a r k e t need n o t 
be c u t ^ . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e achievement o f t h e 1 4 7 % o f t h e 
1938 volume by end 1948^ was g a i n e d p a r t l y as a r e s u l t o f t h a t 
1. Cab.134/636 P r o d u c t i o n Committee m e e t i n g 6 t h September 1948 
2. Cab.134/438 I n v e s t m e n t Programmes Committee m e e t i n g 4 t h 
May 1948 
3. Cab.134/210 M e e t i n g Economic P l a n n i n g Board m e e t i n g 2 1 s t 
J u l y 1948 
4. Cab.134/636 P r o d u c t i o n Committee m e e t i n g 2 3 r d J u l y 1948 
5. Cab.128/10 C a b i n e t m e e t i n g CM(47)92 2nd December 1947 
6. Economic Survey f o r 1949 T a b l e 8. 
v e r y c i r c u m s t a n c e . A l t h o u g h p a r t o f t h e e x p o r t i n c r e a s e c o u l d 
be a c h i e v e d by a n e x p a n s i o n o f w o r l d t r a d e , i f o u r s h a r e o f 
w o r l d m a n u f a c t u r e s h a d d e c l i n e d f r o m t h e p r e - w a r p e r i o d ( a n d 2 5 % 
o f t h e 1938 a c h i e v e m e n t c o m p r i s e d e x p o r t s o f c o a l ) , t h e e x p o r t 
f i g u r e t o be a c h i e v e d i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g c o m m o d i t i e s a l o n e , w o u l d 
r e q u i r e a n i n c r e a s e o f o v e r 2 0 0 % ^ , w i t h t h e r e q u i r e d n u m b e r s i n new 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g e m p l o y m e n t n e e d i n g t o r i s e f u r t h e r s t i l l . Mo r e o f 
t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f p l a n t a n d m a c h i n e r y w o u l d a l s o h a v e t o be u s e d 
t o r e - r e q u i p a t home. T h e f a c t t h a t much o f t h e e x p o r t t a r g e t 
was a c h i e v e d by t h e e x p o r t o f m a c h i n e r y ' ^ o n l y t e s t i f i e s t o t h e way 
t h e t r a d e - o f f was made: i t b e i n g r e c o g n i s e d t h a t home i n v e s t m e n t 
and m a n u f a c t u r i n g w o u l d s u f f e r . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f c o n t i n u i n g 
t h i s s t r a t e g y i n t o 1948 m e a n t r e n e w i n g t h e p o l i c y o f r e f u s i n g t o 
e x t e n d a n d i m p r o v e o n t h e c a p i t a l s t o c k . T h e c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t 
r e p o r t f o r 1 9 4 9 , a s a g r e e d by t h e G o v e r n m e n t , o p t e d a g a i n f o r t h e 
s h o r t t e r m ^ m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t : 
a p o l i c y o f make do a n d mend a s n e c e s s a r y i n 1949 
a s 1948 means t h a t e x t r a c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s h o u l d 
be d e v o t e d t o g e t t i n g more o u t p u t f r o m e x i s t i n g 
p l a n t r a t h e r t h a n t h e c r e a t i o n o f f r e s h c a p a c i t y 
McKay, R.V^ .G, B r i t a i n i n Wonderland (London G o l a n z 1948) 
pp. 43 
Rob i n s o n , E.A.G. Economic P l a n n i n g i n t h e U.K.- some l e s s o n s 
(Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1967) pp.26-7, I n f a c t l a b o u r 
on m a n u f a c t u r i n g o n l y i n c r e a s e d by 1% f r o m m i d 1 9 3 9 - t o end 
1948 (computed f r o m Economic Survey f o r 1949 T a b l e 18) 
Labour employed i n d i s t r i b u t i o n and on p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
d i d n o t f a l l - The b u i l d i n g l a b o u r f o r c e was a l s o r i g i d as 
we have seen. 
European C o - o p e r a t i o n : memoranda s u b m i t t e d t o t h e o r g a n i s a -
t i o n f o r Eurooean Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o Economic 
a f f a i r s i n t h e p e r i o d 1949-53 Cmnd 7572 (London R^ !SO Dec 1948) 
p a r a 109. 
Economic Survey f o r 1949 p a r a 122; see a l s o Economic Co-opera-
t i o n memorandum s u b m i t t e d p a r a 158. 
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by k e e p i n g o l d and o b s o l e t e p l a n t i n use, by 
w o r k i n g o v e r t i m e o r d o u b l e t i m e , r e s u l t s may t»e 
o b t a i n e d e a r l i e r and w i t h l e s s c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e 
t h a j i by more a m b i t i o u s p r o j e c t s whicph i n o t h e r 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s m i g h t be pushed ahead 
Thus t h e r e w o u l d be l e s s new p l a n t and mac h i n e r y t o . r e d u c e 
c o s t s i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g , and some damage t o o u r l o n g t e r m 
c o m p e t i t i v e p o s i t i o n . T h i s f a c t was r e c o g n i s e d by t h e 
p l a n n e r s ^ . I n v e s t m e n t w o u l d be p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d t o r e m e d y i n g 
e x i s t i n g s u p p l y d e f i c i e n c i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n b a s i c i n d u s t r y and 
where ' d i r e c t ' c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o i m m e d i a t e i m p o r t s a v i n g s and 
i n c r e a s e d e x p o r t s c o u l d be a c h i e v e d ^ . F i n a l l y a ' l i m i t e d 
number o f p r o j e c t s aimed a t r e d u c i n g c o s t s ' w h i c h were ' p a r t 
o f t h e o r d i n a r y p r o c e s s o f i n d u s t r i a l p r o g r e s s ' s h o u l d go ahead 
b u t o n l y i f i t c o u l d be shown t h a t t h e s e w o u l d p r o d u c e 'very 
marked c o s t r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e s h o r t t e r m ' ^ . The p h r a s e 'make 
do and mend' was a s l o g a n f i r s t used d u r i n g t h e war^, and i t s 
c o n t i n u o u s use i n peace r e f l e c t s t h e e x p e d i e n c y of" p o l i c y m a J c i n g 
i n t h i s f i e l d . 
The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e i l l u s t r a t e s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n v e s t -
ment as i n d i c a t e d by t h e Government's Economic Survey f o r 1949. 
Even though t h e p o s i t i o n f o r 1949 was t o be r o u g h l y t h e same as 
f o r 1948 some modest i n c r e a s e s i n i n d u s t r y a r e e v i d e n t . However 
t h i s t a b l e s h o u l d be s t u d i e d i n r e l a t i o n t o subsequent t a b l e s 
f o r t h e f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e t o be a p p a r e n t . 
1. Cab.134/439 I n v e s t m e n t Programmes Committee Paper 'Report on 
C a p i t a l I n v e s t m e n t f o r 1949' 1 6 t h J u l y 1948, p a r a 29. 
2. Cab.134/191 O f f i c i a l S t e e r i n g Committee on Economic Dev e l o p -
ment m e e t i n g 2 0 t h J u l y 1948. 
3m Cab.134/439 I n v e s t m e n t Programmes Committee Paper 'Report on 
C a p i t a l I n v e s t m e n t f o r 1949' 1 6 t h J u l y , 1948 p a r a 249. 
4. i b i d 
5. i b i d p a r a 247 
6. I a n McLaine M i n i s t r y o f M o r a l e : Home F r o n t >.'orale and t h e 
M i n i s t r y o f I n f o r m a t i o n i n W o r l d vvar I I (London A l l e n & 
Unwin 1979) p.252. 
TABLE 
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OK GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT IN THE UK 1947 - 49 (PRINCIPAL SECTORS)£m 
1947 1940 1949*^' 
Co n s t . P l a n t T o t a l Const. P l a n t T o t a l Co n s t . P l a n t T o t a l 
i'uel and Power 40 90 130 60 105 165 80 140 220 
T r a n s p o r t , Communications 
& S h i p p i n g 105 220 325 115 240 355 140 220 360 
A g r i c u l t u r e , F o r e s t r y 
& F i s h e r i e s 25 45 70 25 60 85 35 60 9 5 
Other I n d u s t r i e s 95 275 370 100 305 405 125 325 450 
l l o u s i n g ( i n c l u d i n g r e p a i r 
& maintenance) 460 - 460 475 — 475 420 — 420 
Other S o c i a l S e r v i c e s i 40 - 40 65 — 65 100 5 105 
Defence A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 45 5 50 55 5 60 60 10 70 
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d 15 5 20 20 5 25 25 10 35 
Total^^^ 825 640 1465 915 720 1635 985 770 1755 
Notes ( ^ ) 
(O 
At c u r r e n t p r i c e s i n 1947/48 and f o r 1949 art 1948 p r i c e s 
Excludes i n v e s t m e n t i n a g r i c u l t u r e 
E x c l u d i n g m i s c e l l a n e o u s f i x e d i n v e s t m e n t , w h i c h . p a r a 48 o f t h e Economic Survey 
e s t i m a t e d i n 1948 t o be about £370m..Of t h i s about ^ was m a c h i n e r y and e q u i p m e n t and 
t h e r e s t c o n s t r u c t i o n , b u i l d i n g & r e p a i r o f h o t e l s , o f f i c e s and shops e t c . o f f i c e 
machinery and equipment. As these t o t a l s were not expected t o change i n 1949 t h e 
t o t a l o f Gross f i x e d i n v e s t m e n t was n o t expected t o r i s e much above t h e l e v e l o f 
1948 ( t h e f a l l i n h o u s i n g b e i n g due t o t h e c e a s i n g o f t h e temporary programme o f 
c o m p l e t i o n o f b u i l d i n g o f war d e s t r o y e d houses). New h o u s i n g , i n o t h e r y e a r s 
r e g u l a r l y t o o k f r o m £250-£270m. Maintenance and r e p a i r on h o u s i n g ranged from 
£150-£I70m. T o t a l c a p i t a l spending on h o u s i n g i n any post-war year up t o 1949 was 
never below £400m^;"'<in 1948 was £475m^nearly 30% of t h e t o t a l o f £l,635m g r o s s 
d o m e s t i c i n v e s t m e n t . 
Source Economic Survey f o r 1949 Table 7. 
Cab. 134/445 I n v e s t m e n t Programmes Committee V'Jorking P a r t y Paper 'Housing Programme f o r 
England anJ Wales' 2 8 t h A p r i l 1948 memo by M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h . For d e t a i l s o f maintenance 
and r e p a i r on h o u s i n g see Cab.134/439 I n v e s t m e n t Programmes Committee Paper IPC(48)2 
'Estimated Gross I n v e s t m e n t 1948/9' Note by J o i n t S e c r e t a r i e s . 
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The a n a l y s i s so f a r must s u g g e s t a degree o f s c e p t i c i s m 
r e g a r d i n g government s t a t e m e n t s o f what t h e y were a t t e m p t i n g t o 
do, and t h i s must a p p l y a l s o t o t h e Government's l o n g t e r m 
i n v e s t m e n t p l a n p r e p a r e d f o r t h e M a r s h a l l M d o r g a n i s a t i o n OEECD^ 
t h e w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g o f w h i c h , t h e p l a n n e r s t h e m s e l v e s r e c o g n i s e d ^ . 
The s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t how p r o d u c t i v i t y p e r man had r i s e n by 10% 
i n t h e l a s t 2 y e a r s c o n c e a l e d t h e e f f e c t o f r e d u c e d h o u r s and 
the t a k i n g as a base f i g u r e t h e y e a r 1946 when p r o d u c t i v i t y 
g r o w t h was a l m o s t n o n - e x i s t e n t . The i m p r e s s i o n was g i v e n t h a t 
we would be i n v e s t i n g 2 0 % o f n a t i o n a l income i n f u t u r e , some 
£2,050m (£250m o f w h i c h was on c o l o n i a l d e v e l o p m e n t ) ^ . The 
r e p o r t s t a t e d * t h a t t h e needs o f i n d u s t r y must come b e f o r e t h e 
needs o f s o c i a l i n v e s t m e n t ' . The r e p o r t n o t e d t h a t we were 
o n l y s l o w l y o v e r c o m i n g w a r t i m e a r r e a r s o f m a i n t e n a n c e and 
r e p a i r , and t h a t i n v e s t m e n t s t h a t w o u l d r a i s e p r o d u c t i v i t y were 
s m a l l e r t h a n needed. However, t h e r e p o r t gave t h e i m p r e s s i o n 
t h a t any a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s w o u l d go f o r i n v e s t m e n t i n 
4 
i n d u s t r y . I n d u s t r y w o u l d * tai<:e p r e c e d e n c e * . C l o s e r 
a n a l y s i s o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n v e s t m e n t r e v e a l e d t h a t 
a l t h o u g h 20% o f n a t i o n a l income was t h e p l a n n e d f i g u r e , o n l y a 
p r o p o r t i o n o f t h a t was t o be f o r c a p i t a l equipment and 
f a c t o r i e s . The b u l k o f i t , on equipment f o r t h e n a t i o n a l -
i s e d b a s i c i n d u s t r i e s , and s o c i a l i n v e s t m e n t o f one k i n d o r 
a n o t h e r i s r e v e a l e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n o v e r l e a f ^ . 
1. Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n : memoranda s u b m i t t e d 
2. Cab.134/191 O f f i c i a l S t e e r i n g Committee on Economic D e v e l o p -
ment m e e t i n g 10 Sept 1948 ( p a r t i c u l a r l y comments o f S i r John 
Woods, Board o f Trade) 
3. Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n : memoranda s u b m i t t e d p a r a 156 ( f i g u r e 
g i v e n i n d o l l a r s ) 
4. i b i d p a r a 159 
5. Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n : memoranda s u b m i t t e d p a r a 158. 
TABLE 8 
Es t i m a t e o f T o t a l Resources A v a i l a b l e f o r use a t Home 1937-48 
N a t i o n a l c o s t o f 
T o t a l r e s o u r c e s 
Used a t home 
Government 
e x p e n d i t u r e 
Gross I n v e s t -
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Source Cab.134/267 Economic Survey Working P a r t y u n p u b l i s h e d 
Table I I p.2 'The Scale o f I n v e s t m e n t Programmes i n t h e 1950's* 
14 t h May 1948. The f i g u r e s f o r i n v e s t m e n t i n c l u d e i n v e s t m e n t 
abroad by B r i t i s h o i l companies and t h e l a g between e x p o r t s and 
payment f o r them. I t a l s o i n c l u d e s changes i n s t o c k s a t home. 
For t h i s reason t h e f i g u r e s a r e n o t d i r e c t l y comparable w i t h t h e 
e s t i m a t e o f i n v e s t m e n t i n b u i l d i n g s and f i x e d c a p i t a l i n t h e IPC 
Report. 
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The w o r k i n g P a r t y n o t e d t h a t f o r 1947 'The r a t i o i n terms o f 
1947 v a l u e s o f t h e g r o s s i n v e s t m e n t t o t h e t o t a l r e s o u r c e s 
a v a i l a b l e was a b o u t e q u a l t o 1938 and a p p r e c i a b l y below 1937' 
The p l a n n e d i n v e s t m e n t f o r 1948 w o u l d n o t o n l y be below t h a t 
1 2 o f 1937 b u t a l s o 1938 . Much o f i t was government i n d u c e d . 
A n o t h e r u n p u b l i s h e d t a b l e showed t h a t i n v e s t m e n t i n new f i x e d 
a s s e t s a t home i n 1947 was 10% l o w e r t h a n i n 1937 w i t h t o t a l 
i n v e s t m e n t a l s o l o w e r . 
TABLE 
A n a l y s i s o f T o t a l Investment(£m a t 1947 f a c t o r c o s t s ) 
1937 1938 1947 1952 
Cost o f m a i n t a i n i n g 
e x i s t i n g c a p i t a l a t home 695 695 775 855 
New f i x e d a s s e t s a t home 1075 1035 965 1055 
Changes i n s t o c k s & works 
i n p r o g r e s s 50 -80 lOO 5 
T o t a l o f Home I n v e s t m e n t 1820 1650 1840 1945 
Overseas I n v e s t m e n t : O i l 
Companies; Empire D e v e l -
opment; d e b t repayment 30 30 lOO +205 
S u r p l u s & d e f i c i t on 
c u r r e n t b a l a n c e o f 
payments -175 -175 -675 + 
T o t a l Overseas I n v e s t -
ment o r d i s i n v e s t m e n t -145 -145 -575 -205 
TOTAL IWVEST>fENT £1675m £1505m £1265m £2150m 
1. Cab 134/267 E c o n o m i c S u r v e y W o r k i n g P a r t y 'The S c a l e o f I n v e s t m e n t ' p a r a . 7 p 
2. A n o t h e r v e r y s i m i l a r and u n p u b l i s h e d t a b l e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t 
'Governm.ent E x p e n d i t u r e * d i d n o t i n c l u d e s t a t e i n v e s t m e n t 
b u t o n l y c u r r e n t e x p e n d i t u r e on p u r c h a s i n g goods and s e r v i c e s 
by c e n t r a l and l o c a l government. See Cab.134/267 Economic 
Survey Working P a r t y T a b l e XXV ' D i v i s i o n o f T o t a l Resources 
A v a i l a b l e * i n E.S.W.P. ( 4 8 ) 1 5 D r a f t Economic Survey f o r 
1948-52 u n d a t e d p.28. 
3. Source Cab.134/267 Economic Survey W o r k i n g P a r t y u n p u b l i s h e d 
T a b l e :<XVII p. 30. 
375 
A r t h u r Lewis m a i n t a i n e d t h a t i n 1947^ f o r i n s t a n c e , g r o s s 
i n v e s t m e n t was shown t o be a r o u n d 2 0 % o f n a t i o n a l income b u t 
s i n c e 1% o f n a t i o n a l income was b o r r o w e d a b r o a d , d o m e s t i c 
s a v i n g c o n t r i b u t e d o n l y 14%. Making an a l l o w a n c e f o r p r i c e 
i n f l a t i o n we g e t a r e d u c t i o n t o 12%. With i n v e s t m e n t 
necessary t o r e p l a c e worn o u t c a p i t a l o f 10%, he c o n c l u d e d 
t h a t ^ i n t h e absence o f i n f l a t i o n and f o r e i g n b o r r o w i n g ^ n e t 
i n v e s t m e n t i n 1947 w o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t have been much h i g h e r 
1 2 t h a n 2% o f g r o s s n a t i o n a l income . A c c o r d i n g t o Balogh t h e 
c u t s o f 1947 meant n e t i n v e s t m e n t a t £750m ( o r i n 1938 p r i c e s 
l e s s t h a n £400m) ^ r o u g h l y e q u a l t o i n v e s t m e n t i n 1938. 
P a i s h comes t o a s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t t r u e n e t c a p i t a l 
c r e a t i o n " ^ and c a l c u l a t e s t h a t ^ where f o r e i g n d e b t s and s a l e o f 
a s s e t s a r e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , we were e x p a n d i n g c a p i t a l i n 
1947 a t even l e s s ( a t £325m)than t h e e q u i v a l e n t f i g u r e i n 1938. 
Government spokesmen were f o n d o f q u o t i n g t h e c o m p a r i s o n w i t h 
t h e 1930s and m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t we were a t l e a s t k e e p i n g up w i t h 
what vve d i d t h e n , b u t t h e p o i n t s h o u l d be made t h a t t h e y were 
making t h e c o m p a r i s o n w i t h a p e r i o d when t h e r e was unemployment, 
excess c a p a c i t y and a marked r e l u c t a n c e t o i n v e s t . A n o t h e r 
p o i n t i s p e r t i n e n t when e v a l u a t i n g t h e Government f i g u r e s f o r 
i n v e s t m e n t : t h e m o u n t i n g c o s t * For an 
a c c u r a t e e s t i m a t e o f t h e t r u e i n c r e a s e i n c a p i t a l s t o c k t h e s e 
L e w i s , •v.A. The P r i n c i p l e s o f Economic P l a n n i n g (New Y o r k 
Harper I I I . e d i t . 1 9 6 9 ) p p . 5 3 - 4 ) . 
Balogh, T. The D o l l a r C r i s i s , Cause & Cure ( O x f o r d B a s i l 
B l a c k w e l l 1949) p.255 
P a i s h 'The F i n a n c e o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' i n The I n d u s t r i a l 
F u t u r e o f G r e a t B r i t a i n p.121. 
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f i g u r e s must be w r i t t e n down t o t h e a c t u a l c o s t w h i c h f i x e d 
c a p i t a l had been i n s t a l l e d i n t h e past*^. Robinson r e c a l c u l a t e s 
o f f i c i a l f i g u r e s a t comparable c o n s t a n t p r i c e s f o r i m m e d i a t e 
p o s t - W a r g r o s s and n e t i n v e s t m e n t , and compares t h i s w i t h t h e 
s c a l e t h o u g h t n e c e s s a r y by h i m s e l f , P a i s h and o t h e r s . 
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TOTAL 9685 8120 3950 4710 
Robinson as a n o t e d e x - r e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t n e t 
i n v e s t m e n t by t h e end o f 1950 w o u l d have done l i t t l e more t h a n 
c o v e r war damage, w a r t i m e a r r e a r s o f m a i n t e n a n c e and r e p l a c e -
ment. At t h a t r a t e o f i n v e s t m e n t t h e 6% g r o w t h i n p o p u l a t i o n 
w ould n o t have been made up u n t i l t h e end o f 1952 and t h e l e v e l 
o f c a p i t a l p e r head i n i n d u s t r y w o u l d n o t have been r e s t o r e d 
t o i t s pre-war s t a n d a r d u n t i l some t i m e i n 1954; o n l y t h e n 
c o u l d we s t a r t t o i m p r o v e on o u r 'pre-war s t a n d a r d s ' f o r 
c o m p e t i t i v e e f f e c t i n t h e w o r l d market*^. These p o i n t s a r e 
even more s t r o n g l y based when t h e a n a l y s . t t a k e s i n t o c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n how much o f even t h i s p a l t r y n e t i n v e s t m e n t i s a c t u a l l y 
Robertson,D.H B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l Government P o l i c y ' i n 
D.H.Robertson U t i l i t y and A l l t h a t and O t h e r Essays (London 
George A l l e n Unwin 1952) pp.121. 
Source Robinson ' B r i t i s h Economic P o l i c y ' T a b l e 5. 
Robinson ' B r i t i s h Economic P o l i c y ' p.42, E.A.S.Robinson was 
economic a d v i s o r t o t h e B o a r d o f Trade & member o f C.E.P.S, 
1947-8. 
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expended on p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y . R o b e r t s o n c a l c u l a t e s t h e r a t i o 
o f i n v e s t m e n t between s o c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l p u r p o s e s o f 1-3. 
I f a f u r t h e r c a l c u l a t i o n i s made t o i s o l a t e o u t how much can 
be r e g a r d e d as a d d i n g t o c a p i t a l and how much r e p l a c e m e n t , 
and i f one r e g a r d s t h e whole o f s o c i a l b u i l d i n g and o n l y ^ 
o f i n d u s t r i a l e x p e n d i t u r e as n e t i n v e s t m e n t , we g e t a r a t i o o f 
s o c i a l t o i n d u s t r i a l o f abo u t 9-8"^. 
SECTION V : COMPARISON'S 
At t h i s p o i n t a b r i e f c o m p a r i s o n i s i n o r d e r . I n one 
sense we can o n l y p r o v e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s a n a l y s i s i f v;e 
can show t h a t what happened i n B r i t a i n between 1945-9 was 
u n i q u e . A f u l l c o m p a r i s o n w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i s , however, 
beyond t h e scope and i n t e n t o f t h i s t h e s i s , a l t h o u g h p o s s i b l y 
s u g g e s t i v e o f f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h . Enough m a t e r i a l i s i n t r o d u c e d 
i n t h i s s e c t i o n , however, t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e : 
i t i s c l e a r t h a t no o t h e r m a j o r w e s t e r n c o u n t r y u n d e r t o o k a 
l a r g e s c a l e h o u s i n g and b u i l d i n g prograiume f o r g e n e r a l needs 
i n t h e immediate p o s t - w a r p e r i o d . I n France t h e h o u s i n g 
p r o b l e m r e q u i r e d t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 300,000 houses a y e a r , 
y e t f r o m 1945-8 o n l y 53,000 new houses had been e r e c t e d w i t h a 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n on t h e b a r e e s s e n t i a l s o f r e p a i r . I n West 
Germany t h e s i t u a t i o n was s i m i l a r , w i t h n o t h i n g new b e i n g 
b u i l t u n t i l 1949. The s i t u a t i o n was s i m i l a r i n t h e USA and 
I t a l y " ^ . By t h e end o f 1949 B r i t a i n had c o m p l e t e d 623,347 
4 
new houses . I n France o n l y a p r o p o r t i o n o f t h o s e e v e n t u a l l y 
1. R o b ertson ^ B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l I n v e s t m e n t P o l i c y ' p.122. 
2. 'Housing i n B r i t a i n , France & west Germany' P.£,P, P l a n n i n g 
V o D C C a No.490 Aug. 1965 pp. 233-49, T a b l e 4-
3. Eckstein,O.'USA' i n E . S . K i r s t e n e t a l ( e d s ) Economic P o l i c y 
i n Our Time 1949-61 ( C o u n t r y S t u d i e s ) V o l I I ( A m s t e r d a m N o r t h 
H o l l a n d 1964) pp.71-5. 
Tosco,E. * I t a l y ' i n E . S . K i r s t e n e t a l ( e d s ) Economic P o l i c y 
i n Our Time 1949-61 ( C o u n t r y S t u d i e s ) V o l l I I ( A m s t e r d a m N o r t h 
H o l l a n d 1964) pp.245-6 
4. see Appendix V 
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b u i l t were s u b s i d i s e d and s u b j e c t t o a v a r i e t y o f means t e s t s 
and l a r g e l y t o o k t h e f o r m o f f l a t s ' ^ . P u b l i c h o u s i n g i n France 
t o o k o n l y 105^ o f t h e t o t a l up t o 1958. There was l i t t l e 
p u b l i c o u t c r y f o r a c t i o n : h o u s i n g appeared t o have a low 
s a l i e n c y as a p a r t y p o l i t i c a l i s s u e d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t 
French w o r k i n g c l a s s e s seem t o have been more o v e r c r o w d e d w i t h 
l e s s f a c i l i t i e s p e r f a m i l y and h o u s e h o l d t h a n t h e i r B r i t i s h 
c o u n t e r p a r t s . The French i t seems gave g r e a t e r p r i o r i t y t o 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f economic b a l a n c e and p r o d u c t i v e investment"^. 
The B r i t i s h on t h e o t h e r hand pushed on w i t h t h e h o u s i n g 
programme b o t h d u r i n g t h e t i m e s o f c r i s i s and when l a t e r 
e n q u i r i e s showed i t s m o u n t i n g c a p i t a l c o s t . I n C h a p t e r 3 we 
i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t i n t h e p l a n n i n g o f t h e programme l i t t l e had 
been done t o check t h e c o s t o f l a b o u r and m a t e r i a l s . On t h e 
f o r m e r t h e r e l u c t a n c e t o c o n f r o n t t h e b u i l d i n g u n i o n s , and t h e 
method o f g i v i n g i n c r e a s e d wages as a means o f a t t r a c t i n g l a b o u r 
i n t o t h e r e l a t e d m a t e r i a l s i n d u s t r y , was matched by t h e 
r e l u c t a n c e i n t h e l a t t e r case t o c o n f r o n t t h e p r i c e s o f t h e 
m a t e r i a l s m a n u f a c t u r e r s o r c u t o u t t h e p r o f i t o f t h e merchant 
m i d d l e men by e x t e n d e d b u l k p u r c h a s e . The a l l o w a b l e c o s t 
f o r m u l a b u i l t i n t o p r i c e c o n t r o l p r o t e c t e d t h e l e a s t e f f i c i e n t 
h i g h c o s t p r o d u c e r and was d e f i n e d f o r t h e Government by t h e 
Trade A s s o c i a t i o n . The B u i l d i n g U nions had g a i n e d s e v e r a l 
wage i n c r e a s e s f r o m 1945-7 b e f o r e a g r e e i n g t o a p r o d u c t i v i t y 
d e a l and had won a g u a r a n t e e d w e e k l y wage and h o l i d a y s w i t h pay. 
1. B e r n a r d , J. 'France* i n Economic P o l i c y i n Our Time, V o l I I I 
0 0 . 2 8 7 - 3 8 9 
2. D u c l a u d - W i l l i a m s , R. The P o l i t i c s o f Housing i n B r i t a i n and 
and France (London Heinemann 1978) pp.124-6. 
3.
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T h i s was one o f t h e r e a s o n s i d e n t i f i e d by t h e G i r d w o o d 
C o n m i t t e e as c a u s i n g t h e r i s e i n t h e c o s t o f h o u s i n g t o 3h t i m e s 
t h e f i g u r e f o r 1938"^. The i n c r e a s e i n s t a n d a r d s was t h e 
l a r g e s t s i n g l e i t e m i n t h e c o s t o f h o u s i n g o v e r t h e p r e - w a r 
p e r i o d and t h e Committee recommended a c u t , a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n 
c o n s i s t e n t l y r e s i s t e d by Sevan". The s u b s i d y and r e q u i r e d 
r a t e s , b a s e d on a l o w e r c a l c u l a t e d c a p i t a l c o s t o f h o u s i n g , w e r e 
not s u f f i c i e n t t o c o v e r more t h a n h a l f o f t h e a n n u a l costs'^. 
A l t h o u g h Labour d i d n o t i n c r e a s e t h e s t a t e s u b s i d y t o r e f l e c t 
t h i s they ^-erepreoared t o see r e n t s r i s e a l i t t l e above what i t 
had p l a n n e d : a p o s i t i o n • tased somewhat by the way i n which many 
local a u t h o r i t i e s ran d e f i c i t s r a t h e r t h a n see t e n a n t s p e n a l i s e d . 
Of a s u r v e y o f 162 L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s 7 2 % were r e v e a l e d t o be 
c h a r g i n g r e n t s l e s s t h a n t h o s e r e q u i r e d t o meet expenses a f t e r 
s u b s i d y , D e s p i t e t h e r a i s i n g o f w o r k i n g c l a s s p u r c h a s i n g 
power c o n s e o u e n t c n f u l l employment, and f o o d s u b s i d i e s , h o u s i n g 
c o s t s s t i l l t o o k a v e r y s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n o f w o r k i n g c l a s s 
income: a f a c t w h i c h d i s t r e s s e d some l o c a l o f f i c i a l s ^ . 
A c c o r d i n g t o Sevan t h e p r o p o r t i o n was 10?5^. I n t h e USA 
a b i l i t y t o pay was d e f i n e d as 2 0 % o f w e e k l y wages^, Bevan 
1. F i r s t R e p o r t o f t h e o f f i c i a l C o n m i t t e e o f E n q u i r y i n t o t h e 
Cost o f H o u s e b u i l d i n g : M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h ( London Hf-;SC 1948) 
q u o t e d i n L e w i s , 3, B r i t i s h P l a n n i n g and N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
( London George A l l e n & Unwin 1952) p.234-5 
2. Foot, M. A n u e r i n Bevan: a b i o g r a p h y V o l . 2 1945-60 (London 
D a v i s - P o y n t e r 197 3) p,80-
3. '.vood, A. R, H o u s i n g : The R e c k o n i n g , whg s h a l l Pay? (London 
I n s t i t u t e o f M u n i c i p a l T r e a s u r e r s and A c c o u n t a n t s .-{ay 1948) 
p.14 
4. 'Economics o f t h e C o u n c i l House' P.E.P. P l a n n i no Vol.X^v'I 
No.308 Jan.1950 p.158. 
5. '.vood, H o u s i n g : The R e c k o n i n g . 
6.' L.r.C.R. O c t o b e r 6 t h 1950 
7. E c k s t e e n ^ 'USA' i n Economic P o l i c y i n o u r Time, V o l . 1 1 
p. 74. 
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p o i n t e d t o t h e c o n t r a s t w i t h A merica, where d e s p i t e i t s l a r g e 
r e s o u r c e s , h i g h l y p r o d u c t i v e machine-based i n d u s t r y and i t s 
h a v i n g escaped a b l i t z , t h e r e was ' l e s s chance o f g e t t i n g a 
house t h e r e a t a n y t h i n g l i k e t h e r e n t c h a r g e d h e r e and we a r e 
d o i n g t h e s e t h i n g s when e v e r y s i n g l e p i e c e o f m a c h i n e r y and i n 
i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y i s b e i n g used t o i t s u t m o s t e x t e n t * ^ . 
Post-war f e d e r a l - a i d e d a p a r t m e n t b u i l d i n g , w h i c h a l l o w e d 
s u b s i d i s e d r e n t e d accommodation d i d n o t s t a r t u n t i l 1949, By 
1954 o n l y 202,500 had been b u i l t . T h i s was about t h e e q u i v a -
2 
l e n t o f one y e a r ' s achievement i n B r i t a i n p r e 1949 . Y e t 
compared w i t h t h e U.K. t h e U.S. i n 1948/49 spent more (as a 
p e r c e n t a g e ) o f i t s GDP on i n v e s t m e n t ^ i n d i c a t i n g t h a t non-
h o u s i n g i n v e s t m e n t was much h i g h e r . T h i s f a c t i s b o r n o u t by 
t h e l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e l a b o u r f o r c e i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g and 
t h e l a r g e r i n v e s t m e n t , spent i n i n d u s t r y " ^ . The French a l s o 
pushed t h e p r i o r i t y o f i n d u s t r i a l i n v e s t m e n t ^ a s d i d t h e 
Norwegians where i n v e s t m e n t i n b u i l d i n g was h e l d back f o r 
i n v e s t m e n t i n s h i p p i n g , t h e m o d e r n i s a t i o n o f o l d i n d u s t r y and 
t h e development o f new e n t e r p r i s e . I n B e l g i u m t h e Governmen 
pu r s u e d i t s p r i o r i t y o f c o m b a t t i n g i n f l a t i o n t h r o u g h b a l a n c e d 
b u d g e t s and a monetary p o l i c y r a t h e r t h a n p r o t e c t i n g t h e 
c o u n t r y from unemployment, w h i c h i n f a c t r o s e . K e y n e s i a n 
methods went u n t r i e d and p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e and s o c i a l 
programmes d i d n o t r i s e t o any e x t e n t ^ . 
1. L.P.C.R. May 2 6 t h - 3 0 t h 1947 
2. E c k s t e i n 'USA' i n Economic P o l i c y i n o u r Time' V o l , I I 
pp.74-5 
3. B a l o g h , D o l l a r C r i s i s p.29, T a b l e I X 
4. Faaland, J. 'Norway' i n Economic P o l i c y i n our Time. 
V o l . 1 1 pp.155-6 
5. M o r i s s e n s , L. 'Belgium' i n Economic P o l i c y i n o u r Time 
V o l . I l l pp.1-68 
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The case o f West Germany i s one where a c o u n t r y w h i c h 
e n t e r e d m a n u f a c t u r i n g l a t e had t h e ' b e n e f i t ' o f g r e a t e r war 
damage and d e s t r u c t i o n w h i c h e n a b l e d r e - e q u i p m e n t t o be u n d e r -
t a k e n on a g r a n d e r s c a l e and a t a h i g h e r t e c h n i c a l l e v e l . 
Y e t we a l s o have, as i n t h e U.K., t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a h o u s i n g 
p r o b l e m compounded by r e t u r n i n g r e f u g e e s f r o m t h e East. T h i s 
g r e a t e r d e s t r u c t i o n o b v i o u s l y gave i t an a dvantage o v e r t h e UK 
where new t e c h n i q u e s were i n t r o d u c e d more s l o w l y g i v e n t h e 
r e l u c t a n c e t o w r i t e o f f masses o f c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d i n o l d e r 
k i n d s o f equipment e s p e c i a l l y where t h a t engendered unemployment. 
D e s p i t e t h i s p h y s i c a l l y - p r o v i d e d a d v a n t a g e we s h o u l d n o t i g n o r e 
t h e p o s i t i v e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n f a v o u r o f i n d u s t r y f o l l o w e d by 
German Governments i n t h e i r economic p o l i c y . Under t h e 
i n t e l l e c t u a l l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e A u s t r i a n and F r e i b u r g s c h o o l s 
o f e c o n o m i s t s w h i c h i n c l u d e d Hayek, Eucken and M u l l e r - A r m a c k 
and t h e p o l i t i c a l g u i d a n c e o f Ludwiok E r h a r d and Konrad Adenauer, 
t h e so c a l l e d 'new economics' r e a c t e d s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t t h e 
d i r i g i s m e o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h by a renewed emphasis on a m a r k e t 
l e d dynamic c a p i t a l i s m e f f e c t e d by h i g h i n t e r e s t r a t e s , 
b a l a n c e d b u d g e t s and a h o s t i l i t y t o a l l f orms o f p r i c e s u p p o r t 
and control''". These n e g a t i v e s t a n c e s were matched by a s t r o n g 
emphasis on p r o f i t s and low t a x a t i o n . The t a x b u r d e n was 
s w i t c h e d t o weigh more h e a v i l y on wage e a r n e r s and a l t h o u g h 
Halm,G, Economic Systems; a c o m p a r a t i v e a n a l y s i s (New Y o r k , 
R i n e h a r d and W i n s t o n , T h i r d e d i t . 1 9 6 8 ) pp.119-20,324-9,392-3 
B e s t e r s , H., 'West Germany' i n Economic P o l i c y i n o u r Time 
V o l . I l l pp.389-434. 
see a l s o S t r e i t 'Government and b u s i n e s s : t h e Case o f West 
Germany' i n G r i f f i t h s , R.T.(ed) Government, b u s i n e s s and 
Labour i n European C a p i t a l i s m (London E u r o p o t e n t i a l s P r e s s 
1977) p.123. 
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e v e n t u a l economic growth meant t h a t e v e r y o n e was b e t t e r o f f , 
t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income became v e r y unequal"^. The 
b e g i n n i n g o f t h e r e c o v e r y programme was i n i t i a t e d by t h e 
o c c u p a t i o n powers b e f o r e t h e f i n a l d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e new s t a t e 
i n J une 1948. The c a r r y i n g t h r o u g h o f a c u r r e n c y r e f o r m 
r e v a l u i n g t h e Deutchmark was c r u c i a l i n t h i s r e s p e c t . T h i s 
had t h e e f f e c t o f i n t e n s i f y i n g c o m p e t i t i o n by f o r c i n g c a p i t a l i s t s 
t o a c c u m u l a t e from i n t e r n a l s o u r c e s r a t h e r t h a n r e l y i n g on 
borrowed s o u r c e s w h i c h were s c a r c e r w i t h t h e t i g h t e n i n g o f 
c a p i t a l m a r k e t s c o n s e q u e n t on t h e h i g h i n t e r e s t r a t e s t h a t 
a c c o m p a n i e d r e v a l u a t i o n . The r e f o r m a l s o had t h e e f f e c t o f 
w i p i n g o u t t h e v a l u e o f T r a d e U n i o n f u n d s . S p e c i a l m e a s u r e s 
were i n t r o d u c e d to s t i m u l a t e m o d e r n i s a t i o n , t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
r e - e q u i p m e n t and c a p i t a l w r i t e o f f . . I n v e s t m e n t .that was i n 
government hands, v i a t a x a t i o n , was c h a n n e l l e d i n t o i n d u s t r y . 
When unemployment a p p e a r e d from 1948-54 t h e r e was no f l i r t a t i o n 
w i t h K e y n e s i a n i d e a s ^ . As f o r t h e h o u s i n g p r o b l e m t h e m a s s i v e 
h o u s i n g d e f i c i t ( o f f a m i l i e s o v e r a v a i l a b l e a p a r t m e n t s ) d r a g g e d 
on i n t o 1950, R e s i d e n t i a l i n v e s t m e n t was k e p t a s a low 
p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e t o t a l . No a p a r t m e n t s w e r e b u i l t w i t h p u b l i c 
a i d u n t i l 1953 and t h o s e b u i l t w i t h o u t i t t o t a l l e d o n l y 
215,000 by 1950"^. The Germans wer e e x p a n d i n g t h e s u p p l y s i d e 
o f t h e economy and not a s i n t h e UK, c o n c e n t r a t i n g on 
d i s t r i b u t i n g s c a r c i t y . I n C h a p t e r 2 we i d e n t i f i e d t h e 
c h a n g i n g b a l a n c e o f c l a s s f o r c e s a s a p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n f o r t h e 
a d o p t i o n o f demand o r i e n t a t e d p o l i c i e s d i r e c t e d t o t h e 
1. Roskamp, K. C a p i t a l F o r m a t i o n i n West Germany ( D e t r o i t 
Wayne S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1965) po.229-37, 
2. i b i d p.55-141 
3. i b i d p.179 T a b l e 38. 
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p r e s e r v a t i o n o f s o c i a l s e c u r i t y i n i t s w i d e s t s e n s e i n t h e UK. 
I f we n o t e t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c ' s p r o d u c t i o n o r * s u p p l y s i d e * 
e m p h a s i s , a p o l i c y o r i e n t a t e d t o w a r d s m o n e t a r y s t a b i l i t y , i t 
would c e r t a i n l y not be i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o s u g g e s t t h a t a v e r y 
d i f f e r e n t c l a s s b a l a n c e may h a v e l e d t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e -
C e r t a i n l y we c a n i n d i c a t e a l o w e r l e v e l o f n e c e s s a r y w o r k i n g 
c l a s s s u p p o r t : s t r o n g d e f e n s i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s were 
e f f e c t i v e l y d e s t r o y e d by t h e p r e v i o u s r e g i m e , t h e c u r r e n c y 
r e f o r m and r e s t r u c t u r e d a l o n g t h e l i n e s o f l e a s t r e s i s t a n c e 
by t h e o c c u p a t i o n f o r c e s . T h i s q u e s t i o n must however 
r e m a i n open f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h . The c o n t r a s t i s , however, 
n o t i c e a b l e . 
CONCLUSIONS 
T h e r e a r e t h r e e ways o f l o o k i n g a t h o u s i n g and c o n s t r u c t i o n 
g e n e r a l l y a s i n v e s t m e n t . The f i r s t i s sometimes termed 
p r o d u c t e f f e c t , t h e s e c o n d p r o c e s s e f f e c t ^ and t h e t h i r d 
( i v h i c h d e r i v e s from t h i s t h e s i s ) t h e e x t r a c t i o n e f f e c t . The 
p r o d u c t e f f e c t s o f r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n a r e s a i d t o be t h e 
d i r e c t s o c i a l u t i l i t i e s o r s a t i s f a c t i o n s p r o d u c e d and from 
t h i s g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t two more d e t a i l e d e f f e c t s c a n be s e p a r a -
t e d o u t . F i r s t l y , p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t s may a c c r u e t o a s t a t e 
e x t e n d i n g p r o v i s i o n to a d e f i n e d c o n s t i t u e n c y o r c l a s s whose 
s a t i s f a c t i o n s u n d e r a m a r k e t s y s t e m a r e l e s s t h a n a d e q u a t e -
S e c o n d l y , and t h i s i s a r g u a b l e and o f t e n u s e d a s a t h e o r e t i c a l 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n t o c o v e r t h e f i r s t c o n t e n t i o n , s t a t e h o u s i n g 
1. For ' p r o d u c t ' and ' p r o c e s s ' e f f e c t s s e e P u b l i c I n v e s t m e n t 
and F u l l Emoloyment ( M o n t r e a l I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a b o u r O f f i c e 
1946) p.23. 
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a i d s i n d u s t r i a l i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t i t i m p r o v e s 
m o b i l i t y and t h e q u a l i t y o f l a b o u r . A h o u s i n g s h o r t a g e c a n 
add to i n d u s t r i a l c o s t s a s t h e r e n t s and p r i c e s o f s c a r c i t y 
h o u s i n g r i s e and t e n d to l e a d to wage p u s h i n f l a t i o n . B o t h 
o f t h e s e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s a r e a l s o l i n k e d t o t h e s e c o n d p r o c e s s 
e f f e c t s . I n v e s t m e n t i n h o u s i n g by g e n e r a t i n g demand a c t s 
t h r o u g h t h e K e y n e s i a n m u l t i p l i e r f i r s t t o a l l i e d i n d u s t r i e s 
and t h e n more remote s e c t o r s t o k e e p up employment i n t h e 
economy. H o u s i n g i s l a b o u r i n t e n s i v e , t h e r e f o r e a s m a l l 
o u t l a y r e s u l t s i n a b i g g e r i n c r e a s e i n pay r o l l s . T h e r e may 
be c o n t r a d i c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e two e f f e c t s . Ivhen h o u s i n g 
i n v e s t m e n t i s u s e d a s an economic r e g u l a t o r f o r c o u n t e r -
c y c l i c a l employment p o l i c y t h i s may i n v o l v e c o n t r a c t i n g i n v e s t -
ment when f u l l employment i s r e a c h e d and i n f l a t i o n a r y o r t r a d e 
d e f i c i t c o n s e q u e n c e s f o l l o w . For t h i s t o be an a d e q u a t e 
r e s p o n s e i n d i f f e r e n c e to p r o d u c t e f f e c t s must be assumed. Y e t 
t h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t t o make p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e o f t h e 
c o m p e t i t i v e p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t amid w h i c h d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s 
n a t u r e a r e t a k e n . To t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s and s p o n s o r s o f s u c h 
p r o d u c t e f f e c t s h o u s i n g c a n n o t be t r e a t e d a s a r e s i d u a l - The 
need f o r h o u s e s d o e s not f a l l o f f w i t h t h e c h a n g e i n e c o n o m i c 
p o l i c y . T h e r e i s a l s o t h e t e c h n i c a l p r o b l e m o f t i m e l a g and 
a d j u s t m e n t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t b u i l d i n g c a n n o t be e x p a n d e d o r 
c o n t r a c t e d a t w i l l . " ^ Such t e c h n i c a l p r o b l e m s a r e s e i z e d upon 
by t h o s e who have an i n t e r e s t i n e x t e n d i n g t h e t i m e l a g and 
m o d e r a t i n g t h e e f f e c t s o f c u t s . We h a v e s e e n t h i s i n C h a p t e r 
7, where arguments c e n t r e d a r o u n d t h e q u e s t i o n o f need, b u t 
1. Sweet, M.L, and W a l t e r s , S.G. Mandatory H o u s i n g F i n a n c e 
Proorammes - a c o m p a r a t i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l A n a l y s i s 
(New York P r a e g e r 1975) p.17. 
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a l s o on the a p p a r e n t w a s t e i n v o l v e d i n unemployment and l o s s 
o f s k i l l , on t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f c a n c e l l i n g c o n t r a c t s and t h e 
l o s s o f 'good w i l l * and c o - o p e r a t i o n between t h e S t a t e and 
the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y w h i c h would make t h e r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f 
prograannies more d i f f i c u l t . 
The t h i r d t y p e o f e f f e c t - t h e e x t r a c t i o n e f f e c t d e r i v e s 
from t h e r e l a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d between t h i s t y p e o f p r o d u c t i o n 
and o t h e r c a l l s on r e s o u r c e s - H o u s i n g c o m p e t e s f o r l a b o u r , 
m a t e r i a l s and components. B r i c k s , m e t a l goods, s t e e l , g l a s s , 
cement, p a i n t , a s b e s t o s , c o p p e r , l e a d , e l e c t r i c a l and h e a t i n g 
f i t t i n g s and t i m b e r e t c - , have a l t e r n a t i v e b u i l d i n g u s e s o t h e r 
t h a n h o u s i n g and c a n a l s o be embodied i n d i f f e r e n t f o r m s o f 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n c l u d i n g t h a t d e s t i n e d f o r e x p o r t - C o n s t r u c t i o n 
i n v e s t m e n t w i t h d r a w s raw m a t e r i a l s and m a c h i n e r y from c i r c u l a -
t i o n f o r a l o n g p e r i o d o f t i m e and w i t h o u t p r o d u c i n g a q u i c k 
s u r p l u s w h i c h c a n be r e a l i s e d a s p r o f i t on t h e c a p i t a l o u t l a y . 
Such a * l o c k up* o f c a p i t a l i s a c c e n t u a t e d i f p r o j e c t s a r e 
p u shed ahead to s u c h an e x t e n t t h a t new s t a r t s e x c e e d and 
impede c o m p l e t i o n s . T h i s l o c k up o f c a p i t a l ^ h a s s e v e r a l 
c o n s e q u e n c e s . I t r e q u i r e s t h e b o r r o w i n g o f huge sums o f 
money i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e and t h i s c a u s e s d i s t u r b a n c e i n t h e 
money m a r k e t . Monies a r e t a k e n o u t o f t h e m a r k e t w i t h o u t any 
e q u i v a l e n t c o m m o d i t i e s s u p p l i e d t o i t and i f t h e b u i l d i n g i s 
f i n a n c e d by b o r r o w i n g t h e i n t e r e s t p ayments have t o be s e t 
a g a i n s t t h e f u t u r e n a t i o n a l income^. The s i z e o f b o r r o w i n g 
1. e x p l a n a t i o n s o f d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f t h e ' l o c k up* o f 
c a p i t a l a r e d e v e l o p e d e x t e n s i v e l y by Marx i n K. Marx 
C a p i t a l : A C r i t i q u e o f P o l i t i c a l Economy Volume I I : The 
P r o c e s s o f C i r c u l a t i o n o f C a p i t a l (London L a w r e n c e and 
i v i s h a r t 1974) P a r t I I pp. 156-355. 
2, B . I C i l r o y 'Housing F i n a n c e - WTiy so P r i v i l e g e d ? ' L l o y d s Bank 
Review J u l y , 1979 No.133 pp.37-52. 
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i s a l s o a f a c t o r . I f one man o r f i r m b o r r o w s £20,000 he c a n 
pay b a c k £1,000 pe r y e a r (20 y e a r p e r s o n a l l o a n ) ^ i f 20 men 
o r f i r m s borrow £1,000 the y c a n a l l pay b a c k s o o n e r and t h e 
w hole £20,000 i s r e t u r n e d to c i r c u l a t i o n and t h e sum b o r rowed 
i s a v a i l a b l e f o r o t h e r purposes"^. The c o s t o f b u i l d i n g a l s o 
a f f e c t s t h e s i z e o f b o r r o i v i n g , and h o u s i n g i s l i k e l y a l w a y s 
to be c o s t l y g i v e n t h e h i s t o r i c and p e c u l i a r r e s i s t a n c e o f 
b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y to i n c r e a s e s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y ^ . We c a n 
t h e r e f o r e t a l k about t h e e x t r a c t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s when t a l k i n g 
a b o u t a l a r g e and c o n t i n u i n g h o u s i n g programme. I t i s 
d e b a t a b l e w h e t h e r we c a n go f u r t h e r and c a t e g o r i s e t h e p o s i t i o n 
a s a d r a i n on p r o d u c t i v e i n d u s t r y . T h i s argument i s d e p e n d e n t 
upon t h e c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e o f p r o d u c t i v e v e r s u s u n p r o d u c t i v e 
labour"^. We c a n a t l e a s t n o t e t h a t f o r p u b l i c l y s u b s i d i s e d 
and i n d u c e d h o u s i n g a s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n p e r t a i n s . A l t h o u g h t h e 
prograLmme i s l a r g e l y c o n t r a c t e d o u t w i t h p r i v a t e b u i l d i n g f i r m s 
r e c e i v i n g a p r o f i t , i n so f a r a s t h e f i n a l p r i c e s a r e not 
r e a l i s e d on t h e m a r k e t a s a s a l e , b u t a r e p a i d f o r by a S t a t e 
t h a t has no r e a l money o f i t s own, e x c e p t what i t b o r r o w s a t 
a c o s t , t a x e s o r c r e a t e s by e x p a n s i o n o f c r e d i t , t h e n we c a n 
1. L e w i s , J . P a r r y B u i l d i n g C y c l e s and B r i t a i n s G rowth (London 
M a c M i l l a n 1 9 6 5 ) pp.265-6. 
2- B a l l , M. ' B r i t i s h H o u s i n g P o l i c y and t h e H o u s e b u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y ' C a p i t a l and C l a s s 4 S p r i n g 1978, pp.78-100. 
3. f o r a p r o v o c a t i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e d e b a t e i n v o l v i n g M a r x i s t 
and n o n - M a r x i s t p o l i t i c a l economy s e e H o w e l l , P., 'Once 
A g a i n on P r o d u c t i v e and U n p r o d u c t i v e l a b o u r ' R e v o l u t i o n a r y 
Communist 3/4 Nov 1975, pp.46-68 
a l s o I . Cough The P o l i t i c a l Economy o f t h e W e l f a r e S t a t e 
(London .•^iacr^ii 1 I a n 1979) Ch.6. 
s e e a l s o Bacon & E l t i s B r i t a i n s E c o n o m i c P r o b l e m pp.23-32 
and M a t t i c k , ? . , Marx and K e y n e s : The l i m i t s o f t h e m i xed 
economy (London ; - i e r l i n 1974) pp.150- 168. 
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c e r t a i n l y t a l k about t h e S t a t e p r e - e m p t i n g r e s o u r c e s , t h e 
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f w h i c h might t h r e a t e n t h e b a s i s o f t h e mode o f 
p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y was r e c o g n i s e d by t h e s p o n s o r s 
o f e x t e n d e d p u b l i c w o r k s . . . 
I f p u b l i c i n v e s t m e n t programmes r e q u i r e t a j c a t i o n 
o f p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t so l a r g e t h a t p r i v a t e i n v e s t -
ment i s d i s p l a c e d s u c h e n c o u r a g e m e n t m i g h t d i s p l a c e 
a f u r t h e r amount o f p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t , n e c e s s i t a t i n g 
s t i l l f u r t h e r / e n c r o a c h m e n t and so o n . The 
e x t r e m e l i m i t o f s u c h a p r o c e s s m i g h t be t h e c o m p l e t e 
s o c i a l i z a t i o n o f t h e economy 
P l a n n e r s a n x i o u s t o m a i n t a i n some b a l a n c e o r mix b e t w e e n t h e 
p u b l i c and p r i v a t e s e c t o r s o f i n v e s t m e n t w i l l be a n x i o u s t o 
c o - o r d i n a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e two i n ways i n w h i c h one 
i s not a t h r e a t to t h e o t h e r . B u t t h e e x a c t b a l a n c e i s not 
p r e - g i v e n even i f a p p a r e n t ' c o r r e c t ' r e l a t i o n s a r e p r e s u p p o s e d 
i n dominant economic l o g i c . To an i l l - h o u s e d f a m i l y t h e l o g i c 
i s s i m p l e and e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t . To a p o l i t i c i a n s u c h s o c i a l 
demands may s u p p o r t t h e e l e c t o r a l l o g i c on w h i c h h i s p o s i t i o n 
d e p e n ds. For t h e b u r e a u c r a t an e x p a n s i o n o r m a i n t e n a n c e o f 
programmes and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e d e p a r t m e n t s o r b u r e a u s 
c o n c e r n e d may be e q u i v a l e n t to t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f p o s i t i o n 
and s t a t u s ^ . To the e x t e n t t h e n t h a t t h e r e i s a r i v a l l o g i c 
o f f u n c t i o n i n g and dynaonic m a r k e t c a p i t a l i s m t h i s c a n o n l y be 
i mposed by a p r o c e s s o f p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e w i t h i n t h e s t a t e 
and t h r o u g h i t s government. The s t r u g g l e may be c o n f i n e d to 
d e b a t e s , d i v i s i o n i n c o m m i t t e e s , b a r g a i n i n g and r e s i g n a t i o n 
b u t i t may a l s o i n v o l v e t h e m o b i l i s a t i o n o f e x t r a - g o v e r n m e n t a l 
1. I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a b o u r O f f i c e I n v e s t m e n t and F u l l Employment 
p. 44. 
2. F o r a c o n c i s e e x p o s i t i o n and r e v i e w o f p a s t and c u r r e n t 
l i t e r a t u r e c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h e ' r a t i o n a l ' c h o i c e o f 
p o l i t i c i a n s and b u r e a u c r a t s s e e F r e y , B.S. Modern P o l i t i c a l 
Economy (London M a r t i n R o b e r t s o n 1 9 7 8 ) . 
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f o r c e s such as s t r i k e s and c a p i t a l exodus. The r e s o l u t i o n of 
t h a t c o n f l i c t i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e i n the sense t h a t t h e r e a r e too 
many p a r t i c i p a n t s and too many v a r i a b l e s i n v o l v e d to be a b l e to 
p r e d i c t the outcome i n any simple way^. While c a p i t a l i s m may 
be s u b j e c t to c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which can be t h e o r e t i c a l l y s t a t e d 
2 
i n a pure form a s laws o r t e n d e n c i e s , the d i r e c t i o n , speed 
and i n t e n s i t y of such c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a r e aggravated by 
f r i c t i o n s d e r i v i n g from the complexity and d i f f i c u l t i e s o f 
poli c y m a k i n g and implementation. I n t h i s sense, a p o l i t i c a l 
economy i s unique and p e c u l i a r . These i s s u e s w i l l be 
developed f u r t h e r i n the next and c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r . 
1. One of the A l t h u s s e r i a n t h e s e s l i k e l y to remain i s h i s 
development of the i d e a t h a t c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s complex 
r a t h e r than simple. 
L . A l t h u s s e r ' C o n t r a d i c t i o n and Overdetermination» IN 
A l t h u s s e r , L., For Marx (London A l l e n Lane Penguin P r e s s 
1969) pp.89-116. 
2. Y a f f e , D., »The Marxian Theory o f C r i s i s , C a p i t a l and 
the S t a t e * Economy and S o c i e t y Vol.2 No.2 May 1973 pp.188-232 
CHAPTER I X . 
S o c i a l Democracy and the Management o f 
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T h i s c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r draws t o g e t h e r a s p e c t s of the 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e x p e r i e n c e and r e l a t e s them to the broader 
t h e o r e t i c a l q u e s t i o n s surrounding the type and scope of d i s -
c r e t i o n a v a i l a b l e to s o c i a l democracy i n the management o f the 
c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e . Many of the co n c e p t s t h a t have emerged -
i n s u l a t i o n , p o l i c y space, adjustment, w i l l be used to advance 
middle range p r o p o s i t i o n s on the n a t u r e of B r i t i s h s o c i a l 
democracy i n i t s most advanced form when i n p o s s e s s i o n of exten-
s i v e c o n t r o l s over the c a p i t a l i s t economy. The s t r e n g t h and 
no v e l t y of the c h o i c e s open to government as a r e s u l t of such 
widened a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s c r e t i o n w i l l be counterposed to 
t h e o r i e s which emphasize the o t h e r i n g r e d i e n t s i n the modern 
government of c a p i t a l i s m , the c o n s t r a i n t s or ' n e c e s s i t i e s ' 
emerging from the s t r u c t u r a l d e t e r m i n a n t s of the mode of product-
i o n . The e m p i r i c a l content of these i s s u e s were e x p l o r e d i n the 
co n t e x t o f a c a s e study which looked a t the balance between 
s o c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , the s e t t i n g o f p r i o r i t i e s , 
the n a t u r e of p o l i c y combination, c o n s e q u e n t i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
and attempts a t c o r r e c t i o n s or adjustment a t the p o i n t of c r i s i s . 
C o n v e n t i o n a l p o l i c y s c i e n c e l o o k s a t ' a c t o r s ' , and d e c i s i o n 
making c o n s t r a i n t s , these being o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t s , time, i n f o r -
er-mation and b u r e a u c r a t i c behaviour r a t h e r than s t r u c t u r a l d e t 
mination.*^ Orthodox M a r x i s t s who have c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h i s l a t t e r 
1. For i n s t a n c e Duns i r e . A., A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; T h e word and the 
S c i e n c e . (Oxford, Martin Robertson 1973), S e l f , P., 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e t h e o r i e s and P o l i t i c s . (London, George A l l e n 
and Unwin, second e d i t i o n , 1977), and Dror, Y., P u b l i c 
Policymaking Re-examined. ( S c r a n t o n Penn. Cha n d l e r 1968) 
esp. Ch.5. 
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a s p e c t i n t h e i r s t u d i e s of the s t a t e have u n d e r e s t i m a t e d the 
e x i s t e n c e of d i s c r e t i o n a r y behaviour i n favour of the l o g i c of 
cho i c e i m p l i c i t i n the a b s t r a c t r equirements of c a p i t a l . Here 
the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e i s d e r i v e d or deduced from c a t e g o r i e s of 
c a p i t a l accumulation, i t being assumed t h a t c a p i t a l i s m can 
enforce i t s own needs through c r i s i s to which the s t a t e even-
t u a l l y responds. The s t a t e i n these t h e o r i e s comes to know the 
c h o i c e s i t ought to make because of the e x i s t e n c e of a r e l a t i o n -
s h i p between i t and the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s amd the c r i s i s con-
sequences of not adopting the n e c e s s a r y p o l i c i e s . P o s s e s s i n g 
the power and c a p a c i t y s u f f i c i e n t to a c h i e v e the r e q u i r e d adjust-
ments i t f o l l o w s t h a t only one s e t of d e c i s i o n s i s r a t i o n a l f o r 
' C a p i t a l i n G e n e r a l ' - t h a t r e v e a l e d as n e c e s s a r y by the p r o c e s s 
of accumulation. Such a c o u r s e i n v o l v e s the s t a t e not t r y i n g to 
r e g u l a t e or manage i n a r e a s t h a t can on l y i n t e n s i f y economic 
s t a g n a t i o n . The best s t r a t e g y to f o l l o w i s one o f r e s t r u c t u r i n g 
production which reduces c o s t s by r e - a l l o c a t i n g labour, r e d u c i n g 
'unproductive' e x p e n d i t u r e s and promoting sound money. Hidden 
w i t h i n t h i s argument i s the b e l i e f t h a t the laws o f motion of 
c a p i t a l w i l l ensure t h a t s t a g n a t i o n cannot be s u s t a i n e d and the 
s t a t e cannot t o l e r a t e such s t a g n a t i o n f o r any p e r i o d of time."^ 
While i t w i l l be c l e a r t h a t we have some sympathy w i t h the i d e a 
of the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n K e y n e s i a n s t a t e management and 
expenditure ajid the c o n s t r a i n t s of accu m u l a t i o n i n h e r e n t i n the 
laws of motion, c o n s t r a i n t s a r e on l y r e a l c o n s t r a i n t s a t the 
1. A l t v a t e r , E., 'Notes on Some Problems of S t a t e I n t e r -
ventionism ( I I ) ' . Working Papers on the K a p i t a l i s t a t e 2/1973. pp. 76-83. 
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l e v e l of the s t a t e i f they can f o r c e p o l i c y changes t h a t a c c o r d 
with the need of the system as a whole. S i n c e we have argued 
throughout p o l i c y changes depend on p o l i t i c a l c a p a c i t y f t h i s 
school of thought i s too m e c h a n i s t i c to be a b l e to e x p l a i n the 
c o n j u n c t u r a i c o m p l e x i t i e s and p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f s o c i a l democracy. 
But s i n c e t h i s s c h o o l of thought has gained c o n s i d e r a b l e ground 
i n e x p l a n a t i o n s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e and economy 
there i s a need to examine f u r t h e r such w r i t i n g s i n order to 
account f o r such e m p i r i c a l b l i n d n e s s . 
F i r s t l y t h e r e i s the handling of h i s t o r y . The behaviour of 
the s t a t e can be p r e d i c t e d from the c o u r s e of the development of 
the c a p i t a l i s t mode of production and i t s r e s u l t i n g laws o f 
motion. There i s t h e r e f o r e a n e c e s s a r y s t r u c t u r a l correspondence 
between s t a t e and economy with c o n c r e t e c o n j u n c t u r e s becoming 
e s s e n t i a l s e c t i o n s of longer p e r i o d i z a t i o n s . The p e r i o d c o r r e s -
ponds to the epoch. The r o l e of the s t a t e i s t h e o r i z e d as 
nothing but a moment i n the h i s t o r y o f c a p i t a l . The pace of 
p o l i t i c a l change, n o v e l t y and p e c u l i a r i t y of response to c r i s i s 
a r e of l i t t l e i n t e r e s t to these h i s t o r i c i s t s who re g a r d p o l i t i c a l 
anagement as p e r i p h e r a l and as an i n e s s e n t i a l source of study 
i n the h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s . The r e d u c t i o n i s t and u n i c a u s a l 
e x p l a n a t i o n i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s makes i t r e s i s t a n t to the not i o n 
t h a t changes i n the form and behaviour of the s t a t e may r e s u l t 
from developments i n the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e of the s t a t e i t s e l f . 
I n the work of M u l l e r and Neususs f o r i n s t a n c e , the s t a t e i s 
obl i g e d , by the f o r c e of n e c e s s i t y i n c r i s i s , to s u s t a i n the 
o p e r a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s t p roduction, thereby r e p r o d u c i n g the long 
term f u t u r e of c a p i t a l - i n - g e n e r a l ^ even i f t h i s meajis s h o r t term 
a t t a c k s on p a r t i c u l a r c a p i t a l i s t interestS" and c o n c e s s i o n s to 
m 
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the labour movement i n the reform of working c o n d i t i o n s and t h e 
p r o v i s i o n of W e l f a r e . ^ I f a j i y of t h e s e measures s h o u l d begin 
to t h r e a t e n the system,, the s t a t e as the ' i d e a l c o l l e c t i v e 
c a p i t a l i s t ' w i l l take c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n to e n s u r e t h a t the 
working c l a s s bear the b r u n t of any a d j u s t m e n t . ^ R e d i s t r i b u t i o n 
and r e a l g a i n f o r t h a t s u b o r d i n a t e c l a s s i s an i l l u s i o n . D i s -
t r i b u t i o n i s c o n s t a n t l y s u b j e c t to the i m p e r a t i v e s o f the under-
l y i n g l i n k w i t h the n e c e s s i t y to m a i n t a i n p r o f i t a b l e production.^ 
I n the l o n g run, one of the key f u n c t i o n s of the s t a t e must be 
the 'promotion of n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l i n the c a p i t a l i s t world 
market.' The l i b e r a l d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e w i t h i t s e q u a l l y weighted 
v o t e s and j u r - i d i c a l e q u a l i t y between c i t i z e n s i s the form of 
State most a p p r o p r i a t e f o r commodity e x c h a n g e ^ . Any n o t i o n t h a t the 
deve lopment o f ' m y s t i f i e d ' e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s c o u l d p r o d u c e p a r t i e s w h i c h 
ho ld up o r impede t h i s p r o c e s s i s r e n d e r e d an i l l u s i o n by t h e a s s e r t i o n o f 
the l o g i c o f the l aws o f mot ion o f c a p i t a l . ^ T h i s economic 
l o g i c a s s e r t s i t s e l f "by "being t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n 
and i n order to p r o v i d e an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p 
many of the a u t h o r s , i n t h i s and o t h e r s c h o o l s we s h a l l d i s c u s s , 
o perate by u t i l i z i n g ^ i n i t s v a r i o u s forms, the c o n c e p t of 
1. M u l l e r , W., and Neususs, C., 'The I l l u s i o n of S t a t e S o c i a l i s m 
and the C o n t r a d i c t i o n between wage l a b o u r and C a p i t a l ' . 
T e l o s No.25, F a l l 1975. pp.13-90. 
2. i b i d . p.29 and pp.72-4. 
3. i b i d pp.48-59. 
4. A l t v a t e r , E., 'Notes on some Problems of S t a t e I n t e r v e n t i o n i s m 
(I)» Working Papers on the K a p i t a l i s t a t e 1/1973, pp.lOO-2. 
5. f o r e x t r a c t s d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h i s e q u i v a l e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p see 
Holloway, J * , and P i c c i o t t o , S., ( e d s . ) S t a l e and C o n t r o l : 
A.GSrman Debate. (London, Edward Arnold 1 9 7 8 ) . c s p . the 
a r t i c l e by Bernhard B l a n k e . 
6. M u l l e r and Neususs, pp.88-9. 
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' s t r u c t u r a l s e l e c t i v i t y ' . H i r s c h ^ f o r i n s t a n c e , argues t h a t 
w h i l e the s t a t e ' s s t r u c t u r e e n a b l e s the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
demands,it p o s s e s s e s c e r t a i n s e l e c t i v e mechanisms t h a t enable 
i t to s o r t them out, p r o c e s s them and make them com p a t i b l e w i t h 
the long run needs of c a p i t a l i s m . P a r t of t h i s ' s e l e c t i o n ' i s 
a c h i e v e d through the c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n o f a F i n a n c e M i n i s t r y over 
the v a r i o u s c l i e n t e l e a g e n c i e s . ^ 
Arguments about the n e c e s s a r i l y f u n c t i o n a l , a s p e c t s of s t a t e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n a r e developed i n the e a r l y work of Poulcintzas and 
a r e i n s c r i b e d i n the very e x i s t e n c e or d e f i n i t i o n of the s t a t e 
i t s e l f , ^ A r e p r o d u c t i v e b a l a n c e of p o l i c i e s i s guaranteed 
because compromise i s s t r u c t u r e d by the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the 
system as a whole. The i n c a p a c i t y of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s to 
o r g a n i z e i t s e l f p o l i t i c a l l y as a f o r c e r e q u i r e s the s t a t e to 
s t e p i n and r e a l i z e t h e i r p o l i t i c a l hegemony by c a n c e l l i n g out 
the c o m p e t i t i v e i s o l a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l c a p i t a l i s t s ^ and t h e i r 
d i v i s i o n i n t o f r a c t i o n s or s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t Iobbies.,so developing 
long term s t r a t e g i e s f o r the common i n t e r e s t of the bourgeoise 
as a whole. The s t a t e not only o r g a n i z e s the dominant c l a s s but 
d i s o r g a n i z e s the s u b j e c t c l a s s by posing as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , of a 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t ^ l e g i t i m a t e d through c i v i c freedom, u n i v e r s a l 
1. H i r s c h , J . , 'What i s the F i s c a l C r i s i s o f the S t a t e ? On the 
P o l i t i c a l F u n c t i o n of the F i s c a l C r i s i s Paper g i v e n to the 
Bradford Conference of S o c i a l i s t Economists 1977. pp.9-10. 
see a l s o H i r s c h , J . , 'The S t a t e Apparatus and S o c i a l 
Reproduction:Elements of a theory of the B o u r g e o i s S t a t e ' i n 
J . Holloway and S. P i c c i o t t o ( e d s . ) S t a t e and C.on.txol o p ^ c i t . 
T h i s and the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s were w r i t t e n b e f o r e the 
p u b l i c a t i o n of J e s s o p , B., The C a p i t a l i s t S t a t e : M a r x i s t 
t h e o r i e s and Methods. (Oxford, M a r t i n Robertson, 1982) which 
has s u b s t a n t i a l l y e n l a r g e d on the e x p o s i t i o n aind the c r i t i q u e 
o f f e r r e d here. 
2. Poulantzas, N., P o l i t i c a l Power and S o c i a l C l a s s e s . (London, New L e f t Books 1973). 
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s u f f r a g e and c o n c e s s i o n s on s o c i a l p o l i c y enforced,where 
n e c e s s a r y , a t the expense of p a r t i c u l a r c a p i t a l i s t s * R e l a t i v e 
autonomy i s thus the d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the s t a t e / aad 
t h i s i s developed t h e o r e t i c a l l y a t the o u t s e t . Such autonomy 
does not depend on the n a t u r e of the balaince of c l a s s f o r c e s 
r e v e a l e d e m p i r i c a l l y . ' ^ So w h i l e P o u l a n t z a s concedes much more 
than A l t v a t e r on the d i s c r e t i o n a r y behaviour of the s t a t e he 
r e n d e r s i t r e s t r i c t e d by making i t , a p r i o r i , c o mpatible with 
the long run s t a b i l i t y and s u c c e s s of c a p i t a l i s m . The s t a t e 
l o s e s the ' d s y f u n c t i o n a l ' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i t p o s s e s s e d i n the 
work of the p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d German ' c a p i t a l l o g i c ' s c h o o l 
and becomes i n s t e a d a ' f a c t o r of c o h e s i o n ' 'condensing,* and 
s o r t i n g out c o n t r a d i c t i o n s by ' p r i o r i tizing,* ' r e g u l a t i n g ' auid 'co-
o r d i n a t i n g . H i s use^ of the term e q u i l i b r i u m s u g g e s t s a form of 
plaj^ning of which the s t a t e i s assumed c a p a b l e . ^ The p r o c e s s e s 
through which a f u n c t i o n a l combination of i n t e r v e n t i o n compatible 
w i t h the long run r e p r o d u c t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m i s produced a r e 
developed u s i n g a s i m i l a r concept of ' s t r u c t u r a l s e l e c t i v i t y ' as 
t h a t of the German s c h o o l . While i n h i s e a r l y work he saw the 
s t r u c t u r e of the s t a t e a s a c e n t r a l i z e d , u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and 
i n t e r n a l l y c o h e s i v e unxty , t h i s was l a t e r r e v i s e d to account 
f o r the e v i d e n t p o l y c e n t r i s m of the s t a t e a p p a r a t u s as a f i e l d 
of c l a s s and f r a c t i o n a l s t i r u g g l e . ^ D e s p i t e t h i s he s t i l l argues 
i n favour of s e l e c t i v i t y v i a such d e c i s i o n making mechanisms as 
1. P o u l a n t z a s , N., P o l i t i c a l Power and S o c i a l C l a s s e s . (London, 
New L e f t Books 1973). pp.271-3. . 
2. i b i d , pp.44-5. 
3. i b i d . 
4. i b i d , pp.255-61, pp.303-5. 
5. P o u l a n t z a s , N., S t a t e , Power, S o c i a l i s m (London, Verso 1980) pp.127-139. 
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' p r i o r i t i z a t i o n ' , 'system grading', ' s h o r t c i r c u i t r y ' , and 'non-
d e c i s i o n making'.^ Although he r e c o g n i z e s the dxsorgssiizing and 
2 
'muddling through' a s p e c t s of p u b l i c p o l i c y , the complex 
bargaLining does not pr e v e n t the tendency f o r u n i t y and co-
o r d i n a t i o n to r e - a s s e r t i t s e l f even i f i t i s not by the p r i n c i p l e 
of hierarchy."^ The most e f f i c i e n t and c o h e s i v e f u n c t i o n a l 
a pparatus i s t h a t devoted to m a t t e r s of economic i n t e r v e n t i o n 
or the 'accumu l a t i o n - r e p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s of c a p i t a l ' . The 
main problem with a l l t h i s i s t h a t P o u l a n t z a s assumes r a t h e r 
than demonstrates such c a p a c i t y . I f , as he r e c o g n i z e s , much of 
the interdependence between d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of i n t e r v e n t i o n i s 
not given but e s t a b l i s h e d through a p r o c e s s of b a r g a i n i n g and 
o f t e n s t r u g g l e , then, as t h i s t h e s i s has demonstrated t h e r e can 
be no guarantee t h a t the outcome.- the r e s u l t i n g combination of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n s - r e f l e c t s a correspondence w i t h the long run needs 
of c a p i t a l i s m u n l e s s one assumes a t the o u t s e t such an i n b u i l t 
tendency to s e l f - c o r r e c t i o n through s t r u c t u r a l s e l e c t i v i t y and 
i n t e g r a t i o n . T h i s t h e s i s has shown a post war B r i t i s h con-
j u n c t u r e with ideology, s t a t e and economy d i s l o c a t e d r a t h e r than 
i n t e g r a t e d . While Poulaintzas may s e t down a r a t i o n a l e f o r the 
r o l e of the s t a t e , o n l y an examination o f the c o n t e n t ajid e v ents 
of i n t e r v e n t i o n can a s s e s s whether what i s done i s rational... 
a c c o r d i n g to a h y p o t h e s i s r e g a r d i n g the maintenance of a r e p r o -
d u c t i v e b a l a n c e i n favour of c a p i t a l i s m . As Saunders p o i n t s out 
1. P o u l a n t z a s , N., S t a t e , Power, S o c i a l i s m . (London Verso 1980), pp.134-7. 
2. i b i d . p.194. 
3» i b i d , pp.136-9. 
4. i b i d , p.171. 
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the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n and s t r u c t u r e i s an 
e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n and cannot be a c h i e v e d a p r i o r i . " ^ 
S i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e encountered i n the t h i r d and most 
r e c e n t attempt a t a n a l y s i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e and 
c a p i t a l , t h a t of c o r p o r a t i s m . A c c o r d i n g to W i n k l e r u n t i l 
r e c e n t l y the s t a t e was s u b o r d i n a t e d to the i n t e r e s t s of p r i v a t e 
c a p i t a l but has now expanded from SUPPORT of the accumulation 
p r o c e s s to i t s DIRECTION.^ The c o u r s e and cause o f t h i s ' t r a n s -
i t i o n ' a re not r e a l l y e x p l o r e d save t h a t i t has been i n response 
to c e r t a i n 'problems' such as d e c l i n i n g p r o f i t a b i l i t y , the 
i n c r e a s i n g s c a l e of production, high r e s e a r c h and development 
c o s t s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i o n which n e c e s s i t a t e c o l l e c t -
3 
i v e l y o r g a n i z e d a c t i o n . The form of t h i s new ' d i r e c t i o n ' i s 
taken by new age n c i e s such as the N a t i o n a l E n t e r p r i s e Board 
which e x i s t s to c o n t r o l investment by i n f r i n g e m e n t s on what was 
p r e v i o u s l y a s o l e l y m a nagerial p e r o g a t i v e , and i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r 
the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of wage and p r i c e l e v e l s . I n o r d e r to avoid 
the h o s t i l i t y of p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and la b o u r to such developments 
and to reduce the need f o r more bureaucracy the p r o c e s s of 
determining p o l i c y i n the sphere o f p r o d u c t i o n i s i n c r e a s i n g l y 
d e l e g a t e d to t r i p a r t i t e bodies, the p a r t i c i p a n t s o f which, i n 
exchange f o r p r i v i l e g e d a c c e s s to the s t a t e and p o l i c y con-
c e s s i o n s , agree to a h i e r a r c h i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n on rank and f i l e 
p r e s s u r e and accept the l e g i t i m a c y of the s t a t e ' s r o l e . The 
r e s u l t i s t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r i s m of the p r e s s u r e group i s 
1. Saunders, P., Urban P o l i t i c s ; A S o c i o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
(London, Hutchinson 1979), p.58. 
2. Winkler, J . , 'Corporatism', A r c h i v e s Europeenes de 
S o c i o l o g i e x\o.l7, 1976. p. 103. 
3. i b i d , pp.117-32. 
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r e p l a c e d by the i n t e g r a t i o n and mediation of the c o r p o r a t e 
1 2 3 world. D e s p i t e d i s c l a i m e r s by Winkler » Rhodes aind o t h e r s 
t h a t they a r e not d e s c r i b i n g a system but s u g g e s t i n g a trend or 
4 
b i a s i n s o c i a l and economic development, the h i s t o r i c i s m of such 
w r i t e r s i s apparent i n the way i n which a g e n c i e s a r e i n v e s t e d 
with the seeds of the f u t u r e on the b a s i s of the s t a t e d and 
p r e d i c t e d aims of t h e i r o r i g i n a t o r s r a t h e r than a thorough exam-
i n a t i o n of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n when a p p l i e d to the s e c t o r s i n 
q u e s t i o n . Such examination may o f t e n b e t r a y a f a r l e s s e r impact 
than e n v i s a g e d . ^ T h i s must s u r e l y be the c a s e w i t h the N a t i o n a l 
E n t e r p r i s e Board, the N a t i o n a l Economic Development C o u n c i l , the 
N a t i o n a l Board f o r P r i c e s and Incomes and the Community Land Act. 
Much of t h i s o v e r a m b i t i o u s tendency to i n v e s t phenomena 
with s i g n i f i c a n c e they perhaps do not p o s s e s s , o r a r e prevented 
from p o s s e s s i n g i d e r i v e s from the way i n which c o n c e p t s emerge 
w i t h i n the paradigm. T h i s r e v e a l s a somewhat s u r f a c e r a t h e r than 
r e a l treatment of the phenomenal forms of the s t a t e . Winkler for 
i n s t a n c e , i t seems,operates w i t h a Weberian method where one 
' i n t e r p r e t s * e vents through the r a t i o n a d . i z a t i o n s and appare.nt 
a c t s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves. He e r e c t s c o r p o r a t i s m i n 
B r i t a i n from the d i s c o u r s e of c u r r e n t a f f a i r s where order," u n i t y , 
1. f o r a d e t a i l e d s p e c i f i c a t i o n of terms such as h i e r a r c h y and 
i n t e r m e d i a t i o n i n t h i s c o n t e x t , see S c h m i t t e r , P.C. * S t i l l 
the Century of Corporatism?' Review of P o l i t i c s , Vol.36, No. 
1, January 1974. esp. pp.93-4. 
2. Winkler, J . , Corporatism, p.114. 
3. Rhodes, R.H.W-i C o n t r o l and Power i n C e n t r a l - L o c a l Government 
R e l a t i o n s h i p s . (Farnborough SSRC Gower 1981). pp.113-4. 
4. Middlemas, K., P o l i t i c s i n I n d u s t r i a l S o c i e t y . (London, Andre 
Deutsch 1979). Chs. 13,15. 
3. f o r a demonstration of t h i s l e s s e r impact see Cox, A., 
'Corporatism as Reductionisra', the a n a l y t i c l i m i t s o f the 
c o r p o r a t i s t t h e s i s Government and O p p o s i t i o n , Volume 16, 
No.l. Winter 1981. pp.78-95. 
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n a t i o n a l i s m , and s u c c e s s a r e t e a s e d out as the g u i d i n g l i g h t s . " ^ 
The i d e a of • c o n c e r t a t i o n ' ^ , the r e s u l t of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
form known as T r i p a r t i s m i s an almost d i r e c t s y n t h e s i s and 
t h e r e f o r e r e p r o d u c t i o n of the appearance of or d e r , of everybody 
appearing to get together on the b a s i s of a v a l u e consensus and 
e x c l u d i n g would-be t r o u b l e raaicers by apparent c o n t r o l s on 
o r g a n i z a t i o n membership. I n p l a c e of the r a t h e r l e s s than 
o r d e r l y worlds of p l u r a l i s m w i t h i t s c o m p e t i t i o n and c o n f l i c t 
and marxism w i t h i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n and s t r u g g l e , we a r e given 
the p r o c e s s e s of ' i n t e r m e d i a t i o n ' , ' i n t e g r a t i o n * and 'manage-
ment'^. Y e t these p r o c e s s e s might w e l l be a r e f l e c t i o n of the 
promises of policymakers r a t h e r than a d e s c r i p t i o n of the a c t u a l 
r e s u l t of t h e i r a c t i o n o r even i t s o r i g i n . C o n n o l l y has warned 
of the danger of c o n s t r u c t i n g ones concepts from e s t a b l i s h e d 
d i s c o u r s e s p r e v a i l i n g i n the polit.y. The meaning of e s t a b l i d i e d 
p r a c t i c e s can only be p r o p e r l y a p p r o p r i a t e d by a d e t a i l e d look 
at p a r t i c u l a r outcomes and t h i s means enschewing .the s o c i o l o g i c a l 
i m p r e s s i o n i s m of Winkler and o t h e r s i n fav o u r of an i n t e n s i v e 
study of d e c i s i o n s w i t h i n s p e c i f i c c o n j u n c t u r e s : a t a s k 
attempted i n t h i s t h e s i s . 
Another problem with c o r p o r a t i s t theory d e r i v e s from an 
apparent d i v i s i o n between i t s advocates which r e s u l t s i n some 
co n f u s i o n about e x a c t l y what wider system of o r d e r i s being 
produced or reproduced. 
1. Winkler, Corporatism. pp.l03-9. 
2. A concept developed by Bonnett, K., and J e s s o p , B., 'A c r o s s 
n a t i o n a l study of i n t e r v e n t i o n and P o l i t i c a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to Keynesianism, monetarism, i n t e r -
v e n t i o n i s m and Corporatism'. SSRC Panel on Co r p o r a t i s m and 
A c c o u n t a b i l i t y . Canterbury. A p r i l 1981. 
3. Rhodes, C o n t r o l and Power, p.118, p.119. 
4. Connolly, W.E., The Terms o f P o l i t i c a l D i s c o u r s e (Lexington. 
Mass. D.C. Heath 1974). pp.1-2. 
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For Winkler c o r p o r a t i s m i s a system i n i t s own r i g h t 
n e i t h e r c a p i t a l i s m or s o c i a l i s m , but some s o r t of" hybrid*^. For 
Rhodes c o r p o r a t i s m i s r a t h e r an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e method f o r 
a c h i e v i n g the twin aims of ' r e g u l a t i n g c a p i t a l i s m ' and ' r e g u l a t -
i n g f o r the s t a t e s own needs f o r growth and power*• T h i s leaves 
unexplored the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e s e aims a r e c o n t r a d i c t o r y as 
the orthodox m a r x i s t school and o t h e r s have p o i n t e d out i n 
t h e i r s t r e s s on the s t a t e s tax dependence."^ The c e n t r e cannot 
a r b i t r a r i l y assume t h a t a s u f f i c i e n t s u r p l u s w i l l be produced 
i n order to c a r r y on am e x i s t i n g and p o s i t i v e l e v e l of p r o v i s i o n 
f o r the maintenance of s o c i a l c o n s e n s u s ^ i f the ^ a t e grows a t the 
expense of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . With J e s s o p c o r p o r a t i s m i s a 
form of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a meaois of g a i n i n g consent w i t h i n a 
c a p i t a l i s t o r d e r whereby la b o u r and c a p i t a l ' p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 
f o r m u l a t i o n and implementation of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the 
4 
economy and m o t h e r m a t t e r s r e l e v a n t to c a p i t a l a c c u m u l a t i o n • . 
Corporatism i s l i n k e d to the p r o c e s s of ' c o n c e r t a t i o n * whereby 
* such p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n v o l v e s a c c e p t i n g the i m p e r a t i v e s of c a p i t a l 
accumulation and s u b o r d i n a t i n g a l l p o l i c i e s to those imperatives'^. 
The v a r i o u s accounts of c o r p o r a t i s m seem then to v a r y on the 
1. Winkler, Corporatism, p.113. 
2. Rhodes, C o n t r o l and Power, p.119. 
3. f o r i n s t a n c e Mattick, P., Marx and Keynes:the l i m i t s of the 
Mixed Economy. (London^ M e r l i n P r e s s 1974). Buchanan, J . , 
and Wagner, R.E., Democracy i n D e f i c i t : T h e P o l i t i c a l Legacy 
of Lord Keynes (New York Academic P r e s s 1977). Bacon, W., 
and E l l i s , W., B r i t a i n ' s Economic Problem :too few-Producers. 
(London, MacMillan 1976). 
4. Jessop, B., ' C a p i t a l i s m aind Democracy: the B e s t P o s s i b l e 
p o l i t i c a l s h e l l ' IN G- L i t t l e j o h n e t a l ( e d s . ) Power 
and the S t a t e . (London, Croom Helm 1978)p.41. 
5. i b i d . For-a f u r t h e r development of J e s s o p ' s view see J e s s o p , 
B., 'Corporatism, P a r l i a m e n t a r i s m eoid S o c i a l Democracy' IN 
P.G. S c h m i t t e r and G. Lehmbruch ( e d s . ) Trends towards 
C o r p o r a t i s t s I n t e r m e d i a t i o n . ( B e v e r l e y H i l l s Ca. Sage 1979) 
pp.185-212. 
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nature of the f u n c t i o n s being performed by the 'bias'. 
Apart from the more obvious p o i n t s c o n c e r n i n g the 
i n s t a b i l i t y of c o r p o r a t i s t b a r g a i n s , the non-compliance or 
breakdown i n wage arid p r i c e p o l i c i e s and the c o n f l i c t s w i t h 
more t r a d i t i o n a l forms o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e r e i s the problem 
i n these t h e o r i e s which c e n t r e s on t h e i r r a t h e r l o o s e s p e c i f i -
c a t i o n of terms. N e a r l y every a n a l y s i s of c o r p o r a t i s m mentions 
its adequacy f o r economic i n t e r v e n t i o n d i r e c t e d a t the imperatives 
of ' c a p i t a l accumulation', y e t seem u n c l e a r on what type 
of i n t e r v e n t i o n c o r p o r a t i s m i s an adequate v e h i c l e f o r . What 
i s the l e v e l and s c a l e of accumulation p o s s i b l e under a 
system where the c o n d i t i o n f o r such arrangement i s to s e c u r e 
the a c t i v e consent and p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f both s i d e s of i n d u s t r y ? 
S t a b i l i t y , c ohesion and c l a s s b a l a nce i n the economy may be 
a s s u r e d by the bargained arrangement t h a t i s c o r p o r a t i s m ^ b u t 
what i f the i m p e r a t i v e needs of c a p i t a l a c c u m u l a t i o n r e q u i r e a 
d i s t u r b a n c e of agreed p a t t e r n s of behaviour so t h a t b a r g a i n s 
need to be broken, r e s o u r c e s f r e e d , and a more f l e x i b l e and 
dynamic mode of production r e s t o r e d ? C e r t a i n l y f o r our p e r i o d 
the t r i p a r t i t e bargaiin w i t h the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y was seen as 
a s u b s t a n t i a l o b s t a c l e to the r e - i n t r o d u c t i o n of a dynamic and 
c o m p e t i t i v e response to the onset of c r i s i s and was b e l i e v e d 
to impose a number of p e r t i n e n t economic c o s t s . 
The l i b e r t i e s t h a t can be taken u s i n g c o r p o r a t i s m without 
a proper examination of p a r t i c u l a r c o n j u n c t u r e s a r e immense. 
For i n s t a n c e , w i t h J e s s o p , i f c o r p o r a t i s m i s adequate to l a t e 
c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n , then s o c i a l democracy becomes 
the p o l i t i c a l f o r c e most s u i t e d to c o r p o r a t i s m because o f i t s 
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f a c i l i t y i n i n t e g r a t i n g the labour movement. ' I t manages to 
i n t e g r a t e popular-democratic and economic c o r p o r a t e c l s L i m s i n t o 
a programme t h a t f a v o u r s s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the i n t e r e s t s of 
accumulation',^ With i t s b u r e a u c r a t i s m and i n s t i n c t f o r 
i d e o l o g i c a l c o n t r o l t h i s view o f s o c i a l democracy as a f r o n t 
o r g a n i z a t i o n i s v i r t u a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the view o f 
the movement as e s s e n t i a l l y i n c o r p o r a t i v e h e l d by M u l l e r and 
Neususs and P o u l a n t z a s . Rather than see corporatism,pace 
Winkler,as ' f a s c i s m with a human f a c e ' J e s s o p f i n d s i t the 
•hig h e s t form of s o c i a l democracy.'^ 
Another problem w i t h c o r p o r a t i s m i s t h a t i t s l a r g e l y 
i n t e r n a l focus p r e v e n t s i t from apprehending i n f u l l the r o l e 
of e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t on p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n a l economies. Winkler 
w r i t e s of the end of market d e t e r m i n a t i o n and competitiDn w i t h i n 
the n a t i o n s t a t e , of o l i g o p o l i e s and p r i c e f i x i n g growing i n 
l i n e w i t h i n d u s t r i a l concentration"^. Y e t i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic 
competition s t i l l e x i s t s and t a k e s p l a c e on the b a s i s of com-
modity producers exchanging on the b a s i s o f c o m p e t i t i v e p r i c e 
w i t h f r e e m u l t i l a t e r a l t r a d e r a t h e r thaji the r e g u l a t e d o r b i -
l a t e r a l trade bargains, which would be more s u i t a b l e f o r the 
c o r p o r a t i s t mode. 
L a s t l y c o r p o r a t i s m assumes t h a t over time the problem o f 
the i n t e r n a l coherence of the s t a t e a p p a r a t u s and i t s a g e n c i e s 
w i l l be s o l v e d by g r e a t e r co-ordination^^ $o t h a t f u n c t i o n a l 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y or correspondence between s t a t e form and the 
1. J e s s o p ' C a p i t a l i s m and Democracy' p.45 and J e s s o p , 'Corpor-
atism, P a r l i a m e n t a r i s m and S o c i a l Democracy', pp.204-9. 
2. i b i d . 
3. Winkler, Corporatism, p.11, pp.119-20. 
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r e q u i r e d dynamic i n the economy i s produced. T h i s i s c o r p o r -
atism e q u i v a l e n t o f ' s t r u c t u r a l s e l e c t i v i t y ' ; C o n f l i c t w i t h i n 
the s t a t e i s reduced by v a r i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t e c h n i q u e s such 
as Planning, Programming and budgeting systems (PPBS), c o s t 
b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s , and c o r p o r a t e p l a n n i n g i n l o c a l government. 
The p o t e n t i a l f o r c o - o r d i n a t i o n i s improved a l o n g s i d e the 
emergence of h i e r a r c h i c a l and non-competitive r e l a t i o n s between 
a g e n c i e s . Yet again the evidence f a l l s s h o r t of the p r e d i c t i o n . 
The f a i l u r e of PPBS both i n B r i t a i n and the U n i t e d S t a t e s ^ a n d 
the s t u n t e d i n i t i a t i v e o f the Ash Reforms under Nixon^bear 
w i t n e s s to the weakness of such i n i t i a t i v e s a g a i n s t department-
a l i s m , c l i e n t i l i s m and l o c a l autonomy.^ 
The production of p o l i c i e s and s t r a t e g i e s t h a t r e s u l t i n 
a t o t a l f u n c t i o n a l e n t i t y known as 'the s t a t e ' i s s t i l l as 
problematic as t h a t r e v e a l e d i n the p e r i o d i n v e s t i g a t e d i n t h i s 
t h e s i s . Each p e r i o d or c o n j u n c t u r e is»in many r e s p e c t s , u n i q u e 
and the nature of the p o l i t i c a l c a p a c i t y a v a i l a b l e to p a r t i -
c i p a n t s v a r i e s . As such t h i s does not r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of c o r p o r a t i s t forms becoming inbedded. They cannot however be 
assumed on the b a s i s of an i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c g l a n c e a t pas t o r 
pr e s e n t events. 
Our c a s e study i l l u s t r a t e d p r e c i s e l y such a unique phase. 
F i r s t l y i n the sense of an experiment c o n f i n e d to B r i t a i n , and 
1. see G l e n n e r s t e r , H., S o c i a l S e r v i c e budgets and S o c i a l P o l i c y 
(London, A l l e n and Unwin 1974), a l s o L i e b f r i e d , S., The 
Bureaucracy of the S t a t i s t R e s e r v e : t h e Case o f the U.S.A. 
(Western S o c i e t i e s Program O c c a s i o n a l Paper No.112, C o r n e l l 
U n i v e r s i t y I t h a c a New York, 1979)f and Van Gunsteren, H., 
The Quest f o r Control:A c r i t i q u e of the R a t i o n a l - C e n t r a l 
Rule Approach i n P u b l i c A f f a i r s . (New York, Wiley and Sons 
1976). 
404 
secondly, i n s o f a r as a range of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s based 
on war economy were used to supplement the o p e r a t i o n of a peace-. 
time economy i n o r d e r to f u r t h e r and p r o t e c t s o c i a l p r i o r i t i e s . 
Where apparent c o r p o r a t i s t bodies d i d e x i s t f o r the g e n e r a l 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n of economic p o l i c y , such as the Economic P l a n n i n g 
Board, they a c t e d as a r e a s f o r the l e g i t i m a t i o n o f d e c i s i o n s 
a l r e a d y determined elsewhere r a t h e r than the forums f o r the 
making of them. Any apparent ' c o n c e r t a t i o n • was c l e a r l y l e d by 
the government and i n some c r u c i a l a r e a s the o r c h e s t r a was l e f t 
to p l a y a d i f f e r e n t t une,often with no audience i n W h i t e h a l l . 
A l l the t h e o r i e s so f a r surveyed then, s h a r e a p a r t i c u l a r 
method. They a r e c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h c o n c e p t s t h a t c o n t a i n b u i l t 
i n s o l u t i o n s to the problems posed. They begin w i t h the language 
of ' i m p e r a t i v e n e c e s s i t y ' ' r e p r o d u c t i o n ' ' r e g u l a t i o n ' 'manage-
ment i n t e r m e d i a t i o n ' and p o s i t the e x i s t e n c e o f a s t r u c t u r a l 
s e l e c t i v i t y , uncharted, but deep w i t h i n the s t a t e apparatus 
which guarantees the r e q u i s i t e p o l i c y . Y e t to a s s e r t such 
mechanisms without an e m p i r i c a l demonstration o f t h e i r o peration, 
i s a r i s k y e n t e r p r i s e f o r those who wish to advance theory. A 
number of authors have r e c e n t l y r e t r e a t e d from t h i s concept of 
s t r u c t u r a l s e l e c t i v i t y , i n p a r t i c u l a r C l a u s e O f f e . H i s l a t e r 
work a t l a s t appears to have j e t t i s o n e d h i s s c h o o l s e c l e c t i c 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h f u n c t i o n a l i s m and systems a n a l y s i s i n favour 
of much more c a u t i o u s response. He doubts now whether the 
c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e can perform a l l of i t s ' f u n c t i o n s ' simultaneously 
and s u c c e s s f u l l y f o r any l e n g t h of time. I f i t s s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s 
seem to reproduce c a p i t a l i s t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s by l e g i t i m a t i o n , 
the p r o v i s i o n o f such l e g i t i m a t i o n i s dependent on a c e r t a i n r a t e 
405 
of s u r p l u s accumulation which i s c o n t i n u a l l y b e i n g e x t r a c t e d 
to pay f o r s o c i a l c o n t r o l . ^ T h i s l a c k of c o m p a t a b i l i t y or even 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n s t a t e f u n c t i o n s l e a d s him to s t a t e t h a t 
There i s n e i t h e r v i s i b l e nor to be a n t i c i p a t e d 
a s t r a t e g y t h a t a c t u a l l y does r e c o n c i l e t h e s e 
f u n c t i o n s and thus a c h i e v e a balanced i n t e g r a t i o n 
o f the s t a t e and the a ccumulation p r o c e s s , t h a t 
i s , a r e l i a b l e and workable s t r a t e g y of 'system 
maintenance.'2 
Rather than assuming i n t e r n a l s e l e c t i o n t h a t prevent non-
c a p i t a l i s t i n t e r e s t s and f o r c e s from f u s i n g the b l a c k box, we 
now have a growing l i t e r a t u r e on 'overload', where the r e s u l t 
of e l e c t o r a l c o m p e t i t i o n ^ b u r e a u c r a t i c 'muddling through' and the 
p a r t i c u l a r i s m of p r e s s u r e groups begin to invade and d i s t o r t the 
aims of i n d u s t r i a l and economic p o l i c y . ^ I n a d d i t i o n , t h i s 
t h e s i s has shown, f o r a t l e a s t one c o n j u n c t u r e , t h a t c r i s i s 
cannot of i t s e l f s t e e r a c o r r e c t path f o r f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n 
f o r long run a c c u m u l a t i o n ^ s i n c e the c r i s i s s t i l l has to be 
i n t e r p r e t e d and acted on by proximate d e c i s i o n makers who may, 
d e s p i t e the odds, be a b l e to r e s i s t the d i r e c t i o n a l p u l l to some 
c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t depending on the b a l a n c e of c l a s s f o r c e s . 
Rather than, as w i t h Offe, r e s t i n g c o n t e n t w i t h t h e o r e t i c a l 
s c e p t i c i s m on the concept of s t r u c t u r a l s e l e c t i o n t h i s t h e s i s 
has undertaken,as p a r t of i t s t a s k , a d i s s e c t i o n o f the 'black 
box' i n o r d e r to e m p i r i c a l l y demonstrate the p r e s e n c e or absence 
of s e l e c t i o n and consequently the scope f o r manoeuvre for social 
1. O'Connor, J . , The F i s c a l C r i s i s of the S t a t e , (New York, 
S t . M a r t i n s P r e s s , 1973). 
2. Offe, C. , The theory of the C a p i t a l i s t S t a t e auid the Problem 
of P o l i c y formation i n L i n b e r g , L., e t a l ( e d s . ) S t r e s s and 
C o n t r a d i c t i o n i n Modern C a p i t a l i s m . ( L e x i n g t o n Mass. D-C. 
Heath and Co. 1975), p.144. 
3. f o r i n s t a n c e King, A., 'Overload:Problems of Governing i n the 
1970's' P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s V o l . X X I I I , Nos. 2.and 3, 1975, pp. 
162-174,. a l s o Rose, ,^.and P e t e r s , B.G., Can Government Go 
Bankrupt? (New York B a s i c Books 1978) and Hood, C., arnd 
Wright, M. ( e d s . ) . B i g Government i n Hard Times (Oxford 
Martin Robertson 1981). 
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democracy. The s e a r c h r e v e a l e d a l a c k o f e q u i l i b r i u m , i . e. no 
management of demand and supply o f p u b l i c p o l i c y to ensure 
adequate c o - o r d i n a t i o n but the beg i n n i n g s of, what o t h e r s might 
c a l l , a slow s t a g n a t i o n and even e x p r o p r i a t i o n of the c a p i t a l i s t 
b a s i s o f the Nation s t a t e d What f o l l o w s i s a more d e t a i l e d 
s y n t h e s i s of the f i n d i n g s o f the e m p i r i c a l work and t h e i r 
s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r an understainding of s o c i a l democracy. 
The c o n j u n c t u r e - B r i t a i n i n the 1940's - we argued con-
s t i t u t e d a unique p o l i t i c a l economy which was the r e s u l t of a 
combination o f many p o l i c y o b j e c t s each w i t h i t s own p a r t i c u l a r 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . What we have demonstrated e m p i r i c a l l y can be 
summarized as the e v i d e n t uneven r e l a t i o n s between p o l i t i c s , 
ideology, bureaucracy and the requirements of the economy. These 
uneven relations stemmed from the f a c t t h a t each o f .these p r a c t i c e 
had t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i e s and momentums which s e t up 
d i s l o c a t i o n s or l a g s i n adjustment r e s u l t i n g i n c o n s t a n t s h i f t s 
i n the terms on which problems co.uLd be s o l v e d i n a - p a r t i c u l a r 
p e r i o d . Such uneven r e l a t i o n s p r evented any m e c h a n i c a l a d j u s t -
ment of s o c i e t y to economy v i a the medium of a r a t i o n a l o r d e r -
the s t a t e . The problem of adjustment has f i g u r e d a g r e a t d e a l 
i n the t h e s i s , p a r t i c u l a r l y adjustment i n c r i s i s . We have 
i n d i c a t e d e m p i r i c a l l y the c a p a c i t i e s o f the s t a t e , and i n exam-
i n i n g t h i s c a p a c i t y i n r e l a t i o n to B r i t i s h S o c i a l Democracy, we 
have c o n c e n t r a t e d on i t s uneven r e l a t i o n s . 
1. M a t t i c k , Marx and Keynes, pp. 161-3. 
2. f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of u n i l i n e a r v e r s u s d i f f e r e n t i a l time see 
A l t h u s s e r , L., and B a l i b a r , E., Reading C a p i t a l (London 
New L e f t Books, 1970), pp.94-107^ 
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We o u t l i n e d the e x i s t e n c e i n B r i t a i n d u r i n g the War of an 
i n t e g r a t e d working c l a s s . I n terms of p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s , we 
i d e n t i f i e d t h i s as i t s s t r e n g t h not i t s weatkness. I t ' s h i s t o r y 
of s t r u g g l e had taught i t the b e n e f i t s to be gained by combining 
b a r g a i n i n g a t the p o i n t of p r o d u c t i o n w i t h p a r t i c i p a t i o n a t the 
p o l i t i c a l c e n t r e . The p a r t i c u l a r c o n f i g u r a t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t i c 
power and c o n t r o l over the war economy was a t the same time a 
r e s u l t and a cause of the s t r e n g t h e n e d d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n of the 
working c l a s s i n the eyes of the government. The f e a r of t h i s 
p o t e n t i a l s t r e n g t h had d r i v e n the government i n t o a s e r i e s of 
guarantees designed to c a t e r to a c l i m a t e of postwar e x p e c t a t i o n s . 
T h i s commitment i n v o l v e d r e t a i n i n g many of the wartime c o n t r o l s 
f o r the peace i n o r d e r to reduce market u n c e r t a i n t i e s and provide 
extended s o c i a l s e c u r i t y , so r e i n f o r c i n g the p o s i t i o n the l a b o u r 
movement had a c h i e v e d i n war. A s e t of s o c i a l programmes was 
giv e n p r i o r i t y , and t h e i r s u c c e s s was judged to be dependert. 
upon a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n s u l a t i o n from r e s o u r c e competition. These 
state-managed a l l o c a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the b u i l d i n g programme, 
produced a unique h i s t o r y which we argue was n o n - f u n c t i o n a l i n 
terms of a r a t i o n a l i t y read o f f from the a b s t r a c t requirements 
of c a p i t a l . The phase of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n was an attempt to o r d e r 
a re-emerging c a p i t a l i s t economy i n t o s e t of a c t i v i t i e s o r p a r t s 
determined and c o n t r o l l e d by the s t a t e . I n the absence of such 
c o n t r o l s the performance of the economy might have taken a 
d i f f e r e n t form. The only way c a p i t a l c o u l d impose i t s i n t e r e s t 
on s o c i e t y was through j u s t such an absence. 
We o u t l i n e d the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the e x i s t e n c e of a dynamic 
c a p i t a l i s m . T h i s r e q u i r e d ^ a s i t s spokesmen i n d i c a t e d ^ a n element 
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of d i s o r d e r j u s t as r a t i o n a l i n i t s way as the c l a i m s f o r 
c o n t r o l . I n p l a c e of p l a n n i n g and f i x i t y i n the Structure of 
p r o d u c t i o n , what was needed was f l e x i b i l i t y , some u n c e r t a i n t y 
and t h e r e f o r e the r e c r e ^ L t i o n of s o c i a l i n s e c u r i t y . I n a 
s i t u a t i o n where mechanisms, s t r u c t u r e s ! p r i o r i t i e s and i d e o l o g y 
had been developed to s u s t a i n the g i v e n environment, those 
demanding adjustment o f p r i o r i t i e s not o n l y had to c h a l l e n g e 
the e x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s but the whole a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system, the 
guarantees g i v e n to p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l groups and the g i v e n 
' a p p r e c i a t i v e s e t t i n g ' o r v a l u e s which c r e a t e d the very f a c t s 
which were h e l d to be i m p o r t a n t . ^ 
With wartime pledges so r e c e n t and K e y n e s i a n economics so 
novel and e n t r e n c h e d i n key d e c i s i o n c e n t r e s , c r i t i c s of govern-
ment p o l i c y f a c e d an u p h i l l t a s k . D e c i s i o n s taken i n the p a s t 
became embodied i n i n s t i t u t i o n s and g i v e n a s s u m p t i o n s . The 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n o f p r i o r commitments meant t h a t p o l i c y 
makers a c c e p t i n g t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s as mecuis, and the theory 
accompanying i t as t h e i r language, r e c o n f i r m e d the assumptions 
and t h e r e f o r e the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of p a s t p o l i c y o v e r and o v e r 
again. D e c i s i o n s to remove commitments p r o t e c t e d by such means 
and such t h e o r y had to proceed on the b a s i s t h a t such means 
and theory c o u l d be changed; i f they c o u l d not then p o l i t i c a l 
c a p a c i t y was wanting. There was no automatic mechanism a t the 
p o l i t i c a l or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l t h a t c o u l d determine t h a t 
investment and e x p o r t s became key o b j e c t i v e s . 
1. The n o t i o n of an ' a p p r e c i a t i v e s e t t i n g ' i s taken from 
V i c k e r s , G., The A r t of JudQement:A study of P o l i c y making. 
(London, Chapman and H a l l 1965), pp.92-6. 
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P a r a d o x i c a l l y , t h e l i b e r a l opponents of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n 
would have had to engage i n a form of c e n t r a l i s m of t h e i r own 
i n order to seek to break the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between the o b j e c t s 
of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n as expressed i n departmental programmes. With 
a more dynamic s t r a t e g y of adjustment and d i s p l a c e m e n t being 
posed, a d a p t a t i o n s or r e s t r u c t u r i n g w i t h i n the s t a t e apparatus 
would have had to have been more determined than those which 
took p l a c e , a l m o s t as token g e s t u r e s , i n 1947. A h i e r a r c h y i n 
p o l i c y was d i f f i c u l t to impose without a h i e r a r c h y i n d e p a r t -
ments, and g e t t i n g departments to a l t e r or reduce t h e i r pro-
grammes, even with a h i e r a r c h y , would have had to have assumed 
away a l l the c l i e n t i l i s t p r e s s u r e s the government of the time 
was p l e a s e d to encourage as a f a c e t of f u n c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t -
a t i o n . Departments of s t a t e were encouraged to r e c e i v e as w e l l 
as g i v e p o l i c y . T h i s was deemed n e c e s s a r y i f the 'democratic' 
f a b r i c of p l a n n i n g was to be m a i n t a i n e d . The ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e -
ness' of p l a n n i n g s e t s p e c i f i c l i m i t s on the f u r t h e r e x t e n s i o n 
of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of 
the c o m p e t i t i v e power of n a t i o n a l ' c a p i t a l i n g e n e r a l ' without 
d e f l a t i o n . Such an a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n came up a g a i n s t the 
b a r r i e r s s e t by the nature of c a p i t a l i s t i d e o l o g y . T h i s was 
embodied i n n o t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s , autonomy and freedom 
from d i r e c t i o n s t h a t would tend to reduce i n d i v i d u a l c a p i t a l i s t s 
and trade unions to agents of the s t a t e , d e s p i t e the good 
i n t e n t i o n s behind the s a n c t i o n s , i n t e n d e d as they were to i n c r e a s e 
e x p o r t s and c a p i t a l re-equipment. 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s were a l i t t l e more t o l e r a b l e i f 
they were n e g a t i v e i n the sense of s e t t i n g r e s t r a i n t s on 
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behaviour r a t h e r than p>ositive c o n t r o l s t h a t i n v o l v e d com-
pulso r y s h i f t s and t r a n s f e r s and b r e a c h e s i n c a p i t a l i s t perog-
a t i v e . I n s t r u c t i o n s what not to do were f a r more easy to accept 
than i n s t r u c t i o n s what to do. The government c o u l d not t r a n s -
cend the e a r l i e r l i b e r a l i d eology, which became a f e t t e r on 
the f u r t h e r development of s t a t e power. But t h i s f e t t e r on 
development was a l s o u s e f u l i n the s e n s e t h a t , i f i t had been 
absent, i t t h r e a t e n e d to expose (by such measures as the com-
pul s o r y d i r e c t i o n of l a b o u r ) , i n v i s i b l e ^ , f orm the u n d e r l y i n g 
c o e r c i v e n a t u r e of the c l a s s r e l a t i o n i n the management of labour 
power and consequently the c a p i t a l i s t n a t u r e of the s t a t e . 
The government s h i e d away from adjustment by m a i n t a i n i n g i n -
t a c t the b i a s of p r i o r i t y p l a n n i n g based on l a b o u r i n t e n s i v e 
investment, s o c i a l e x p e n d i t u r e and employment p o l i c y . T h i s 
r e s u l t e d i n a c r y s t a l V U a t i o n or r i g i d i t y i n the s t r u c t u r e o f 
production which l e d to a p a r a l l e l c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n o f s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s as c l a s s f o r c e s were s t a b i l i s e d a t a l e v e l which 
fundamentally reduced o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r f l e x i b i l i t y i n h e r e n t i n 
the concept of dynamic c a p i t a l and regarded as e s s e n t i a l f o r a 
s u c c e s s f u l r e f i t i n t o the c o m p e t i t i v e world market. So t h e r e i s 
a r e c i p r o c a l c a u s a l i t y h e r e . The economic s t r u c t u r e c o n d i t i o n s 
the balance of s o c i a l f o r c e s but once c r y s t a l l i s ^ e d these same 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s c o u l d a c t to r e s i s t the f u r t h e r adaption and 
development of production."^ T h e r e f o r e any o p t i n g f o r a p o l i c y 
of adjustment by the s t a t e had to r e c o g n i z e t h a t economic l o g i c 
c o u l d only be imposed by fundamental c l a s h e s on c l a s s l i n e s . 
1. On these p o i n t s , see L e v i n e , A., and Wright, E.G., 
' R a t i o n a l i t y and C l a s s S t r u g g l e ' New L e f t Review 123 
(September - October 1980) pp.47-68. 
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S o c i a l democracy c o u l d not countenance such s e l f - r e n u n c i a t i o n 
and t h e r e f o r e found the very c o n d i t i o n f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e a 
l i m i t on i t s p o t e n t i a l manoeuverabi 1 i t y . 
We looked i n d e t a i l a t how the p l a n n i n g machinery i n s t i t u -
t i o n a l i s e d the demand s i d e economics t h a t had become dominant 
and was r e f l e c t e d i n departmental r e q u e s t s * The r e d u c t i o n i n the 
s u p e r v i s o r y r o l e of the T r e a s u r y , and the f a c t t h a t r e s i d e n t 
economists had no power to i n t e r f e r e i n the s e c t o r programming 
of ' s o v e r e i g n ' departments r e i n f o r c e d the b i a s a g a i n s t a r e -
s c h e d u l i n g of p r i o r i t i e s . Yet i t was t h e s e p r i o r i t i e s t h a t 
c r e a t e d the very s c a r c i t i e s p l a j i n i n g was supposed to remove. 
Committees o s t e n s i b l y i n the b u s i n e s s of r e v i e w and a l l o c a t i o n 
were e s s e n t i a l l y formal w h i l e those p r i o r i t i e s remained i n t a c t . 
• C o r p o r a t i s t ' machinery was d e v i s e d i n o r d e r to p r e v e n t the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r from i n t e r f e r i n g i n government p o l i c y and to 
l e g i t i m a t e the l a t t e r ' s s t r a t e g y w i t h those who might oppose i t . 
To s o l v e the q u e s t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n without a l t e r i n g the b a l a n c e 
of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r i o r i t i e s ^ o r removing the r e s t r a i n t s on 
c a p i t a l equipment ( t h a t would i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i v i t y permaDently )^ 
the government opted f o r a {Dolicy of encouraging i n c r e a s e s i n 
labour i n t e n s i t y . The ' p r o s p e r i t y ' campaign t r i e d to l i n k the 
maintenajice of s o c i a l p r i o r i t i e s w i t h .the achievement of h a r d e r 
work,yet the f o r c e of such an i m p l i e d t h r e a t was reduced because 
the government had made a p r i o r commitment not to reduce i t s 
concessions a commitment which had f o r c e d them i n t o mobil-
i s a t i o n of t h i s s o r t i n the f i r s t p l a c e . Adjustments were con-
s i s t e n t l y d e l a y e d . R e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a c r i s i s would be produced, 
or i f i t a l r e a d y e x i s t e d would i n t e n s i f y , l e d the proponents of 
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e x i s t i n g p r i o r i t i e s to d e v i s e new d i s c r e t i o n a r y r esponses (many 
of them n e g o t i a t e d around the apparent e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t of 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic environment) i n o r d e r to manage i n 
the s h o r t and medium term. I t i s t h i s e x t e r n a l environment . 
which formed the focus of c e n t r a l c h a p t e r s of the t h e s i s . Here 
we showed t h a t the type of r e l a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d between i n t e r n a l 
and e x t e r n a l markets was not j u s t a q u e s t i o n of the management 
of c o n s t r a i n t s s i n c e the form i n which they were to emerge and 
t h e r e f o r e t h e i r impact was s t i l l s u b j e c t to p o l i t i c a l mani-
p u l a t i o n . The h o s t i l i t y to .the m u l t i l a t e r a l i s t o p t i o n i n i t s 
pure form, even to i t s advocates, d e r i v e d from the requirement 
to expose the n a t i o n to renewed u n c e r t a i n t i e s undermining 
i n t e r n a l p l anning and i n v o l v i n g a d e c i s i o n to renounce o o l i t i c a l 
c h o i c e and d i s c r e t i o n over trade and exchange, a l l o w i n g the 
a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s to be determined by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o d u c t i v i t y . T h a t would mean t h a t c o u n t r i e s 
l i k e B r i t a i i n ^ whose commodities were r e l a t i v e l y u n c o m p e t i t i v e , 
who were s u b j e c t to i n f l a t i o n i n c o s t s and payments d e f i c i t s , 
and whose c u r r e n c y was as a consequence unpopular on the f i x e d 
exchanges, would s u f f e r a- d r a i n d i r e c t e d from o u t s i d e the 
boundaries of the n a t i o n s t a t e and i t s ' p o l i t i c i a n s ' . Such a 
d r a i n would p e n a l i s e those who had not c o n c e n t r a t e d as many 
r e s o u r c e s as p o s s i b l e on c a p i t a l equipment and e x p o r t s . 
The b i l a t e r a l i s t a l t e r n a t i v e on the o t h e r hand was b e l i e v e d 
to be c o n s i s t e n t with the p r o t e c t i o n or i n s u l a t i o n of the home 
economy and t h e r e f o r e s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . I t i n v o l v e d 
extending the use of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and i m p e r i a l c o n t r o l s i n 
o r der to d i s c r i m i n a t e . Such c o n t r o l s made i t p o s s i b l e to 
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r e g u l a t e the e x t e n t of incoming s u p p l i e s to match the e s s e n t i a l 
needs and r a t i o n f o r e i g n exchange. I n i t s extreme form i t a l s o 
i n v o l v e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between s u p p l i e r s . The p e c u l i a r 
dependence of the U. K. a t t h i s time, however, on the d o l l a r a r e a 
f o r c r u c i a l s u p p l i e s meant t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s , as. a powerful 
advocate of m u l t i l a t e r a l trade, was i n a p o s i t i o n to i n s i s t on 
a degree of commitment to m u l t i l a t e r a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s w i t h the 
b i l a t e r a l i s t a l t e r n a t i v e consequently weakened. However the 
dependance of the U n i t e d S t a t e s on the Europec^n market -
p a r t i c u l a r l y a W e s t e r n - o r i e n t a t e d Europe -. c r e a t e d the b a r g a i n i n g 
s i t u a t i o n t h a t r e s u l t e d i n a p o l i c y mix a v o i d i n g the w o r s t 
extremes of both a l t e r n a t i v e s . The U n i t e d Kingdom co u l d use b i -
l a t e r a l i s t p r a c t i c e s f o r the s h o r t term but agreed to r e - e n t e r 
the world market on American terms a t a date f i x e d by them and 
abajidon such p r a c t i c e s i n the long term. 
During these two post war y e a r s then the p o l i t i c a l di^rcretion 
open to s o c i a l democracy was enhanced by the bargained r e t e n t i o n 
of p r o t e c t i o n i s t t r a d e . T h i s s o - c a l l e d ' t r a n s i t i o n ' phase we 
have e n t i t l e d a p o l i c y space. A n e g o t i a t e d time and space but 
one which was s t r u c t u r a l l y determined. F i r s t l y , because we had 
been f o r c e d to abandon d i s c r e t i o n a t a pre-determined p o i n t r e -
e n t e r i n g a c o m p e t i t i v e p r o c e s s ; and secondly, because our weak 
n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n was the r e s u l t o f an o b j e c t i v e r e s o u r c e 
d e f i c i e n c y . We have seen t h a t the b e s t n e g o t i a t o r s were those 
t h a t r e c o g n i s e d s t r u c t u r a l weakness and used i t to t h e i r 
advantage. Those who d e c e i v e d themselves i n t o i m a g i n i n g t h a t 
they were s t r o n g e r thain they were began w i t h p o s t u r i n g ajid ended 
with disappointment. They p l a y e d f o r too high s t a k e s and r i s k e d 
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l o s i n g e v e r y t h i n g - I f t h e a i d and t h e t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d o f 
b i l a t e r a l i s t c o n t r o l had p r o v i d e d t h e p o l i c y space i n w h i c h t h e 
government c o u l d manoeuvre f o r s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h o u t 
h a v i n g t o s u b m i t t o t h e c o m p e t i t i v e p r o c e s s t t h a t space was 
s h o r t enough t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e most r a t i o n a l moves f o r t h e 
s t a t e w ould be t o p r e p a r e f o r r e - e n t r y i n t o t h e system n e g o t i a t e d 
f o r t h e l o n g t e r r a . The c o n d i t i o n s f o r success i n t h i s l o n g e r 
t i m e p e r i o d i n v o l v e d a p a r a d o x . To re d u c e t h e e x t e r n a l 
u n c e r t a i n t y i n open f r e e w o r l d m a r k e t and e n s u r e some s u c c e s s t 
t h e government would have t o c r e a t e u n c e r t a i n t i e s f o r i t s c on-
s t i t u e n c y i n t h e s h o r t t e r m by such a d j u s t m e n t s t h a t w o u l d a l t e r 
t h e b a l a n c e o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p o l i c i e s and r e n o u n c e c e r t a i n 
g u a r a n t e e s o f exten d e d s o c i a l s e c u r i t y . So t h e t i m e gauLned i n 
th e p o l i c y space c o u l d a l s o be used f o r r e s t r u c t u r i n g manu-
f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r i e s t o i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i o n , cheapen o u t p u t by 
g i v i n g s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e r e - e q u i p m e n t o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
and t h e s t i m u l a t i o n o f e x p o r t s by changes i n t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f 
l a b o u r , raw m a t e r i a l s and money c a p i t a l . Such s h i f t s and d i s -
p l a c e m e n t s , w h e t h e r a c h i e v e d by d e f l a t i o n a r y ' f r e e i n g ' o f 
r e s o u r c e s o r by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e means, W D u l d b r e a k t h e c o n t i n u i t y 
t h a t had c h a r a c t e r i s e d r e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h i n k i n g and p r a c t i c e 
s i n c e 1942. The problem was immense. The e n v i r o n m e n t o f 
e x p e c t a t i o n s s i n c e t h a t d a t e , e n c o u r a g e d by t h e government i t s e l f 
had been c o n d i t i o n e d t o a c c e p t t h e i d e o l o g y o f ' w e l f a r e ' 
c a p i t a l i s m . The government soon f o u n d t h a t i t was e a s i e r t o 
expand than c u t programmes because t h e c o m m u n i c a t i n g o f a change 
i n i n t e n t was e a s i e r i f i t e x t e n d e d f a t h e r t h a n r e v o k e d 
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e x p e c t a t i o n s . ^ The a t t e m p t a t e x t e n d e d p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , 
o r • a c c u l t u r a t i o n ' ^ by m o b i l i s i n g s u p p o r t t h r o u g h s e l e c t i v e 
economic messages i n o r d e r t o p r e p a r e t h e p u b l i c f o r r e v e r s a l s 
o f p o l i c y , became p a r t o f t h e management o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . We 
r e v e a l e d t h e l i m i t s o f a t t e m p t s t o r e s t r u c t u r e p u b l i c o p i n i o n 
so soon a f t e r e x i s t i n g c h o i c e s and o p t i o n s had been l e g i t i m i s e d . 
The p r o b l e m o f t i m i n g t h e r e f o r e i n t h e s o - c a l l e d * m o b i l i s a t i o n 
o f b i a s * i s c r u c i a l . The g o v e r n m e n t ' s own s u r v e y s r e v e a l e d h i g h 
d egrees o f m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a r e l u c t a n c e t o ' f a c e f a c t s ' . 
G iven t h i s c l i m a t e , d e c i s i o n s t o r e c o n s t r u c t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
w i t h i n t h e p o l i c y space became d i f f i c u l t and d e c i s i o n s t o m a in-
t a i n and e x t e n d t h e e x i s t i n g t r e n d e a s i e r . The a d j u s t m e n t s 
seemed n e c e s s a r y and r a t i o n a l b u t t h e y were made l e s s l i k e l y 
because t h e i m m e d i a t e c o m p e t i t i v e n e c e s s i t y f o r them had been 
re d u c e d . An i n e v i t a b l e and p r e d i c t e d c r i s i s a t r e - e n t r y pxaint 
was a l l o w e d t o come and as i t a r r i v e d t h e government used t h e 
c r i s i s t o i t s advantage r a t h e r t h a n a l l o w i t t o impose a n y t h i n g 
on i t . 
R e c o g n i s i n g a g a i n t h e dependence o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s on a 
f r i e n d l y Europe r a t h e r t h a n one a n t i t h e t i c a l t o t h e i r system, 
the B r i t i s h s e t o u t on a n o t h e r r o u n d o f b a r g a i n i n g t a k i n g up 
t h e o f f e r o f f u r t h e r a i d and n e g o t i a t i n g a f u r t h e r r e t e n t i o n -
i n d e e d e x t e n s i o n - o f p o l i c y space by d r a m a t i s i n g and p l a y i n g 
1. V i c k e r s , The A r t o f Judgement, pp.214-15, n o t e s t h i s p r o b l e m 
o f p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 
2, T h i s p h r a s e appears i n Watson, M.M., 'The c h a r a c t e r and 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f w e s t e r n s t y l e P l a n n i n g ' i n R.T. G r i f f i t h s 
( e d . ) Government, B u s i n e s s and Labour i n European C a p i t a l i s m 
(London, E u r o p o t e n t i a l s P r e s s 1978) p.49. 
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t h e v e r y s e n a r i o t h e Americans f e a r e d : t h a t u n l e s s t h e y d i d t h i s 
f o r us we wo u l d be f o r c e d i n t o s o m e t h i n g t h a t t h e y w o u l d n o t 
l i k e . ^ The government's own f e a r o f a c l a s h w i t h p u b l i c 
e x p e c t a t i o n s was m a g n i f i e d and used i n n e g o t i a t i o n s t o t h e p o i n t 
where t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M a r s h a l l A i d A d m i n i s t r a t o r s d e f e n d e d t h e 
U n i t e d Kingdom Housing Programme and i m p r o v e d c o n s u m p t i o n l e v e l s 
b e f o r e t h e i r own Congress. A l l i t needed was f o r B r i t a i n t o make 
s i g n s o f good f a i t h such as t h e t r i b u t e made i n t h e s a l e o f g o l d 
by t h e Bank o f England and a p r o m i s e t o a t t e n d C o n f e r e n c e s 
d e d i c a t e d t o a l o n g term ( a l l t h e t i m e g e t t i n g l o n g e r ) f o r t h e 
p r a c t i c e s o f t h e s h o r t term t o be c o n t i n u e d f u r t h e r i n t o t h e 
f u t u r e . The a d v e r s e consequences on s o c i a l programmes o f 
M a r s h a l l A i d c o n c e s s i o n s were, as we p o i n t e d o u t , f a r l e s s 
o n erous t h a n was commonly supposed. W i t h i n t h a t e x t e n d e d and 
se c u r e n e g o t i a t e d space Government c o u l d e x e r c i s e ' c h o i c e * . They 
c o u l d use f u r t h e r space i n o r d e r t o p l a n on t h e b a s i s t h a t i t 
would e v e n t u a l l y be removed o r t h e y c o u l d r e s t c o n t e n t t o p u r s u e 
t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i c i e s w h i c h t h e r e m o v a l o f i m m e d i a t e c o n s t r a i n t 
made p o s s i b l e . As we saw i t was t h i s second o p t i o n t h a t s u r v i v e d . 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e r e t e n t i o n o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y t r a d e and 
exchange c o n t r o l s a f t e r t h e f a t e f u l a t t e m p t t o r e s t o r e c o n -
v e r t a b i l i t y i n 1947, by 1949 t h e Americans, and t h r o u g h them t h e 
IMF, had conceded t o B r i t a i n t h e r i g h t t o use t h e most f u n d a m o i t a l 
1. T h i s k i n d o f b a r g a i n i n g t a c t i c i s a v a r i a n t i n t h e e x e r c i s e 
o f power, see de C r e s p i g n y , A., 'Power and i t s Forms'. 
P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , V o l , 1 6 , No.2. 1968. pp.192-209. 
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d i s c r e t i o n a r y power a v a i l a b l e t o a s t a t e o s t e n s i b l y t i e d t o an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c y d i s c i p l i n e , v i z . d e v a l u a t i o n . As a 
s h o r t t e r m r e s p o n s e t h e d e v a l u a t i o n p o t e n t i a l l y s o l v e s a pay-
ments c r i s i s , n o t by p e n a l i s i n g t h e i n e f f i c i e n t by l o s s o f 
r e s e r v e s and c o n t r a c t i o n o f t h e money s u p p l y as u n d e r a g o l d 
s t a n d a r d , b u t by an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a n i p u l a t i o n o r d i r e c t i v e 
t h a t r e n d e r s t h e l e s s s u c c e s s f u l more s u c c e s s f u l by s i m p l e 
d e c l a r a t i o n . Of c o u r s e c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s must be p r e s e n t f o r 
t h e i n s t a n t a dvantage t o be s u s t a i n e d b u t f o r a government 
a n x i o u s t o i m p r o v e t h e c o m p e t i t i v e p o s i t i o n o f i t s e x p o r t e r s 
w i t h o u t an a t t a c k on t h e e x t e n d e d s o c i a l s e c u r i t y , such an o p t i o n 
must be a t t r a c t i v e . D e v a l u a t i o n t h e n i s one o f t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
t e c h n i q u e s a v a i l a b l e f o r p o l i c y m a i n t e n a n c e i n s o c i a l democracy. 
D e v a l u a t i o n m u t a t e s i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n s t h a t would 
o t h e r w i s e be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p r o d u c t i v i t y -
S t a t e c o n t r o l o f t h e C e n t r a l Bank i s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n 
n e c e s s a r y f o r such a power. I n d e e d i t i s on t h e e x i s t e n c e o f 
t h e S t a t e t h a t t h e v e r y l e g i t i m a c y o f paper money i s p r e m i s e d 
t h r o u g h t h e S t a t e ' s a b i l i t y t o e x t r a c t r e s o u r c e s f r o m c a p i t a l 
w i t h o u t an i m m e d i a t e e q u i v a l e n t v a l u e b e i n g g i v e n i n exchange. 
T h i s l e g a l , and t o a l a r g e e x t e n t l e g i t i m a t e , monopoly i s taj<-
a t i o n . The c r e d i t power o f t h e C e n t r a l bank meanwhile e n a b l e s 
t h e s t a t e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e b a l a n c e between i n f l a t i o n and 
d e f l a t i o n . The f o r m e r , when c o u p l e d w i t h d e v a l u a t i o n , e n a b l e s 
r e s o u r c e s t o be t r a n s f e r r e d , n o t o n l y a c r o s s s t a t e , b u t a l s o 
a c r o s s c l a s s l i n e s as d e b t o r s b e n e f i t a t t h e expense o f c r e d i t o r s . 
I t a l s o e n s u r e s t h a t f a i l u r e s i n t h e c o m p e t i t i v e p r o c e s s i n c u r no 
p e n a l t y and c o n s e q u e n t l y s u r v i v e . Such d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers 
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a l l o w p o l i c i e s and p r i o r i t i e s t o be m a i n t a i n e d . We saw t h a t 
t h e c u t s i n s o c i a l programmes p r e p a r e d d u r i n g t h e c r i s i s d i d 
n o t b i t e deep and were o f t e n r e s c i n d e d . The o f f i c i a l s d e l e g a t e d 
t o w i e l d t h e axe had t h e i r p r o p o s a l s c o n s t a n t l y amended by 
p o l i t i c i a n s , and i n any case l a c k e d e x e c u t i v e powers. The 
i n t e r e s t s on whom t h e government were dependent i n t h e b u i l d i n g 
i n d u s t r y amd t h e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s c o n v i n c e d them t h a t i f t h e y 
wanted t o r e a s s e r t t h e i r s o c i a l p r i o r i t i e s a t some l a t e r s t a g e 
t h e y needed t o c o - o p e r a t e i n t h e i n t e r i m . T h i s p o s i t i o n a r o s e 
because t h e government was s t i l l w i l l i n g t o s u s t a i n an e n v i r o n -
ment t h a t made them so dependant on i n t e r e s t s and r e f u s e d t o 
renounce g u a r a n t e e s t o them. The same s i t u a t i o n e x i s t e d i n t h e 
d e c i s i o n t o m a i n t a i n d e f e n c e s p e n d i n g . W i t h t h e spokesman f o r 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y l a r g e l y c o n v i n c e d by government communi-
c a t i o n t h a t t h e s h o r t term was what m a t t e r e d , t h e c u t s were a p p l i e d 
much more d e e p l y on l o n g term i n v e s t m e n t on i n d u s t r i a l r e - e q u i p -
ment. When t h e p o l i c y o f 'make do o r mend' was d e v e l o p e d 
i m m e d i a t e g a i n s f o r t h e t r a d e d e f i c i t were o b t a i n e d f r o m t h e 
e x p o r t o f m a c h i n e r y d e s p i t e t h e r e c o g n i s e d damage t o l o n g t e r m 
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s . Such e x p e d i e n c y was an i n t r i n s i c p a r t o f t h e 
Keynesi a n paradigm w i t h i t s p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t p o s t e r i t y c o u l d l o o k 
a f t e r i t s e l f . 
The K e y n e s i a n p a r a d i g m was based on an a n a l y s i s o f a g g r e -
g a t e s w h i c h c o n f l a t e d m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n v e s t m e n t t o a component o f 
g r o s s d o m e s t i c i n v e s t m e n t w i t h no d i s t i n c t i o n made between p r i v a t e 
and p u b l i c s e c t o r s . I n v e s t m e n t was t h e n p e r c e i v e d as one p a r t 
amongst e q u a l s i n a g g r e g a t e demand w h i c h m i g h t be e x c e s s i v e o r 
d e f i c i e n t i n r e l a t i o n t o e x i s t i n g p u r c h a s i n g power w i t h g i v e n 
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r e s o u r c e s and r a t e s o f s a v i n g . The seeming o p p o s i t e s o f b u s i n e s s 
a c c u m u l a t i o n and t a x a t i o n were c o u p l e d as ' s a v i n g s ' as t h o u g h 
t h e y were u n r e l a t e d . E x p o r t s were o f t e n seen o n l y as revenue 
f o r i m p o r t s . The e s s e n t i a l t a s k o f management was t o b r i d g e t h e 
gap between t o t a l r e s o u r c e s and t o t a l demands, p l a n n i n g b e i n g 
e s s e n t i a l l y a n e g a t i v e e x e r c i s e o f d e c i d i n g which c l a i m a n t went 
s h o r t g i v e n t h e s e e x i s t i n g p r i o r i t i e s . By l u m p i n g t o g e t h e r a l l 
i n v e s t m e n t i n a g g r e g a t e t o be c u t when r e s o u r c e s were s c a r c e , 
t h e K e y n e s i a n b i a s i g n o r e d t h e need f o r growth p r o d u c e d by t h e 
v e r y i n d u s t r i a l m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n v e s t m e n t t h e y were r e d u c i n g : i n 
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f macro b a l a n c e and t h e s h o r t t e r m payments 
d e f i c i t . 
T h i s g r o w t h was a p r e - r e q u i s i t e f o r a c o u n t r y a n x i o u s t o 
a c h i e v e s u r p l u s i n c o n d i t i o n s where d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t e c h n i c a l 
development l e d t o d i s p l a c e m e n t e f f e c t s on f o r m a l l y e q u a l com-
m o d i t y p r o c e d u r e . I n v e s t m e n t amd i t s e f f e c t s on p r o d u c t i v i t y 
were amply d e m o n s t r a t e d a t t h e t i m e as a v i t a l n e c e s s i t y t o 
f i n a n c e f u l l employment, g r o w t h i n p o p u l a t i o n and an e x p o r t boom. 
The government o f s o c i a l democracy chose t o r e l y o n s h o r t t e r m 
t a c t i c s - e x p o r t i n g c a p i t a l e q u i p m e n t , h i g h c a p i t a l t a x a t i o n t o 
f i n a n c e s o c i a l e x p e n d i t u r e s and a ' p r o s p e r i t y ' c a m p a i g n t o 
encourage i n c r e a s i n g l a b o u r i n t e n s i t y on t h e g i v e n c a p i t a l com-
p o s i t i o n o f i n d u s t r y t , t h e s t r u c t u r e o f w h i c h c o u l d be p r e s e r v e d 
by making do and mending. P a r t i a l a n a l y s i s o f o t h e r s e l e c t e d 
c o u n t r i e s ' e x p e r i e n c e s a t t h i s t i m e r e v e a l e d t h e p r i o r i t y g i v e n 
t o t h i s f o r m o f i n v e s t m e n t and t h e l a c k o f any a p p r e c i a b l e 
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i n v e s t m e n t i n h o u s i n g . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , m o n e t a r y p o l i c y and 
a g r e a t e r r e m i s s i o n o f c a p i t a l t a x a t i o n wens p u r s u e d . We have 
i n d i c a t e d f o r B r i t a i n t h e c u r c i a l r o l e o f t h e l e v e l o f w o r k i n g 
c l a s s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e war e f f o r t i n t h e n a t u r e o f s o c i a l 
change and c e r t a i n l y i t s absence e l s e w h e r e m i g h t be one a r e a t o 
e x p l o r e . But t h i s c o m p a r a t i v e work i s e s s e n t i a l l y beyond t h i s 
t h e s i s and e x p l a n a t i o n s o f d i f f e r e n c e must a w a i t f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h 
We have done enough h e r e t o c h a r a c t e r i s e B r i t i s h s o c i a l democracy 
as a p r a c t i c e o f managing d e c l i n e w h i l e o b s e r v i n g , i n d e e d 
a d v a n c i n g , t h e s o c i a l a d vantage and s e c u r i t y f o r t h o s e who w o u l d 
o t h e r w i s e s u f f e r u n d e r more r a p i d d e c l i n e i J i r e i a t e n i n g 
t h e c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f a n o n - r e v o l u t i o n a r y e l e c t o r a l p o l i t y . 
The management i n v o l v e s s u s t a i n i n g s h o r t t e r m a d v a n t a g e s so t h a t 
t h e y become t h e f u t u r e t h r o u g h t h e s k i l l s o f n e g o t i a t i o n cind t h e 
t e c h n i q u e s o f p o l i c y m a i n t e n a n c e such as b o r r o w i n g and d e v a l u a -
t i o n . These t e c h n i q u e s a r e p r e c i s e l y t h o s e s u i t a b l e f o r a 
c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e f e t t e r e d , r a t h e r t h a n a s s i s t e d , by an e l e c t o r a l 
e n v i r o n m e n t * Uu-s results-in a. p o l i c y f o r p r e s e n t r a t h e r t h a n f u t u r e 
g e n e r a t i o n s : o f i m m e d i a t e r a t h e r t h a n d i s t a n t outcomes. The 
w o r l d o f f i n e t u n i n g and 'stop g o ' p r e v e n t s s t a g n a t i o n f r o m 
d e v e l o p i n g i n t o c r i s i s . However such c r i s i s management does n o t 
c o n s t i t u t e 'systems m a i n t e n a n c e ' because s o c i a l d e m o c r a t s i g n o r e 
t h e c o m p e t i t i v e , d i s o r d e r l y a s p e c t s w h i c h , i t i s a r g u e d , a r e 
r e q u i r e d by dynamic n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l . They f e e l t h e p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r i s e s s e n t i a l l y 'manageable' because o u t t h e r e a r e p r i v a t e 
managers w i t h whom t h e s t a t e can d e a l , and t h e i r m o t i v a t i o n s 
as key d e c i s i o n makers i n t h e economy have changed so t h a t 
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p r o f i t becomes s u b s i d i a r y t o s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l w e l f a r e . ^ 
I t i s however t o o b l a n d and commonplace t o s u g g e s t t h a t 
p o l i t i c i a n s e x h i b i t s h o r t term e x p e d i e n c y because t h e r e a l com-
p e t i t i o n t h a t c r a s h e s down on them w i t h t h e f o r c e o f g r a v i t y i s 
e l e c t o r a l . Such an emphasis on t h e e l e c t o r a l e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h 
i t s economic a n a l o g y o f v o t e s b e i n g a k i n t o consumer p r e f e r e n c e s 
and t h e s e p r e f e r e n c e s , where e x p r e s s e d , d e t e r m i n i n g p o l i c y ^ u n d e r -
e s t i m a t e s t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h p a r t y s u p p l y d e t e r m i n e s e l e c t o r a l 
demand; how a v o t i n g m a r k e t may be skewed by t h e dominant 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t y s ' use o f a d v e r t i s i n g and a c a r t e l - l i k e m a n i -
2 
p u i a t i o n o f e l e c t o r a l system t o remove p o t e n t i a l c o m p e t i t o r s . 
More i m p o r t a n t l y e l e c t o r a l i s t t h e o r y c o n c e n t r a t e s on t h e p o s t 
second w o r l d war e n v i r o n m e n t and f a l s e l y a b s t r a c t s t h i s as an 
essence^ i g n o r i n g t h e i m p o r t a n t i n s i g h t s g a i n e d f r o m a p e r i o d -
i z a t i o n o f p a r t y b e h a v i o u r o f w h i c h t h e K e y n e s i a n e r a i s b u t 
one moment. Post war B r i t i s h s o c i a l democracy seemed t o 
r e i n f o r c e s h o r t term c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n t h e s e being s o l e l y 
p r o d u c e d by the logLc o f the e l e c t o r a l system- I t d e s i r e d t o r e a c t t o 
e v e n t s by c r e a t i n g and r e - c r e a t i n g e x t e n d e d s o c i a l s e c u r i t y by 
t h e e a s i e s t c o u r s e p o s s i b l e . No one c o u l d a r g u e t h a t p r e -
K e y n e s i a n governments e x h i b i t e d t h e same t r e n d o f low t i m e 
h o r i z o n s i n economic p o l i c y . T h e i r s t r a t e g i e s o f t e n opened them 
up t o s u b s t a n t i a l e l e c t o r a l r i s k , w h e n t h e chosen c o u r s e ( s u c h as 
t h e 1924 r e t u r n t o t h e h i g h p a r i t y g o l d s t a n d a r d w h i c h abandoned 
p o l i t i c a l d i s c r e t i o n o v e r c u r r e n c y managemen-^ t u r n e d o u t 
1. C r o s l a n d , C.A.R,, The F u t u r e o f S o c i a l i s m (London, J o n a t h a n 
Cape Abri'^lged e d i t i o n 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 14-19. 
2. B r i t t a n , S., 'The Economic C o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f Democracy' 
B r i t i s h J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , Volume 5, P a r t 2, A p r i l 
1975, pp.129-159. The p r i n c i p a l t h e o r e t i c a l w o r k on t h e s u b j e c t 
i s Downst A., An Economic Theory o f Democracy (New York, Harper 
and Bros. 1957), see a l s o t h e c r i t i q u e by B a r r y , B., S o c i o -
l o g i s t s , E c o n o m i s t s and Democracy, ( U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago 
Press 1 9 7 8 ) . 
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tr> be.less than b e n e f i c i a l . As s h o r t term K e y n e s i a n managonent became popular 
and e a s i e r , and, as a c o n s e q u e n c e , f a v o u r e d p e o p l e who c o u l d be 
h e l p e d e a r l i e r r a t h e r t h a n t h o s e o f l a t e r g e n e r a t i o n s t a p a r a l l e l 
d evelopment o f ' p r e s s u r e g r o u p p o l i t i c s ' s u s t a i n e d t h a t t y p e o f 
m e n t a l e n v i r o n m e n t and f u r t h e r e d a new t y p e o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l -
i s a t i o n i n a d d i t i o n t o v o t e r s , p a r t i e s amd l e a d e r s ^ i n h i b i t i n g 
t h e w i l l i n g n e s s and t h e c a p a c i t y t o engage i n l o n g term p l a n n i n g 
i n and o u t s i d e t h e s t a t e a p p a r a t u s . The i n i t i a l c h o i c e o f housing 
as an economic r e g u l a t o r was based on i t s r e l a t i v e l y i m m e d i a t e 
employment o r 'process' e f f e c t s and i t s a t t r a c t i v e u t i l i t i e s 
o r ' p r o d u c t ' e f f e c t s t h a t c o u l d be w eighed i n v o t e s and p l a c a t e d 
s o c i a l g r o u p s . R e s i d e n t e c o n o m i s t s and o f f i c i a l s who argued t h e 
n e c e s s i t y f o r a d i f f e r e n t d u r a t i o n o f STOP o r a d i f f e r e n t com-
f X D s i t i o n o f GO were al w a y s a t a s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i t i c a l d i s -
a dvantage when d e a l i n g w i t h t h i s programme. 
B r i t i s h S o c i a l Democracy i n i t s c r u c i a l f o r m a t i v e and most 
s u c c e s s f u l s t a g e r e f l e c t s i n many ways t h e k i n d o f p o l i c y making 
f o r m sometimes known as i n c r e m e n t a l i s m and i t i s no a c c i d e n t t h a t 
i t s f o r e m o s t a d v o c a t e s a r e K e y n e s i a n o r i e n t a t e d . ^ S t a t e manage-
m e n t , i n t h i s view, i s e s s e n t i a l l y one o f m a r g i n a l a l t e r a t i o n ; i n 
t h i s o r t h a t g i v e n p o l i c y ! t h e p a s t b e i n g a c c e p t e d as t h e g u i d i n g 
l i g h t and t h e need f o r a v a l u e consensus b e i n g t h e s i n g l e , b i g g e s t 
c o n s t r a i n t on e x p l i c i t p o l i c y g o a l s o r o b j e c t i v e s . The s a f e s t 
b e t s o r d i r e c t i o n s a r e t h o s e g o v e r n e d by t h e most a c c e p t a b l e 
means: th o s e t h a t can b u i l d s o c i a l agreement o r p r e s e r v e i t . The 
1. B r a y b r o o k e , D., and L i n d b l o m , C.> A S t r a t e g y o f D e c i s i o n : 
P o l i c y E v a l u a t i o n as a S o c i a l Process (New Y o r k , The Free 
Press 1 9 3 ) , W i l d a v s k y , H e c l o , and Dahl s h a r e a s i m i l a r 
K e y n e s i a n b i a s . 
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p r e f e r e n c e s o f t h e s o c i a l d emocrat a r e l i k e w i s e f o r m o b i l i s i n g 
c o n s e n t by b a r g a i n i n g , and m a n i p u l a t i n g t h e g i v e n e n v i r o n m e n t 
i n t h e medium t e r m . The o m i s s i o n o f i m p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s i n 
i n c r e m e n t a l i s t t h e o r y i s based on t h e d e s i r e t o r e s t r i c t p o l i c y 
p r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e p o l i t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t a v o i d i n g ' c o n f r o n t a t i o n ' 
n o t o n l y between c a p i t a l and l a b o u r b u t a l s o w i t h i n t h e s t a t e 
a p p a r a t u s where i n t e r e s t s , w h i c h have s o l i d i f i e d i n t o s t r u c t u r e s 
o r ' d e p a r t m e n t a l v i e w s ' , s h o u l d n o t and c a n n o t be pushed a r o u n d } 
For s o c i a l democrats t h e w o r s t k i n d o f s i n i s t h e s a c r i f i c e o f 
s h o r t term management f o r ' p r i n c i p l e s ' and ' i d e o l o g y * . A bad 
government i s one t h a t r e s i s t s n e g o t i a t i o n f o r t h e p u r s u i t o f a 
s i n g l e o b j e c t i v e such as t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f sound money o r 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . C o l l e c t i v e wisdom comes n o t f r o m t h e compre-
h e n s i v e p l a n drawn up by a h i e r a r c h y o f d e c i s i o n makers, b u t f r o m 
t h e s o c i a l f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f a n a l y s i s , t h e m u l t i p l i c y o f d e c i s i o n 
c e n t r e s t h a t p r e v e n t s y n o p t i c m i s t a k e s . D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and 
d e p a r t m e n t a l i s m a r e t h u s n o t o n l y i n e v i t a b l e , as no one man can 
comprehend t h e whole, b u t b e n e f i c i a l as t h e y . e n c o u r a g e each 
p o l i c y programme t o be c o m p a r t m e n t a l i s e d and i n s u l a t e d , r e ^ D o n d i n g 
t h e r e b y o n l y t o t h e i n s i g h t o f t h o s e i n t e r e s t s c l o s e s t a t hand. 
By p r e v e n t i n g t h e c o . n f l a t i o n o f s e p a r a t e i s s u e s , programmes and 
i n t e r e s t s t o t h e c o v e r i n g d e c i s i o n s o f o v e r a l l p l a n n e r s , i n c r e -
m e n t a l i s m a l l o w s f o r p i e c e m e a l s o c i a l e n g i n e e r i n g . Where c o -
o r d i n a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d , a s o r t o f s o c i a l r a t i o n a l i t y emerges as 
1. H e c l o , H., and W i l d a v s k y , A., The P r i v a t e Government o f 
P u b l i c Money, (London, M c M i l l a n 1 9 7 4 ) . 
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each p i e c e o f t h e p o l i c y p r o c e s s , and i n d e e d each p o l i c y , l i n k s 
w i t h t h e o t h e r by b a r g a i n i n g o r what L i n d b l o m c a l l s ' p a r t i s a n 
m u t u a l a d j u s t m e n t * ^ . When t h e government i n 1948 was r e q u i r e d 
by t h e terms o f M a r s h a l l A i d t o p r e p a r e a s t a t e m e n t o f l o n g 
term aims i t s latnguage r e f l e c t e d a l m o s t t o a word t h i s k i n d o f 
t h i n k i n g where 
p r o g r e s s towards o u r o b j e c t i v e i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
a c o n t i n u o u s p r o c e s s o f a t t a c k on a s u c c e s s i o n 
o f i n d i v i d u a l p r o b l e m s 3s\<X a d j u s t m e n t s t o e v e r 
c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s . ^ 
As can be seen t h i s f o r m o f words does n o t r u l e o u t t h e maiin-
tenance o f p r i o r i t i e s . C h a p t e r s 6, 7 and 8 i n d i c a t e t h a t t h i s 
i s what happened. 
W h i l e we ca n n o t reduce S o c i a l Democracy t o t h e 'management' 
o f c a p i t a l i s m , n e i t h e r can we r e d u c e i t t o a g o a l - l e s s i n c r e m e n t a l -
i s m , s i n c e we i d e n t i f i e d c o s t s i n t h e e v e n t u a l p o l i c y m i x : c o s t s 
t h a t d e r i v e d f r o m t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 
s t a t e - t h e p r o t e c t i o n and i n s u l a t i o n o f s o c i a l programmes and 
th e c o n s e q u e n t ' f r e e z i n g ' o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f p r o d u c t i o n . Use 
o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s t o supplement t h e a c h i e v e m e n t s o f 
n e g o t i a t i o n r e p r e s e n t t h e a t t e m p t t o impose some s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
and o r d e r i n a t o t a l i t y t h e s o c i a l d emocrat r e f u s e s t o d e f i n e 
save as a h y b r i d - t h e 'mixed' economy. W i t h a w h o l e , whose 
p a r t s c o n t i n u e t o br e a k up and seek autonomy, t h e s o c i a l democrat 
sees h i s r o l e p r i n c i p a l l y as a c o n t i n u o u s a t t e m p t t o r e c r e a t e 
o r d e r a m i d s t d i s o r d e r . S i n c e t h e t o t a l i t y t h e y manage i s a 
1. L i n d b l o m , C., The I n t e l l i g e n c e o f Democracy ; d e c i s i o n m a k i n g 
t h r o u g h P a r t i s a n M u t u a l A d j u s t m e n t (New York, The Free Press 
1 9 6 5 ) . 
2. Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n : M a t e r i a l s u b m i t t e d t o t h e QEECD 
r e l a t i n g t o economic a f f a i r s i n t h e p e r i o d 1949-1953. Cmnd. 
7572. (London, H.M.S.O-, December 1 9 4 8 ) . 
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c o n t r a d i c t o r y u n i t y , s o c i a l democracy i s a s s u r e d as a 
r e o c c u r r i n g phenomena, as p o l i t i c a l l y t h e r e i s a l w a y s a l i n e o f 
l e a s t r e s i s t a n c e . T h e i r s u ccess i s i n l a r g e p a r t due t o t h e 
emergence f r o m 'Labourism' and t h e c u l t i v a t i o n o f t h e h a b i t s o f 
p o l i t i c a l management. W h i l e t h e t e r m s o f such management may be 
d e t e r m i n e d by t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e , t h e p r o c e s s o f accumu-
l a t i o n , t h e n a t u r e and c o n s t r a i n t s o f t h e w o r l d m a r k e t and 
w h e t h e r t h e r e i s a boom o r a slump, t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y o r 
i n s t a b i l i t y o f such management c a n n o t be p r o n o u n c e d a p r i o r i o r 
deduced f r o m a s t a t e t h e o r y d e p e n d e n t on a r e f l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h t h e economy. Whatever t h e terras o f management may be, even 
i f t h e y i n v o l v e a c r i s i s e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o 
s u s p e c t t h a t one can n e c e s s a r i l y p r e d i c t t h e i n a b i l i t y o f s o c i a l 
democracy t o s u r v i v e i t s own c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . I n d e e d , on t h e 
b a s i s o f t h e s k i l l s i t seems t o b r i n g i n t o p l a y , as i l l u s t r a t e d 
i n t h i s t h e s i s , i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o 'meike do and mend' o r 
'manage' w h a t e v e r t h e te r m s * U n l e s s t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s a l l o w e d 
f o r p o l i t i c s as an autonomous p r a c t i c e o r ' a r t ' o f government 
i s s u p e r f l u o u s . Whatever c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a r e p r o d u c e d by s o c i a l 
democracy t h e y can have no p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s u n l e s s t h e y a r e 
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f l i c t w i t h i n and w i t h o u t t h e 
s t a t e . An ove r - e m p h a s i s on ' t h e s t a t e ' p r e v e n t s an a n a l y s i s o f 
government and t h r o u g h government t h e a c t i v i t y , n e g o t i a t i o n 
and m a n i p u l a t i o n o f p o l i t i c i a n s , who i n t e r e s t e d i n p r e v e n t i n g 
the t r a n s l a t i o n o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t o c o n f l i c t , d e f i n e t h e i r 
a r t as one o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . I n c o n t r a s t t h i s t h e s i s has, 
i n s t e a d , p l a c e d a s h a r p f o c u s upon t h e p r o c e s s o f government 
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w i t h i n a f r a g m e n t e d s t a t e . T h a t f r a g m e n t a t i o n i s r e i n f o r c e d 
by t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f p o l i t i c i s m s who, c o n s t i t u t i n g government, 
can t h u s s u s t a i n t h e m a r g i n a l a d v a n t a g e o f d i s c r e t i o n o v e r 
c o n s t r a i n t t h a t p r o d u c e s t h e e n d u r i n g a p p e a l o f s o c i a l democracy 
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T r n ^ f i * ^ ^ * ^ ^*^'^r ^^2^-^"^ ° ° P - " " 3 t e f i g u r e s w e r e n o t o b t a i n e d o f n s u h s 1 d l z e d h o u s e s b u i l t hy l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s a n d p r i v a t e e n t e r n r i s e r e s o e c t i v t j 
, , i g ^ r e s c j l v e n I n t h e a b o v e t a b l e f o r u n s u b s l d l z e d h o u s e s b u i l t by p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e a c c o r d i n g l y I n c l u d e up to 1929 some h o u s e s b u i l t 
by l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s w i t h o u t s u b s i d y . The number o f s u c h h o u s e s ' was s m a 1 ] . 
J ^ ' ^ " ' - ' ' - ' T l v a t e E n t e r p r i s e I'ous 1 nq (^ennrt o f t h e sub-coiinn 11too t h e C e n t r a l H o u s i n g A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h 
• ( L o n d o n , M . M . p . o . J u l y 1944) A p p e n d i x I V . 
(1) Tlie f o l l o w i n g tab le shows the number of new permanent dwel l ing! 
b u i l t In Great B r i t a i n dur ing each of the y e a r s from 1945 to 
1952, both i n c l u s l v e : -
(11) The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e shows the numbers of permanent d w e l l i n g s provided 
by means other than now b u i l d i n g , and of temporary p r e f a b r i c a t e d housej 
provided In those y e a r s : -















































































































































































































































England A Wales 
Scotland 
Great Brltiiln 




provided by conversion 
Unlnlialilt£tble war 
damaged 


























8,606 60,817 8,939 -
- 60 - - - 437 8,606 CO - 60,817 - 9,376 
16,503 19,490 1 35.565 10,855 70,811 120 
1,044 - - - 12,119 -16,503 20,534 1 35,565 10,855 82,930 120 
10,453 24,340 234 9.843 9,931 34,118 233 
47 1,654 56 - - 11,974 20 
10.500 25,994 290 9.843 9,931 46,092 253 
5,845 21,201 227 2,143 7,656 10,587 159 
24 1,150 72 - - 7,550 -5,869 22,351 299 2.143 7,656 18,137 159 
2.964 10,372 219 696 4,148 _ 3 
12 1,069 54 - - 76 -2,976 11,441 273 696 4,148 76 3 
1.241 7,418 77 126 2,641 -
6 519 52 - - - -1.247 7,937 129 126 2,641 - -
783 6,384 120 41 1,593 _ 
3 253 12 - - - -786 6.637 132 41 1,593 - -
426 5,519 57 2 1,050 _ 
9 204 19 - - - -417 5,723 76 2 1,050 - -
46,821 94,724 935 109,233 37,874 124,455 515 
83 5,953 265 - - 32,156 20 46,904 100,677 1,200 - 37,874 156,611 535 
1. 'llie figures alxjve f o r new permanent drfelUngs Incliilo, under tlte totals 
for local autliorltios and private eiiLenirIsc, tl\e rebulldliwi o f war 
tlestroycd h o u s e s . 
* F l g u r o D f o r E n g l a n d a n d W a l c B a r e f r o m l a t A p r i l , 1945. 
. Source: Houses ; The Next Step . Cmnd. 8996. (London, J I . M . S . O . November 1953) 
* F i g u r e s f o r E n g l a n d a n d W a l c M n r o from l u t A p r i l , 1945. 
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1946 1082 917 -165 183 295 84 162 +190 487 164 -323 o -298 
1947 1560 1145 -415 246 309 128 186 + 121 278 129 -149 o -443 (f^ 
1948 1794 1602 -192 244 458 137 192 + 269 172 96 - 76 o + 1 
1949 1978 1841 -137 266 500 127 200 + 307 174 35 -139 o + 31 
1950 2383 2250 -133 265 675 112 271 + 569 165 29 -136 0 + 300 
1951 3481 2748 -733 384 754 194 307 +483 192 38 -154 4 -400 
Source: U n i t e d Kingdom Balance o f Payments 1946-54 Cmnd. 9291, Table 1 quo t e d i n Walker, G., 
Economic P l a n n i n g by Programme- and C o n t r o l i n Great B r i t a i n (London, Heinemann 1 9 5 7 ) , p.109 
Notes: (a) s h i p p i n g and t r a v e l 
(b) S h i p p i n g T r a v e l and o t h e r n e t ' r e c e i p t s ' 
(c) I n t e r e s t , p r o f i t s d i v i d e n d s , and m i g r a n t s 
f u n d s , l e g a c i e s and p r i v a t e g i f t s ( n e t ) . 
(d) I n t e r e s t p r o f i t s and d i v i d e n d . c : . 
(e) The d e f i c i t was -658 i n 1945" (p.388 D u t t ) . 
( f ) The main element i n t h e 1947 d e f i c i t WAS 
m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e b u t t h e f a l l i n 
v i s i b l e t r a d e (p.310 G a r d n e r ) . The volume 
o f e x p o r t s stopped r i s i n g w h i l e i m p o r t s 
m c f a / ; » c r\ir\ nr1rec;)mnre th;^n Pvnr ) r + < ; . 
430 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. PRIMARY SOURCES 
( a ) M a n u s c r i p t and A r c h i v a l Sources* 
U n i t e d Kingdom P u b l i c Record O f f i c e * 
C a b i n e t M i n u t e s and Papers 1940-1948. 
C a b i n e t Committee M i n u t e s and Papers 1940-1948. 
M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h Papers and Cor r e s p o n d e n c e 1940-1948. 
H.M. T r e a s u r y Papers and Correspondence 1940-1948. 
M i n i s t r y o f Works Papers and Correspondence 1940-1948. 
( b ) O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n s . 
P a r l i a m e n t a r y P r o c e e d i n g s , ( H a n s a r d ) , ( V a r i o u s d a t e s 1940-1951). 
Report o f t h e Committee on T r u s t s . Cmnd 9236, (London HMSO 1919) 
M i n i s t r y o f Works. R e p o r t o f t h e E d u c a t i o n Committee o f t h e 
C e n t r a l C o u n c i l f o r Works and b u i l d i n g s on T r a i n i n g 
f o r t h e b u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y . (London HMSO 1 9 4 2 ) . 
T r a i n i n g f o r t h e b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y . Cmnd 6248, (London HMSO 
F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 3 ) . 
P r o p o s a l s f o r an I n t e r n a t i o n a l C l e a r i n g U n i o n . Cmnd 6437, 
(London HMSO 1 9 4 3 ) . 
J o i n t S t a t e m e n t by E x p e r t s on t h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund. Cmnd 6519, (London HMSO 
A p r i l 1 9 4 4 ) . 
Employment P o l i c y . Cmnd 6527, (London HMSO May 1 9 4 4 ) . 
A r t i c l e s o f Agreement * U.N. Monetary and F i n a n c i a l C o n f e r e n c e 
a d o p t e d a t B r e t t o n Woods. Cmnd 6346, (London HMSO 
J u l y 1 9 4 4 ) . 
M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h . D e s i g n o f E n ^ - e l l i n g s , R e p o r t o f t h e Design 
o f D w e l l i n g s Sub Committee o f t h e C e n t r a l H o u sing 
A d v i s o r y Committee, (London HMSO 1 9 4 4 ) . 
431 
M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h . P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e H o u s i n g : R e p o r t o f t h e 
Sub Committee o f t h e C e n t r a l H o u s i n g A d v i s o r y Committee, 
(London HMSO, J u l y 1 9 4 4 ) . 
The P u b l i c G e n e r a l A c t s o f 1944» (London HMSO,1945). 
Ho u s i n g . Cmnd 6609, (London HMSO, March 1 9 4 5 ) . 
R e p o r t o f t h e I n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l Committee on Rent C o n t r o l . 
Cmnd 6621, (London HMSO, A p r i l 1 9 4 5 ) . 
H o u s i n g ;The Temporary Programme. Cmnd 6686, (London HMSO, 1 9 4 5 ) . 
F i n a n c i a l Agreement between t h e U.S. aind t h e U.K. Cmnd 6708, 
(London HMSO, December 1 9 4 5 ) . 
P r o p o s a l s f o r C o n s i d e r a t i o n by an I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e on 
Trade and Employment. Cmnd 6709, (London HMSO, December 
1 9 4 5 ) . 
The P u b l i c G e n e r a l A c t s o f 1945, (London HMSO, 1 9 4 6 ) . 
The P u b l i c G e n e r a l A c t s o f 1946. (London HMSO, 1 9 4 7 ) . 
H o u s i n g Programme f o r 1947, Cmnd 7 0 2 1 , (London HMSO, Jasiuary 
1 9 4 7 ) . 
Economic Survey f o r 1947, Cmnd 7046, (London HMSO, F e b r u a r y 
1 9 4 7 ) . 
C a p i t a l I n v e s t m e n t i n 1948, Cmnd 7268, (London HMSO, December 
1 9 4 7 ) . 
C a p i t a l I s s u e s C o n t r o l ; S p e c i a l Memorandum t o t h e Commissioners, 
Cmnd 7281, (London HMSO, December 1 9 4 7 ) . 
Economic Survey f o r 1948, Cmnd 7344, (London HMSO, March 1 9 4 8 ) . 
European C o - o p e r a t i o n Agreement U.K./U.S.A., Cmnd 7446, 
(London HMSO, June 1 9 4 8 ) . 
432 
Housing R e t u r n f o r E n g l a n d and Wales up t o 3 1 s t May, 1948, 
Cmnd 7448, (London HMSO, June 1 9 4 8 ) . 
Housing R e t u r n f o r E n g l a n d and Wales up t o 3 0 t h September, 
1948, Cmnd 7552, (London HMSO, O c t o b e r 1 9 4 8 ) . 
European C o - o p e r a t i o n ; Memoranda s u b m i t t e d t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
f o r European Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o t h e 
p e r i o d 1949-53, Cmnd 7572, (London HMSO, December 1948) 
M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h , F i r s t R e p o r t o f t h e O f f i c i a l Committee o f 
E n q u i r y i n t o t h e c o s t o f h o u s e b u i l d i n c , (London HMSO, 
1948) . 
M i n i s t r y o f Works, R e p o r t o f t h e Committee o f E n q u i r y i n t o t h e 
D i s t r i b u t i o n o f B u i l d i n g M a t e r i a l s and Components, 
(London HMSO, 1 9 4 8 ) . 
The P u b l i c G e n e r a l A c t s o f 1947, (London HMSO, 1 9 4 8 ) . 
Economic Survey f o r 1949, Cmnd 7647, (London HMSO, F e b r u a r y 
1949) . 
M i n i s t r y o f Works, B u i l d i n g , R e p o r t o f the W o r k i n g P a r t y o f 
th e M i n i s t r y o f Works, (London HMSO, Jamuary 1 9 5 0 ) . 
C e n t r a l O f f i c e o f I n f o r m a t i o n , H o u s i n g i n B r i t a i n , (London 
HMSO, March 1 9 5 1 ) . 
Houses : The Next Step, Cmnd 8996, (London HMSO, November 1953). 
( c ) Newspapers and P e r i o d i c a l s . 
The Times, ( v a r i o u s d a t e s 1 9 4 0 - 5 1 ) . 
The D a i l y T e l e g r a p h , ( v a r i o u s d a t e s 1940-51). 
The F i n a n c i a l Times, ( V a r i o u s d a t e s 1940-51). 
The Economist, ( v a r i o u s d a t e s t o 1 9 5 1 ) . 
The B u i l d i n g Worker, V o l . 1. 
The B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r i e s Survey V o l . v i i . 
433 
B, SECONDARY SOURCES. 
Abrams, P., 'The F a i l u r e o f S o c i a l Reform 1918-20', P a s t and 
P r e s e n t , 24 ( A p r i l 1 9 6 3 ) , pp. 43-64. 
A d d i s o n , P., The Road t o 1945 ; B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s and t h e Second 
'v>jorld War, (London, J o n a t h a n Cape, 1 9 7 5 ) . 
A l t h u s s e r , L., For Marx, (London, A l l e n (and P e n g u i n P r e s s ) , 
1 9 6 9 ) . 
A l t h u s s e r , L., and B a l i b a r , E., Reading C a p i t a l , (London, New 
L e f t Books, 1 9 7 0 ) . 
A l t v a t e r , E. , *Notes on Some Problems o f S t a t e I n t e r v e n t L o n i a n ( I ) ' , 
W o r k i n g Papers on t h e K a p i t a l i s t a t e 1/1973, pp. 79-108. 
A l t v a t e r , Ev, 'Notes on Some Problems o f S t a t e I n t e r v e n t i o n i s m 
(II)», W o r k i n g Papers on t h e K a p i t a l i s t a t e 2/1973, 
pp. 76-83. 
Amalgamated Uni o n o f B u i l d i n g T rade Workers, The B u i l d i n g 
Workers S t r u g g l e , (London, Amalgamated Union o f 
B u i l d i n g Trade Workers C e n t e n a r y S o u v e n i r , 1 9 4 8 ) . 
Amery, L., The Awakening ; Our P r e s e n t C r i s i s and t h e Way Out, 
(London, MacDonald 1 9 4 8 ) . 
Anderson, P., and B l a c k b u r n , R., Towards S o c i a l i s m , (London, 
Fontana, 1 9 6 5 ) . 
A n d r e s k i , S., M i l i t a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n and S o c i e t y , (Second e d i t . , 
London, R o u t l e d g e and Kegan P a u l , 1 9 6 8 ) . 
Bacon, R., and E l t i s , W., B r i t a i n ' s Economic Problem ; Too few 
p r o d u c e r s , (London, M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 7 6 ) . 
B a i l e y , R., The S g u a t t e r s , (Harmondsworth, P e n g u i n , 1 9 7 5 ) . 
434 
B a l l , M., ' B r i t i s h Housing P o l i c y and t h e H o u s e b u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y C a p i t a l and C l a s s . 4, S p r i n g , 1978, pp. 78-
lOO. 
Balmer, T., ' P o i g n a r d o f T r u t h t o Mr. Bevan', Labour M o n t h l y , 
V o l . X X X I I , No. 1 , J a n u a r y 1950, pp. 15-22. 
Bal o g h , T., * The P l a n n i n g and C o n t r o l o f I n v e s t m e n t * , B u l l e t i n 
o f t h e O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e o f S t a t i s t i c s , 
V o l . V I I , O c t o b e r 1945, No. 10, pp. 244-251. 
Balogh, T., The D o l l a r C r i s i s , Cause and Cure, ( O x f o r d , B a s i l 
B l a c k w e l l 1 9 4 9 ) . 
B a l o g h , T., Unegual P a r t n e r s , Volume I I , ( O x f o r d , B a s i l 
B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 6 3 ) . 
Bareau, P., ( e d . ) . The I n d u s t r i a l F u t u r e o f G r e a t B r i t a i n , 
(London, Europa P r e s s , 1 9 4 8 ) . 
B a r r y , B., S o c i o l o g i s t s , E c o n o m i s t s and Democracy, ( U n i v e r s i t y 
o f Chicago Press, 1 9 7 8 ) . 
B a r t l e t t , C.J., A H i s t o r y o f P o s t War B r i t a i n 1945-75, (London, 
Longmans, 1 9 7 7 ) . 
Beer, S., T r e a s u r y C o n t r o l ; The C o - o r d i n a t i o n o f F i n a n c i a l and 
Economic P o l i c y i n G r e a t B r i t a i n , (2nd R e v i s e d e d i t i o n , 
O x f o r d , The C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 117-22. 
Beer, S., Modern B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s , (London, Faber and Faber, 
1 9 6 5 ) . 
B e r n s t e i n , E., E v o l u t i o n a r y S o c i a l i s m , (New Y o r k , Schoeken, 1961), 
Benewick, R., e t a l ( e d s . ) , Knowledge and B e l i e f i n P o l i t i c s : 
t h e p r o blem o f i d e o l o g y , (London, A l l e n and Unwin, 
1 9 7 3 ) . 
435 
Bogdanor, V., and S k i d e l s k y , R., ( e d s . ) , The Age o f A f f l u e n c e 
1951-65, (London, M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 6 7 ) . 
B o n n e t t , K., and Jessop, B., 'A Cross N a t i o n a l Study o f 
I n t e r v e n t i o n i s m and P o l i t i c a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h 
p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e t o K e y n e s i a n i s m , m o n e t a r i s m , 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m and c o r p o r a t i s m * , SSRC Panel on 
C o r p o r a t i s m and A c c o u n t a b i l i t y , ( C a n t e r b u r y , A p r i l 
1 9 8 1 ) . 
Bowley, M., H o u s i n g and t h e S t a t e 1919-1944, (London, A l l e n 
and Unwin, 1 9 4 5 ) . 
Bowley, M-, 'Housing P o l i c y i n G r e a t B r i t a i n ' , I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Labour Review, V o l . L I I , Nos. 2-3, August-September 
1945, pp. 258-9. 
Bowley, M., 'Housing and t h e Economic C r i s i s i n B r i t a i n * , 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour Review, V o l . LIX, No.2, F e b r u a r y 
1949, pp.134-52. 
Bowley, M., The B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y ; Four S t u d i e s i n 
r e s p o n s e and r e s i s t a n c e t o change, (Cambridge 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 6 ) . 
Brady, R., C r i s i s i n B r i t a i n ; P l a n s and A c h i e v e m e n t s o f t h e 
Labour Government, (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 0 ) . 
B r a y b r o o k e , D., and L i n d b l o m , C., A S t r a t e g y o f D e c i s i o n ; P o l i c y 
e v a l u a t i o n as a S o c i a l P r o c e s s , (New Y o r k , The Free 
P r e s s , 1 9 6 3 ) . 
B r e t t , E., G i l l i a t t , S.E. and P o p l e , A., 'Planned Trade, Labour 
P a r t y P o l i c y and U.S. I n t e r v e n t i o n : t h e successes and 
f a i l u r e s o f P o s t War R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' , H i s t o r y Workshop 
J o u r n a l 13, S p r i n g , 1982, pp. 130-142. 
436 
B r i d g e s , E., T r e a s u r y C o n t r o l , (London, A t h l o w e P r e s s , 1 9 5 0 ) . 
B r i g g s , S., Keep S m i l i n g Throuqh : The Home F r o n t 1939-45, 
( W i e d e n f i e l d ajid N i c h o l s o n , 1 9 7 5 ) . 
B r i t t a n , S., S t e e r i n g t h e Economy ; The T r e a s u r y under t h e 
T o r i e s 1951-64, (Harmondsworth, P e n g u i n , 1 9 7 1 ) . 
B r i t t a n , S., * The Economic C o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f Democracy*, 
B r i t i s h J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , Volume 5, P a r t 
2, A p r i l 1975, pp. 129-159. 
Brogan, C. , P a t r i o t s ? My F o o t ! , (London, H o l l i s and C a r t e r , 1949). 
Brown, A,L., Rules and C o n f l i c t : an i n t r o d u c t i o n t o P o l i t i c a l 
L i f e and i t s Study, (New J e r s e y , P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1 9 8 1 ) . 
Buchanan, J . , and Wagner, R., Democracy i n D e f i c i t : The 
P o l i t i c a l Legacy o f L o r d Keynes, (New Y o r k , Academic 
P r e s s , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
B u r c h a r d t , F.A., and M a r t i n , K., *West Germany and R e c o n s t r u c t i o n * , 
B u l l e t i n o f t h e O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e o f 
S t a t i s t i c s , V o l . IX, No. 12, 1947, pp. 409-429. 
B u r c h a r d t , F.A., 'Cuts i n C a p i t a l E x p e n d i t u r e ' , B u l l e t i n o f t h e 
O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e o f S t a t i s t i c s , V o l . X, 
No. 1 , J a n u a r y 1948, pp. 1-8. 
B u r r i d g e , T.D., B r i t i s h Labour and H i t l e r ' s War, (London, 
Deutsch, 1 9 7 6 ) . 
C a l d e r , A., The P e o p l e ' s War : B r i t a i n 1939-45, (London, 
J o n a t h a n Cape, 1 9 6 9 ) . 
C a r t e r , C.F., 'The B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y ' IN D.L. Burn ( e d . ) . The 
S t r u c t u r e o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r y , V o l . I , (Cambridge 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 8 ) . 
437 
C h e s t e r , D.N., ( e d . ) , Lessons o f t h e B r i t i s h War Economy, 
(Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 1 ) , 
Coates, D., The Labour P a r t y and t h e S t r u g g l e f o r S o c i a l i s m , 
(Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 5 ) . 
Coates, D., Labour i n Power? A Study o f t h e Labour Government 
1974-8, (London, Longmans, 1 9 8 0 ) . 
C o l e , G.D.H., P r i n c i p l e s o f Economic P l a n n i n g , (London, 
M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 3 5 ) . 
C o l e , G.D.H., The M a c h i n e r y o f S o c i a l i s t P l a j i n i n q , (London, 
H o g a r t h , 1 9 3 8 ) . 
C o l e , G.D-H., Pl a n f o r D e m o c r a t i c B r i t a i n , (London, Odams P r e s s , 
1 9 3 9 ) . 
C o l e , G.D.H., * The Labour Problem i n t h e B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y * , 
Agenda : Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , V o l . I , 
No. 2, 1942, pp. 129-43. 
Cole, G.D.H., 'The B u i l d i n g I n d u s t r y a f t e r t h e War*, Agenda : 
Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , V o l . I I , No.2, 
May 1943, pp. 146-52-
Co l e , G.D.H., B u i l d i n g and P l a n n i n g , (London, C a s s e l l and Co., 
19 4 5 ) . 
C o n n o l l y , Iv.E., The Terms o f P o l i t i c a l D i s c o u r s e , ( L e x i n g t o n 
Mass. D,C. Heath, 1 9 7 4 ) . 
Cox, A., ' C o r p o r a t i s m as r e d u c t i o n i s m : t h e a m a l y t i c l i m i t s o f 
th e c o r p o r a t i s t t h e s i s ' , Government and O p p o s i t i o n , 
Volume 16, No. 1, W i n t e r 1981, pp. 78-95. 
C r a i g , F.W.S., ( e d . ) , B r i t i s h G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n M a n i f e s t o s 1918-
66, ( C h i c h e s t e r P o l i t i c a l R e f e r e n c e P u b l i c a t i o n ) , 1970). 
438 
de C r e s p i g n y , A., »Power and i t s Forms', P o l l t i c a l S t u d i e s , 
V o l . 16, No.2, 1963, pp. 192-205. 
Crosland, A., 'The Movement o f Labour i n 1948', P a r t I I , 
B u l l e t i n o f t h e O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e o f 
S t a t i s t i c s , V o l . I I , No. 7 and 8, J u l y / A u g u s t , 1949, 
pp. 194-212. 
Crosland, C.A.R., The F u t u r e o f S o c i a l i s m , ( a b r i d g e d e d i t i o n ) , 
(London, J o n a t h a n Cape, 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 14-19. 
C u l l i n g w o r t h , J.B., Hou s i n g and L o c a l Government i n E n g l a n d and 
Wales, (London, A l l e n and Unwin, 1 9 6 6 ) . 
C u l l i n g w o r t h , J.B., E n v i r o n m e n t a l P l a n n i n g 1939-69, V o l . I : 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and Land Use P l a n n i n g 1939-47, (London, 
HMSO, 1 9 7 5 ) . 
D a a l d e r , H., C a b i n e t Reform i n B r i t a i n 1914-63, ( S t a n f o r d 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 3 ) . 
D a h l , R.A., and L i n d b l o m , C.E., P o l i t i c s , Economies and W e l f a r e , 
( U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago P r e s s , 1 9 5 3 ) . 
D a h l , R., Modern P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , ( s e c o n d e d i t i o n ) , (New York, 
P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1 9 7 0 ) . 
Dal t o n , H., Hi g h T i d e and A f t e r ; Memoirs 1945-6Q, (London, 
M u l l e r , 1 9 6 2 ) . 
Deutsch, K., The Nerves o f Government : models o f p o l i t i c a l 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n and c o n t r o l , (New Yor k , The Free P r e s s , 
1 9 6 6 ) . 
Devons, E., 'The P r o g r e s s o f R e c o n v e r s i o n ' , The Ma n c h e s t e r 
School o f Economic and S o c i a l S t u d i e s , V o l . XV, N o . l , 
( J a n u a r y 1 9 4 7 ) , pp. 1-25. 
439 
Devons, E. , ' V a r i e t y among t h e P l a o i n e r s ' , M a n c h e s t e r School o f 
Economic and S o c i a l S t u d i e s , V o l . XV, N o . l , J a n u a r y 
1947, pp. 93-112. 
Devons, £., 'Economic P l a n n i n g i n War and Peace', The Manchester 
School o f Economic and S o c i a l S t u d i e s , V o l . X V I , N o . l , 
( J a n u a r y 1 9 4 8 ) , pp. 1-29. 
Devons, E., 'The Economic Survey f o r 1949', M a n c h e s t e r School 
o f Economic and S o c i a l S t u d i e s , V o l . X V I I , No.2, 
May 1949, pp. 111-128. 
Devons, E., ' P l a n n i n g by Economic Survey', Economica, XIX, 
No. 75, A u g u s t 1952, pp. 237-252. 
D i e s i n g , P., P a t t e r n s o f D i s c o v e r y i n t h e S o c i a l S c i e n c e s , 
(London, R o u t l e d g e and Kegan P a u l , 1 9 7 2 ) . 
D i c k e n s , P., ' S o c i a l Change, H o u s i n g and t h e S t a t e - some 
a s p e c t s o f c l a s s f r a g m e n t a t i o n aind i n c o r p o r a t i o n 
1915-46', IN M. H a r l o e ( e d . ) Papers p r e s e n t e d a t t h e 
C o n f e r e n c e on Urban Change and C o n f l i c t , U n i v e r s i t y 
o f York, 1977, (London C e n t r e f o r E n v i r o n m e n t a l 
S t u d i e s , 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 336-396. 
D i l l a r d , D., The Economics o f John Maynard Keynes, (New Y o r k , 
P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1 9 4 8 ) . 
Donnison, D., The Government o f H o u s i n g , (Harmondsworth. 
Penguin, 1 9 6 7 ) . 
Donoughue, B., and Jones, G.W., H e r b e r t M o r r i s o n . : P o r t r a i t 
o f a P o l i t i c i a n , (London, W e i d e n f e l d and N i c h o l s o n , 
1 9 7 3 ) . 
440 
Dow, J.C.R., The Management o f t h e B r i t i s h Economy 1945-60, 
(Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 0 ) . 
Downs, A., An Economic Theory o f Democracy, (New York, 
H a r p e r and B r o s . , 1 9 5 7 ) . 
Downs, A., I n s i d e B u r e a u c r a c y , ( B o s t o n L i t t l e Brown, 1 9 6 7 ) . 
D r o r , Y., P o l i c y m a k i n g Re-examined, ( S c r a n t o n Penn. C h a n d l e r , 
1 9 6 8 ) . 
Drummond, J.M., The F i n a n c e o f L o c a l Government, En g l a n d and 
Wales, (London, A l l e n and Unwin, 1 9 5 2 ) . 
D u c l a u d - W i l l i a m s , R., The P o l i t i c s o f H o u s i n g i n B r i t a i n and 
France, (London, Heinemann, 1 9 7 8 ) . 
Duns i r e . A., A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; The Word and t h e S c i e n c e , ( O x f o r d , 
M a r t i n R o b e r t s o n , 1 9 7 3 ) . 
D u t t , R. Palme., C l J i l s l s o f B r i t a i n and t h e B r i t i s h Empire, 
(London, Lawrence and W i s h a r t , 1 9 5 3 ) . 
E a t w e l l , R., The 1945-51 Labour Governments, (London, B a t s f o r d 
Academic, 1979) . 
E l s a s , M.J., Housing B e f o r e t h e War and A f t e r , (London, S t a p l e s 
P r e s s , 1 9 4 2 ) . 
E t z i o n i , A., A C o m p a r a t i v e A n a l y s i s o f Complex O r g a n i z a t i o n s , 
(New York, The Free P r e s s , 1 9 6 1 ) . 
F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s , R e c o n s t r u c t i o n : R e p o r t o f the 
F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s , May 1942. 
F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s , The F u t u r e o f o u r E x p o r t Trade; 
R e p o r t by t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s , 
F e b r u a r y 1943. 
441 
F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s , I n t e r i m R e p o r t o f t h e 
F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s on t h e F i n a l A c t 
o f t h e U.N. Monetary and F i n a n c i a l C o n f e r e n c e , 
November 1944. 
F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s , I n d u s t r y and t h e Way t o 
Recovery, Report by t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h 
I n d u s t r i e s , A u g u s t 1947. 
Foot, M., A n e u r i n Bevan ; a b i o g r a p h y . V o l . 2, 1945-60, 
London, D a v i s P o y n t e r , 1 9 7 3 ) . 
Forbach, L.F., Homes f o r Heroes : A Study o f t h e E v o l u t i o n o f 
B r i t i s h P u b l i c H o u s i n g 1 9 1 5 - 2 1 , (London, S e e l e y 
S e r v i c e , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
Fratnks, O., C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g i n War and Peace, (London, 
Longmans, 1 9 4 7 ) . 
Frey, B.S., Modern P o l i t i c a l Economy, (London, M a r t i n R o b e r t s o n , 
1 9 7 8 ) . 
Gardner, R., S t e r l i n g - D o l l a r D i p l o m a c y , (Second e d i t . , New Y o r k , 
M c G r a w - H i l l , 1 9 6 9 ) . 
G a u l d i e , E., C r u e l H a b i t a t i o n s - A H i s t o r y o f W o r k i n g C l a s s 
H o u s i n g 1780-1918, (London, A l l e n and Unwin 1 9 7 4 ) . 
Gibson, A.H., and K i r k a l d y , A.W., B r i t i s h F i n a n c e 1914-21, 
(London, B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n f o r Advancement o f 
S c i e n c e 1 9 2 1 ) . 
G i l b e r t , B., B r i t i s h S o c i a l P o l i c y 1914-39, (London, B a t s f o r d , 
1 9 7 0 ) . 
G l e n n e r s t e r , H., S o c i a l S e r v i c e b u d g e t s and S o c i a l P o l i c y , 
(London, A l l e n ajid Unwin, 1 9 7 4 ) . 
442 
Gray, H., The Cost o f C o u n c i l H o u s i n g , Research Monograph 18, 
( I n s t i t u t e o f Economic A f f a i r s , London, 1 9 6 8 ) . 
G r e e n s t e i n , F., and P o l s b y , N., ( e d s . ) . The Handbook o f 
P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , V o l . 7, ( R e a d i n g Mass. A d d i s o n 
Wesley, 1 9 7 5 ) . 
G r i f f i t h s , R.T-, ( e d . ) . Government, b u s i n e s s and Labour i n 
European C a p i t a l i s m , (London, E u r o p o t e n t i a l s P r e s s , 
1 9 7 8 ) . 
Gupta, P.S., I m p e r i a l i s m and t h e B r i t i s h Labour Movement 1914-64, 
(London, M a c M i l i a n , 1 9 7 4 ) . 
G u s t a f s s o n , G., and R i c h a r d s o n , J . , C o n c e p t s o f R a t i o n a l i t y ajid 
t h e P o l i c y P r o c e s s ' , European J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l 
Research, V o l . 7, No.4, December 1979, pp. 415-436. 
G y f o r d , J . , and Haseler,. S., S o c i a l Democracy beyond R e v i s i o n i s m , 
( F a b i a n Research S e r i e s 292, March 1 9 7 1 ) . 
H a l l , P., e t a l ( e d s . ) , Chcunge, C h o i c e and C o n f l i c t i n S o c i a l 
P o l i c y , (London, Heinemann, 1 9 7 5 ) . 
Halm, G., Economic Systems : A C o m p a r a t i v e A n a l y s i s , ( T h i r d e d i t . , 
New Y o r k , H o l t , R i n e h a r t and W i n s t o n , 1 9 6 8 ) . 
H a m i l t o n , M., * An A n a l y s i s and T y p o l o g y o f S o c i a l Power*, P a r t I I , 
P h i l o s o p h y o f S o c i a l S c i e n c e 7, ( 1 9 7 7 ) , pp. 51-65. 
Hancock, W-K., and Gowing, M.M., B r i t i s h Vvar Economy, H i s t o r y o f the 
- S e c o n d W o r l d W a r : C i v i l i S e r i e s , (London, HMSO..1949). 
H a r r i n g t o n , W., and Young, P., The B r i t i s h R e v o l u t i o n , (London, 
D a v i s P o y n t e r , 1 9 7 8 ) . 
H a r r o d , R., Are t h e s e h a r d s h i p s n e c e s s a r y ? , (London, H a r t - D a v i s , 
1 9 4 7 ) . 
443 
H a r t , P.E., ( e d . ) , S t u d i e s i n P r o f i t , B u s i n e s s S a v i n g and 
I n v e s t m e n t i n t h e U.K. 1920-1942, Volume I I , (London, 
A l l e n and Unwin, 1 9 6 8 ) . 
Hayek, F.A., T i g e r by t h e T a i l : a F o r t y Year commentary on 
K e y n e s i a n i s m , (London I n s t i t u t e o f Economic A f f a i r s , 
H o b a r t Paperback, 1 9 7 2 ) . 
Hayek. F.A., F u l l Employment a t Any P r i c e ? , (London I n s t i t u t e 
o f Economic A f f a i r s , O c c a s i o n a l Paper No. 45, 1 9 7 5 ) . 
H e c l o , H., and W i l d a v s k y , A., The P r i v a t e Government o f P u b l i c 
Money, (London, M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 7 4 ) . 
Heinemann, M., 'How Near i s t h e Slump?', Labour M o n t h l y , V o l . 
X X X I I , No. 6, June 1950, pp. 268-275. 
Henderson, H., 'The A n g l o - A m e r i c a n F i n a n c i a l Agreement', 
B u l l e t i n o f t h e O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e o f 
S t a t i s t i c s , Volume V I I I , No. 1 , J a n u a r y 1946, pp. 1-13. 
Henderson, H., 'The I m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e M a r s h a l l Speech', 
B u l l e t i n o f t h e O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e o f 
S t a t i s t i c s , Volume I X , No. 8, A u g u s t 1947, pp.274-82. 
Henderson, H., The I n t e r War Years and O t h e r Papers, ( O x f o r d , 
The C l a r e n d o n Press, 1 9 5 5 ) . 
H i r s c h , J . , 'What i s t h e F i s c a l C r i s i s o f t h e S t a t e ? On t h e 
P o l i t i c a l F u n c t i o n o f t h e F i s c a l C r i s i s ' , U n p u b l i s h e d 
Papers g i v e n t o C o n f e r e n c e o f S o c i a l i s t E c o n o m i s t s , 
B r a d f o r d , 1977. 
H i t c h , C.J., 'The Contr.ol,s i n P o s t War R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' , O x f o r d 
Economic Papers, No. 6, A p r i l 1942, pp. 43-56. 
Hobsbawn, E.J., I n d u s t r y and Empire, (Harmondswor t h P e nguin, 1969), 
444 
H o l l o w a y , J . , and P i c c i o t t o , S., ( e d s . ) . S t a t e and C a p i t a l ; 
A German Debate, (London, Edward A r n o l d , 1 9 7 8 ) . 
Hood, C., and W r i g h t , M., ( e d s . ) . B i g Government i n Hard Times, 
( O x f o r d , r - i a r t i n R o b e r t s o n , 1 9 8 1 ) . 
H o p k i n s , H. , The New Look:A S o c i a l H i s t o r y o f t h e F o r t i e s and 
F i f t i e s i n B r i t a i n , (London, Seeker and Warburg, 1 9 6 3 ) . 
H o r o w i t z , D., The Free W o r l d C o l o s s u s ; A C r i t i g u e o f A m e r i c a ' s 
F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n t h e C o l d War, (New Y o r k , H i l l and 
Wang, 19 6 6 ) . 
H o w e l l , D., B r i t i s h S o c i a l Democracy, (London, Croom Helm, 1976). 
H o w e l l , P., 'Once Agaiin on P r o d u c t i v e and U n p r o d u c t i v e l a b o u r ' , 
R e v o l u t i o n a r y Communist 3-4, November 1975, pp.46-68. 
Howson, S., Domestic Monetary Management i n B r i t a i n 1919-38, 
U n i v e r s i t y o f Cambridge Department o f A p p l i e d 
Economics O c c a s i o n a l Paper No. 48, (Cambridge 
U n i v e r s i t y Press 1975;). 
I l e r s i c , A.R., Government F i n a n c e and F i s c a l P o l i c y i n Post War 
B r i t a i n , (London, S t a p l e s P r e s s , 1 9 5 5 ) . 
I.L.O., P u b l i c I n v e s t m e n t and F u l l Employment, ( M o n t r e a l 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour O f f i c e , 1 9 4 6 ) . 
Jessopt 3., ' C a p i t a l i s m and Democracy : The b e s t p o s s i b l e 
p o l i t i c a l s h e l l ? IN G. L i t t l e j o h p , B. Smart e t a l 
Power and t h e S t a t e , (London, Croom Helm, 1 9 7 8 ) , 
pp. 10-51. 
Jessop, B., The C a p i t a l i s t S t a t e : M a r x i s t t h e o r i e s and methods, 
( O x f o r d , M a r t i n R o b e r t s o n , 1 9 8 2 ) . 
Jewkes, J . , O r d e a l by P l a n n i n g , (London, M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 4 8 ) . 
445 
Johnson, P.B., Land F i t f o r Heroes : The P l a n n i n g o f B r i t i s h 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 1916-1919, ( U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago 
Press, 1 9 6 9 ) . 
Jones, J . , F i f t e e n Weeks, F e b r u a r y 21 - June 5, 1947, (New York, 
V i k i n g P r e s s , 1 9 5 5 ) . 
Joseph, M., and K a l d o r , N., Economic R e c o n s t r u c t i o n a f t e r t h e 
War, A s s o c i a t i o n f o r E d u c a t i o n i n C i t i z e n s h i p 
handbook, (London, E n g l i s h U n i v e r s i t i e s P r e s s , 1 9 4 3 ) . 
K a t z n e l s o n , I . , ' L e n i n o r Weber? C h o i c e s i n M a r x i s t T h e o r i e s o f 
P o l i t i e s ' , P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , V o l . XXIX, No. 4, 
December 1981, pp. 632-640. 
K i l r o y , B., 'Housing F i n a n c e - why so p r i v i l e d g e d ? ' , L l o y d s 
Bank Review, J u l y 1979, No. 133, pp. 37-52. 
K i n g , A., ' O v e r l o a d : Problems o f G o v e r n i n g i n t h e 1970's', 
P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , V o l . X X I I I , Nos. 2 and 3, 1975, 
pp. 162-74. 
K i r s t e n , E.S. e t a l ( e d s . ) , Economic P o l i c y i n o u r Time 1949-61, 
( C o u n t r y S t u d i e s ) , Volume I I , (Amsterdam, N o r t h 
H o l l a n d , 1 9 6 4 ) . 
K i r s t e n , E.S. e t a l ( e d s . ) . Economic P o l i c y i n o u r Time 1949-61, 
( C o u n t r y S t u d i e s ) , Volume I I I , (Amsterdam, N o r t h 
H o l l a n d , 1 9 6 4 ) . 
Kohan, CM., Works and B u i l d i n g s , H i s t o r y o f t h e Second W o r l d 
W a r : C i v i l S e r i e s , (London, HiMSO, 1 9 5 2 ) . 
Labour P a r t y C o n f e r e n c e R e p o r t s 1940-51. 
Labour P a r t y , Housing and P l a n n i n g A f t e r t h e War, (London, 
T r a n s p o r t House, 1 9 4 3 ) . 
446 
L a b o u r P a r t y , ABC o f t h e C r i s i s , ( L o n d o n , T r a n s p o r t House, 
1 9 4 7 ) . 
Lansl.ey, S. , H o u s i n g a n d P u b l i c P o l i c y , ( L o n d o n , Croom Helm, 
1 9 7 9 ) . 
L a y t o n , E., B u i l d i n g by L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s , ( L o n d o n , A l l e n and 
U n w i n , 1 9 6 1 ) . 
L e o n t i e f f , W., The S t r u c t u r e o f t h e A m e r i c a n Economy 1 9 1 9 * 3 9 ; 
an e m p i r i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f e g u i l i b r i u m a n a l y s i s , 
( O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 1 ) . 
L e v i n e , A., a n d W r i g h t , E.G., ' R a t i o n a l i t y a n d C l a s s S t r u g g l e ' , 
New L e f t R e v i e w 1 2 3 , ( S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1 9 8 0 ) , 
pp. 4 7 - 6 8 . 
L e w i S f B., B r i t i s h P l a n n i n g a n d N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , ( L o n d o n , A l l e n 
a nd U n w i n , 1 9 5 2 ) . 
L e w i s , J . P a r r y , B u i l d i n g C y c l e s and B r i t a i n ' s G r o w t h , ( L o n d o n , 
M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 6 5 ) . 
L e w i s , W.A., The P r i n c i p l e s o f E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n o , ( T h i r d e d i t i o n . 
New Y o r k , H a r p e r , 1 9 6 9 ) . 
L i e b f r i e d , S., The B u r e a u c r a c y o f t h e S t a t i s t R e s e r v e : t h e Case 
o f t h e U.S.Ay ( W e s t e r n S o c i e t i e s P r o g r a m O c c a s i o n a l 
P a p e r No. 1 1 2 , C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y I t h a c a , New Y o r k , 
1 9 7 9 ) . 
L i n d b e r g , L.N,, A l f o r d , R. , e t a l ( e d s . ) . S t r e s s a n d 
C o n t r a d i c t i o n i n M o d e r n C a p i t a l i s m , ( L e x i n g t o n Mass. 
D-C. H e a t h a n d Co. 1 9 7 5 ) . 
L i n d b l o m , C., * The S c i e n c e o f M u d d l i n g T h r o u g h ' , P u b l i c 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n R e v i e w 19, 1 9 5 9 , p p . 7 7 - 3 5 . 
447 
L i n d b l o m , C., The I n t e l l i g e n c e o f D e m o c r a c y : d e c i s i o n m a k i n g 
t h r o u g h P a r t i s a n M u t u a l A d j u s t m e n t , (New Y o r k , The 
F r e e P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ) . 
L i n d b l o m , C , P o l i t i c s a n d M a r k e t s , (New Y o r k , B a s i c B o o k s , 
1 9 7 7 ) . 
L i t t l e j o h n , G», e t a l ( e d s . ) . Power and t h e S t a t e , ( L o n d o n , 
Croom Helm, 1978 ) . 
M c C a l l u m , R.B., and i^eadman. A., The B r i t i s h G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n 
o f 1945, ( L o n d o n , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 4 7 ) . 
M a c G r e g o r , D.H., * A c t u a l War I n f l u e n c e s a n d R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' , 
A g e n da : Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , V o l , 1 , 
No. 1 , J a n u a r y 1 9 4 2 , p p . 3-12. 
McKay, D., and Cox, A., Xhe P o l i t i c s o f U r b a n C h ange, ( L o n d o n , 
Croom Helm, 1979 ) . 
McKay, R.W.G., B r i t a i n i n W o n d e r l a n d , ( L o n d o n , G o l l a n c z , 1 9 4 8 ) . 
M c K e n z i e , R.X., B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , ( L o n d o n , H e i n e m a n n , 
1 9 6 3 ) . 
M a c L a i n e , I . , M i n i s t r y o f M o r a l e ; Home F r o n t M o r a l e a n d t h e 
M i n i s t r y o f I n f o r m a t i o n i n W o r l d War I I , ( L o n d o n , 
A l l e n and U n w i n , 1 9 7 9 ) . 
M a c M i l l a n , H., T i d e s o f f o r t u n e 1 9 4 5 - 5 5 , V o l u m e I I I M e m o i r s , 
( L o n d o n , M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 6 9 ) . 
Madge, J . , The R e h o u s i n g o f B r i t a i n , T a r g e t f o r T o m o r r o w S e r i e s , 
( L o n d o n , T r a n s a t l a n t i c 1 9 4 5 ) . 
M a r q u a n d , D., Ramsay M c D o n a l d , ( L o n d o n , J o n a t h a n Cape, 1 9 7 7 ) . 
M a r r i s s , R., The M a c h i n e r y f o r : E c o n o m i c P o l i c y , ( L o n d o n , 
F a b i a n R e s e a r c h S e r i e s , No. 168, 1 9 4 8 ) . 
448 
M a r w i c k , A., * The L a b o u r P a r t y a n d t h e W e l f a r e S t a t e i n 
B r i t a i n ' , A m e r i c a n H i s t o r i c a l R e v i e w , No- 7 3 , ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 
p p . 3 8 0 - 4 0 3 . 
M a r w i c k , A., The D e l u g e : B r i t i s h S o c i e t y a n d t h e F i r s t W o r l d 
War, ( L o n d o n , M a c i M i l l a n , 1 9 6 5 ) . 
M a r w i c k , A., B r i t a i n i n a C e n t u r y o f T o t a l War, ( L o n d o n , 
B o d l e y Head, 1968 ) . 
M a r x , K,, C a p i t a l ; A C r i t i q u e o f P o l i t i c a l Economy, V o l . I I , 
( L o n d o n , L a w r e n c e a n d W i s h a r t , 1 9 7 4 ) . 
M a t t i c k , P., M a r x a n d K e y n e s : t h e l i m i t s o f t h e M i x e d Economy, 
( L o n d o n , M e r l i n , 1 9 7 4 ) , p p . 1 5 0 - 1 6 8 . 
Meade, J.E., P l a n n i n g a n d t h e P r i c e M e c h a n i s m , ( L o n d o n , A l l e n 
a j i d U n w i n , 1948 ) . 
M e r r e t t , A . J , a n d S y k e s , A., H o u s i n g F i n a n c e a n d D e v e l o p m e n t , 
( L o n d o n , Longmans, 1 9 6 5 ) . 
M i d d l e m a s , K., P o l i t i c s i n I n d u s t r i a l S o c i e t y , ( L o n d o n , A n d r e 
D e i i t s c h , 1 9 7 9 ) . 
M i l i b a n d , R., P a r l i a m e n t a r y S o c i a l i s m , ( s e c o n d e d i t . , L o n d o n , 
M e r l i n P r e s s , 1 9 7 3 ) . 
M i l l e r , J.D.B,, The N a t u r e o f P o l i t i c s , ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h , P e n g u i n , 
1 9 6 5 ) . 
M i l w a r d , A.S., War, Economy a n d S o c i e t y 1 9 3 9 - 4 5 , ( L o n d o n , 
A l l e n L a n e , P e n g u i n , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
Mimkin, • The L a b o u r P a r t y C o n f e r e n c e , R e v i s e d e d i t i o n , 
( M a n c h e s t e r U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 0 ) . 
M i t c h e l l , J . , G r o u n d w o r k t o E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g , ( L o n d o n , S e e k e r 
and W a r b u r g , 1 9 6 6 ) . 
449 
M o r r i s o n , H., * E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g * , P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
V o l . XXV, No. 1 , S p r i n g 1 9 4 7 , p p . 3-9. 
M o r r i s o n , H., G o v e r n m e n t a n d P a r l i a m e n t , ( O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s , 1 9 5 4 ) . 
M u l l e r , W., a n d N e u s u s s , C., 'The i l l u s i o n o f s t a t e s o c i a l i s m 
a n d t h e C o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n Wage L a b o u r a n d C a p i t a l 
T e l o s No. 25, F a l l 1 9 7 5 , p p . 1 3 - 9 0 . 
M u r i e , A., H o u s i n g P o l i c y and t h e H o u s i n g S y s t e m , ( L o n d o n , 
A l l e n and U n w i n , 1 9 7 6 ) . 
N e e d l e m a n , L., The E c o n o m i c s > o f H o u s i n g , ( L o n d o n , S t a p l e s 
P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ) . 
N e v i n , E., The P r o b l e m o f t h e N a t i o n a l D e b t , ( C a r d i f f , U n i v e r s i t y 
o f W a l e s P r e s s , 1 9 5 4 ) . 
N e v i t t , A.A., H o u s i n g , T a x a t i o n a n d S u b s i d i e s , ( L o n d o n , N e l s o n , 
1 9 6 6 ) . 
N e v i t t , A.A. ( e d ) , The E c o n o m i c P r o b l e m s o f H o u s i n g , ( L o n d o n , 
M a c M i l l a n 1 9 6 7 ) . 
O'Connor, J . , The F i s c a l C r i s i s o f t h e S t a t e , (New Y o r k , S t . 
M a r t i n s P r e s s , 1 9 7 3 ) . 
P a i s h , F., 'The F i n a n c e o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' , L o n d o n a n d C a m b r i d g e 
E c o n o m i c S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n , V o l . XXV, F e b r u a r y 1 0 t h 
1 9 4 7 , pp. 1 8 - 2 3 . 
P a i s h , F., The P o s t War F i n a n c i a l P r o b l e m , a n d O t h e r E s s a y s , 
( L o n d o n , M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 5 0 ) . 
P a n i t c h , L., S o c i a l D e m o c r a c y a n d I n d u s t r i a l M i l i t a n c y , 
( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 6 ) . 
P a r k e r , R.A., The R e n t s o f C o u n c i l H o u s e s , O c c a s i o n a l P a p e r s i n 
S o c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n No. 2 2 , ( L o n d o n , C o d i c o t e P r e s s , 
1 9 6 7 ) . 
450 
F e l l i n g , H., H i s t o r y o f T r a d e U n i o n i s m , ( L o n d o n , M a c M i l l a n , 
1 9 6 3 ) . 
F e l l i n g , H., A S h o r t H i s t o r y o f t h e L a b o u r P a r t y , ( L o n d o n , 
M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 7 2 ) . 
P.E.P. ^ E c o n o m i c s o f t h e C o u n c i l H o u s e * , P.E.P. P l a n n i n g , 
V o l . X V I , No. 308, J a n u a r y 1 9 5 0 , p p . 1 5 8 - 1 8 5 . 
P.E.P., G o v e r n m e n t a n d I n d u s t r y , ( L o n d o n , P.E.P., 1 9 5 2 ) . 
P.E.P., ' H o u s i n g i n B r i t a i n , F r a n c e a n d West Germany*, P.E.P., 
P l a n n i n g , V o l . X X X I , No. 4 4 0 , A u g u s t 1 9 6 5 , p p . 2 3 3 -
24 9 . 
P o l l a r d , R.S.Vv. , R e c o n s t r u c t i o n : T h e n a n d Now, ( L o n d o n , 
F a b i a n R e s e a r c h S e r i e s 9 8 , 1 9 4 5 ) . 
P o l l a r d , S., The D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e B r i t i s h Economy 1 9 1 4 - 6 7 , 
( s e c o n d e d i t i o n , L o n d o n , E d w a r d A r n o l d , 1 9 6 9 ) . 
P o u l a n t z a s , N., P o l i t i c a l Power a n d S o c i a l C l a s s e s , ( L o n d o n , 
New L e f t B o o k s , 1 9 7 3 ) . 
P o u l a n t z a s , N., S t a t e , Power, S o c i a l i s m , ( L o n d o n , V e r s o , 1 9 8 0 ) 
P r i t t , D.N., The L a b o u r G o v e r n m e n t 1 9 4 5 - 5 1 , ( L o n d o n , L a w r e n c e 
a n d W i s h a r t , 1 9 6 0 ) . 
P r z e w o r s k i , A., * S o c i a l D e m o c r a c y as a h i s t o r i c a l p henomenon'. 
New L e f t R e v i e w , No. 1 2 2 , ( J u l y - A u g u s t 1 9 8 0 ) , p p . 27 
58. 
Rhodes, R.H.W., C o n t r o l a nd Power i n C e n t r a l - L o c a l G o v e r n i n e n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , ( F a r n b o r o u g h SSRC Gower, 1 9 8 1 ) . 
R i c h a r d s o n , H.W., and A l d c r o f t , D., B u i l d i n g i n t h e B r i t i s h 
Economy b e t w e e n t h e Wars, ( L o n d o n , A l l e n a nd U n w i n , 
1 9 6 8 ) . 
4 5 1 
R o b b i n s , L., The E c o n o m i c P r o b l e m i n P e a c e a n d War, ( L o n d o n , 
M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 4 7 ) . 
R o b e r t s o n , D.H., U t i l i t y a n d A l l t h a t a n d O t h e r E s s a y s , 
( L o n d o n , G e o r g e A l l e n aind U n w i n , 1 9 5 2 ) 
R o b i n s o n , E.A.G., B r i t i s h E c o n o m i c P o l i c y 1 9 4 5 - 5 0 ' , L o n d o n a nd 
C a m b r i d g e E c o n o m i c S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n I I , V o l . X X V I I I , 
May 1 9 5 0 , p p . 4 1 - 8 . 
R o b i n s o n , E.A.G., E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g i n t h e U.K. - some l e s s o n s , 
( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 7 ) . 
Rogow, A., a n d S h o r e , P., The L a b o u r G o v e r n m e n t a n d B r i t i s h 
I n d u s t r y 1 9 4 5 - 5 1 , ( O x f o r d , B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 5 5 ) . 
Rosa, R.V,, 'The P r o b l e m o f F r e n c h R e c o v e r y ' , E c o n o m i c J o u r n a l , 
J u n e 1 9 4 9 , p p . 1 5 4 - 1 7 0 . 
Roskamp, K. , C a p i t a l F o r m a t i o n i n Vvest Germany, ( D e t r o i t , Vvayne 
S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ) . 
Rose, R., a n d P e t e r s , B.G., Can G o v e r n m e n t Go B a n k r u p t ? (New 
Y o r k , B a s i c B o o k s , 1 9 7 8 ) . 
R o s e n b e r g , N. , E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g i n t h e B r i t i s h B u i l d i n g 
I n d u s t r y 1 9 4 5 - 9 , ( P h i l a d e l p h i a U n i v e r s i t y o f 
P e n n s y l v a m i a P r e s s , 1 9 6 1 ) . 
R o s t a s , L., ' I n d u s t r i a l P r o d u c t i o n , P r o d u c t i v i t y a n d D i s t r i -
b u t i o n i n B r i t a i n , Germany a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , 
1 9 3 5 - 7 ' , E c o n o m i c J o u r n a l , V o l . L I I I , No. 2 0 9 , 
( A p r i l 1 9 4 3 ) , p p . 3 9 - 5 4 . 
R o s t a s , L., C o m p a r a t i v e P r o d u c t i v i t y i n B r i t i s h a n d A m e r i c a n 
I n d u s t r y : O c c a s i o n a l P a p e r No. X I I I N a t i o n a l 
I n s t i t u t e o f E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l R e s e a r c h , ( L o n d o n , 
C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 4 8 ) . 
452 
R o t h b a r t h , E., 'Causes o f S u p e r i o r e f f i c i e n c y o f A m e r i c a n 
I n d u s t r y as c o m p a r e d w i t h B r i t i s h I n d u s t r y ' , 
E c o n o m i c J o u r n a l , V o l u m e L V I , ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 6 ) , 
p p . 3 8 3 - 9 0 . 
S a b a t i n o , R-A., H o u s i n g i n G r e a t B r i t a i n 1 9 4 5 - 9 , ( D a l l a s , 
S o u t h e r n M e t h o d i s t U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 6 ) . 
S a u n d e r s , P., U r b a n P o l i t i c s : A S o c i o l o g i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
( L o n d o n , H u t c h i n s o n , 1 9 7 9 ) . 
S a y e r s , R.S., F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1 9 3 9 - 4 5 , H i s t o r y o f t h e S e c o n d 
V v o r l d War : C i v i l S e r i e s , ( L o n d o n , HMSO, 1 9 5 6 ) . 
S c h m i t t e r , P.C., ' S t i l l t h e C e n t u r y o f C o r p o r a t i s m ? ' R e v i e w o f 
P o l i t i c s , V o l . 36, No. 1 , J a n u a r y 1 9 7 4 , pp. 8 5 - 1 3 1 . 
S c h m i t t e r , P.C- and L e h m b r u c h , G., ( e d s . ) , T r e n d s t o w a r d s 
C o r p o r a t i s t I n t e r m e d i a t i o n , ( B e v e r l e y H i l l s Co. 
Sage, 1979 ) . 
S c h u m a c h e r , E.F., E x p o r t P o l i c y a n d F u l l E j n p l o y m e n t , ( L o n d o n , 
F a b i a n R e s e a r c h S e r i e s No. 7 7 , 1 9 4 4 ) . 
S e l f , P., A d m i n i s t r a t i v e t h e o r i e s and P o l i t i c s , ( s e c o n d e d i t i o n 
L o n d o n , A l l e n a n d U n w i n , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
S i mon, E.D.S-, R e b u i l d i n g B r i t a i n : A l W e n t y Y e a r P l a n ( L o n d o n , 
G o l l a n c z , 1 9 4 5 ) . 
S i s s o n s , M., and F r e n c h , P., Age o f A u s t e r i t y , ( L o n d o n , H o d d e r 
a n d S t o u g h t o n , 1 9 6 3 ) . 
S j o b e r g , G., a n d N e t t , R., A M e t h o d o l o g y f o r S o c i a l R e s e a r c h , 
New Y o r k , H a r p e r and Row, 1 9 6 8 ) . 
S k i d e l s k y , R., P o l i t i c i a n s a n d t h e S l u m p ; The L a b o u r G o v e r n -
m e n t 1 9 2 9 - 3 1 , ( L o n d o n , M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 6 7 ) . 
453 
S m i t h , B., P o l i c y m a k i n g i n B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t - An A n a l y s i s o f 
Power and R a t i o n a l i t y , ( L o n d o n , M a r t i n R o b e r t s o n , 
1 9 7 6 ) . 
S m i t h , M.E-H., A G u i d e t o H o u s i n g , ( L o n d o n . H o u s i n g C e n t r e 
T r u s t , 1 9 7 1 ) . 
S t e v e n s o n , J . , and Cook, C., The S l u m p : S o c i e t y a n d P o l i t i c s 
d u r i n g t h e D e p r e s s i o n , ( L o n d o n , J o n a t h a n Cape, 1 9 7 7 ) . 
S t r a c h e y , J . , *Mr J.M. K e y n e s and t h e F a l l i n g R a t e o f P r o f i t * , 
The M o d e r n Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 1 , O c t o b e r 1938, p p . 3 3 7 -
4 7 . 
S t r a n g e , S., S t e r l i n g and B r i t i s h P o l i c y : a P o l i t i c a l S t u d y o f 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l C u r r e n c y i n D e c l i n e , ( O x f o r d , U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 ) . 
S weet, M.L., a n d W a l t e r s , S . G . , - M a n d a t o r y H o u s i n g F i n a n c e 
P rogrammes - a C o m p a r a t i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l A n a l y s i s , 
(New Y o r k , P r a e g e r , 1 9 7 5 ) . 
Tawney, R.H., »The A b o l i t i o n o f E c o n o m i c C o n t r o l s 1 9 1 8 - 2 1 ' , 
E c o n o m i c H i s t o r y R e v i e w X I I I , Nos. 1 a n d 2, 1 9 4 3 , 
p p . 1 - 3 1 . 
T h e r b o r n , G., What d o e s t h e R u l i n g C l a s s do when i t r u l e s ? , 
( L o n d o n , New X e f t B o o k s , 1 9 7 8 ) . 
T h o r n t o n , A.P., The H a b i t o f A u t h o r i t y : P a t e r n a l i s m i n B r i t i s h 
H i s t o r y , ( L o n d o n , G e o r g e A l l e n a n d U n w i n , 1 9 6 6 ) . 
T r e s s , R.C., * The P r a c t i c e o f E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g ' , M a n c h e s t e r 
S c h o o l f o r E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l S t u d i e s , V o l . X V I , 
No. 2, May 1 9 4 8 , p p . 1 9 2 - 2 1 4 . 
4 5 4 
Tyerman, D., ( e d . ) , Ways a n d Means o f R e b u i l d i n g , R e p o r t o f 
t h e L o n d o n C o n f e r e n c e o f t h e Town a n d C o u n t r y 
P l a n n i n g A s s o c i a t i o n , 1 9 4 3 , ( L o n d o n , Town and C o u n t r y 
P l a n n i n g A s s o c i a t i o n , 1 9 4 4 ) . 
Van G u n s t e r e n , H., The Q u e s t f o r C o n t r o l : A C r i t i q u e o f t h e 
R a t i o n a l - C e n t r a l R u l e A p p r o a c h i n P u b l i c A f f a i r s , 
(New Y o r k , W i l e y a n d Sons, 1 9 7 6 ) . 
V i c k e r s , G., The A r t o f J u d g e m e n t : A S t u d y o f P o l i c y m a k i n g , 
( L o n d o n , Chapman a n d H a l l , 1 9 6 5 ) . 
W a l k e r , G., E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g by Programme a n d C o n t r o l i n G r e a t 
3 r i t a i n , ( L o n d o n , H e i n e m a n n , 1 9 5 7 ) . 
Wigham, E., S t r i k e s and t h e G o v e r n m e n t 1 8 9 3 - 1 9 7 4 , ( L o n d o n , 
M a c M i l l a n , 1976 ) . 
W i l l i a m s , P., Hugh G a i t s k e l l : A P o l i t i c a l B i o g r a p h y , ( L o n d o n , 
J o n a t h a n Cape, 1 9 7 9 ) . 
W i l s o n , T*, M o d e r n C a p i t a l i s m a n d E c o n o m i c P r o g r e s s , ( L o n d o n , 
M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 5 0 ) . 
W i n c h , D«, E c o n o m i c s and P o l i c y : a H i s t o r i c a l S u r v e y , ( L o n d o n , 
F o n t a n a , 1 9 7 2 ) . 
W i n k l e r , J . , * C o r p o r a t i s m ' , A r c h i v e s E u r o o e e n e s d e S o c i o l o g i e , 
V o l . X V I I , No. 1 , 1 9 7 6 , p p . 1 0 0 - 1 3 6 . 
Wolman, H., H o u s i n g and H o u s i n g P o l i c y i n t h e U.S. and t h e U.K. 
( L e x i n g h a m Mass. D.C. H e a t h , 1 9 7 5 ) . 
Wood, A.R., H o u s i n g : t h e R e c k o n i n g , Who S h a l l P a y ? , ( L o n d o n 
I n s t i t u t e o f M u n i c i p a l T r e a s u r e r s a n d A c c o u n t a ^ i t s , 
1 9 4 8 ) . 
455 
Wor s w i c k , G.D.N., a n d Ady, P.M., The B r i t i s h E conomy 1 9 4 5 - 5 0 , 
( O x f o r d , The C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 5 2 ) . 
Y a f f e , D., 'The M a r x i a n T h e o r y o f C r i s i s , C a p i t a l a n d t h e S t a t e * , 
Economy a n d S o c i e t y V o l . 2, No. 2, May 1 9 7 3 , p p . 1 8 8 -
2 3 2 . 
Young, M., L a b o u r ' s P l a j i f o r P l e n t V t ( L o n d o n , G o l l a n c z , 1 9 4 7 ) . 
